The characteristics of Xi Jinping’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs: the conflict between institutionalization and centralization

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China’s (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader’s personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping’s rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping’s authority over the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for “promoting reunification” limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao’s policies toward Taiwan.

KEYWORDS:

• Cross-Strait Relations
• the CCP’s policy-making
• Taiwan affairs
• Xi Jinping
• Tsai Ing-wen

1 Introduction

This article aims to summarize the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policy-making toward Taiwan, analyze the dynamics of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) domestic politics and the cross-Strait relations that have led to this evolution, and then discuss the particular characteristics of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs. Under Xi Jinping’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, economic and cultural relations across the Taiwan Strait rapidly became closer. As a result of the “institutionalization” of the relationship, the actors involved in the policy execution tended to increase and become more pluralistic. Since the inauguration of the Xi Jinping regime, what kind of transformation has taken place in the organizations involved in policy and policy-making toward Taiwan?

For the CCP, its relationship with Taiwan is the most critical policy area related to the PRC’s national “reunification.” For this reason, to explain the CCP’s policy on Taiwan affairs, most scholars tend to focus on the words and deeds of its top leader¹. While this is an effective approach, it is also interesting that as mainland China’s interaction with Taiwan becomes more active, a variety of interest groups involved in policy research, coordination, and implementation have had an effect on its policy on Taiwan affairs. Additionally, as the Cross-Strait relations have dramatically changed since Xi Jinping took office, the policy-making process on Taiwan affairs is now changing further.

The foundation of the current CCP’s policy-making process on Taiwan affairs was laid in the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequently, around 2000, some studies about the process were published. Michael D. Swaine analyzed the CCP’s policy-making process on Taiwan affairs from 1978 to 2000 and pointed out that although top leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin played a decisive role in determining the CCP’s policy on Taiwan affairs, the policy-making process was becoming more bureaucratic, pragmatic, and consensus-based, as was the case in other policy areas². In addition to Swain’s conclusion, a study by George Tsai W. pointed out that informal policy-making circles outside of this process also play an important role in policy-making toward Taiwan³. During this period, the Republic of China’s (ROC) Research Bureau published an overview of the Communist Party’s policy-making organs⁴. The author of this book, Jui-Hua Kuo, pointed out in his doctoral dissertation that this transition in policy-making organizations and processes is based on China’s perception of the Taiwan issue⁵.

Based on the above studies, this paper will focus on Xi Jinping’s policy-making process on Taiwan affairs and discuss how the organizations and decision-making processes involved have changed or not from his predecessor, Hu Jintao. First, this paper will summarize the primary organization and operation of the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs, which was established in the 1980s and 1990s. The second section discusses how the organizations and processes have been institutionalized, as the exchange platforms between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) have coexisted with intergovernmental relations during the Hu Jintao era. Finally, the third section will discuss how the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs has changed since the inauguration of Xi Jinping in 2012.

This paper highlights that power is concentrated in Xi Jinping which is reflected in the handling of Taiwan affairs. The background to this lies is the interaction of three factors; 1) the centralization of decision-making in the hands of Xi Jinping throughout the CCP, 2) the relative decline in the roles of the policy administration organs such as the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG) as a result of the lack of communications across the Strait, and 3) the increasingly active role of some local areas like Fujian in Taiwan affairs, along with the decreasing role of others. The sources on which this study analysis relies are secondary literature, such as newspaper articles and journal papers, in addition to official policies or statements by key figures released by the relevant ministries or Xinhua. This is because information on the CCP’s policy-making process, organization, or personnel on Taiwan affairs is not publicly available but classified.

2 Traditional policy-making process on Taiwan affairs

The framework of the organization involved in today’s policymaking on Taiwan affairs was completed during the 1980s and 1990s. Swain’s study pointed out that the Chinese policy apparatus related to Taiwan affairs can be divided into four separate but interrelated policy areas, each defined by a distinct set of policy functions: policy formulation and oversight, policy administration and implementation, policy coordination and supervision, and research and analysis (Figure 1)⁶. Other studies on the policy-making process in Taiwan affairs also generally divide the process into four areas, although they have named each process slightly differently.

Figure 1. The Chinese policy apparatus related to Taiwan affairs.

The TALSG often plays a central role in policy coordination and supervision. The membership has embodied the critical areas of policy on Taiwan affairs in each era. An organization regarded as the forerunner of the TALSG has existed within the CCP since the 1950s. After the stagnation of Taiwan affairs during the Cultural Revolution, in January 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” In 1981, Ye Jianying proposed nine principles for “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. Then, the CCP’s operations on Taiwan affairs began earnestly, and their targets expanded from the KMT elites to “compatriots in Taiwan.” In terms of the means of manipulation, economic exchanges were added to the traditional military and political operations. Under these circumstances, the organization was rebuilt to improve new processes to new targets⁷.

Although not all members of the TALSG in the 1980s are known, Yang Shangkun, who became a successor of Deng Yingchao, has served as the leader of the small group since 1987. Liao Chengzhi and Wu Xuejian became deputy leaders, and Yang Side, who was well-versed in intelligence matters, was the chief of the office. In the 1990s, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, the selection of TALSG personnel began to become routine. Since the Jiang Zemin era, the General Secretary of the CCP has always been the head of the TALSG. The deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the deputy chief of staff of the PLA, the head of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the head of the National Security Department (NSD), and the head of the TAO have been constantly appointed as members of the TALSG⁸. However, some appointments appear to have strongly reflected Jiang Zemin’s will, such as Qian Qichen, who supported diplomacy during the Jiang Zemin era, serving as deputy chief, and Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin’s right hand, serving as secretary-general. In addition, as will be discussed later, the influence of the chairman of ARATS on Jiang Zemin could not be underestimated⁹. (Table 1)

Table 1. TALSG members since 1993.

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013	2018	Positions
Head	Jiang Zemin		Hu Jintao		Xi Jinping		General Secretary of the CCP
Deputy head	Qian Qichen 94-	Qian Qichen	Jia Qinglin	Jia Qinglin	Yu Zhengsheng	Wang Yang	President of the CPPPC
Secretary general	Xiong Guangkai 96-	Zeng Qinghong 00-	Tang Jiaxuan	Dai Bingguo	Yang Jiechi	Yang Jiechi	State councilor in charge of foreign affairs
Members	Wang Zhaoguo (Xiong Guangkai) (Wang Zhaoguo) Jia Chunwang (Qian Qichen) (Wang Zhaoguo) Wang Daohan 95-	Zhang Wannian 00- Xiong Guangkai Wang Zhaoguo Xu Yongyue 98- Chen Yunlin 98- Wang Daohan	Wang Gang Guo Boxiong Xiong Guangkai Liu Yandong Xu Yongyue Chen Yunlin Wang Daohan	Wang Qishan Ling Jihua 【Wang Gang】 Guo Boxiong Ma Xiaotian Du Qinglin Geng Huichang 【Liu Yunshan】 【Chen Deming】 Wang Yi 【Chan Yunlin】	Wang Yang Li Zhanshu 【Du Qinglin】 Fan Changlong Qi Jianguo* Ling Jihua* Geng Huichang 【Liu Qibao】 【Gao Hucheng】 Zhang Zhijun 【Chen Deming】	Liu He Ding Xuexiang Xu Qiliang You Quan Chen Wenqing 【Huang Kunmin】 【Zhong Shan】 【Wang Yi】 Liu Jieyi	Vice-premier of the State Council Director of the CCP Central Committee General Office Vice president of the CPPCC Deputy chairman of the CMC Deputy chief of staff of the PLA Head of the UFWD Head of the NSD Head of theCentral Propaganda Department** Head of the Ministry of Commerce Head of the MFA Chief of the TAO President of the ARATS

Notes: 【 】indicates uncertainty as to whether or not the appointment has been made.*Qi Jianguo was replaced by Sun Jianguo in August 2013, while Ling Jihua was replaced by Sun Chunlan in December 2014.**Some studies point that the executive vice presidents have been appointed, in the order of Ji Bingxuan (in 2003), Luo Shugang (in 2008), Huang Kunming (in October 2013) from the Publicity Department.Sources: Radio Press, Chugoku Soshikibetsu Jinmeibo, (editions of each year), and Kuo, “‘520’ Hou de Zhonggong Duitai Renshi Buju yu Zhengce Dongxiang,” “Zhonggong ‘Xhiba Da’ Hou de Zhongyang Duitai Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu Chengyuan Fenxi,” “Zhonggong 19 Hou Duitai Zhengce Zouxiang yu Renshi Buju,” and “Zhonggong Duitai Renshi Bianquan yu Zhangzhi Yihan.”

Then, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) TAO was established under the TALSG for policy administration and implementation. Taiwan affairs departments were also set up in other central and local organizations. For example, at the main level, the Taiwan Affairs Office was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Taiwan Affairs and Trade Office was established in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. At the local level, mainly in the southeast coastal areas geographically close to Taiwan, local-level party and government offices were rebuilt or established as Taiwan Affairs Offices¹⁰. In 1987, Chiang Ching-Kuo effectively relaxed restrictions on exchanges with mainland China (the so-called “three no’s” policy) and partially opened the border for people to visit their relatives there. In response to this decision, the Taiwan Affairs Office was newly established in the State Council in November 1988, and Ding Guangyun was appointed its director. Its role was to organize, guide, manage, and coordinate the Taiwan-related affairs of the relevant departments of the State Council and the local governments directly under the jurisdiction of the State Council, by policies determined by the government, and to promote “reunification” with Taiwan¹¹.

In 1991, the CCP integrated the TAO of the CCCPC and the State Council, thus creating a single organization with two titles, one for the party and one for the state. This was in response to Lee Teng-hui’s announcement of the “Guidelines for National Unification” to promote exchange with mainland China as an equal political entity, establishing the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) under the Executive Yuan and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) as a semiofficial organization for exchange with mainland China. At the time of its establishment, the TAO consisted of four groups: the Secretary Administration Group, the Policy Research Group, the Liaison Group, and the Coordination Group, but in conjunction with the subsequent development of the PRC’s policy on Taiwan affairs, it expanded its operations by establishing new bureaus or departments.

The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was established under the TAO as a “private” organization for exchanges with Taiwan. Wang Dohan, Jiang Zemin’s predecessor as mayor of Shanghai and honorary president of the Shanghai Taiwan Studies Association, was appointed chairman of the ARATS. As noted above, the Chief of the TAO and the President of the ARATS joined the TALSG during the Jiang Zemin era and retained a certain influence within it. In particular, Wang was in a position to provide direct advice and information to Jiang as his predecessor as mayor of Shanghai. As honorary chairman of the Shanghai Taiwan Studies Association, he was well-versed in Taiwan affairs. In 1993 and 1998, top-level meetings between the ARATS and its Taiwanese counterparts (the so-called “Wang-Koo” meetings) were held. Wang was a key player in these meetings.

3 Institutionalization during the Hu Jintao era

3.1 Formation of the national platform

When the DPP Chen Shui-bian government came to power in Taiwan, the traditional channels between the PRC and Taiwan outlined in the previous section became less effective, and the CCP and the KMT, which had fallen into opposition in Taiwan, began to build new channels to replace the traditional ones. The KMT, which lost the 2000 presidential election, immediately established a think tank called the National Policy Foundation. Chiang Pin-Kung and Su Chi, the Former Director of the Mainland Affairs Council, were involved in the running of this foundation and actively contacted the PRC’s officials. In 2001, Kao Koong-lian, a fellow of this foundation and the active deputy director of the SEF, led a delegation of the KMT legislators to mainland China to exchange views on “Three Direct Links” with the PRC’s officials¹².

During this period, the CCP underwent a power transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. When Chen Shui-bian was reelected president in March 2004, the CCP further accelerated its efforts to strengthen ties with the KMT. In this election, the CCP leadership learned from past mistakes that a coercive approach to Taiwanese voters had backfired, and did not use force or propaganda to intimidate. Even after the reelection of Chen Shui-bian, and with an eye on the legislative elections in Taiwan later that year, the CCP announced that it would eliminate tariffs on 15 kinds of Taiwanese fruit¹³. In 2005, the Hu Jintao regime, which had established its power base within the party, lobbied Taiwan more aggressively. On the one hand, the CCP showed flexibility in concluding talks on traveling during the Lunar New Year between mainland China and Taiwan by allowing both bureaucrats to participate as advisors in the aviation industry associations of the PRC and Taiwan¹⁴. On the other hand, in March 2005, the PRC enacted the “Anti-Secession Law,” indicating that it would not hesitate to use force to quell efforts to divide the nation, such as the “Taiwan independence” movement. However, this was also an indication of its stance that negotiations were possible as long as “independence” was not achieved¹⁵.

Thus, in dealing with the continuation of the DPP regime in Taiwan, the CCP adopted a flexible approach in which it checked “Taiwan independence” on the one hand but exerted its influence on Taiwanese politics through the KMT. At the same time, the CCP developed channels for dialogue with the KMT, such as by hosting visiting delegations of KMT officials. One of the milestones of these efforts was the meeting between the General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, and the KMT President Lien Chan in April 2005 (the “Hu-Lian meeting”). The meeting not only marked the beginning of the CCP-KMT summit as a channel for dialogue but also set the agenda for subsequent dialogue in the Press Communiqué, which included the establishment of the “KMT-CCP Platform” to promote exchanges and dialogue between the two parties.

The Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum (KMT-CCP Forum) occupied an important position in the KMT-CCP Platform. Initially, the Hu-Lien meeting planned to hold the Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Culture Forum, which focused on economic and cultural exchange, and the Peace Forum, which dealt with political issues, in parallel, but there was strong opposition within Taiwan to holding the Peace Forum, so only the Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum went ahead. As for the venue, it was initially envisaged that the Forum would be held alternately in mainland China and Taiwan, but the forum had never been held in Taiwan. The forum’s role was twofold: to announce policies that would provide economic benefits from mainland China to Taiwan and to promote joint proposals for economic and cultural exchange between mainland China and Taiwan.

After the establishment of the KMT-CCP Forum, the Hu Jintao regime established the Department of Law and Regulation and the Department of Complaints and Cooperation in the TAO¹⁶. Among them, the Department of Complaints and Cooperation was established to protect the rights and interests of Taiwanese enterprises operating in mainland China in the face of the interruption of intergovernmental contacts between the PRC and Taiwan. Its counterpart was the Taiwanese Businessmen Service Liaison Center established within the KMT. They also held joint meetings at least once a year, with the TAO of the State Council inviting bureaucrats from relevant departments and commissions of the State Council and the KMT inviting the presidents of Taiwanese business associations from various regions to share and discuss issues. These mechanisms contributed to the KMT winning many votes from Taiwanese business people in the 2008 presidential elections and were absorbed into the negotiations between the recovered intergovernmental channels after 2008¹⁷.

Regarding the personnel appointment of the TALSG after Hu Jintao’s inauguration, it essentially inherited the routine established during the Jiang Zemin era but expanded its membership as the exchange field with Taiwan expanded. In addition to Hu Jintao, the general secretary, as its chief, the deputy chairman of the CMC, the deputy chief of staff of the PLA, the head of the UFWD, the head of the NSD, and the head of the TAO were still appointed as members of the TALSG. On the other hand, as Hu Jintao took hold of the experiment, new routine appointments were gradually added. The first was having a senior member of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau, who would also serve as president of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), as deputy head of the TALSG, and a state councilor in charge of foreign affairs would serve as Secretary-general of the TALSG. He added the vice premier of the State Council and the director of the Central Office, who also serves as secretary of the General Secretariat, to the TALSG membership. Second, although there are still various observations on the details of this, some believe that senior officials pertaining to the Publicity Department of the CCCPC and the Ministry of Commerce have been added to the TALSG. Third, while the TALSG membership has grown, the influence of ARATS leaders in the TALSG has gradually declined since the death of Wang Dao-Han in 2005¹⁸ (Table 1).

3.2 Reintegration of the party and government

When the KMT Ma Ying-jeou government took office in 2008, dialogue between the two semiofficial counterparts in mainland China and Taiwan resumed. Ma Ying-jeou appointed Chiang Pin-Kung, a leading figure at the start of the KMT-CCP Forum, as president of the SEF. In the same way, Hu Jintao appointed Chen Yunlin, who had long served as chief of the TAO, as the president of the ARATS after Wang’s death in 2005. In these appointments, it was apparent that both sides had high expectations for the role to be played by their semiofficial organizations¹⁹. In fact, between 2008 and 2012, Chen Yunlin and Chiang Pin-Kung held eight rounds of talks and concluded 18 agreements, mainly fulfilling the “Three Direct Links” that the CCP had called for in relation to Taiwan since the 1990s²⁰.

The semiofficial exchange between the PRC and Taiwan led to a close relationship with the KMT-CCP Forum. Chiang Pin-Kung and Kao Koong-lian continued to be involved in the forum under the title of Fellows of the National Policy Foundation. On the other hand, Chen Yunlin also attended the third and eighth forums from the PRC side. In terms of their agendas, the KMT-CCP Forum and the Cross-Strait semiofficial exchanges have developed a complementary relationship since 2008. For example, the issue of the protection mechanism for the rights and interests of Taiwanese enterprises, which was one of the critical issues of the KMT-CCP Forum, has been absorbed into the agenda of the Cross-Strait semiofficial dialogue since 2008. Since then, the KMT-CCP Forum has often served as a platform for preliminary discussions on issues that would later be discussed at the semiofficial meeting. It has functioned as a place to step in and prepare the ground for negotiations at the semiofficial meeting.

In addition to the abovementioned intergovernmental dialogs, exchanges between the local party departments of the CCP and the KMT have also developed since the second half of 2005. The KMT’s local party departments in Taiwan’s counties and cities have begun interacting with their counterparts in the CCP’s municipal committees of local areas in mainland China. For example, there have been several cases in which the CCP’s local Party committees and the KMT’s local departments have made friends with each other in areas where they have something in common, such as the large cities of Shanghai and Taipei, the southern trading city pairs of Guangzhou and Kaohsiung and Xiamen and Taichung, which are the closest cities across the Taiwan Strait, and Hangzhou and Nantou County, which are home to West Lake and Sun Moon Lake, respectively²¹.

Since 2008, the CCP has tried to improve exchanges with opposition parties in Taiwan. At a roundtable discussion held in 2008 to mark the 30th anniversary of the release of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Hu Jintao made the first direct reference to the DPP in an official speech by the Chairman of the CPP, saying, “if the DPP changes its position on Taiwan independence, we will respond positively. In 2009, the TAO established its 11th bureau, the Department of Political Parties. Considering the timing of its establishment and its relationship with other departments, it was assumed that the main task of the new department would be to interact with Taiwan’s opposition parties, particularly the DPP²². Around the same time as these developments, in June 2009, the DPP began requiring party members to report on official visits to mainland China. According to statistics within the DPP, there were 8 reports in 2009, 27 in 2010, 19 in 2011, and 50 in 2012²³.

As for interregional exchanges, exchanges between the local party offices of the CCP and the KMT have evolved into interactions between local governments, and the heads of DPP-registered local governments were also able to exchange with mainland China. For example, Mayor Chen Chu of Kaohsiung, a prominent DPP member, visited Beijing and Shanghai in 2009. She met with the CCP’s local secretaries and some central officials. Also in 2012, former Executive Yuan Premier Frank Hsieh, who belonged to the highest level of DPP cadres at the time, visited mainland China and met with State Councilor Dai Bingguo and the TAO Director Wang Yi – both were members of the TALSG. At that time, Hsieh attempted to form a consensus that would replace the “1992 Consensus” as the basis for exchanges between the DPP and the CCP, but this did not come to fruition. In addition, the DPP treated Hsieh’s visit to mainland China only as a personal visit and was cautious about conducting exchanges with the CCP as a party²⁴.

4 Characteristics of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making

4.1 Jinping’s “centralization” of policy-making and “top-level design”

At the 18th National Congress of the CCP in November 2012, Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the party, and in March 2013, he assumed the Chair of the PRC. As many studies on the PRC’s foreign policy have already pointed out, the trend toward “centralization” in foreign policy-making accelerated immediately after the inauguration of the Xi Jinping regime. Recognizing that past foreign policy had suffered from the adverse effects of “decentralization” or “institutionalization,” Xi Jinping has clarified the authority of the party center in internal party regulations or documents and strengthened the control of party committees within each organization involved in the policy-making²⁵. Efforts were also made to enhance the coordination function among the policy-executing organizations to ensure the execution of policies that the party center would decide²⁶. It is natural to assume that the Xi Jinping regime’s policy on Taiwan affairs has also been affected by this kind of “centralization.”

Most importantly, Xi Jinping’s position as the “core” leader within the Party has been established, and his influence has become overwhelmingly significant in the making of each policy. It is important to note that the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee (18th Six-China Plenum) in October 2016 established Xi’s status as the “core” of the entire Party and Party center. The “core” position is said to carry with it the authority to exercise the final decision-making power when discussions are contentious and consensus building is complex²⁷. At the Politburo meeting immediately after the 19th and 20th National Congress of the CCP, “Some Provisions on Strengthening and Maintaining the Centralized and Unified Guidance of the Party Central” were adopted²⁸. By this regulation, all Politburo members are now required to make an annual work report directly to Xi Jinping, which includes “consciously maintaining General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core position in the party center.”²⁹

After Xi Jinping took charge, the operational methods of the leading small groups (LSGs) have also changed significantly. In March 2018, the CCCPC issued the “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Party and State Institutions” to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of the CCCPC on significant work³⁰. The LSG for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, the LSG for Cybersecurity and Informatization, the LSG for Finance and Economics, and the LSG for Foreign Affairs were upgraded to “Committees,” respectively. The newly formed “Committees” changed the function of the LSG as a deliberation and coordinating body in the past and emphasized the decision-making role of the CCCPC, becoming a “decision-making, deliberation and coordinating body.”³¹ The TALSG did not become a “committee,” although the reasons for this were not made public. However, some observers pointed out that the TALSG was originally under the leadership of the general secretary and would operate like any other committee³².

During Xi Jinping’s appointment as the CCP General Secretary and his assumption of the presidency, there were significant changes in the personnel involved in Taiwan operations. The members of the TALSG were appointed largely in accordance with the precedents of the second Hu Jintao administration in 2013 for his first term of office (see Table 1)³³. However, the presence of the ARATS chairman and the TAO chief in the TALSG since 2013 has declined further. The ARATS chief is believed to have even lost his membership in the TALSG. Xi Jinping appointed a person with a different background to the position of chief of the TAO and chairman of the ARATS. In place of the Chief of the TAO Wang Yi, he appointed Zhang Zhijun, who had spent his career in the CCP Foreign Liaison Office but was unknown in Taiwan. As the chairman of the ARATS, he appointed Chen Deming, the former director of the Ministry of Commerce, who had never been involved in operations toward Taiwan. These appointments may indicate that the working relations across Taiwan Strait developed considerably until 2013 and that the role expected of TAO and ARATS would be less significant thereafter. These appointments also may have been in response to Ma Ying-jeou’s appointment of Lin Join-sane as the chairman of the SEF and Wang Yu-chi as the chief of the MAC soon after Ma’s reelection in 2012, as both Taiwanese officials were not familiar with the Cross-Strait affairs in their career³⁴.

4.2 Upgrading of Cross-Strait exchanges (2012–2016)

During the period from 2012 to 2016, when Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou led exchanges across Taiwan Strait, there was an increasing tendency for negotiation channels to be upgraded and institutionalized. First, at the end of 2012, the PRC and Taiwan established economic and trade offices. During the first round of negotiations between the two sides in 2008, the ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin proposed that the China Travel Service set up an office in Taiwan. A spokesman for the TAO also mentioned on several occasions that the TAO and the MAC should set up an office for each other. Subsequently, in May 2010, the Taiwan Strait Touring Association established its branch in Beijing, and the Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Strait established its department in Taipei, to handle business related to tourism between mainland China and Taiwan. Furthermore, following the conclusion of the ECFA in 2010, discussions on the mutual establishment of trade offices became more active. By the end of 2012, Taiwan’s Foreign Trade Association established “Taiwan Trade Center” offices in Shanghai and Beijing. In January 2013, the PRC also established the “China Electrical Manufacturers Association” office in Taipei. The chief representative of this office was Li Rongmin, who had served as the director of the Secretariat of International Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Commerce and the chairman of the “China Electrical Manufacturers’ Association,” which was a higher-level selection than the “Trade Center” office in Taiwan³⁵.

Then, direct contact was established between the TAO and the MAC, the government’s competent authorities for Cross-Strait relations, and a liaison mechanism was found between the competent authorities. Until then, the PRC and Taiwan, which do not recognize each other’s sovereignty, had never negotiated directly with the government’s agencies in charge of Cross-Strait relations, the TAO and the MAC, but rather with their contact agencies, the ARATS and the SEF, negotiating on their behalf. In February 2014, a meeting was held between the TAO chief Zhang Zhijun and the MAC chief Wang Yu-chi. In this negotiation channel between them, political issues such as the “1992 consensus” or the status of the Republic of China were often taken up rather than negotiations on contact agencies or further economic integration. The mutual establishment of a permanent office for both parties was an agenda item that had been continuously negotiated since the first meeting but was never realized³⁶. During three rounds of meetings between TAO and MAC leaders, the Sunflower Student Movement in March 2014 made it difficult for the KMT to lead the Taiwanese government to deepen Cross-Strait exchanges further. For the CCP, this meant that during Ma’s second term, it would need to further upgrade its inter-government relations with Taiwan and prepare for a possible regime change after the Taiwanese election in 2016.

On November 7 2015, as Ma Ying-jeou was nearing the end of his second term, the Cross-Strait summit meeting came to fruition. The summit meeting had been on the agenda since 2012, and the possibility of such a meeting became even more realistic when the chiefs of the TAO and the MAC met in 2014. However, the negotiation over the timing and location of the meeting and the titles of the two leaders were still being determined, and it was thought that the meeting would be held after the completion of Ma’s term. However, the negotiation made rapid progress behind the scenes, and a surprise announcement was made about a week before the meeting was to take place. Singapore, the site of the 1993 ARATS-SEF meeting, was chosen as the venue for the meeting, and Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou met as “leaders” of mainland China and Taiwan, addressing each other as “Mr. Xi” and “Mr. Ma.” The background to the rapid progress in the negotiations was that the KMT camp was so outmatched in the run-up to the 2016 presidential and legislative elections that the decision to hold the meeting at this time was said to have been based on the strong leadership of Xi Jinping.

In addition to these exchanges with the Taiwanese government and ruling party, since 2012, the CCP has taken a more active stance on exchanges with the DPP. After the inauguration of the Xi Jinping regime, Mayor Chen Chu of Kaohsiung visited mainland China for the second time, and met with TAO chief Zhang Zhijun in August 2013. In addition, Tainan Mayor Lai Ching-te had not visited mainland China until the DPP-registered mayors did, but visited Shanghai in June 2014 and met with the mayor of Shanghai. The reasons behind the CCP’s accelerated exchanges with the DPP after 2012 were: 1) the structure of “preventing independence” and jointly managing the stability of the Taiwan Strait between the PRC and the United States had already stabilized; 2) the PRC’s confidence that had grown with its power, and 3) the contradictions between the CCP and the KMT that had become more serious, and the Ma government’s gradually becoming less receptive to the CCP’s demands. Therefore, the CCP desired to 1) increase pressure on the KMT by interacting with the DPP, 2) contact the Taiwanese counterparts in a broader political position, 3) ease the DPP’s resistance to Cross-Strait exchanges, and 4) prepare for a coming regime change in Taiwan³⁷.

4.3 Advanced operations against the Tsai Ing-wen government (2016–)

After the landslide victory of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP in the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections, there were indications that Xi Jinping tried to maintain a negotiating channel with the new Taiwanese government, making informal contacts at a high level over the “1992 Consensus.” However, the Xi regime was not satisfied with Tsai’s inaugural speech and treated it as an “incomplete response.” Regarding the evaluation of Tsai’s inaugural speech, there was a discrepancy between the views of a scholar who was said to be the brains behind the PRC’s policy on Taiwan affairs since Hu Jintao’s era, which were issued immediately after the speech, and the government’s official position, which was announced later. The fact that it took so long for the TAO to promote the government’s official position suggests that the decision was made at a high level within Xi’s leadership³⁸.

After Xi Jinping understood that Tsai would not change her position further from her inaugural address, he suspended exchanges with the Taiwanese government through existing channels and gradually scaled back its “Hui-Tai [Treat Taiwan well]” policies to provide economic benefits to specific industries while using military force and diplomatic pressure to seek further compromises from Tsai. Although the intention of this policy change toward Taiwan was never clearly explained, it appeared that Xi Jinping was initially trying to form a public opinion critical of Tsai’s policy toward mainland China in Taiwan and to force the administration to change its policy. However, as Tsai refused to compromise easily, combined with international factors such as the evolution of the U.S.-China competition, pressure on Taiwan gradually took on a stronger connotation of punishment for Tsai’s regime and its supporters. Whatever its motivation, such military and diplomatic threats or economic statecrafts require high-level policy decision making. They involve a different policy formation and execution system than traditional operations toward Taiwan, centered in the TALSG and the TAO.

Xi’s hardline approach was not simply a reaction to Tsai’s rejection of the “1992 Consensus” but also an expression of his leadership personality. The signs of this hardline approach had already been seen before 2016. When economic exchanges with Taiwan were promoted under the Hu Jintao regime, the PLA had no military exercises reminiscent of Taiwan operations. Such military activities resumed in 2013, soon after Xi Jinping became Chairman of the CMC³⁹. In addition to military exercises, since 2016, PLA’s military aircraft have circled Taiwan Island, and naval vessels, including aircraft carriers, have sailed through the Taiwan Strait or waters east of the island. These military activities are not routine, and their timing and frequency are linked to the development of U.S.-Taiwan relations and are strongly tinged with external messages. The PRC government remained silent about military activities when they began in 2016. Still, since around 2018, the government has increasingly expressed its intentions to protest strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations or the “independence” trend in Taiwan. Such purposes are increasingly being mainly transmitted not by the TAO but by the PLA, the Ministry of Defense, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition, when the Trump administration was inaugurated in the United States in 2017, before the Tsai administration showed any further signs of compromise, competition between the PRC and the United States gradually intensified, and the Trump administration clarified its stand on supporting Taiwan. As a result, China’s policy toward Taiwan took on a more assertive nature as an essential part of its policy toward the United States. This is also thought to have led to a decline in the presence of institutions involved in the formation and execution of traditional operations regarding Taiwan affairs. For example, as Xi Jinping entered his second term in 2017, the influence of senior officials involved in Sino-U.S. relations, such as Yang Jiechi, Liu He, and Wang Yi within the TSLSG, appears to have increased. In contrast, Liu Jieyi, who is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a lower-ranking official than past appointments, was appointed as the chief of the TAO.

Since 2016, Xi Jinping has adopted a tough stance not only on intergovernmental channels across the Taiwan Strait but also on the platform between the CCP and the KMT, which has been ongoing since 2005. This is presumably because Xi’s assessment of the KMT’s contribution to the national reunification was not positive, and he could no longer tolerate differences in his interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” with the KMT amid changing China-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. As the termination of the CCP-KMT Forum was discussed within the KMT after its defeat in the 2016 election, the CCP proposed that the forum should be renamed the “Cross-Strait Peace and Development Forum” (the Cross-Strait Forum since 2018) which would include a broader range of counterparts in Taiwan. However, after the 10th Forum in May 2015, there have been no subsequent forums for dialogue between the CCP and the KMT or other opposition parties. This may also have influenced the reduced presence of the TAO in policymaking toward Taiwan.

4.4 Polarization of local government’s policies on Taiwan affairs (2016–)

The Xi Jinping regime continues to pursue “Hui-Tai” policies toward Taiwan, but the contents of these policies have changed significantly from Hu Jintao’s era. The Xi Jinping regime has mainly supported forces within the KMT close to the unification with mainland China and has toned down its interaction with mainstream factions. The authority redefined the targets of its outreach, changing the name to “one generation and one stratum” in 2017. It then launched 31 measures in February 26 2018 in November 2019, and 11 in March 2020, to give more preferential treatment to individuals and companies operating in mainland China⁴⁰. These changes indicate that the CCP is seeking a counterpart that can exert influence more directly, even if it is only a subset of citizens in Taiwan.

In addition, the Xi Jinping regime has been focusing on deeper integration between the provinces, such as seeking “fusion development” between Fujian and Taiwan, establishing “model zones” to form a cross-strait “common market,” and equalizing and streamlining essential public services in areas that are geographically close to each other or have matching conditions between mainland China and Taiwan⁴¹. Such economic and social integration with Taiwan has been incorporated into Xi Jinping’s “Top-level Design” for nation-building and positioned as a policy that will simultaneously promote reunification with Taiwan and contribute to China’s economic development.

The role of local TAOs is likely to change with the formulation of such “Huitai” and “fusion development” policies. Under the Xi Jinping regime, the overall volume of local exchanges with Taiwan has been less than it was under the Hu regime. Still, some areas have been considered more critical in promoting reunification with Taiwan. First, the importance of local cities such as Xiamen in Fujian Province, which is at the forefront of the fusion development strategy, and other cities along the Southeast Coast, where many Taiwanese companies have established their operations, have emerged⁴². In addition, while China has closed high-level negotiating channels with the Taiwanese government and criticized the DPP as a ruling party, it continues to interact with cities governed by opposition parties. For example, Ko Wen-je, a nonpartisan mayor of Taipei City since 2014, was questioned by the CCP as to whether he had loyalty to the “1992 Consensus,” but the CCP maintained the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum to put pressure on Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. Therefore, the role of Chinese local governments as counterparts to these Taiwanese local governments is also important. In other words, the role of local TAOs in the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan has been divided into those that have increased in importance and those that have decreased under the Xi Jinping regime.

According to Jui-Hua Kuo’s study, after the CCCPC issued the “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Party and State Institutions” in March 2018, the TAO of each local government was reorganized according to their local conditions. Although the guidance of local Party committees was strengthened for the TAO in each region, the reorganization can be broadly categorized into three types. First, each provincial TAO that plays a relatively important role in Taiwan affairs was incorporated into the provincial party committee’s work organization and converted into a regular bureau-level unit. Especially in some frontline provinces, such as Shandong and Fujian, their TAOs were also integrated with the Hong Kong and Macao affairs system. Second, TAOs in many other regions came under the control of local party committees’ united front work departments and became sub-bureau-level units. Third, TAOs in Xinjiang and other frontier regions were incorporated into local party committees’ united front work departments or foreign affairs bureaus⁴³. Thus, there is a polarization between local cities important in Taiwan affairs and those not, with essential cities retaining local Taiwan policy-making structures. Still, at the same time, the CCCPC, led by Xi Jinping, strengthened its influence on the local policy-making structures.

5 Conclusion

This article focuses on the institutions involved in the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs. It discusses the characteristics of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs compared to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The process of the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is divided into four parts: policy-making, policy coordination, policy execution, and research. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the above four processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made on the basis of this study’s analysis.

First, the process of the PRC’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the personality of the leader at the time and the domestic political situation. In particular, policy-making and policy coordination has a robust personal aspect, and it is natural to assume that the centralization of power in policy-making that has already been pointed out in studies of the PRC’s foreign policy is also occurring in policy-making on Taiwan affairs. The members of the TALSG who play an essential role in policy coordination have been transformed in ways that symbolize the characteristics of the operations against Taiwan in each era. Initially, the TALSG was more of an intelligence and research organization. However, as economic and cultural exchange with Taiwan began, the group members diversified into those responsible for overseeing such dealings and those accountable for diplomacy as the issue of Taiwan in the international community became more important. Although appointments of officials have become almost routine since Hu Jintao’s era, the importance of the TALSG in policy making and the way discussions are conducted within the group have changed due to the influence of the “centralization” of power under Xi Jinping’s regime.

Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations at the time. In particular, the TAO, the body responsible for policy coordination and enforcement of Taiwan affairs, has transformed in line with the circumstances of the exchange with Taiwan. When exchange began in 1991 as an equal political reality between mainland China and Taiwan, the TAO took up the dual role of party and state (government). It established the ARATS as the contact organization for exchange. Since then, the TAO has continued to develop new departments to meet the needs of the Cross-Strait negotiations. However, after 2016, when the DPP government came to power and intergovernmental exchanges were drastically reduced, the influence of the TAO and the ARATS in policymaking went into decline.

Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan has increased. Local governments have also established and enlarged their executive organizations for policies toward Taiwan, such as local TAOs. Local exchanges during the Hu Jintao era began with interactions between local offices of the CCP and the KMT. After Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008, these exchanges developed into exchanges between local governments, and deals were gradually sought with local governments headed by DPP mayors. The local TAOs also adopted the dual status of the party and the government. While taking instructions from the party leadership as a fundamental principle, they also cooperated with local research institutes to develop their policy execution and evaluation systems. Since the inauguration of the Xi Jinping regime, especially after 2016, contacts between central organizations across the Taiwan Strait have declined, and exchanges between localities have gradually become limited to cities headed by non-DPP-registered mayors. As a result, the activities of local TAOs have also been reduced in some regions. However, as the channels for intergovernmental negotiations have been closed, some local areas, such as Fujian Province, play a larger role than before.

Considering the trends of 1) the centralization of policy-making in the hands of Xi Jinping, 2) the relative decline in the roles of the TAO and the TALSG, which are responsible for policy coordination and enforcement on Taiwan affairs, and 3) the polarization of local organizations on Taiwan affairs, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping’s authority over the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for “promoting reunification” limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao’s policies toward Taiwan, such as military threats around Taiwan and the elimination of Taiwan in the international community. In parallel, the Xi Jinping regime’s recent focus has been on strengthening integration with Taiwan through the provinces, especially frontline areas such as Fujian Province. With Xi Jinping at its core, the party central has also strengthened its instructions to local TAOs.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Numbers [JP23252004, JP2528505, JP16H02005].

Notes on contributors

Fukuda Madoka

Fukuda Madoka is a professor of international politics and China studies at the Department of Global Politics, Faculty of Law, Hosei University. She received her Ph.D. and M.A. in media and governance from Keio University. Previously, she studied at the doctoral course of Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Cheng-Chi University as a Taiwan scholarship student. She specializes in the PRC’s diplomacy and Cross-Taiwan Strait relations in the postwar years. She has focused on how PRC’s “One-China” principle was made in constant negotiations and interactions among the PRC, the ROC, and other powers in the Cold War. She published her first book, The PRC’s diplomacy and Taiwan: the origin of the “One-China” principle (Keio University Press, 2013), and was awarded the 25th special prize for Asia-Pacific studies (The Asian Affairs Research Council, Japan). She has also published several peer-reviewed articles and research on Cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

Notes

1. For the CCP’s policy toward Taiwan before Xi’s inauguration, see Shao, Zhonggong Duitai Zhengce: 1979–2013. For Xi’s policy toward Taiwan, see Xin, “Having Much in Common? Changes and Continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,” and Fukuda, “The Xi Jinping Regime’s Maneuvering against Taiwan: Characteristics and Prospects.”

2. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” 289–336.

3. Tsai, “The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process,” 1–30, and Tsai, Zhonggong de Shetai Juece yu Liangan Guanxi Fazhan.

4. Kuo, Zhonggong Duitai Gongzuo Zuzhi Tixi Gailun.

5. Kuo, “Zhonggong Duitai Gongzuo Jizhi Yanjiu: Zhengfu Guocheng de Guandian.”

6. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” 290.

7. Matsuda, “Chugoku no Tai Taiwan Seisaku: 1979–1987,” 128–129.

8. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979–2000,” 296.

9. Swaine, Ibid., 293–294.

10. See note 7 above.129.

11. The State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, “Increasing Cross-Strait Relations and Realizing Peaceful Reunification,” People’s Daily, January 19 1989.

12. Beckershoff, “The KMT-CCP Forum,” 219–220.

13. Matsuda, “Kaizen no Kikai wa Sonzai Shitaka?” 254, People’s Daily, July 29 2004.

14. Huang, “Baeikyu Seiken no Tairiku Seisaku Kettei Katei ni Okeru Yotou Chugoku Kokumintou no Yakuwari,” 160.

15. Kou, “Zhonggong Guotaiban Chengli ‘Zhengdangju’ PIngzhi,” 1 and Yang, “Lian-Sun Deng ‘Liu’ Hou zhi Liangan Guanxi,” 1–2.

16. Kou, Ibid., 3.

17. Chang, “Guogong Pingtai de Xianchuang yu Zhanwang,” 271.

18. Kuo Jui-Hua. “Zhonggong ‘Xhiba Da’ Hou de Zhongyang Duitai Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu Chengyuan Fenxi.”

19. Kuo Jui-Hua. “‘520’ Hou de Zhonggong Duitai Renshi Buju yu Zhengce Dongxiang.”

20. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Benefits of the 18 Cross-Strait Agreements,” Dec. 2012, MAC HP (https://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/491610421671.pdf).

21. Chang, Ibid., 270.

22. Kou, Ibid., 1–2.

23. Lo, “Mingong Jiaoliu de Kunjing yu Chulu,” 312.

24. Kuo, “Mingong Jiaoliu de Xianxiang yu Zhanwang,” 303–308.

25. For example, Cabestan, “China’s Institutional Changes in the Foreign and Security Policy Realm Under Xi Jinping” and“China’s foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making under Xi Jinping.”

26. Aoyama, “Keikaku Gaiko de Suishin Sareteiru Ittai Ichiro Koso,” 56–59.

27. Kadozaki, “Shu Kinpei Seikenka no Taigai Seisaku Kettei Shikkou Katei,” 52–53.

28. “Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Zhaokai Huiyi Yanjiu Buzhu Xuexi Xuanzhuan Guanqie Dang de Shijiuda Jingshen,” October 27 2017, Xinhua (http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121868508.htm) and “Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Zhaokai Huiyi Xi Jinping Zhuchi Huiyi,” October 25 2022, Zhongguo Waijiaobu HP (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202210/t20221025_10791739.shtml).

29. Kadozaki, Ibid.

30. “CPC issues decision on deepening reform of Party and State institutions,” March 5 2018, The State Council of the PRC HP (http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2018/03/05/content_281476067521228.htm).

31. Kou ed., Zhongguo Dalu Duitai Gongzuo Zuzhi Tixi yu Renshi, 40.

32. Kuo Jui-Hua,“Zhonggong Duitai Renshi Bianquan yu Zhangzhi Yihan,” 144–145.

33. Chen, “Zhonggong Xianjieduan Duitai Renshi Tiaozheng yu Zhengce Quxiang,” 1–2.

34. Lin Join-sane had served as deputy director general of the Ministry of the Interior for nearly ten years, and then as Secretary General of the Executive Yuan and Secretary General of the KMT, but he had little experience in policy toward mainland China or in Cross-Strait relations. Wang Yu-chi had served as a spokesman for the president’s office and as a member of the National Security Council’s advisory board, but he was 43 years old and had little experience in Cross-Strait relations. Fan Shi-ping points out that the Ma administration may have chosen a person who was better at coordinating within the party and government rather than a person who was familiar with Cross-Strait relations in order to avoid a setback in relations with China, which had improved significantly during the first term, and to resolve consensus and procedural issues regarding Taiwan’s policy toward mainland China (Fan, “Hailiu Lianghui Renshi Buju yu Liangan Guanxi,” 5–6).

35. Tsai, “Liangan Jingmao Jikou Hushe Banshichu Yinxiang Pingzhi,” 1–6.

36. About the meetings between Zhang and Wang, see the MAC’s website (https://www.mac.gov.tw/CSO/News.aspx?n=9826ED11D0C57D28&sms=7DC61222B6B686D1).

37. See above 24.304.

38. Matsuda, “Sai Eibun Seiken no Tanjyo to Chutai Kankei no Tenkan,” 183–228.

39. Glaser, “The PLA Role in China’s Taiwan Policymaking,” 180.

40. Matsumoto, “Shu Kinpei Seiken to ‘Keitai Seisaku,’” 26–28.

41. “Mainland ‘14 Five’ Drawings, Submissions, and the Cross-Strait Common Market,” Economic Daily, March 6 2021.

42. About the case of Fujian, see Xuan, “Change in Taiwan Policy under Xi Jinping Administration.” 144–156.

43. Kuo, “Dalu Shengji Jikou Gaige Xia de Taiban Shezhi Tiaozheng Fenxi,” 135–138.