China’s dichotomous BeiDou strategy: led by the party for national deployment, driven by the market for global reach

ABSTRACT

China’s foremost national goal is to become a major space power by 2030. Consequently, President Xi Jinping has made the launch of the BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) and promotion of a “BDS global network” a national priority.

BDS represents a frontier technology of the “fourth industrial revolution” which ushered in the digital age. Using BeiDou as a case study, this paper attempts to analyze the structural features of China’s frontier technology strategy and its impact on China’s global influence. Significantly, BDS has both military and civilian applications, which is a prominent feature of today’s cutting edge technologies. Therefore, a focus on BDS will deepen our understanding of how China is exploring these new types of dual-purpose technologies to expand its global reach.

The paper argues that by dramatically restructuring its decision-making process under Xi Jinping, China has been able to adopt a state-led national strategy for using BeiDou domestically, while expanding its global reach through a market-driven approach. This strategy has facilitated the penetration of Chinese BDS applications into the economies and societies of many developing (and some developed) countries.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• foreign policy
• decision-making
• BeiDou
• Xi Jinping
• national mobilization

1 Introduction

China’s foremost national goal is to become a major space power by 2030. Consequently, President Xi Jinping has made the launch of the BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) and promotion of a “BDS global network” a national priority.

BDS is one of four major global navigation satellite systems in use today, alongside the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS), the European Union’s Galileo, and Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). China launched the third satellite for BeiDou-1 in 2003, completing the first flotilla. The second generation, BeiDou-2, went operational in 2012 and covers the Asia-Pacific region. With the 35th and final satellite entering the constellation in 2020, the BDS is now complete.

China now has more navigation satellites in orbit than any country operating with GPS, Galileo, or GLONASS. Furthermore, China’s BDS has a positioning accuracy of less than 10 cm in the Asia-Pacific region (compared to 30 cm for America’s GPS), and its use is believed to exceed that of GPS in 165 countries¹. Completion of the satellite positioning system ends China’s long military reliance on the American-owned GPS. It helps China avoid the risk of GPS disruption in extreme conflict situations and can provide active guidance to precisely target and locate enemy forces and assets.

Along with the tremendous effort China has made to develop and innovate BDS for its own use, since its inception, China has also focused on exploring international markets for BDS downstream. There is a worldwide industry devoted to developing downstream markets for global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and the supply of products and services that “use GNSS-based positioning and navigation as a key enabler. These products and services encompass the entire value chain of GNSS-specific components, GNSS receivers, GNSS systems, GNSS software, and value-added services.”² The key to expanding the global downstream market for China’s BeiDou is to focus on promoting BDS-related applications. These include positioning (determining location), navigation (getting from one location to another), tracking (monitoring the movement of people or objects), mapping (creating maps of the world), and timekeeping (calculating time)³.

The development of BDS has generated a great deal of alarm, especially in the policy circles of many Western democracies. The most significant concern relates to the issue of data security. The BDS is a two-way communication system that allows it to identify the location of the receiver. While at present no method of transmitting malware through navigation signals is known to be feasible, some scholars claim BDS poses a security risk because it could in time allow the Chinese government to track users of the system by deploying malware transmitted through its navigation signals or messaging capabilities⁴. From a security perspective, now that China no longer relies on GPS, it is believed to be developing the capability to jam communication signals⁵. This strategy represents a form of gray zone aggression in space, in that it could disable satellites in the event of conflict, but is unlikely to be considered a hostile attack warranting a robust response.

Attention has also been drawn to GNSS due to its fundamental nature as a dual-purpose technology that was originally developed for military use and now serves as a cornerstone of the modern economy. GNSS is the lynchpin for a wide range of industries, from mapping and geological surveys to transportation and water resources, from fisheries and agriculture to disaster mitigation and public safety, and many more besides. There is a growing concern that once technology of this kind is integrated into a country’s economy and industry, China may try to weaponize the technological dependence thus created. In other words, BDS may increase Chinese leverage with regard to coercion and compulsion, because if China refused to operate BDS or withdrew the service, this would be disastrous for the critical infrastructure dependent on it and could lead to political and social catastrophe for any country using the technology⁶.

It seems, therefore, that BDS will provide a decisive competitive advantage in a Chinese-dominated world order⁷. However, the question of how China might exploit this dual-purpose cutting-edge technology as a means to expand its international reach has not been adequately examined. BDS represents a frontier technology of the “fourth industrial revolution” which ushered in the digital age. Using BeiDou as a case study, this paper attempts to analyze the structural features of China’s frontier technology strategy and its impact on China’s global influence. Significantly, BDS has both military and civilian applications, which is a prominent feature of today’s cutting-edge technologies. Therefore, a focus on BDS will deepen our understanding of how China is exploring these new types of dual-purpose technologies to expand its global reach.

As the paper will show, by dramatically restructuring its decision-making process under Xi Jinping, China has been able to adopt a state-led national strategy for using BeiDou domestically, while expanding its global reach through a market-driven approach. This strategy has facilitated the penetration of Chinese BDS applications into the economies and societies of many developing (and some developed) countries.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains the changes in China’s national decision-making model since Xi Jinping came to power, particularly with regard to foreign policy. Part 3 explores the structural features of China’s BDS strategy and development in the domestic context. Part 4 looks at China’s global development strategy for BeiDou in the name of creating a “BDS global network.” The concluding section identifies changes and continuity in China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping and explains the political-strategic structure for expanding China’s global influence in these new areas of cutting-edge technology.

2 Changes to China’s Foreign Policy Decision-making Model

In 1992, Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton introduced the seminal concept of “fragmented authoritarianism,”⁸ which became the basis for understanding China’s policy-making process following the period of reform and opening-up. Since then, many scholars have delved deeper into this strand of research, arguing that while China continues to be governed by one-party rule, control of society has never been watertight, with factions and independent behavior visible both in local governments and in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)⁹.

These previous studies have accurately highlighted the changes that reform and opening-up have brought to China’s policy-making process, but this is by no means the whole story. The influence of an unchanging, ideologically-based one-party political system on China’s decision-making processes at every level cannot be ignored. Recent debates over the failure of the United States’ policy for engaging with China¹⁰ have redirected attention to China’s ideology and political system. A growing number of scholars now contend that the increasing rivalry between the United States and China is driven not simply by traditional power politics, but also by a broad and deep divide in political values between the two mutually incompatible political systems¹¹.

Emphasizing the fierce competition between the Chinese and American political systems helps reveal that China has never changed course from strictly adhering to a Soviet-style political system over the past seven decades. Indeed, both factionalism and institutionalism can fit well into a one-party Leninist system¹², and the only reason China was able to achieve rapid economic growth during the reform and opening-up period was by creating a way to combine capitalism with the one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

“A predilection for control” is a defining feature of the Chinese political system, and planning and supervision are two of its most important instruments¹³. As Mark Wu argues, the role of state planning, the involvement of the political party, and the strong linkage between the state and the private sector, among other factors, make the Chinese model exceptional, and this unique structure has led to the rapid economic rise of “China, Inc.”¹⁴

Strategic planning has always been a mandatory part of policy-making in the Chinese political system, and the last 70 years have witnessed two models of policy decision-making in China (Model A and Model B), both of which involve a top-level design (頂層設計/頂層規劃) . While the present article focuses on changes in the foreign policy decision-making process under Xi Jinping, these two models of decision-making style are not limited to foreign policy and can be used to explain China’s approach to policy-making in general.

Model A. The two-step dual decision-making model.

	Decision Maker(s)	Issues to be decided
Step One	Top Party leadership	General direction of foreign policy
Step Two	Executive branches of foreign policy administration	Specific foreign policies

Model B. Model B. The top-down single-step decision-making model.

Decision Maker(s)	Issues to be decided
Top Party leadership	Planning and guidance; resource allocation; architecture of national mobilization

The two-step dual decision model (Model A) is a general style of foreign policy decision-making in China. In the first step, the top Party leadership makes decisions on the general direction of China’s foreign policy. “The top Party leadership” corresponds to the supreme leader (e.g., Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping), or the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo under the system of collective leadership. In the second step, specific foreign policies are determined by the executive branches of the foreign policy administration. The relevant leaders or institutions given the power of interpretation¹⁵, such as Zhou Enlai under Mao Zedong or local governments and SOEs during the reform and opening-up era under Deng, then make specific foreign policies based on the general direction set by the top Party leadership. Because the executive branches of foreign policy are at the same time foreign policy-makers, the top leadership and the policy implementers thus work together to make foreign policy decisions. This dual decision-making process constitutes an essential feature of China’s foreign policy decision-making.

Model A suggests that China’s decision-making process is a combination of top-level leadership and executive-level autonomy. It can be seen, therefore, that “fragmented authoritarianism” is not unique to Chinese policy-making during the reform and opening-up period. Although not as pronounced as during the period of opening-up and reform, even under Mao there were occasional inconsistencies between the foreign policy pursued by policy implementer Zhou Enlai and the policy direction set by the central government¹⁶. This inconsistency between strategy and actual foreign policy is inherent in China’s decision-making process.

Model B is a top-down single-step decision-making model comprised of strong planning, governmental guidance, and interdepartmental coordination. Crisis decisions and policies of extreme strategic importance are made by the top Party leadership. In this model, little autonomy is allowed at the executive level. This top-down model of decision-making is known as the “whole nation system (挙国体制)” in China. According to Yalin Tang, a professor at Fudan University, “the whole nation system” embodies several salient features, namely: party planning and guidance, party resource allocation, and national mobilization¹⁷.

President Xi is promoting BDS by restructuring the decision-making process from Model A to Model B. “Fragmented authoritarianism” describes the phenomenon of individual foreign policy implementers interpreting the central government’s diplomatic direction based on their own interests, which occurred as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s “decentralization policy.” However, in the eyes of Xi Jinping and the CCP, the lack of central government control over local governments or SOEs, as enabled by the two-step dual decision-making model, presents a significant challenge for national governance because it weakens the function of “whole nation” planning.

In August 2006, President Hu Jintao convened what was then considered a watershed Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs. During the meeting, Hu emphasized the key role of the Party’s leadership and called on “the entire Party and the whole nation to abide by and adhere to the foreign policy directions and the strategic plans put forward by the Central Committee.”¹⁸ Nevertheless, his efforts turned out to be in vain: “Policies formulated in Zhongnanhai never leave Zhongnanhai (政策不出中南海),” the phenomenon that the central government’s strategic plan could never be implemented at the administrative and local level, was rampant throughout his leadership.

Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping, has taken on the tasks that Hu Jintao failed to accomplish. To avoid the classic agent-principal dilemma, President Xi has pushed to reset the balance between delegation of power and centralization. As the slogan proclaims, “Party, government, military, civilian and academic, East, West, South, North, and Center, the Party leads everything,” and enormous efforts have been made to reinforce the Party’s control over the executive branches of the political administration and society at large. The growing importance of economic security – driven by increased competition between the United States and China and further fueled by the COVID-19 pandemic – has led to a global rise in protectionism and big government. In the case of China, President Xi has been insisting on self-reliance in core technologies, promoting independent innovation, and making indigenous brands bigger since 2013¹⁹, well before President Trump launched a trade war against China. For Xi, the best way to achieve this goal is to (re)introduce “the whole nation system.”

Under Xi’s leadership, a series of moves to increase the absolute authority of the Party’s Central Committee in determining, executing, and allocating resources for foreign policy began to take shape around 2012, with a range of measures being taken to ensure that “the Party is in control of foreign relations (党管外事).” As detailed in the book chapter “The Belt and Road Initiative under ‘Planned Diplomacy’”²⁰, the government has developed a range of party regulations and policy documents that clearly define the party’s absolute control over the executive branches of foreign policy and has strengthened the power of party committees within various foreign policy-related organizations. In addition, in order to ensure that local governments, SOEs, think tanks, and other branches of the administration implement the foreign policies designed at the center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has strengthened its supervision of their activities by organizing lectures and presentations at the national level.

As part of this process of reconfiguring the two-step dual decision-making model, the decision-making power of the executive branches in the second step was ripped away, with the result that planned diplomacy now dominates²¹ and localism is in retreat²².

3 The state-led BeiDou project

3.1 Top-down BeiDou decision-making

The BeiDou project has been a state-led project from its very beginning. China’s journey into space began in 1956, when the country’s first rocket research institute – the Fifth Research Institute of the Chinese Ministry of Defense – was established. In 1970, China launched its first satellite, Dong Fang Hong 1 (DFH 1), making it the fifth country to put a spacecraft into orbit, after the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and Japan.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, realizing that its economy was lagging far behind that of advanced countries, the government put economic development at the top of its national agenda. The “Star Wars Program” proposed by the United States in 1983 sparked a heated debate in China about whether China should also commit to high-tech research. The prevailing view at the time was against it, on the grounds that high-tech research would be too costly for a developing country like China. However, China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was determined to invest in high technology, despite China’s lagging economic capacity. Apparently, in March 1986, a set of “Proposals for Tracking World High-Tech Development” by four prominent scientists caught the attention of Deng, prompting him to make that decision.

Following Deng Xiaoping’s instructions, the State Council began drafting a roadmap for investing in high-tech research. With the participation of 124 experts, the State Council held seven meetings from March to August 1986 to discuss the issue²³. In November, the Outline of the National High Technology Research and Development Plan (also known as the “863 Program”) was released, stipulating that over the next 15 years (1986–2000), China would invest 11 billion RMB in seven high-tech fields²⁴. The aerospace project was positioned as one of the most important projects in the Outline. On September 25 1989, the feasibility test for the first generation of “BeiDou” (or “Big Dipper”) satellites was launched. Its initial success in relation to satellite navigation research further enhanced China’s commitment to this field.

If it was the American Star Wars program that triggered China’s initial investment in aerospace, it was the security mistrust that built up in the bilateral relationship with the United States following a number of incidents that prompted China to develop its own GNNS as an alternative to GPS. One such episode was the so-called “Yinhe incident.” On July 23 1993, the United States accused the Chinese freighter Yinhe (Galaxy) of transporting poison gas ingredients to Iran and demanded that the cargo ship return to China or allow international inspectors on board. After a three-week stalemate, a joint investigation by China, the United States, and Saudi Arabia concluded that the ship carried no materials for making chemical weapons.

The fact that the Chinese government had been forced to accept U.S. inspection requests because the United States blocked Yinhe from using its GPS service was considered a national disgrace²⁵ in China and sowed a deep-seated security distrust of the United States. Shortly after the “Yinhe incident,” Jiadong Sun of the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense proposed that China develop its own GNSS²⁶. The proposal was formally approved by the State Council and Central Military Commission and initiated in December 1994²⁷.

The third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 further strengthened Beijing’s resolve to build its own GNSS. Taiwan held its first democratic presidential election in March 1996 and Lee Teng-hui won a landslide victory. To signal the message that independence for Taiwan would mean war, China conducted missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait before the election. Of the three missiles fired toward the Taiwan Strait, China lost track of the second and third. This was allegedly because the United States cut off the GPS signal to the Pacific that China relied on to track its missiles²⁸.

As China’s economic power has grown since the turn of the millennium, so too has its investment in high technology. In the 10th Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005) alone, China invested 22 billion yuan in 26 critical high-tech projects. The dynamics around BeiDou have changed dramatically since Xi Jinping first came to power. While distrust of the United States remains a major driver, BeiDou’s development is increasingly being driven by domestic factors. Even before the Trump administration (2017–2021) adopted a policy to restrict the flow of technology to China, President Xi had repeatedly emphasized the importance of self-reliant technological innovation for national security. Consequently, the BDS is now depicted as “an independently developed and independently operated GNSS.”²⁹

BeiDou has also become a national icon, a symbol of Chinese national pride that can evoke patriotic sentiments. The Chinese government touts it as a “Chinese miracle” and refers to it as “China’s BeiDou, the world’s BeiDou, a first-class BeiDou.” The current strategic direction of the BDS is likely to continue, at least in the short term. America’s sanctions against Russia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a heated debate in China about BDS and the country’s own national security. The prevailing view in this debate reaffirms China’s current strategic direction, which is that China should continue to promote an independent BDS, work closely with Russia’ s GLONASS, and push forward the use of BDS worldwide³⁰.

3.2 Domestic mobilization for BeiDou

As the decision-making Models A and B illustrate, Chinese policy is always planned and implemented from the top down. The central government develops a new five-year plan every five years to guide the overall policy direction for each industry, and ministries and local provinces are required to stipulate their own five-year plans based on the national one. Under such a political system, the Chinese government has been allocating significant resources to developing the BDS, which is a top-level designed national project par excellence.

With China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) positioning the navigation industry as a strategic priority, the State Council released the (extremely lengthy) Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for the National Satellite Navigation Industry in 2013³¹, making the innovation and internationalization of BeiDou its primary goal. Subsequently, each ministry and province also published their own plans for developing BDS.

After the release of the national satellite navigation development plan, China’s provinces and ministries all rushed to experiment with BeiDou technology within their jurisdictions. For example, the Ministry of Transport installed BeiDou terminals in vehicles for monitoring travel, and the Ministry of Agriculture applied BeiDou technology to promote hydrological monitoring, meteorological measurement, and forestry fire prevention. The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) promulgated The Vision for Maritime Cooperation under BRI, which recommends using BeiDou systems for marine environmental monitoring, maritime search and rescue, and ocean profiling and observation of buoys. In addition to the provincial programs, several pilot projects – such as the Yangtze River Delta BDS pilot project and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Regional BDS pilot project – were also launched.

Thanks to this nationwide effort, BDS applications are being developed and tested across the country in all sectors: from transportation, public safety, disaster relief and mitigation to agriculture, forestry, livestock and fisheries and infrastructures such as power, water, and communications. Following the introduction of the “top-level design” concept into the BeiDou strategy in 2013, China’s ministries, provinces and SOEs further increased their investment in BDS applications. Private companies such as the telecom conglomerate Huawei and ZTE are also actively involved in promoting BDS applications, including the fintech giant Ant Group. Despite increasing government control, Ant Group continues to work closely with the Forestry and Grassland Bureau of Yunnan Province and the Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, using BDS as part of an elephant conservation project called “Ants Protect Elephants.”

Xi’s emphasis on top-level strategic planning and the centralization of foreign policy-making authority have made the central government more effective in mobilizing national resources to promote BeiDou applications. However, this whole nation system has also resulted in a massive overlapping of resources and redundant investment in similar products and services across the country that the government has repeatedly highlighted.

Research on aerospace and BDS is also highly “mobilized” by the top-level decision-makers. Once a BeiDou strategy has been decided by the top leadership, there is little room for academic research or public opinion to alter the policy trajectory, which is a major change since Xi Jinping assumed his leadership role. Following the government’s lead, academic debate tends to emphasize the importance of investing in aerospace and China’s self-reliant development of the BDS. Everett C. Dolman’s assertion – “who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind”³² – is widely quoted in the academic literature in China.

Chinese scholars generally classify aerospace-generated power into three categories: coercive power, institutional power, and value and normative power³³. There has also been a strong focus on the advantages that a new wave of cutting-edge technology can bring to a rising nation, which explains why Geoffrey L. Herrera’s book Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Change is so popular in China. The design of China’s BDS strategy thus sits completely within the top-down single-step policy decision model (Model B): the decision-making occurs at the highest level and the whole nation is mobilized for its implementation.

4 Promoting BeiDou abroad

4.1 Less emphasis on cooperation and more on patriotic rhetoric

The low-Earth orbit where all GNSS are located has become increasingly congested. Based on the “first-come, first-served principle,” most of the spectrum needed for a global positioning system is already occupied by the United States. Fully aware of such constraints on its development of BDS, China has made cooperation a key principle alongside competition. In fact, in 2003 China even considered joining the European Union’s “Galileo” satellite navigation project³⁴, although it later withdrew to focus on developing BeiDou by itself.

This line of cooperation continued into the mid-2010s. In its White Paper on China’s space activities released in 2011, the Chinese government highlighted the importance of close cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western industrialized countries³⁵. In December 2017, after three years of negotiations, China and the United States reached an agreement to allow BeiDou’s civilian signals to interoperate with GPS³⁶. The two countries agreed to continue consultations and cooperation related to compatibility and interoperability in order to provide better services to users worldwide³⁷. However, in the domestic context, China’s positive stance on cooperation with the West actually began to wane in 2016, one year before reaching the agreement on BeiDou with the United States. Beginning in 2017, China has chosen to emphasize the importance of cooperating with Russia and developing countries, since which time its patriotic rhetoric permeates the domestic narrative in relation to BeiDou.

To be sure, there is still plenty of room for cooperation between China and the West in international organizations. Attaching great importance to the normative and institutional power of GNSS, China has been actively participating in the activities of international standard-setting organizations such as the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

4.2 Cooperation between China and Russia

In parallel with the diminishing rhetoric around cooperation with the West, cooperation between China and Russia in aerospace has gone from strength to strength. The Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on Satellite Navigation signed by the two countries in June 2014³⁸ marked a turning point in their relations. China’s official media emphasized that the MOC clarified the intentions of both sides and paved the way for future cooperation based on strategic trust³⁹.

Within the MOC, bilateral cooperation in satellite navigation between the two countries was positioned as a strategic cooperation project, and a committee of four working groups was established to develop specific plans for cooperation which subsequently identified several pilot projects. This initiative for cooperation in satellite navigation originated from Moscow. Although Beijing has consistently placed a strategic emphasis on satellite cooperation with Russia, in 2014 China was still holding on to its cooperation with the West. Even when the China-Russia cooperation plan was released, China repeatedly emphasized that it intended to continue working with the United States and the European Union.

In May 2015, Russia proposed combining its own GLONASS with China’s BeiDou and to create chip sets suitable for joint production of the navigation system⁴⁰. Despite the fact that China had set out its national goal of creating a complete industrial supply chain of chips, modules, boards, terminals, and operational services for BeiDou, it agreed to Russia’s request and signed a treaty to this effect⁴¹. Based on these agreements for cooperation in the peaceful use of GLONASS and BDS signed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in November 2018, the two countries began deploying measurement stations for both networks to ensure their effective operation in both territories⁴².

As tensions between China and the West continued to grow, cooperation between China and Russia on BeiDou accelerated further. In December 2021, another document called the Roadmap for Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Satellite Navigation (2021–2015) was signed by the head of the Russian Space Agency, Dimitry Rogozin, and the chairman of the China Satellite Navigation Committee, He Yubin. When Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Beijing in February 2022, the two countries signed an agreement on GLONASS/BeiDou Time Interoperability Cooperation, as well as an agreement on cooperation in the field of data and digital technology⁴³.

4.3 Expanding the BDS global network

In order to expand the international market for BDS applications and services, China has made significant efforts to strengthen intergovernmental space cooperation in the name of expanding the BDS global network. As China’s BDS has moved from covering the Asia-Pacific region to covering the whole world, it is natural that China should choose to focus on cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries first. In December 2011, China released a White Paper on its space activities, identifying cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and with developing countries as its main foreign policy objectives⁴⁴. Xi Jinping reaffirmed this strategy. In the government’s Blue Paper China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (2016), it set out the goal of providing BeiDou applications to countries along the route of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by 2018.

Pakistan was the first country in Asia to sign a BeiDou cooperation agreement with China, which it did in 2013. Thailand, Brunei, and Laos signed similar agreements in 2019. China has built multiple platforms to promote BeiDou cooperation with ASEAN countries, such as the Forum on China-ASEAN Technology Transfer and the Collaborative Innovation and China-ASEAN Information Harbor Forum. China is also actively promoting BeiDou cooperation through the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation framework. To date, most ASEAN countries, including Indonesia and Malaysia, are now cooperating with China on BeiDou-related projects.

Seeking to expand further afield, China has used several joint cooperation forums to actively promote BDS technology in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA; generally referred to in Chinese policy documents as “the Arab region”), Africa, and Central Asia (Table 1).

Table 1. Promoting BeiDou’s global network.

Region	Form of Cooperation	Date and Location
MENA	China-Arab BeiDou Cooperation Forum	No. 1: May 2017, Shanghai
		No. 2: April 2019, Tunis
		No. 3: December 2021, Beijing (hybrid meeting format)
Central Asia	“Cooperation on BDS” under the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum	No. 1: October 2019, Nanning, Guangxi province (during the 7th China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum)
		No. 2: October 2021, Lanzhou, Gansu province (during the 8th China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum)
Africa	China-Africa BDS Cooperation Forum	No 1: November 2021, Beijing

At the ministerial meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum held in Beijing in June 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed the “1 + 2 + 3” cooperation model comprising nuclear energy, space satellites, and new energy breakthroughs. Since 2014, the China Satellite Navigation Office (CSNO) has been reaching out to the Arab Organization for Information and Communication Technology (AOICT) and the Arab Academy for Science Technology & Maritime Transport (AASTMT). Efforts have also been made to cooperate with individual countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and the UAE on BDS application promotion, education and training, and joint research and development⁴⁵.

In the Chinese government’s “Arab Policy Paper” released in January 2016, space cooperation and the distribution of satellite navigation products were made a priority⁴⁶. Likewise, the Chinese government lobbied hard for BeiDou cooperation to be included in the 2018–2020 “Action Plan for the China-Arab Cooperation Forum” as well. The first China-Arab BeiDou Cooperation Forum was held in Shanghai in 2017. During this meeting, the two sides agreed to cooperate over BDS in the fields of intelligent transportation, land mapping, precision agriculture technology, and public security. The second China-Arab BeiDou Cooperation Forum was held in Tunis, home to the “China-Arab States BDS/GNSS Center-AICTO” Center of Excellence, which went operational in April 2018.

During the third Forum in 2021, which was held using a hybrid meeting format due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the CSNO and AOICT signed the “Action Plan for China-Arab Cooperation in the Field of Satellite Navigation (2022–2023).” According to this action plan, the two sides will jointly implement at least five pilot projects to promote the use of BDS applications in key areas and will establish either one or two more BDS centers in the MENA region⁴⁷. To date, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and UAE have all adopted BDS/GNSS high-precision services for use in land surveying and mapping, transportation, precision agriculture, environment monitoring, and security, amongst others⁴⁸.

Efforts to expand the use of BDS in Central Asia began in 2019. “Cooperation on BDS” was one of the four panels of the 7th China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum held in Nanning, Guangxi province in October 2019. During the Forum, three agreements on satellite navigation monitoring and evaluation, education and training, and industrial cooperation were signed between Chinese and Uzbek institutions and Thai companies⁴⁹. The second event to promote BDS applications in Central Asia was held during the 8th China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum held in Lanzhou, Gansu province in October 2019. During the Forum, Beijing UniStrong Science &Technology Co., Ltd. exhibited its satellite navigation products, and the aim of strengthening BDS cooperation was included in the jointly agreed “Initiative to enhance China-Central Asia Cooperation,” released at the meeting.

Having established cooperation agreements with Arab and Central Asian countries, China has begun working to strengthen BDS cooperation in Africa. During the first China-Africa BeiDou System Cooperation Forum held in Beijing in November 2021, China identified ten areas where BeiDou technology could be applied in Africa, including vehicle position management, railroads, precision agriculture, international search and rescue, surveying and mapping, digital construction, intelligent mining, public safety, wildlife protection, and smart cities. China is now championing the cause of wildlife conservation in Africa by replicating the BeiDou-based environmental projects set up by global technology provider Ant Group. Currently, more than ten sub-Saharan African countries including Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya are already using BeiDou-based products.

In South America, Argentina was the first country to join the BeiDou project. China and Argentina agreed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning BeiDou cooperation in December 2020⁵⁰ and confirmed further cooperation during Argentine President Alberto Fernández’s visit to Beijing during the Winter Olympics in February 2022.

China convened the first International Summit on BDS applications in Changsha, Hunan province in September 2021, providing another important showcase for China’s enormous efforts to promote the marketization of BDS on a global scale. In addition to marketing and sales efforts, the Chinese government is keen to provide scholarships and job training for countries and companies using BeiDou’s service applications. In sum, the BDS applications first promoted through domestic state mobilization are now being promoted by China’s central government on the global market or embedded within bilateral and regional cooperation projects.

It is worth noting that much of the activity to expand the BDS global network is achieved through what is called “orderly development,” over which local governments and SOEs in China have little control. Government agencies, companies, and individuals involved in the promotion of BeiDou applications are all designated by central government in accordance with the “top-level design.”

5 Conclusion

The way the BDS project has been rolled out demonstrates the impact that China’s political decision-making structure has on the implementation of global strategy under Xi Jinping. This state-led national program first began in the 1980s. However, China’s BDS global strategy only began to unfold after the second generation of BeiDou became operational in 2012, the year Xi Jinping was appointed to be China’s next top leader. Under the leadership of President Hu Jintao, China shifted its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific and developing countries, and since then its foreign policy has undergone further significant changes during the Xi Jinping era.

The strengthening of relations between Russia and China and the decline in Chinese cooperation with the West are two distinct changes visible since the start of Xi Jinping’s administration. During the same period, BDS has become synonymous with China’s national prestige and a means of propagating patriotic rhetoric in China. These changes were evident even before new tensions arose between the United States and China.

Foreign policy decision-making has also undergone a dramatic change since Xi Jinping came to power. By fundamentally reorienting the decision-making process from a two-step system (Model A) to a single-step one (Model B), top-level planning, government resource allocation, and oversight of policy implementation by the Party have become defining features of China’s current “whole nation” decision-making process. As a result, a new political-strategic structure has emerged for promoting China’s foreign policy. The government is pursuing a state-led national strategy domestically, while at the same time working to expand BeiDou’s global reach through a market-driven approach.

This strategy has facilitated the rapid development of BeiDou applications at home and the economic and social penetration of BeiDou into many developing countries that are thirsty for cutting-edge technologies. Consequently, containment policies to curb China’s influence in regard to BeiDou’s dual-purpose technologies may not be feasible. On the other hand, the global reach of BDS depends on its technological edge and marketing success, which makes Xi’s whole nation system significantly different from the system that existed under Mao. Independence and compatibility have been key words in the development of BDS. As the compatibility of BDS exposes it to global GNSS competition, it will need to sustain its technological edge if it wants its global reach to continue to expand.

The impact of the “BeiDou global network” on China’s international reach is complex. Expanding the use of civilian BDS does not necessarily lead to an expansion of Chinese military power; currently, Pakistan is the only country to use China’s BDS for both military and civil purposes (although Saudi Arabia has reportedly signed a MOU on the military use of BeiDou as well). What is clear, however, is that the international promotion of BeiDou for civilian use through a “whole nation system” increases China’s leverage for coercion and compulsion across the globe.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rumi Aoyama

Rumi Aoyama is Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies and Director of Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies

Notes

1. Tsunashima, “In 165 Countries, China’s BeiDou Eclipses American GPS.”

2. “GNSS Industry and Value Chain.”

3. Millner, Maksim, and Huhmann, “BeiDou: China’s GPS Challenger Takes Its Place on the World Stage.”

4. Jordan, “China’s Alternative to GPS and its Implications for the United States.”

5. “China’s Satellite Jamming Test Creates International Security Concerns.”

6. Kidwai, “BeiDou and BRI: Dependence Masked as Independence?”

7. Goswami, “The Economic and Military Impact of China’s BeiDou Navigation System.”

8. Lieberthal and Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China.

9. In support of these arguments, see also: Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” 995–2012; Bo, “The Institutionalization of Elite Management in China,” 70–100; Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership; Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary: How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World.

10. For details of the debate, see: Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China,” 99–114; Campbell and Ratner “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” 60–70.

11. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” 7–64.

12. Fewsmith, Rethinking Chinese Politics.

13. Gueorguiev, Retrofitting Leninism: Participation Without Democracy in China.

14. Wu, “The ‘China Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 261–324.

15. Many previous studies have pointed out the importance of interpretive power. For recent research, see: Ye, The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China, 1998–2018; Zhao, “Top-level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policymaking in Xi Jinping’s China,”1–14.

16. Aoyama, Contemporary China’s Foreign Policy (Gendai Chuugoku no Gaikou).

17. Tang and Hao, “The New Whole Nation System: Historical Evolution, Characteristics of the Times and Model Construction (Xinxing Juguo Tizhi: Lishi Yanbian, Shidai Tezheng yu Moshi Goujian,”1–15.

18. “Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs Held in Beijing (Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Huiyi zai Jing Juxing.”

19. “Deeply Implement the Party’s Goal of Strengthening the Military in the New Situation and Accelerate the Construction of a World-class University with Our Military Characteristics (Shenru Guanche Luoshi Dang zai Xin Xingshi xia de Qiangjun Mubiao, Jiakuai Jianshe Juyou Wojun Tese de Shijie Yiliu Daxue).”

20. For details on the specific measures taken under the leadership of Xi Jinping, see: Aoyama, “The Belt and Road Initiative under ‘Planned Diplomacy’(Keikaku Gaigo de Suishin sarete iru Ittai Ichiro Koso’.”

21. Ibid.

22. Bulman and Jaros, “Localism in Retreat? Central Provincial Relations in the Xi Jinping Era,” 697–716.

23. “‘863 plan’ Funding Application 200 Million Approved 10 Billion (‘863 Jihua’ Jingfei Shenqing 2 Yi Pi le 100 Yi).”

24. “The ‘863 Project’: Behind the Scenes of a Great Science and Technology Project (‘863 Jihua: Yige Weida Keji Gongcheng de Taiqianmuhou).”

25. “This Incident 27 Years Ago was Listed as One of the ‘Three Most Humiliating Incidents’ by Netizens (27 Nian Qian de Zhe Jian Shi, Bei Wangyou Liewei ‘Sanda Quru Shijian’ zhi Yi).”

26. “Why did China Build BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (Zhongguo Weishenme YaoJianli BeiDou Weixing Daohang Xitong).”

27. “From Being under the Control of Others to Being Independently Controllable! (“Cong Shouzhiyuren Dao Zizhukekong!)”

28. McConoly, “China’s BeiDou GPS is a Strategic Challenge for the U.S.”

29. “Russia and China Sign Roadmap on Satellite Navigation.”

30. “Can the U.S. Kick Russia out of GPS? (Meiguo Shifou Neng Jiang EguoTichu GPS?)”

31. For the full text of Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for the National Satellite Navigation Industry, see: http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/35861/37517/xgzc37523/Document/1614278/1614278.htm

32. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, 248.

33. In line with these arguments, see: Zhan, “Technology Power, Technology Life Cycle and Technology Policy Choices of Major Powers (Jishu Quanli, Jishu Shengming Zhouqi yu Daguo de Jishu Zhengce Xuanze,)” 59–88; Zhou and Wu,“Sino-US Digital Technology Power Competition: Theoretical Logic and Typical Facts (Zhongmei Shuzi Jishu Quanli Jingzheng: Lilun Luoji yu Dianxing Shishi)”; Liu and Xu, “Security of New Strategic Space: A Preliminary Framework for Analysis (Xin Zhanlue Kongjian Anquan: Yige Chubu Fenxi Kuangjia”, 1–13.

34. Stumbaum, “Risky Business? The EU, China and Dual-use Technology.”

35. White Paper: China’s Space Activities in 2011.

36. “China’s Rival to GPS Navigation Carries Big Risks.”

37. “Joint Statement on Civil Signal Compatibility and Interoperability Between the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS).”

38. There are conflicting reports about this in China. Some reports say that the MOC was signed in October 2014. Even if this is so, the question of signing the Memorandum was raised at a roundtable meeting between the two countries in June that year.

39. “Sino Russian Round-table on Satellite Navigation Cooperation Promotes Practical Cooperation between Systems (Zhonger Weixing Daohang Hezuo Yuanzhuo Huiyi Tuidong Xitongjian Wushi Hezuo.)”

40. “Telecommunications Satellites: Russia Invites China to Combine its BeiDou Regional System with the GLONASS Global system-Rogozin.”

41. China Satellite Navigation Office, BeiDou Satellite Navigation System Development Report.

42. “Space and Rocket Building: Russia Preparing to Ratify GLONASS/BeiDou Cooperation Agreement with China.”

43. “Joint Communique on the 25^th Regular Meeting between the Prime Ministers of China and Russia.”

44. See above 35. 2011.

45. “Statement of the First Sino-Arab Compass Cooperation Forum signed in Shanghai (Di Yi Jie Zhonga Beidou Hezuo Luntan Shengming zai Hu Qianshu).”

46. Full text of China’s Arab Policy Paper, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-01/14/content_37573547.htm

47. “The 3rd China-Arab BeiDou Cooperation Forum held in Beijing (Di San Jie Zhonga Beidou Hezuo Luntan Shengming zai Jing Juban).”

48. “China, Arab States Ink New Action Plan over BDS Cooperation.”

49. “The first China Central Asia BeiDou Cooperation Forum was successfully held in Nanning (Shoujie Zhongguo-Zhongya Beidou Hezuo Luntan zai Nanning Chenggong Juban).”

50. “Ambassador to Argentina Zou Xiaoli Attended the Online Signing Ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding on Sino-Argentine Cooperation in the Field of Satellite Navigation (Agenting Dashi Zou Xiaoli Canjia Zhonga Weixing Daohang Lingyu Hezuo Liangjie Beiwanglu Zaixian Qianshu Yishi).”