The Xi Jinping administration’s desire for legitimacy: the strategic implication of its “new political party system”

ABSTRACT

On June 25th, 2021, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a white paper entitled “China’s New Political Party System.” This document argues that the political systems of Western nations are “outdated” and emphasizes the superiority of the political system of “Chinese democracy,” as promoted by Xi Jinping. However, the Chinese government’s official English translation leaves out the context of “newness” and does not emphasize the harmfulness of the West’s “outdated” system. Why was the English version rewritten with little nuance? This could be because of a desire to avoid drawing international criticism for its plan to boost China’s “international discourse power” (国际话语权 in Chinese), which President Xi Jinping has sought to shore up. This paper argues that China’s “new political party system” was implemented as a political tool to formulate Xi Jinping’s new social science theory. Thus, it did not bring about any major changes to China’s political consultation system, in which “democratic parties” can consult with the Communist Party but basically cannot oppose or disagree. Additionally, the phrase “new political party system” was created amidst conflict around discourse power with the West and was an argument with strategic significance in its connection to foreign policy. Discussion of China’s political system is likely to become all the more important amidst the current structural conflict between the US and China.

KEYWORDS:

• Discourse power
• Chinese political system
• Chinese “democracy”

1. Introduction

On June 25^th, 2021, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a white paper entitled “China’s New Political Party System.” This document argues that the political systems of Western nations are “outdated” and emphasizes the superiority of the political system of “Chinese democracy,” as promoted by Xi Jinping. However, at the time of its release, it received little attention from foreign media. One reason for this was that the Chinese government’s English translation leaves out the context of “newness” and does not emphasize the harmfulness of the West’s “outdated” system. The title of the paper was also liberally translated as “China’s Political Party System: Cooperation and Consultation.”¹

Since the original (Chinese language) document clearly criticized the West, why was the English version rewritten with little nuance? The author considers this to be a compromise between the diplomatic strategy of strongly emphasizing the originality of China’s political system in the face of US-China competition and a pragmatic measure to avoid international criticism for its plan to boost China’s “international discourse power” (国际话语权 in Chinese), which President Xi Jinping has sought to shore up. This paper first analyzes the progress of public opinion building under the CCP’s “united front work” strategy before exploring the factors behind the recent development of the theorization of the political party system and “Chinese-style democracy.” It then indicates that the aim of the Chinese government is to expand its “discourse power.”

2. The development of central united front work in response to a diversifying society

To begin with, it is imperative to review the position of political parties in China other than the Communist Party (the so-called “democratic parties”). The parliamentary system for those outside the Communist Party in China is called the “political consultation system.” Thus, these eight democratic parties in modern China exist mainly as actors in the Political Consultative Conference, an organization for consultation with the Communist Party. The Communist Party’s CUFWD has consistently supervised the construction of relationships with individuals and organizations outside the Communist Party to support this.

The theory of a united front is, to speak broadly, a strategy for socialism that provides a way for various parties and organizations to collaborate in pursuing a common goal without changing their individual political goals. It is an idea that was formulated at the third (1921) and fourth (1922) assemblies of the Komintern (an international organization of communists and left-wing socialists from different countries that existed from 1919 to 1943) and was discussed as a strategy for the international Communist movement. Ever since Mao Zedong’s argument in 1939 that a united front, armed conflict, and establishment of a party are the “three treasures” of the Chinese Communist Party,² a united front has been the first of its “three treasures.” The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, composed of representatives from the Communist Party, democratic parties, and various organizations and sectors, was declared to be a typical united front organization. It is also the most well-known.

The united front was reassessed in more realistic terms as all of China veered away from socialist ideology, and it was used broadly by the Communist Party when working with people outside the party. Interestingly, in modern China, the united front has been loosely expanded in response to a diversifying society. At the 14^th National United Front Work Assembly in 1979, eight items were identified as the subject and scope of the united front, but this was increased to 10 items at the 15^th Assembly in 1981, 12 items at the 19^th Assembly in 2000, and 15 items at the 20^th Assembly in 2006. In response to this expansion, the idea of a united front itself has been reformed by each of China’s top leaders. In June 1979, Deng Xiaoping proposed a “patriotic united front,” which, by making “being patriotic” the sole requirement for participation, made all citizens part of the united front. This “patriotic united front” affirmed the rehabilitation of people who had lost their standing during the Cultural Revolution and gave an ideological basis to active pursuits of economic activity. Furthermore, in December 2000, Jiang Zemin laid out a “united front for the new century” at the 19^th National United Front Work Assembly, and in July 2006, Hu Jintao proposed a “new stage of the united front for a new century” at the 20^th Assembly. Each of their arguments aimed to promote social integration and economic development through the addition of a “new social class” of workers skilled in the management of private and foreign companies, following logic that urged the unification of citizens around the core of the Communist Party. Additionally, emphasis was once again placed on the “five relationships”—political relationships (the relationship between the Communist Party and the democratic parties); ethnic relationships (relationships between ethnic groups, especially Han Chinese and ethnic minorities); religious relationships (relationships between members of the population with different religious beliefs); class relationships (relationships between the social classes); and relationships with compatriots abroad and at home (relationships between people in mainland China, Macau, Taiwan, and Chinese citizens around the world).³

Under the Xi Jinping administration, “Chinese Communist Party United Front Work Regulations (Trial)” went into effect in May 2015 and remained in effect until its recodification in 2021. These regulations were established in December 2013 by the Politburo Standing Committee and were ratified on April 30^th, 2015 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. During this period, the drafting small group was organized by the CUFWD, the Central Organization Department, the Office of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, the State Religious Affairs Bureau, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, and the Overseas Community Affairs Council. In April of the same year, inquiries began at the national level.⁴

In the regulations, Chapter 10 Article 46 contains items for general provisions; organizational leadership and responsibilities; work with democratic parties and individuals not affiliated with a party; work with intellectuals outside the party; work with ethnic groups; religious work; united front work in nonpublic economic areas; united front work in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; the establishment of representative teams outside the party; and supplementary provisions. First, these regulations framed the discussion of the subject and scope of united front work and detailed new provisions. For example, “management and technical positions in private and foreign firms,” “mediation organization positions” and “contractors” were brought together under the concept of “members of a new social class,” which was also made to include “new media workers.” Second, there were concrete provisions regarding the training, use, and management of “representatives from outside the party.” Third, leaders from the Central Committee or a Communist organization were placed in charge at each level, making it clear that the united front division was under the control of the Central Committee. The organizational structure and configuration of management were thus stipulated to define the relationship between the united front division and other divisions.⁵

These regulations were further revised in December 2021 by the Central Committee into the “Chinese Communist Party United Front Work Regulations” (hereinafter referred to as the new regulations). The new regulations saw the regulations expanded to 14 chapters and 61 articles with the addition of chapters on united front work by new social class workers (Chapter 8), foreign united front work and overseas work (Chapter 10), the establishment of a division for united work (Chapter 12), and security and supervision (Chapter 13). Following chapters on general provisions (Chapter 1) and organizational leadership and responsibilities (Chapter 2), Chapter 3 addresses “work with democratic parties and those unaffiliated with a party” and states that “Multi-party cooperation and the political consultative system led by the Communist Party is a new political system of socialism unique to China, and it is the foundational political system of our country.” Here, the “new political system,” the focus of this paper, is mentioned once again.

The proclamation of new regulations obviously aimed to build the authority of the Communist Party and increased the power of General Secretary Xi Jinping. According to a memorandum sent out by the Central Committee on January 5^th, 2021, the new regulations focus on “leadership by Xi Jinping with socialist ideology unique to China in a new era” and the “thorough implementation of important ideology regarding the strengthening and improvement of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s united front work.” It also revealed a policy in which “important situations and proposals in the implementation of the ‘regulations’ must be promptly reported to the Central Committee in every district and division.”⁶ In addition, the day after the release of the memorandum, on January 6^th, the People’s Daily ran an article on the front page titled “Opening a New Stage of United Front Work in a New Era,” emphasizing the efficiency of united work organizations and the Communist Party’s focused and united leadership.⁷ On the same day, the United Front Work Department also explained that in the provisions of the new regulations, “the ideology regarding strengthening and improvement of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s united front work” is important and “the united front is the most salient feature of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership.”⁸ In other words, united front activities in China constitute one political method to integrate a diversifying society. The governmental response to changes in certain social conditions and political policies, while based on socialist ideology, is intended to guide public opinion with the release of an explanation of the Communist Party’s uniqueness. As it became difficult for the Xi administration to control public opinion, regulations of the united front work were made even stronger.

3. Theorizing a “new political party system” with an emphasis on “Chinese originality”

The Political Consultative Conference (CPC) is considered the most important arena for united front building in China. This section first examines the political implications of the “new political party system” theory of the CPC and then focuses on the theory of “Chinese-style democracy,” as espoused by the Xi administration. Before deciphering the aims of the Xi Jinping administration, it is important to review its “new political party system” theory. A white paper entitled “China’s New Political Party System,” released on June 25^th, 2021 by The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, defines the previously mentioned “new political party system” as follows:⁹

Multi-party cooperation led by the Chinese Communist Party and the political consultation system comprise China’s foundational political system. The system comes from the soil of this country, and it involves not only using Chinese knowledge, but also actively referencing and absorbing the outstanding results of the political culture of humanity. This is China’s new political party system.

The “multi-party cooperation” and “political consultation system” mentioned here refer to the system of political management through cooperating and consulting (协商) with the eight other “democratic parties” (民主党派) and people unaffiliated with a party (无党派人士). When this white paper was released, however, it did not receive much attention from the foreign media. One of the reasons for this was that the Chinese government did not translate the “new” context into English in its official translation of the white paper, nor did it emphasize the negative effects of the “old” context. For instance, though the original white paper clearly stated “China’s new political party system has created a new model of party politics (中国新型政党制度创造了一种新的政党政治模式),” the English version of the document merely states “This is a unique political model.”

In fact, another reason why foreign media did not report on this much is that this system is not new at all. Before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party held political consultative conferences with other parties and citizen groups. After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, it was stipulated again as a political system to achieve party leadership via the “Opinion on maintaining a political consultation system and multi-party cooperation led by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.” Later, the “Opinion of the Central Committee on further strengthening of the establishment of a political consultation system and multi-party cooperation led by the Chinese Communist Party” (2005) and the white paper “China’s Political System” (2007) were released. Thus, the “new political party system” was already previously established as a political system.

If this was the case, why was this called a “new system?” Soon after the release of the white paper, multiple papers explaining “why this is new” were also released, which had the following views in common.¹⁰ In fact, they call representative democracies based on elections in Western countries an “outdated political system” and, in contrast to this, say that political parties other than the Communist Party in China are coalition parties. Thus, since eight “democratic parties” and people unaffiliated with a political party participate under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, they say that China avoids two issues seen in “outdated political party systems:” 1) Few people and advocacy groups serving small numbers of people are represented and 2) There is discussion, but nothing is decided or implemented. They say that this makes the Chinese system superior. Similarly, the white paper evaluates “China’s new political party system” as a “new model for humanity’s political culture.” This explanation results from the Chinese Communist Party’s subjective self-assessment. In actuality, there are no checks and balances for the Communist Party’s power; in other words, the Chinese political system has always been plagued by the issue that its system gives rise to dysfunction, as “democratic parties” can consult with the Communist Party but basically cannot oppose or disagree. In addition, since the Chinese “new political party system” is theoretically considered a form of consultative democracy or competitive authoritarianism, it is not necessarily unique to China.

4. Theorizing “Chinese-style democracy”—competition with the west

According to the logic of the Chinese party-state system, the CPC system is part of a united front effort with other interest groups; additionally, it is positioned as part of a “Chinese-style democracy,” which broadly absorbs the will of the people from the perspective of national governance. On December 4 2021, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper entitled “Chinese Democracy” (中国的民主). Based on the premise that “democracy is a value common to all mankind,” the white paper argues that China has an “whole process people’s democracy” that is consistent with its own national conditions. “Whole process people’s democracy,” a key phrase that General Secretary Xi Jinping used at the 100th anniversary ceremony of the Communist Party of China in July 2021, refers to “advancing the people-centered development idea and developing people’s democracy of the whole process.”¹¹ It was also explained in the following statements: “the system of people’s congresses is an important institutional vehicle for realizing whole process people’s democracy in China” and “the people’s congress system, made by Chinese people under the CPC leadership, is a great creation in the history of political systems as well as a brand new system of great significance in the political history of both China and the world” at the Communist Party’s first Central People’s Grand Work Conference in October 2021.¹²

At the same time, the CPC was actively involved in international publicity activities. A “Democracy: Common Values for All Humanity” forum was held online, inviting representatives from more than 120 countries and regions and over 20 international organizations.¹³ One of the objectives was to demonstrate the forum’s superiority in numbers, given that only 110 countries and regions participated in the Summit for Democracy held by the Biden administration. Such a response was part of a strategy of discursive power, which is discussed in greater detail later, to influence public opinion at home and abroad. This can be also seen as an extension of the policy to make “greater efforts to construct China’s own discourse and narrative, interpreting China’s practices by its own theories,” a statement made by Xi Jinping at the 30th Group Study of the CPC Central Political Bureau at the end of May 2021.¹⁴ The aim of the summit would have been, first and foremost, to tout the “whole process people’s democracy” proposed by Xi Jinping in domestic contexts. It may also have been a counter-tactic to delegitimize the Summit for Democracy since Taiwanese dignitaries were invited to the summit. However, as the white paper on “Chinese Democracy” was meant to “comprehensively summarize the remarkable achievements of China’s democratic development, and to thoroughly explain the value concept, institutional procedures, participation practices and world significance of the whole process of people’s democracy,” it did not formulate any new political system.

Why, then, is the Xi Jinping administration taking on the US with regard to democracy? In light of its harsh criticism of the US in the “Democratic Situation in the United States” report released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 5, it is reasonable to assume that China has gone on the offensive in its interregional competition with the US. To begin with, the Biden administration has tended to emphasize “democracies versus autocracies,” the legitimacy of democratic politics when discussing interregional competition with China and Russia, and democracy as a value system when advocating international cooperation.

What are the logical features of the “Chinese-style democracy” white paper, then? First, it asserts that China’s political system with democratic institutions embedded in a one-party dictatorship is superior to the U.S.-style democratic system; in other words, China has institutional superiority. This aggressive logic has actually been deployed before: at a meeting of top US-China diplomats in March 2021, Yang Jiechi referred to “Chinese-style democracy” and forcefully argued that the US side’s claim was the fallacy. The “values common to all humankind” mentioned by Yang at this meeting were proposed as values linked to the “community of the destiny of humankind” that the Xi Jinping administration extols.¹⁵ “Chinese-style democracy” refers to a political system in which representatives are elected through partial elections (“electoral democracy”) and popular will is consolidated through debate to achieve so-called “democracy through discussion” (“deliberative democracy”). Similarly, at a press conference held in conjunction with the release of the white paper, Tian Peiyin, Deputy Director of the Central Policy Research Office, harshly criticized the U.S. electoral system, saying, “A democracy that wakes up only when people vote and then goes dormant, that listens to slogans during the campaign but has nothing to say afterward, that gives preferential treatment only during voting and leaves people alone after the election is not a real democracy. Such a democracy is not a real democracy, and the Chinese people do not like or need such a democracy.”

As democracy is certainly not a perfect political system, the arguments for the logic of “Chinese-style democracy” are of mixed validity, and the difficulty in handling it lies in the fact that it cannot be totally denied. However, Tian Peiyuan continues, “Chinese democracy is a people’s democracy under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and party members and cadres at all levels must ensure that the power given to them by the people is always used for the people’s benefit.” (The Chinese Communist Party’s self-praise that “such a democracy is broader, truer, and more effective than that of the United States” was heavily tinged with propaganda and lacked objectivity.)

Another feature of the white paper is that it presents a concept of “democracy” that differs from the existing conventional understandings of democracy. For example, the opening of the white paper states that “democracy is a common value for all mankind and a key idea that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have maintained throughout history.”¹⁶Additionally, the “democratic situation in the United States” is briefly explained in this manner: “(democracy) means ‘people’s rule’ and ‘sovereignty over the people.’”¹⁷ Here, “democracy” in China refers to the political situation in which the people have and exercise power, which is a rather broad and fundamental concept. The white paper also stipulates that “whether a state is democratic is to be evaluated and judged by the people of that state.” In contrast, in existing theories of democracy, the structure and functionality of the design of political institutions are estimated in terms of basic indicators to measure the degree of democratization. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), for example, provides a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset to measure five high-level principles of democracy – electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.¹⁸ While existing political theories attempt to measure the level of democracy using objective indicators that exclude cultural and social conditions, the concept of “democracy” proposed by China is extremely subjective in its boundaries.

Given the criticism that the Summit for Democracy brought about a clear dichotomy between who was invited and who was not invited, however, it is possible that some countries may find Chinese-style “democracy” attractive. Such a shake-up of the concept of democracy itself can be seen as a platform for the Biden administration to redefine the “democracies versus autocracies” opposition as “U.S.-style democracy versus Chinese-style democracy.

5. Why theorize about China’s political originality?—china seeks its “discourse power (话语权)”¹⁹

Why has China’s theory of political systems been adapted in this way? The starting point may have been the Xi Jinping administration’s announcement of theoretical reforms for the political system in 2013. At the “New Year’s Talks with People Outside the Party” supervised by the Communist Party Central Committee, Xi indicated that the examination of “socialist coalition parties unique to China that work together with democratic groups and the Chinese Communist Party” was needed. This announcement was considered a “combination of themes in theoretical research and important events that occurred in the political context from 2013 to 2014.”²⁰ Ideological policies were being strengthened at this time in the wider political context – even beyond China. On August 19^th, 2013, at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, Xi Jinping said, “We must clearly understand our power to lead in ideological policy, our power in manage, and our discourse power.” In the same way, the idea of discourse power (话语权) was used in domestic ideological policies to mean “the power to lead discourse.” Much of the discourse, nevertheless, focused on China’s ability to be influential on an international level.At the 18^th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session in November 2013, the following statement was issued: “The level of cultural openness must be increased. We must stick to political leadership, corporate agency, market management, social participation, and expand foreign cultural diplomacy, strengthen international transmission of information and the establishment of foreign discourse systems, and forge ahead with letting China face the world” [emphasis added by author].²¹ The meaning of “discourse system (话语体系)” is a framework for discourse with theoretical consistency. According to the People’s Daily, “China’s discourse system is fundamentally a theoretical expression and linguistic manifestation of China’s path. We must be able to explain how China’s path will succeed in the world and what its significance is for the world.”²² Accordingly, the “discourse system” must include the theoretical version of the Chinese model for development.

In examining this “discourse system,” its expression of rivalry with universal values, which are repeatedly implied to refer to human rights and democracy, must also be considered. For example, according to the State Council Information Office, “All discourse systems are also an expression of a specific ideology and have a political position. The clash of diverse discourse systems is actually an intersection between diverse strains of social thought and is a clash between political positions. Within ‘universal values,’ there is slander against Marxism, socialism, and the leadership of the Communist Party;”²³ this statement reveals antagonism toward the West. In this dissatisfaction with the unfairly low assessment of Chinese values based on “universal values” and in the active expression of a new discourse, one can see a desire for China to lead international discourse according to its own standards.

This strategy of discourse power has spread to the construction of a Chinese political model. The turning point was an important speech given by Xi Jinping on May 17^th, 2016 at the Symposium of the Work of Philosophy and Social Sciences, referred to as the 5.17 Speech.²⁴ The Symposium was organized by Xi himself and was held in Beijing, with participation from departments related to the party and nation, the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, the head of the marketing department for each region and municipality and the Xinjiang Production and Army Party Conference, researchers in Marxist theory, construction program consultation, and related fields of research. In this 5.17 Speech, Xi first emphasized the importance of philosophy and social science in modern China with the following statement: “Countries without developed natural sciences do not reach the top, and neither do countries without flourishing philosophy and social sciences” and “When human society makes rapid progress or achieves a major development, there is always a revolution in philosophical and social science knowledge and ideology leading the way.” In Western history, according to Xi Jinping, superior culture and ideology influenced society at times of great changes, such as in ancient Greece and Rome, the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, and the American Revolutionary War. Now, Xi argued, China is at the center of global changes. As a result, Xi stated that the role of philosophy and the social sciences has been increasing to motivate those in attendance.

Here, it is worth noting that, in addition to the expansion of “scientific systems and scholarly systems” for philosophy and social science, Xi Jinping also mentions once again: “we must be careful to strengthen the establishment of a discourse system and exhibit the results of our country’s philosophy and social science.” Xi describes his intention, saying, “We have the greatest discourse power when it comes to explaining China’s accomplishments and constructing a theory of China. However, the voice of our philosophy and social sciences internationally is relatively small. (…) We must lead the development of research and discussion in the international scholarly world, and create new concepts, categories and expressions that are easy to understand for international society.” It is under this political vision that reform was planned in China’s political party theory.

The phrase “new political party system” seems to have first appeared in 2018. Preceding this, from 2016 to 2017, there was much research – mainly in socialist schools and united front theoretical research institutions – focused on “increasing international discourse power related to China’s political system,” creating the structure for theories of the political system. For example, in 2018, Professor Daojiu Guo at the Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nanking University presented “research on strengthening the international communication ability of Chinese political theory, which was the result of the Tianjin Philosophy and Social Science Major Planning Project.²⁵ In March 2018, at the first session of the 13^th National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping declared political systems based on elections “outdated,” and laid out the following “three new points:”²⁶

1. China is new in terms of being a combination of Marxist theory and the reality of China, which effectively enables it to evade the harm of outdated political systems that only represent a small number of people and advocacy groups.

2. China is new in that each party and people unaffiliated with any party work closely together to face common goals, which effectively enables China to avoid harm that comes from the rotation of parties, negative competition, and not having one party in a supervising role.

3. China is new in terms of having systematized and standardized procedures for integrating proposals and opinions, effectively avoiding the harm of outdated systems in terms of being caught up in the profit of one faction, class, region or group, which leads to social division.

In these “three new points,” one can see the claim that a “new political party system” will overcome the harm of the West’s political system. In addition to legitimizing the political system of China, Xi’s “three new points” asserts the superiority of the Chinese system.

Why then doesn’t Xi administration assert its superiority when discussing the “new political party system” in the English-language white paper? Behind this decision seems to be a strong awareness of the necessity of “be[ing] accepted by international society.” At the 30^th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in late May 2021, Xi Jinping said, “We must explain Chinese accomplishments in terms of Chinese theory and channel Chinese theory into Chinese accomplishments, create new concepts, new categories and new expressions to integrate China and the rest of the world, and more perfectly and clearly present the story of China and the power of the ideology and spirit behind it.” He also discussed the importance of “international discourse power befitting China’s full national power and international position.”²⁷ It is believed that the primary emphasis must be on the formation of discourses that would lead to acceptance of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule.

Under the current international circumstances, the greatest concern also lies in whether Russia supports the idea. Following a meeting between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Feb. 4, the two countries issued a joint statement on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development. The joint statement says that the two countries share a common recognition regarding democracy and human rights in the first item of the joint statement.²⁸ It states, “Certain states’ attempts to impose their own “democratic standards” on other countries, to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria, … prove to be nothing but flouting of democracy and go against the spirit and true values of democracy,” This implies the two countries’ will to challenge the conventional definition of and criteria for democracy.

Such a recognition is an antithesis to universal values while representing China’s stance in its cognitive warfare against Western countries. China has proposed building “a community with a shared future for mankind” to deepen ties with its partner countries not only by standing against the US or cooperating in economic areas, but also through seeking to share a strategic vision. In that sense, forming a united front with Russia is also crucial for China in terms of constructing discourse power.

A US-China summit was held in Indonesia in November 2022 in conjunction with the G20 summit meeting. In a briefing after the meeting, then-State Councillor and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi described another “red line” in addition to the Taiwan issue as follows; “Attempting to subvert the leadership of the CPC and China’s socialist system would mean stepping on the bottom line and crossing the red line, which will undermine the foundation of bilateral relations.”²⁹ He avoided a narrative of his country’s superiority in the current round of talks, though, there is no doubt that the Chinese side continues to emphasize its political system theory.

6. Conclusion

As argued above, the proposal of China’s “new political party system” was implemented as a political tool to formulate a new social science theory led by Xi Jinping, but it did not bring about any major changes to China’s political consultation system itself, in which “democratic parties” can consult with the CPC but basically cannot oppose or disagree. Additionally, the phrase was created amidst conflict around discourse power with the West, and was a significant argument in its connection to China’s diplomatic strategy. Discussion of China’s political system is likely to become all the more important amidst structural conflict between the US and China.

*This is a revised version of my article “Chinese-Style Democracy: Competition or Coexistence of Political Systems?” published in International Affairs, No. 711 in Japanese.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Naoko Eto

Naoko Eto is professor at the Department of Political Science, Gakushuin University. Her main research interests include contemporary Chinese politics and Japan-China relations. Before taking up her current position, she was an associate senior research fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) and a research fellow at the Center for Area Studies, National Institutes for the Humanities (NIHU). She holds an MA in international policy studies from Stanford University and a PhD in political science from Keio University. She was also a visiting research fellow at the School of International Studies, Peking University (2004–2005) and the East Asian Institute, Singapore National University (2019–2020). Her recent publications include Japan in the Context of Chinese Nationalism: The Transformation of “Patriotism” and the Issue of Differing Historical Perspectives (in Japanese, Keiso Shobo, 2014); “Chinese Nationalism from the Angle of Japan-China Relations” (Nations and Nationalism, Vol 22, No.3, July 2016); “An Emerging Structure of Japan-China Relations: Constant Maritime Tension and Mutual Cooperation” (in Proc. Japanese Views on China and Taiwan: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1, 2018); “Japan-China Strategic Communications Dynamics under the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of ‘Third Country Business Cooperation’” (Asian Perspective, Vol. 45, no.3, Summer 2021).

Notes

^1. Both the original and English translation are posted on the website of “The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

^2. For further explanation of Mao Zedong’s words, see “Zhongguogemingqudechenggong de ‘Sanda Fabao’ shishenme?” [What are the “Three Great Treasures” of the Successful Chinese Revolution?] cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/64157/4418419.html.

^3. Eto, “Views on China Shukinpeiseikennoyoronyudou.”

^4. “Zhongguogongchandangtongyizhanxiangongzuotiaoli (Shixing) dan’shengji.”[The Birth of the “CCP United Front Work Regulations (Trial)”].

^5. “CCP Unified Front Work Regulations (Trial)” in People’s Daily, September 23^rd, 2015.

^6. “Zhonggongzhongyangyinfa.

“Zhongguogongchandangtongyizhanxiangongzuotiaoli,” [Central Communist Party of China Issue“CPC Unified Front Work Regulations”] in People’s Republic of China website, January 5^th, undefined.

^7. People’s Daily reviewer, “Kaichuangxinshidaitongyizhanxiangongzuoxinjumian,” [.

New Phase of Unified Front Work in the New Era of Opening and Creation] in People’s Daily, January 6^th, 2021.

^8. “Liuwen ‘Zhongguogongchandangtongyizhanxiangongzuotiaoli,’” [Six QuestionsChinese Communist Party Unified Front Work Ordinance] Central United Front Work Department website, January 6^th.

^9. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

^10. “Zhongguoxinxingzhengdangzhiduheyiwei‘xin,’” [What is “New” about China’s New.

Political Party System] The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, August 11^th, 2021; “Dongxiwen | Qiang, Ge. Zhongguoxinxingzhengdangzhidu“xin”|“Dongxiwen | Qiang, Ge. Zhongguoxinxingzhengdangzhidu‘xin’zaihechu?” [Question | Qiang, Ge. What is “New” about China’s New Political Party System?]” China News Service, August 26^th; “[CRI jihyo]Chugoku no shingataseitouseido no dokoga atarashii noka,” [【CRI

Review】What’s New about China’s New Political Party System?] China News Service (Japanese version), June 26^th, 2021.

^11. “Xijinping.

zaiqingzhuzhongguogongchandangchengli100zhouniandahuishangdejianghua.” [Xi Jinping: Speech at the Conference to Celebrate the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China] Xinhua Net, July 1, 2021. It was originally reportedly raised by Xi Jinping during his visit to the Changning District of Shanghai in November 2019.

^12. “Xijinpingzaizhongyangrendagongzuohuiyishangfabiaozhongyaojianghua.” [Xi Jinping.

Delivered an Important Speech at the Central People’s Congress Work Conference]

^13. “Minzhu:Quanrenleigongtongjiazhiguojiluntanzaijingkaimu.”[International Forum on “Democracy: A Common Value for All Humanity” Opens in Beijing] in People’s Daily, December 4, 2021.

^14. “Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Improving China’s International Communication Capacity,” in Xinhua Net, June 1, 2021.

^15. “Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi Hold China-U.S. High-level Strategic Dialogue with Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China webpage, March 11, 2021.

^16. Chinese State Council Information Office, “‘Zhongguodeminzhu’ baipishu(quanwen),”[White Paper on “Democracy in China” (Full Text)] December 4, 2021.

^17. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meiguominzhuqingkuang,”[Democracy in the United States], December 5, 2021.

^18. Referred on the Varieties of Democracy webpage. https://www.v-dem.net/.

19. This section was originally published as “China’s Quest for Huayu Quan: Can Xi Jinping Change the Terms of International Discourse?” by author in 2017, substantially revised and updated.

^20. Huang, “Chapter 3: The Relationship Between United Front and Political Parties,” 87–88.

^21. “Zhonggongzhongyangguanyuquanmianshenhuagaigeruoganzhongdawentidejieding.”

[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several

Major Issues of Comprehensively Deepening Reform (Passed by the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Session of the Central Committee of the CPC on November 12, 2013)”]

^22. WangandWang.“Renminribaorenminyaolun:buduanzengqiangzhongguohuayutixideganranli.”[People’s Daily Key Points: Continuously Enhance the Appeal of China’s Discourse System].

^23. State Council Newspaper Office, “Huayutixijiangoudehexinyaoyiyuneizailuoji.”[The Core Meaning and Inner Logic of the Construction of the Discourse System].

^24. “Xijinping: zaizexueshehuikexuegongzuotanhuishangdejianghua (quanwen),”

[Xi Jinping: Speech at the Symposium on Philosophy and Social Sciences (full text)] Xinhua net.

^25. Guo, “Zengqiangzhongguozhengdanglilunhuayuyanjiu.” [Strengthening Chinese.

Political Party Theory International Spoken Rights Research];Or, “‘He’yizixin: zengqiangzhongguozhengdanglilunhuayuquanyanjiu—

Jiantanmakesizhuyiyuchuantongwenhuajieheshiyexiadezhongguozhengdangxieshangzhidao,” [Confidence through “Consolidation:” A Study on Enhancing the Theoretical Discourse Power of Chinese Political Parties – The Way of Political Party Consultation in China under the Perspective of Combining Marxism and Traditional Culture] United Front Work Department of Dalian City Municipal Party Committee.

^26. “Establishing the ‘New’ and Eliminating the ‘Harm’:” Xi Jinping Discusses the New Political Party System,”[立“新”除“弊” 习近平纵论新型政党制度]Xinhua net.

^27. “Jiaqianghegaijinguojichuanbogongzuo, Zhanshizhenshilitiquanmiandezhongguo,”[Strengthening and Improving International Communication: Showing the Real, Three-Dimensional and Comprehensive China] People’s Daily, June 2^nd, 2021.

^28. “Russia-China Joint Statement on International Relations, February 4, 2022,” USC US-China Institute.

^29. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi Briefs the Media on the Meeting between Chinese and U.S. Presidents and Answers Questions.”