ABSTRACT
Shigeru Ishiba is a heavyweight in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and served as Defence Minister from 2007 to 2008. In this interview, he shares his views on the role of nuclear weapons in US–Japan alliance and Japan’s security policy. Especially, he put emphasis on the need to ensure that extended deterrence by US nuclear weapons is always credible, while he acknowledges the miseries of nuclear weapons. In the face of growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme, Ishiba also noted that Japan’s policy of not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons in its territory should be re-examined, effectively casting doubt on the third pillar of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Missile defence is another item that he thinks must be strengthened to enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrence. He went on to praise Japan’s plutonium policy as this constitutes ‘potential nuclear deterrence’ for Japan.
Nuclear Deterrence and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
The logic of nuclear deterrence is premised on the reality of the threat of mass destruction. It assumes that relations between nuclear-armed states can be stabilised as long as opponents’ behaviour is under control with the threat. This logic is, however, accompanied by humanitarian problems, the risk of accidental nuclear war and the risk of failure of nuclear deterrence. Taking into account these aspects, how do you think about the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear weapons from a security point of view?
I know the miseries of nuclear weapons very well. A film which recorded the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was released in the United States – I guess it was in 1968. I was, then, only a sixth-grader in elementary school, but I still remember how stunned I was by the film. I am second to none in acknowledging the miseries of nuclear weapons and believing that they should never be used again.
Having said that, I must also contend that Japan’s security policy is, as is the case with many other countries, based on the logic of balancing power. Basically, war should not break out in the parity of military power. A ‘balance of fear’ during the Cold War era was a manifestation of such logic. Even now, what is most important is how to maintain the balance of force. Here lies the purpose of possessing nuclear weapons as deterrence by punishment. The same logic can be applied to relations between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, between the US and China, between the US and Russia and between India and Pakistan in the contemporary world. In that sense, I do not think that the desirability of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons is incompatible with the belief that they are necessary at this moment.
Do you think that nuclear weapons are necessary for the time being, but that we should seek to ultimately get rid of them if the security environment changes in the future?
Exactly. In addition, Japan cannot virtually possess nuclear weapons. With respect to Japan’s security policy, we need to utilise our best efforts to ensure deterrence by denial. Missile defence is a case in point, and we also have to build nuclear shelters nationwide. Our scheme to protect civilians in the case of nuclear attacks needs to be further strengthened.
Missile defence is, I think, the most important element among a variety of deterrence mechanisms by denial in our possession. It is true that there is no limit to how much we build up our missile defences: ‘If you strike us with missiles, we will shoot all of them down. Even if you attack us, we will let nobody die’. If we can build deterrence by denial in such a spirit, opponents will give up striking us with missiles. We need to continue to make efforts in that direction. However, this is feasible only in the case of missile attack. In the case of the suitcase bomb, missile defence does not make any sense. Therefore you must take note that missile defence does not provide sufficient credibility for deterrence by denial.
At this moment, both deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial depend on our alliance with the US. How do you think of the US policy of extended deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in it?
It is only when China carried out a nuclear test on 16 October 1964 that Japan began to seriously consider whether it should go nuclear. On the 7th day of the Tokyo Olympic Games, China conducted the test on purpose. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who had taken office in November on the retirement of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, told US ambassador Reischauer firmly that Japan’s nuclerisation would be inevitable. This occurred only 19 years after the end of the Pacific War. It was imperative for the US to prevent Japan from going nuclear, so the US encouraged Japan to adopt the so-called ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ in exchange for providing Japan with a nuclear umbrella. This is how the situation has developed.
Although the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet entered into force (it did so in 1970), Japan adopted the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. These include the principles of not making, not possessing and not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons. Eisaku Sato himself recalled later that not introducing nuclear weapons was the wrong policy, but the three principles became a national policy at that time. Here we had the Soviet Union and China in mind when it came to extended deterrence.
So, how about the situation now? China and Russia – the latter being the successor nation of the former Soviet Union – are both permanent members of the UN Security Council. So it is almost inconceivable that they will use nuclear weapons. In contrast, we cannot deny the possibility of actual use of nuclear weapons by North Korea. We cannot safely assume that the country will not dare to use them simply because it means the end of its regime. It does not make an essential difference whether the target of North Korean missiles is Washington DC, New York, Hawaii (where the command of the US Pacific Force is located), or strategically important Guam or US bases in Japan. The fact that North Korea has come to possess missiles that can reach these places, or might possess them in the future, has a new meaning for us.
Against this background, the credibility of US extended deterrence – which means committing itself to implementing nuclear retaliation even through US mainland or military bases are within the reach of nuclear missiles – has to be scrutinised. The Japanese government has to be held accountable for this.
The Credibility of Extended Deterrence
I would now like to ask you about the credibility and reliability of extended deterrence with nuclear weapons. The US has provided Japan with some information about nuclear extended deterrence. But they will not disclose to any country detailed nuclear strategies related to the survival of the United States, or concrete operational options for actual nuclear use. The US has officially maintained the ‘Neither confirm nor deny’ policy regarding the location of nuclear weapons. So how can we scrutinise the credibility of extended deterrence or reach a conclusion that reliable nuclear deterrence for Japan does exist and function?
During the Cold War, the former West Germany asked the US to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missile Pershing II to counter similar weapons of the former Soviet Union. The purpose was to make the idea of nuclear extended deterrence more credible. French President de Gaulle decided to develop independent nuclear forces against US opposition according to his belief that allies do not share the same fate, even when they fight jointly. In contrast, Britain adopted American nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons technology almost as they were, and has continued to be a nuclear power. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy or Belgium have secured extended deterrence through nuclear sharing with the US. And, among some NATO non-nuclear weapons states and the US as a nuclear power, the credibility of nuclear extended deterrence has been confirmed both at the political level and at the working level.
How about Japan? Have we always checked the credibility of nuclear extended deterrence at the working or political level? I do not think we have done enough. I remember my discussion about this issue with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice under the Bush administration when I was the Secretary of State for Defense (2002–04). Rice stated that this was the first time this issue had ever been raised by Japanese politicians. Anyway, I have heard that a process to review the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence then began and has made some progress. Of course, I know that the US cannot disclose everything. Basically, the US does not confirm or deny whether a particular vessel is loaded with nuclear weapons. But the credibility of nuclear extended deterrence has to be scrutinised and checked among both non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states.
You raised the deployment of US nuclear weapons and nuclear sharing as options adopted by NATO non-nuclear weapons states. But both of these options were introduced in the Cold War era and look to be obsolete. Are they what Japan should now adopt?
Given present-day nuclear deterrence, allowing the physical presence of nuclear weapons in our soil might not be significant. But it is logically contradictory to rely on nuclear extended deterrence while refusing their introduction.
In the post-Cold War era, as a general rule, the US has ceased to deploy nuclear weapons outside the US territory except for strategic submarines. It is true that some South Korean politicians have begun to call for the deployment of nuclear weapons. But, as far as I know, the US does not plan to change its post-Cold War policy. The latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) under the US Trump administration expands the role of nuclear weapons, and shows its willingness to develop new and more ‘usable’ sea-deployable nuclear weapons. According to the NPR, the US, when deemed necessary, is ready to deploy dual capable aircrafts (DCAs) and nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. However, it does not seem that its willingness corresponds with its capability. The US remains cautious in deploying nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. As such, it is appropriate to conclude that the US will not change this line with respect to Japan as well. If so, more doubt may be cast on the credibility of nuclear extended deterrence due to Japan’s obsession to nuclear weapons and the consequent discord between the US and Japan. I am fully aware that we need serious discussion on this issue.
In what case is it necessary to use nuclear weapons, and in what case is it unnecessary? Is the US willing to use nuclear weapons for the sake of allies even in the case where the US mainland, Guam or Hawaii might be subject to nuclear counter-attacks and huge casualty is expected? If asked, some may argue that the US will not take such a risk. Experts or high-ranking officials both in Japan and the US say so in public. To eliminate this concern, it is necessary to have regular discussions in the Japan–US political level. However quickly an intercontinental missile flies, it takes some time to reach North Korea. It is almost inconceivable that there will be no additional counter-measures initiated from US bases in Japan, because they are close to the Korean Peninsula. Considered in this context, it is meaningless not to allow nuclear weapons into Japanese territory.
US bases in Japan can act both as deterrents and targets for enemies. But you still think that the advantage of deterrence is larger than the risk of being a target?
Exactly.
Prior Consultation Mechanism Based on the US–Japan Security Treaty
This is also a hypothetical scenario, but let me ask you this question because it is important. Imagine a situation under which Japan suffers from North Korea’s nuclear first strike. Of course, this should never happen – this would be a serious situation where we would suffer the third atomic bombing of a city after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This would be an unimaginable emergency more severe than that following the Great East Japan Earthquake, at least when it comes to victim relief. Even under this situation, do we still need to request the US to wage a nuclear strike on North Korea? Or will we concur with the US when the US intends to strike back with nuclear weapons? It might be strategically reasonable to carry out nuclear retaliation against North Korea if it makes a third strike completely impossible. But doing so is not easy. If so, don’t you think that it is extremely difficult to judge whether we should retaliate against North Korea with nuclear weapons?
It is because this is extremely difficult that we need to have regular consultations with the US on this matter. About 15 years ago, we knew to some extent when and from where North Korea would launch missiles. We also knew how many missiles would come. But North Korea has come to possess solid fuel-type missiles. They can now launch them anytime, anywhere. Besides, there is no way to detect the point from which they will launch missiles since they use transporter erector launchers (TELs). Also, by using a cold launch (perpendicular launch) system (missiles are discharged completely in the air after launched lightly from a launch pad), they can now launch many missiles from the same launch pad with less damage inflicted on infrastructure. Therefore, we have no idea how many missiles will be incoming. We cannot be sure that there will be no third strike from North Korea.
That means this is a matter of probability. Under the situation where no one is certain about what follows, Japanese political leaders need to decide whether they concur with the US with respect to nuclear retaliation, or whether they ought to request that the US retaliate. This is a very serious decision, not only for the government, but also for the people. I wonder if we have established a decision-making system to face such an extreme emergency, or a political system that can take into account people’s reactions.
That’s why I have maintained we need such a discussion. At the same time, this is what responsible politicians such as myself must explain to citizens. What we have done so far is merely to advocate two policies, that is, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy. However, have we really engaged in substantial debate about them? I do not necessarily think so. The Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy means a besieged battle. We cannot carry this out without sufficient fuel, food, ammunition or personnel. But I do not think that we have had enough debate in the national legislature about how to implement the policy. With respect to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, we have failed to examine whether the principles have really contributed to Japan’s deterrence, and, if the answer is no, whether we should revise the policy.
We have a prior consultations system in the US–Japan Security Treaty. Could you tell me how the system will be implemented when US bases in Japan are attacked, or when populated areas are attacked by nuclear weapons? Of course, these two scenarios are different.
I think that we need to conduct simulations on various cases in a standing organisation before beginning a prior consultation.
What do you think about this?
Naturally speaking, it depends on which scenario eventuates.
Especially when US bases are attacked, Japan will have almost no say in the matter.
If the US is willing to counter-attack as an execution of its right of individual self-defence, Japan will have almost no say.
Here’s another hypothetical case. Do you think Japan will ask the US to engage in prior consultation regarding a nuclear retaliation to North Korea when Japanese cities are exposed to its nuclear first strike?
The US wishes to retaliate with nuclear weapons and wants Japan to accept it – is that the scenario you have in mind?
Or, Japan might ask the US to retaliate with nuclear arms.
That’s possible.
It is not impossible to raise the issue in a prior consultation.
It’s possible.
But the Japanese government does not have any clear idea about the way they raise the issue and what kind of solutions are possible.
That’s why I have maintained we need such scrutiny.
The Role of Missile Defence
It is said missile defence (MD) is part of deterrence by denial. However, the capability of interception is limited due to technical problems. So why is this an effective strategy to deter North Korea?
MD is a pillar of multiple choices in deterrence by denial. Even if it is not perfect, we still have nuclear umbrellas. I know all the incoming missiles cannot be intercepted with MD. Even if that is possible, we cannot perfectly respond to saturation attacks (simultaneous attacks with an overwhelming number of missiles which exceeds the number of interceptors).
That’s because we don’t have enough interceptors.
But it is much better than not having anything. All we can do is raise the standard of security by combining extended deterrence, MD and the protection of nationals. When I was a Minister of State for Defense, we made an agreement with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on a joint research and development programme about a new interceptor SM-3 Block 2A system. Reportedly, the system has double the capacity of the current type of SM-3 missiles. It will be operational very soon. However, I was then told that it was totally impossible to intercept all the missiles or that there was no cost-effectiveness. Some say this is as if shooting down a bullet with a bullet. Nevertheless, its goal has been achieved and new interceptors are about to be deployed. Even if it’s not perfect, it could make a substantial difference.
Japan emphasises that its MD system is aimed at North Korea. Nevertheless, China and Russia are opposed to the move since it may be detrimental to their respective nuclear deterrence. What do you think of this, and how do you make counter-arguments?
I visited China as a Minister of State for Defense who had decided to develop a MD programme. In intensive discussions with the Chinese Secretary of Defense and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, opposition was voiced against Japan’s MD. I asked: ‘This is only for interception and not intended to inflict damages on a country from where nuclear-armed missiles will be launched. Why are you opposed to this?’ But the Chinese side could provide no counter-argument. China was concerned with the possible impact on nuclear missiles that they had built up. But we would not postpone the deployment of our MD system for the sake of making China’s nuclear missiles robust. I said: ‘This is a system to defend ourselves from missiles of rogue states or terrorists. It is inconceivable for China to launch a missile against Japan out of antagonism. So this does not work against China’. They were not able to refute my argument. Some of them then asserted that MD would facilitate an arms race. When I asked them if they would then build up missile capabilities that could outstrip our defence system, they couldn’t answer. So I consider that we have their understanding through this conversation.
Basically, Japan’s MD is a reaction to North Korea’s move.
It is.
How would you deal with our MD system if Korean Peninsula becomes stabilised and North Korea is going to abandon its nuclear weapons in the future? Would you keep Japan’s MD intact with China or Russia in mind, or discard it when the North Korea problem is solved?
Unlike North Korea, missile launch pads in China or Russia are far from Japan. Their missiles should fly very fast when they try to hit Japan. We can deal with them with state-of-the-art SM-3 Block2A interceptors. Another issue is whether Japan can intercept missiles flying from China or Russia to the US mainland. The security legislation that has recently been enacted permits Japan to exercise a limited right to collective self-defence. When a ‘Survival-Threatening Situation’ is recognised, one in which Japan’s survival is threatened and a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness is posed, it is possible to intercept missiles heading to the US.1
In that case, you have to make a decision in a very short period of time.
Exactly. Or those missiles might be able to constitute as a ‘rapid dog’ or ‘runaway horse’ that endanger citizens’ lives or property as stipulated in Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Act.2 In that case, we could possibly intercept them under the concept of a right of international policing.
We need to facilitate global discussions on the future of MD so that this will not lead to an arms race. Do you agree with me?
Threat is composed of capability and intention. Since decision-making processes in other countries differs from that of ours, I cannot expect to understand how this mechanism would work in practice. This is why we need to keep on engaging in confidence-building measures through dialogue even if they appear to be indirect. However, it is important for any country to avoid building up its military capability.
Potential Nuclear Deterrence
Meanwhile, you have drawn our attention to the necessity of ‘potential nuclear deterrence’. Japan possesses a good amount of plutonium that could be used as a material for nuclear weapons, and it also has technical capabilities to manufacture nuclear warheads or missiles. That is, Japan has potential capability to acquire nuclear weapons. What matters is whether Japan intends to do this. You have just contended that Japan will not go nuclear. I do not think Japanese citizens consider this a viable option. Against this background, do you really think your line of argument about potential nuclear deterrence is relevant? Don’t you think it has more disadvantages than advantages?
They often say, ‘If Japan gets serious about it’. There are various estimations about how long it will take for Japan to develop nuclear weapons – from three month to a year. We could physically develop nuclear weapons or missiles with advanced Japanese science and technology. It is true there is no room for testing in Japan. And, needless to say, I have maintained in numerous occasions of parliamentary debate that Japan’s constitution does not prohibit the government form possessing nuclear weapons if it is a defence force within the ‘minimum necessary level’. Not only in the context of nuclear non-proliferation, but also in the context of credibility of nuclear umbrella for Japan, the US has repeatedly warned other countries that Japan might go nuclear if they continue to be insensitive to Japan’s security concerns.
Your argument is also aimed at raising awareness in the US Congress or China about how serious North Korea’s problem is by letting them know Japan’s readiness to arm itself with nuclear weapons
Yes, that is one of the desired effects, I think.
And you extend this argument consciously.
Definitely. Another issue is that you cannot defend yourself from nuclear attack without knowing what a nuclear weapon is. Having no knowledge about nuclear weapons means having no knowledge about how to minimise damage to citizens under nuclear attack.
Do you think that only knowing the experiences of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Fukushima is insufficient?
Even though we have experienced such a plight, we have failed to draw systematic lessons and wisdom from this experience for the protection of our nationals. Right after WWII, the US sent the Strategic Bombing Survey all over Japan and conducted thorough investigations about casualties. For example, so many more people were dead in Tokyo than in Germany even though the number of bombs dropped was fewer in Tokyo. What was revealed in the survey is that the Japanese Imperial Government had not taken any effective measures to evacuate citizens away from battlefields. A lot of women, the elderly and sick or injured people were left in Tokyo and thus killed. The conflict between the Department of Interior and the Department of Army over which department was in charge of the Air Defense Law led to the government’s inaction, which became a major cause of large casualties.
In Hiroshima, some people were saved, even near the hypocentre, because they hid themselves in the basement. The survey team found that the evacuation to the basement had lowered the death rate. This conclusion helped raise awareness about the need for nuclear shelters. The surveys in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were instrumental in building a network of nuclear shelters in the US during the Cold War.
But Japan itself has failed to do so. It is said that the maintenance rate of nuclear shelters is only 0.02% in Japan. We need to make full use of technologies in terms of nuclear defence to minimise damage to people in the future. Japan cannot avoid nuclear attacks merely by abandoning technologies about nuclear weapons and choosing not to make shelters. The government must make efforts to limit damages.
If Japan tries to have a potential nuclear deterrent, it needs a uranium-enrichment facility or a reprocessing facility to extract plutonium, or both. But this could have the unintended consequence of risking nuclear proliferation. If Iran or South Korea wish to build a uranium-enrichment facility or a reprocessing facility alike, isn’t it detrimental to Japan’s non-proliferation diplomacy centring on the NPT?
I am aware of a plenty of contradictions or defects in the NPT. But it is much better than going without the treaty. Japan has always been subject to severe IAEA inspections and it has been proven difficult for the country to divert fissile materials to military use immediately. And this is also the case for Iran. It remains to be seen how Iran will develop its nuclear policy, but I would like Iran to be transparent as Japan. For some people, the NPT is an unequal regime and tantamount to a ‘nuclear apartheid’. We need to have a deeper discussion about possible cases of withdrawal from the treaty as stipulated in Article 10.3
If we emphasise that Japan is a potential nuclear power, enemy countries might construe Japan’s civilian nuclear fuel cycle facilities as military facilities. If so, these civilian facilities could be targets of attack in emergencies. Although international humanitarian laws prohibit the State Parties from carrying out military offensives on nuclear facilities, opponents might forcibly justify the attack on what they consider as ‘military facilities’. What do you think of this?
It is the custom of other countries and international society to make unjust charges if it is considered beneficial. In that sense, no facility is risk-free. What is more important is whether facilities in Japan are well-guarded or not.
Do you mean that both in terms of terrorist attacks and missile attacks?
Yes. In many countries around the world that use nuclear energy peacefully, such facilities are guarded basically by military forces. But in Japan, they are guarded by local police. Sending police forces in emergencies is not enough. Concentration of nuclear power plants along the Sea of Japan makes it necessary to have Self-Defense Forces guard the facilities, including by deploying Patriot interceptors to defend the Shimane nuclear power plants at the very least.
And this is not only about the Shimane prefecture.
Of course not. We need to be prepared not only for missiles but also for agents. We must have an intensive discussion about this. The more preparations we make, the less risk we will have.
Thank you very much.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Fumihiko Yoshida
Fumihiko Yoshida is Editor in Chief of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament and Vice Director of Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University. He was Deputy Director of the Editorial Board of the Asahi Shimbun. He served as a member of the Advisory Panel of Experts on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation for Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Notes
1 The ‘Three New Conditions’ are as follows.
(1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
(2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people;
(3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary.
2 Article 4: In the event of a dangerous situation, such as a natural disaster, incident, destruction of a structure, traffic accident, explosion of a hazardous materials, appearance of a rabid dog or runaway horse, severe crush, or the like, which is likely to endanger the lives or bodies of people or cause serious damage to property, a police official may provide necessary warning to persons who happen to be at the scene, the controller of relevant items and other persons concerned; and in cases of extreme urgency, the police official may restrain or evacuate persons who are liable to suffer harm within the limits of necessity to escape harm at the scene, or order persons who happen to be at the scene, controller of relevant items and any other persons concerned to take measures generally considered necessary for the prevention of harm, or take such measures himself or herself.
Source: Japanese Law Translation Database System http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2229&vm=04&re=2&new=1.
3 Article X Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.