Establishing Nuclear Weapons Obligations for a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

ABSTRACT

The United Nations General Assembly in 2019 held its first annual conference with the “aim of elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”. This process will need to consider what might be the core obligations relating to nuclear weapons to include in the long sought for treaty and zone. The measures suggested in this article draw on and w\ould serve to reinforce commitments that many states in the region have already accepted or offered support for, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The article also suggests some general principles and time-bound measures drawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that if adopted could enable a sustained period of confidence-building to stabilize a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. If a core aim of the Zone is to strengthen the stability of the region against nuclear proliferation risks, a shutdown of nuclear power programs would offer enduring benefits.

KEYWORDS:

• Middle east nuclear weapon free zone
• nuclear weapons
• disarmament
• nonproliferation
• middle east weapon of mass destruction free zone

Introduction

On 22 December 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution to convene an annual week-long international inter-governmental conference with the “aim of elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region”.¹ The first such conference was held in November 2019 at the United Nations in New York with 23 states from the region and four observer states (Britain, China, France, and Russia) participating – Israel and the United States did not attend (UN General Assembly 2019)²

The 2019 conference adopted a political declaration that participating states “welcome all initiatives, resolutions, decisions and recommendations on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”.³ The second session of the conference, scheduled for November 2020 was postponed because of the COVID pandemic and instead two informal workshops were held (July 2020 and February 2021)⁴ This article, based on a presentation to the second informal workshop, outlines some possible core obligations relating to nuclear weapons that could be considered in the further discussions and eventual negotiations for the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The discussion here is limited to the obligations that could be considered for adoption by the states that participated in the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. These countries will need to consider and find agreement among themselves on the scope, strictness, and duration of constraints on a range of nuclear activities potentially relevant to the treaty. Since all the relevant states would be accepting such constraints for themselves as well as on each other, these obligations will need to reflect commitments states have already made as part of other treaties and arrangements as well as new commitments they are willing to make to each other specifically for the purposes of this treaty. It is for these states and others, and civil society, to find ways and means to bring Israel on board, since it did not participate in the first Conference and may continue to choose to remain outside the process to protect its status as the only nuclear-armed Middle East nation.

The measures suggested here draw on and would serve to reinforce commitments that many states in the region have already accepted as parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZT). The measures also draw on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has now entered into force, since many states in the region were part of the treaty negotiations and voted in favor of adoption of the treaty text (for the status of membership in and expressed support for these four treaties, see Appendix 1). The Middle East Treaty Organization, a civil society initiative, has proposed a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East Draft Treaty that incorporates a similar approach and requires states to “sign and/or ratify, as applicable, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Chemical Weapons Convention” (METO (Middle East Treaty Organization) 2019).

This discussion also includes nuclear restraints and transparency measures adapted from a report for the International Panel on Fissile Panels on advancing a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction treaty (von Hippel, Mousavian, and Emad Kiyaei 2013). It also incorporates principles from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding time-bound treaty obligations to enable a sustained period of confidence-building that could aid stabilization of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Core Obligations

It is widely agreed that the minimum core obligations of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone should include those which are part of the NPT, as applied to non-weapon states. These obligations include⁵

• not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.

• not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, without safeguards.

The verification of obligations on the transfer and control over nuclear weapons is not laid out explicitly in the NPT. It is presumed that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as applied to non-weapon states can adequately monitor whether such a state is undertaking activities that run counter to the prohibition on manufacturing nuclear weapons. The limits of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA or INFCIRC/153 corrected), intended to be the basis for independently verifying that no nuclear material within a state is diverted from peaceful uses and related facilities not misused, led to a system of supplementary measures codified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540, corrected) (IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 1997).

To these longstanding and key NPT obligations could be added those relating to nuclear weapon testing as agreed under the CTBT. Restrictions on testing are necessary since the NPT did not bar nuclear tests. Article V of the NPT allows for non-weapon states to access “under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions”. This access was never exercised. The relevant nuclear testing obligations from the CTBT are⁶

• not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

• to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The verification of these obligations is limited to the actual conduct of a nuclear test explosion and is undertaken by the International Monitoring System managed by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. This global system of monitoring instruments does not serve to verify the prohibition on causing, encouraging, or participating in a nuclear test explosion or the positive obligation on a state to prohibit and prevent such an explosion on its territory. Nor does it verify research relevant to preparing a nuclear weapon test.

There are important additional obligations that some states in the region have accepted as part of the ANWFZT relating to the prohibition of research and development on nuclear weapons and prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons and transparency regarding the capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons. These activities are not covered explicitly by the NPT or CTBT. ANWFZT commitments that could be made core obligations in the Middle East Zone treaty include⁷

• not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;

• not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling of any nuclear explosive device;

• not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling of any nuclear explosive device.

• to declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.

• to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

ANWFZT verification and monitoring arrangements rely on the IAEA safeguards system and an annual reporting system by states parties. The prohibitions on research and development for weaponization, assistance and encouragement, declaring capability are not fully verifiable under the IAEA safeguards system, even with the substantial verification benefits associated with the application of the measures in the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA does have relevant experience in the region of verifying non-weaponization, first in Iraq and then in Libya and most recently in Iran. In the case of Iraq, “the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA: to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of Iraq’s nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any related subsystems or components or any related research, development, support or manufacturing facilities” (UN Security Council 1997). The IAEA reported that “monitoring and verification activities carried out since April 1997 have not revealed indications of the existence in Iraq of prohibited materials or activities. As regards prohibited equipment, the Iraqi counterpart has handed over to the IAEA a number of pieces of weaponisation-related equipment … This equipment is being removed from Iraq” (UN Security Council 1997).

In Libya, in 2004, the IAEA noted it had made an “assessment of nuclear weapon development capabilities”, and reported that “the Agency’s inspections have not led to the finding of specific facilities related to nuclear weapon component design, manufacturing or testing, and concluded that “in order to verify Libya’s declarations with regard to nuclear weaponization, the Agency has continued to review Libya’s nuclear capabilities with the cooperation of the Libyan authorities” (IAEA 2004).

More recently, as part of the process of achieving and implementing the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the IAEA and Iran agreed a process outside the standard safeguards procedures to clarify possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program prior to 2003. This was necessary because of IAEA information regarding 12 areas of “activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” and “activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile” (IAEA 2011):

• Program management structure

• Procurement activities

• Nuclear material acquisition

• Nuclear components for an explosive device

• Detonator development

• Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments

• Hydrodynamic experiments

• Modelling and calculations

• Neutron initiator

• Conducting a test

• Integration into a missile delivery vehicle

• Fuzing, arming and firing system

After its investigation of these 12 areas with Iranian cooperation, the IAEA concluded “these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities” (IAEA 2015). This makes clear a prohibition on nuclear weapon-related research and development can be verified, with appropriate transparency and cooperation from the state in question, including technical-expert meetings. This prohibition and the judgment that it can be verified was further codified in Section T of the JCPOA, which was endorsed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council, and requires that⁸

Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

• Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

• Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

• Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

• Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources.

None of the countries that are part of the current process to develop and agree a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction are believed to have ever made a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device. As long as this situation persists, there would seem to be no need to carry over from the ANWFZT the obligations on each party to “dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty” and “to destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where possible, to convert them to peaceful uses”. This obligation would only apply prospectively to Israel, should it join the treaty-making process and eventually join the treaty.

A fourth source of possible nuclear weapon-related core obligations for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction is the TPNW. All but four states who were involved in first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction have registered their support for the TPNW through their vote in favor of adoption of the treaty at the conclusion of the successful negotiating conference in 2017. The TPNW obligations reiterate NPT obligations and CTBT obligations and some ANWFZT obligations, notably “never under any circumstances to”:⁹

• develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

• transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;

• receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;

• use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

• assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

• seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

• allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

For states that have never had nuclear weapons, key obligations are intended to be verified by the IAEA safeguards system. As with the other treaties noted above, some prohibitions are not fully verifiable through this system.

All of the four treaties discussed, and the other NWFZ treaties, recognize and leave in place the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This is in part a political legacy of a technocratic view from the 1960s that nuclear energy inevitably would be a major source of energy and access to it should be protected through treaty rights, but with agreed regulations on its use because of nuclear energy’s connection through key materials, technologies, and knowledge to nuclear weapon proliferation. The imagined future of the widespread use of nuclear energy has not come to pass and the prospects for nuclear energy are increasingly uncertain (IPFM (International Panel on Fissile Materials) 2010). As of 2020, only 31 countries operate nuclear power reactors, with five countries generating about 70% of global nuclear electricity (which is only about 10% of global commercial gross electricity production), and some large, long-standing nuclear programs are coming to end. Germany’s nuclear phase-out will be completed by the end of 2022, other countries are moving towards a nuclear phase-out, there is limited new reactor constructions, and it is projected that worldwide by 2030 an additional 137 new reactors (with a combined capacity of 107.5 GW) would have to start up to replace expected closures (assuming no additional reactors are closed) to maintain the current global reactor fleet (Schneider and Froggatt et al. 2020).

The continued expected decline in interest in civilian nuclear energy globally because of increasingly poor economics compared to renewable energy, and the well-established risks from nuclear accidents, disposal of long-lived highly radioactive nuclear spent fuel, and possible proliferation, all may affect the actual future of nuclear energy programs in the Middle East. A Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction treaty could be well served by becoming also a nuclear energy-free zone. This would remove many possible sources of future security concerns and significantly ease verification demands.

In the absence of an early decision by states in the Middle East to forgo nuclear energy where states do not have it and a phase-out in states that already have it, it is worth considering how a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction treaty could help reduce concerns about national nuclear fuel cycle activities. It is clear from the history of the region over the past three decades that agreed additional measures of restraint and transparency with regard to nuclear fuel cycle activities that go beyond those in the NPT and its safeguards system could be useful. Over this period there has been significant regional and global concern about nuclear activities in Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria related to the pursuit nuclear weapon capabilities despite all these states being parties to the NPT and having safeguards.

A Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction could gain additional stability if the treaty obligations, directly or as a protocol to it, included an agreed system of verifiable nuclear fuel cycle constraints, some of indefinite duration and others that are initially bounded in time but potentially capable of being made indefinite. The notion of treaty obligations that are of limited duration but that could be extended by agreement of the parties is not without precedent. It is worth noting that while existing NWFZ treaties and all their obligations are of unlimited duration, the NPT as negotiated required (Article X.2) that “twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty”.

The potential positive value of such additional nuclear fuel cycle measures is that they put limits on nuclear activities of possible concern and introduce levels of transparency that together offer predictability and stability for an extended period after entry into force of such a treaty. This glide-path approach allows for the treaty and other political, economic, social, and technical processes to take effect and help further bind treaty parties in mutual, cooperative relationships.

This approach of using time-bound measures to create stability as part of an agreement underlies the JCPOA¹⁰ The measures there include caps and time limits for 8.5 years on some uranium enrichment centrifuge research and development activities, 10-year limits on some centrifuge production and operation activities, 15-year limits on uranium enrichment levels and locations, and on plutonium separation (reprocessing), heavy water production and heavy water reactors. The JCPOA also includes time-bound measures of additional transparencyfor instance, 10 years of oversight of the purchase of dual-use materials, 20 years of continuous monitoring of uranium enrichment centrifuge production, and 25 years of continuously monitoring of uranium mining and milling. There also are enduring commitments, including to not separate plutonium.

The process of reaching agreement on a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction treaty and achieving entry into force will have to run in parallel to the clock on the various JCPOA time-bound obligations – some of the core JCPOA obligations may end before the treaty enters into force, soon after entry into force, or long afterwards, unless these obligations are extended as part of the treaty, and presumably applied to all parties. It therefore will be uncertain what the scale, nature and transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities will be when a possible Middle East Zone treaty enters into force unless measures are included in the treaty to fix in place the scope and transparency of these activities for some agreed time after entry into force.

If a core aim is to strengthen the stability of the region against potential proliferation risks, as noted above, a shutdown of nuclear power programs would offer the most enduring benefits. If states insist and agree to run proliferation risks, then marginal nonproliferation benefits flow from agreeing to limit some critical potential nuclear fuel cycle activities based on the JCPOA (Glaser et al. 2015). In this situation, some possible control measures to include in the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction treaty are (Mian et al. 2014):

A ban on the separation of plutonium

Even if Middle East countries pursue ambitious civilian nuclear power programs, they need not develop reprocessing capabilities. No sound economic or environmental justification exists for using plutonium for civilian applications and reprocessing and stockpiling separating plutonium creates serious proliferation risks as the material could be used to make nuclear weapons (IPFM 2015).

Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment

Centrifuge enrichment plants pose significant proliferation concerns because they can be quickly reconfigured for production of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that is weapon-usable.

• A commitment to not undertake uranium enrichment for any purpose would offer long-term stability, and need not to be an obstacle to the pursuit of a nuclear power for peaceful purposes since most countries with nuclear power purchase enriched uranium for fuel commercially from the international market.

• A multilateral arrangement for any uranium enrichment activity in any state in the region rather than national enrichment programs; this could be managed by the body responsible for implementing the treaty.

• A general prohibition on the production and use of HEU; the International Atomic Energy Agency treats uranium enriched above 20% as direct weapon-usable material.

• A limit on the maximum uranium enrichment of 5–7% U-235; this is more than sufficient for fuel used in light-water nuclear power reactors.

Cooperative Verification and Safeguards

Along with accepting all the verification, safeguards and reporting measures in the NPT, including those which are not mandatory, and in the ANWFZT, and TPNW, there could be benefit in including complementary regional arrangements for safeguards, and transparency and cooperative verification.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol

A core obligation could be for states that have not yet done so to adopt a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. While a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement permits IAEA inspection of declared sites, the Additional Protocol provides IAEA inspectors access to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, “complementary access” to all buildings on a nuclear site, and allows collection of environmental samples at sites other than declared locations. States also are required to specify the location of nuclear fuel cycle activities, including operating and shut down uranium mines (IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 1997). Following the experience with the JCPOA, states could regionalize and extent the duration of, or make permanent, the transparency measures beyond the Additional Protocol accepted by Iran.

Appendix 2 lists the status of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol for states participating in the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Regional Nuclear Fuel-cycle and Verification Organization

States may complement IAEA safeguards and inspections of nuclear activities in the region with a dedicated regional capability. A precedent for such an arrangement is the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) developed between Argentina and Brazil as part of the Latin American NWFZ, and their agreed Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, which aims to verify non-diversion of nuclear materials towards nuclear weapons from any of the nuclear activities of the two countries¹¹ ABACC was modeled on Euratom, which shares safeguards responsibilities with the IAEA in European Union.

The Middle East zone regional organization, possibly together with the IAEA, could oversee operations of any fuel-cycle facilities in the region, such as uranium enrichment plants, and monitor all nuclear materials used in any enrichment facility in the region, including uranium mining and purification, uranium imports, conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for enrichment or from UF6 after enrichment.

Middle East Open Skies

A regional arrangement for mutual over-flights of unarmed aircraft or drones carrying agreed monitoring instruments could serve to increase confidence in the absence of clandestine nuclear facilities. The 1992 Open Skies Treaty provides a precedent for such over-flights¹² Specific sensors could include:

• gamma-ray spectrometers to identify ground-level radiation anomalies from uranium mining activity (Martin et al. 2015).

• Infrared sensors to verify the operating or shutdown status of a nuclear reactor by detecting the temperatures of the reactor containment building or cooling towers (von Hippel, Mousavian, and Emad Kiyaei 2013).

• krypton-85 sensors for monitoring the radioactive gas released when spent nuclear fuel is being prepared for plutonium separation (Schoeppner 2018a, 2018b).

Conclusion

The United Nations mandated diplomatic process underway since 2018 to develop a treaty for a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction will need to consider what specific possible obligations concerning nuclear weapons ought to be discussed for inclusion in the final treaty. Since the states participating in the process and expected to be members of the zone are already parties to existing treaties with obligations concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon-related activities it seems reasonable for all these states to consider adopting the obligations in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

There may be a need to assuage concerns about making long-term commitments to the zone given the experience of the almost 50 year-long effort to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East since it was first proposed in the United Nations in 1974 by Iran and Egypt, the history of wars and conflicts among states and the proliferation crises in this region during this period. Including some time-bound commitments that offer additional security and confidence as part of the treaty to allow other political, economic, social, and technical processes to take effect and bind treaty parties in enduring mutual, cooperative relationships may be a solution. Building on the model of the NPT and the JCPOA, a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction could include an agreed system of verifiable nuclear fuel cycle constraints which are initially bounded in time but potentially capable of being made indefinite.

Along with accepting all the verification, safeguards and reporting measures in the exiting treaties and the additional initially time-bound fuel-cycle control measures, there could be additional security and confidence-building benefits in including complementary regional arrangements for safeguards, and transparency and cooperative verification. Agreeing to make the Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone also a nuclear energy-free zone would add significantly to the stability of the zone against future nuclear breakout and proliferation risks.

Acknowledgments

This article is adapted from a background paper prepared for the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Informal Workshop on Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, 23–25 February 2021.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Zia Mian

Zia Mian is a physicist with Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, which is part of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. He also directs the Program’s Project on Peace and Security on South Asia. He is co-author with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel of Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation (MIT Press, 2014). He is the recipient of the 2014 Linus Pauling Legacy Award and the 2019 Leo Szilard Award from the American Physical Society.

Notes

¹ Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its seventy-third session Volume II: Decisions 18 September – 22 December 2018 General Assembly Official Records Seventy-third Session Supplement No. 49, p.23. https://undocs.org/en/A/73/49(Vol.II).

² The 23 participating states were Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.236/INF/3

³ Political declaration adopted at the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, A/CONF.236/6. https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/A-conf-236-6-annex.pdf.

⁴ Informal Workshop on Good Practices and Lessons Learnt with respect to Existing Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones (7–9 July 2020), https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/me-nwmdfz-workshop-july2020; and Second Informal Workshop on Good Practices and Lessons Learnt with respect to Existing Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones (23 to 25 February 2021), https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/me-nwmdfz-workshop-feb2021.

⁵ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt.

⁶ Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt.

⁷ African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba.

⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) and Annex: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015, https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015)

⁹ Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tpnw/text.

¹⁰ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 14 July 2015, https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015).

¹¹ Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. https://www.abacc.org.br/en.

¹² Treaty on Open Skies. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/5/14127.pdf.

Appendix 1:

Status of Middle East states with regard to ratification/accession or signature (S) or vote in favor (V) for treaties relating to nuclear weapons

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZT)

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons (TPNW)

Israel is not included since it did not participate in the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Table

STATE	NPT	CTBT	ANWFZT	TPNW *
Algeria	12 January 1995	11 July 2003	11 February 1998	(V) 7 July 2017
Bahrain	3 November 1988	12 April 2004	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Comoros	4 October 1995	(S) 12 December 1996	24 July 2012	–
Djibouti	16 October 1996	15 July 2005	(S) 11 April 1996	(V) 7 July 2017
Egypt	26 February 1981	(S) 14 October 1996	(S) 11 April 1996	(V) 7 July 2017
Iran	2 February 1970	(S) 24 September 1996	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Iraq	29 October 1969	26 September 2013	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Jordan	11 February 1970	25 August 1998	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Kuwait	17 November 1989	6 May 2003	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Lebanon	15 July 1970	21 November 2008	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Libya	26 May 1975	6 January 2004	11 May 2005	–
Mauritania	26 October 1993	30 April 2003	24 February 1998	(V) 7 July 2017
Morocco	27 November 1970	17 April 2000	(S) 11 April 1996	(V) 7 July 2017
Oman	23 January 1997	13 June 2003	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Palestine	10 February 2015	–	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Qatar	3 April 1989	3 March 1997	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Saudi Arabia	3 October 1988	–	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Somalia	5 March 1970	–	(S) 23 February 2006	–
Sudan	31 October 1973	10 June 2004	(S) 11 April 1996	(V) 7 July 2017
Syria	24 September 1969	–	–	–
Tunisia	26 February 1970	23 September 2004	7 October 2009	(V) 7 July 2017
UAE	26 September 1995	18 September 2000	–	(V) 7 July 2017
Yemen	1 June 1979	(S) 30 September 1996	–	(V) 7 July 2017

* Of these countries, Algeria. Libya and Sudan have signed but not ratified the TPNW, while Comoros and Palestine have signed and ratified the treaty, as of October 2021.

Appendix 2:

Status of Middle East states with regard to with regard to accession or signature (S) of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)

Additional Protocol (AP)

Israel is not included since it did not participate in the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Table

STATE	CSA	AP
Algeria	7 January 1997	(S) 16 February 2018
Bahrain	10 May 2009	20 July 2011
Comoros	20 January 2009	20 January 2009
Djibouti	Signed 2010	26 May 2015
Egypt	30 June 1982	_
Iran	15 May 1974	(S) 18 December 2003*
Iraq	29 February 1972	10 October 2012
Jordan	21 February 1988	28 July 1998
Kuwait	7 March 2002	2 June 2003
Lebanon	5 March 1973	_
Libya	8 July 1980	11 August 2006
Mauritania	10 December 2009	10 December 2009
Morocco	18 February 1975	21 April 2011
Oman	5 September 2006	–
Palestine	14 June 2019	–
Qatar	21 January 2009	–
Saudi Arabia	13 January 2009	–
Somalia	–	–
Sudan	7 January 1977	–
Syria	18 May 1992	–
Tunisia	13 March 1990	(S) 24 May 2005
UAE	9 October 2003	20 December 2010
Yemen	14 August 2002	–

* As part of the JCPOA, Iran accepted provisional application of the Additional Protocol as of 16 January 2016 pending entry into force.