Korean Denuclearization and the US-China Strategic Rivalry

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the ways in which the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China will complicate regional efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. In particular, it reviews how relative gains, strategic mistrust, domestic politics, and coercive bargaining will all make cooperation on Korean denuclearization increasingly challenging for the United States and China. Our paper concludes by reflecting on how the US, the Republic of Korea, and Japan can navigate this increasingly complex security environment.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategic rivalry
• US-China relations
• North Korea

Introduction

Strategic rivalry between the United States and China creates formidable challenges for regional efforts to denuclearize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Prior to the onset of this rivalry, the United States and China struggled to coordinate their policies toward the DPRK due to differing priorities and policy preferences. However, as the United States and China increasingly view their relationship in competitive terms, additional obstacles are emerging. As this paper will discuss, concerns about relative gains, strategic mistrust, political constraints, and coercive bargaining are all likely to impede US-China cooperation toward the DPRK. This, in turn, will complicate ongoing regional efforts to bring an end to the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Existing Obstacles

The United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and China have long seen a denuclearized peninsula as beneficial for their respective interests. For the United States and its allies, an end to the DPRK’s nuclear program would remove a major security threat, allow them to adjust their military footprints in the Indo-Pacific, render their alliances more credible, and bolster the global non-proliferation regime. For China, a denuclearized DPRK reduces the chances that more of its neighbors, including the ROK and Japan, might themselves pursue nuclear armaments.

Despite these common interests, however, regional cooperation to rein in the DPRK’s nuclear program has been challenging. The United States and China in particular have clashed over the proper approach to the DPRK’s growing arsenal. For the United States and its allies, denuclearization and deterrence against DPRK aggression are arguably their primary objectives. For China, on the other hand, maintaining the DPRK as a stable buffer state is its top goal; denuclearization is an important but secondary objective.

As a result of their different priorities, the United States and China have traditionally endorsed different policies to encourage denuclearization. The United States has focused on compelling the DPRK to denuclearize while keeping its Japanese and ROK allies secure; to do this, it has sought to isolate Pyongyang diplomatically and economically through sanctions while also upgrading its regional military presence and alliances. The United States frequently calls for greater cooperation from China with respect to these policies, emphasizing that China must curtail its ties with the DPRK and acquiesce to strengthened US alliances.

China, meanwhile, views these steps as destabilizing and usually prefers offering economic assistance and security guarantees to the DPRK regime to reduce tensions, improve stability, and induce the DPRK to denuclearize. China often calls for the United States, Japan, and the ROK to adopt this approach, demanding that the allies lift their sanctions and scale back their military capabilities. These fundamentally different visions of pathways to denuclearization continue to hinder regional cooperation toward the DPRK to this day. We argue, however, that the growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China will create new hurdles to regional cooperation on Korean denuclearization.

Strategic Rivalry

Strategic rivalry can be best defined as a state of comprehensive competition between two great powers that believe their competitor is challenging their fundamental interests (McDonald 2020). Several key issues and trends have driven the United States and China toward a state of strategic rivalry. The United States and its allies, including the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, have grown increasingly concerned about China’s rapid military modernization, excessive maritime claims, and military and economic coercion. At the same time, US leaders have grown more critical of China’s nationalist economic policies, human rights practices, and undemocratic political system. Ultimately, both the Trump and Biden administrations have argued that China poses the leading threat to the US interest in a free, open, and rules-based international system (White House, 2017, 2022). The United States has therefore embraced competition with China as its foremost foreign policy priority. China, meanwhile, regards the US efforts to enhance its regional partnerships, assert its navigational rights, and rectify economic imbalances as a major threat (China State Council Information Office 2017). Chinese elites have generally concluded that the United States and its allies are embracing a thinly-veiled strategy of containment that threatens China’s fundamental interests and its continued rise to a position of power, prestige, and prosperity in the international system. As a result of these contentious issues and the broader ongoing shift in relative power between the two states, American and Chinese leaders have come to view their relationship as a rivalry. Polling data indicates that this shift in elite perceptions is echoed by the general public, with growing majorities in both states expressing antagonism toward each other (Silver 2022).

Relative Gains

This strategic rivalry creates several obstacles to regional cooperation on the DPRK nuclear program. Critically, strategic rivalry will encourage both states to prioritize relative rather than absolute gains. A state experiences absolute gains when cooperation improves that state’s security, prosperity, and influence such that the state is better off than it was before the onset of cooperation. A state experiences relative gain, on the other hand, when cooperation improves that state’s security, prosperity, and influence such that the state is better off in comparison to its peers prior to the onset of cooperation. Under anarchy, preoccupation with relative gains can impede mutually beneficial cooperation. Given that states must depend on self-help for their defense they will be wary of any cooperation that might provide a partner with a relative gain. After all, that partner could potentially use its new advantage to threaten or coerce the state, undermining its core interests. This concern may lead states to forgo cooperation that might otherwise bring about mutually beneficial absolute gains (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993).

Strategic rivalry should make states’ concerns over relative gains especially acute. If a state’s strategic rival achieves a relative gain through cooperation, it constitutes a clear and imminent threat that is almost certain to be leveraged to undermine the state’s fundamental interests. As such, states are likely to see mutually beneficial solutions that provide their leading competitor with comparatively greater benefits as undesirable.

Concerns over relative gains will likely hinder cooperation between the United States and China on the Korean peninsula. Both states have a clear interest in terminating the DPRK’s nuclear program, as mentioned above; any deal that increases the chances of denuclearizing the DPRK offers the prospects of absolute gains for both great powers. Nevertheless, a denuclearized DPRK would give the United States and its allies a number of new advantages over China.

First, the end of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile program would eliminate a troublesome vulnerability in the United States’ alliance relationships with Japan and the ROK. As the DPRK has improved its ability to strike the continental United States with a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, the ROK and Japan have both harbored doubts about the United States’ reliability as a military partner. In particular, some worry that the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal might decouple the United States from its partners, deterring the US from supporting either treaty ally in the event DPRK aggression or provocation (Rapp-Hooper 2017). These fears of decoupling and abandonment put serious strains on the US alliances with Japan and the ROK. In particular, as these fears grow more intense, the allies are likely to attach less value to their military partnerships with the United States. As a result, the US ability to call on its allies to support efforts to counterbalance or contain China’s power in the Indo-Pacific could be diminished.

The elimination, or even reduction, of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities would go a long way to reassuring these partners of the US commitment. If these partners are confident in the reliability and value of their military alliances with the United States, they will likely be more receptive to US calls for assistance and support in its strategic competition with China. As such, by bolstering its alliances, denuclearization would offer the United States a critical advantage over China.

Second, with the DPRK nuclear program gone, the United States and its allies would be better able to redirect diplomatic, economic, and military resources toward countering China’s revisionism elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. The United States and its partners are increasingly concerned about China’s extraordinary maritime claims and expanding military presence in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the United States is wary of China’s mounting pressure toward Japan in the East China Sea over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. Finally, the United States has expressed alarm over increasing Chinese military coercion against the island of Taiwan.

Currently the United States has roughly 28,500 of its troops based in ROK territory to help manage the threat posed by the DPRK. These forces conduct regular military exercises alongside the ROK military focused explicitly on defeating an attack by the DPRK. The United States spent an average of $3.34 billion over the course of 2016–2019, alongside important ROK contributions, to maintain and strengthen this military presence (United States Government Accountability Office, 2021). It is, admittedly, doubtful the United States would completely eliminate this military presence in the event of DPRK denuclearization given the DPRK’s significant conventional armed forces. It would, however, be able to reallocate a larger portion of its resources toward deterring China in the South China, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait.

The ROK and Japan would similarly have more of their resources available to deter China should the DPRK denuclearize. The ROK would need to continue to focus on deterring the DPRK’s considerable conventional forces. Nevertheless, it could redirect funds from capabilities designed expressly to counter DPRK nuclear weapons as part of the Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense, and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation concepts toward other programs designed to counterbalance China’s growing military presence in the Indo-Pacific. Japan, which unlike the ROK is not directly threatened by the DPRK’s conventional military forces, would be even better positioned to shift its resources and attention southwards toward threats in the South and East China Sea.

Third, progress toward denuclearization might allow the United States, Japan, and the ROK to cultivate stronger relations with the DPRK, pulling it away from China’s orbit. While other disputes plague relations between the allies and the DPRK, particularly with respect to human rights and Japanese abductees, a negotiated settlement to end the nuclear dispute would go a long way toward repairing relations. With sanctions lifted, trade and investment from the United States, the ROK, and Japan would begin to flow across the DPRK’s borders, weaning the DPRK off of its traditional dependence on China. China’s influence in the DPRK would likely decline as United States, ROK, and Japanese influence expanded.

This last possibility is increasingly worrisome for many Chinese policy experts. During the Trump administration’s negotiations with the DPRK, Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University and one of the CCP’s top foreign policy scholars, expressed concern that China was losing out compared to its rival as a result of the talks. As the talks progressed, Shin fretted that “China has been completely bypassed” as North Korea and the United States temporarily improved relations at China’s expense (Le 2018). Ultimately, Shin concluded that “of all the parties, China gets the least” out of the ongoing talks, having alienated the DPRK by participating in United States-led sanctions to get the DPRK to the negotiating table (Le 2018). Around the same time, Zhang Liangui, an expert in DPRK at the Central Party School in Beijing, emphasized that there was a risk that progress toward denuclearization would drive the DPRK and the United States closer together to China’s disadvantage (Wong and Zhou 2018). Similarly, an anonymous senior Chinese official was similarly reported as saying that during the Trump-Kim talks “We were concerned that North Korea was drifting away, our influence in Pyongyang was declining, and our interests were not being protected” (Chhabra et al. 2021).

Strategic Mistrust

Mutual strategic mistrust stemming from the intensifying US-China rivalry will likely pose a major hurdle to cooperation toward Korean denuclearization. As highlighted above, states in a strategic rivalry believe their competitor seeks to undermine their fundamental interests. As such, states will tend to view their rival’s offers of mutually beneficial compromise as disingenuous and fueled by ulterior motives. They also will be more concerned that rivals will defect from any cooperative agreement in an effort to secure an advantage in their unfolding strategic competition. This generates an atmosphere of intense distrust rendering strategic cooperation in the form of alliances, condominiums, or concerts of power untenable except under extraordinary circumstances. This distrust will also “trickle down” to impede cooperation on the full range of narrower issues facing the rivals in their bilateral relationship, from nonproliferation to narcotrafficking.

This atmosphere of distrust is likely to render US-China cooperation far more difficult on the Korean peninsula. China already seems to view US proposals for cooperation on DPRK denuclearization as disingenuous. When the Biden administration called for Chinese support for new United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning and sanctioning the DPRK’s missile tests in 2022, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Zhang Jun expressed skepticism:

How shall we go about solving the issue of the Korean peninsula? The answer does not hinge on whether or not the Council adopts a new draft resolution. The crux of the matter is whether or not anyone wants to use this issue as a card in their so-called Indo-Pacific strategy or treat it as a chess piece on the chessboard of that strategy. (United Nations Security Council, 2022a)

Here, Zhang suggests that the United States is not actually seeking to bring about denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula but is instead using it as an opportunity to seek a regional military advantage over China. At other times, Zhang has argued that the US proposals are designed with “cynical intentions” to create discord between China and other members of the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 2022a). Zhang would later imply that the United States was seeking conflict rather than pursuing genuine cooperation, arguing that “some are covertly devising other plans, with the end result being the spread of the flames of war to North-East Asia and the Korean peninsula” (United Nations Security Council, 2022a). This perspective reflects a deep skepticism of US professed cooperative intentions on the Korean peninsula.

The United States is similarly likely to see Chinese offers of cooperation on the DPRK as driven by ulterior motives. Given the challenges that China poses to the longstanding rules-based international order elsewhere, particularly in the maritime domain, the Biden administration may rightly be skeptical of whether China is genuinely committed to the global non-proliferation regime. This distrust has only been compounded by China’s growing track record of enabling DPRK sanctions evasion (Nichols 2023). As Blinken emphasized in the 2021 US-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial (2 + 2), “We are clear-eyed about Beijing’s consistent failure to uphold its commitments” (US Department of Defense, 2021).

Strategic distrust has already begun to color the US views on China’s proposals for cooperation on the Korean peninsula. At the United Nations Security Council, China has called for sanctions relief on the DPRK as a pathway to restarting denuclearization talks. In response, US Permanent Representative Thomas-Greenfield argued that this proposal had ulterior motives, claiming that “this is a clear effort by China and Russia to reward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for its bad actions” (United Nations Security Council, 2022b). Later, Thomas-Greenfield made this point still more forcefully, arguing that China offered “blanket protection” to the DPRK and has “enabled” it because it “think[s] they make a good regional buffer to the United States” (United Nations Security Council, 2022c). In doing so, she indicated that the United States increasingly views China’s policy on the Korean peninsula as aimed at competing with the United States rather than working toward denuclearization.

Political Constraints

Strategic rivalry will also create domestic political obstacles to cooperation on DPRK denuclearization for both states. To compete with their rivals, states will need to pour more resources into diplomatic, economic, and military policies designed to counter those rivals. As such, states in a strategic rivalry face incentives to mobilize their public behind these costly policies (Christensen 1996). In order to do this, states will emphasize the significance of the threat posed by their strategic rivalry and the necessity of more assertive diplomacy and more powerful military capabilities. Leaders may seek to do this through various means, including public speeches, remarks, and testimony, as well as public relations and propaganda campaigns. If these efforts are successful, the state’s broader public will become increasingly hostile toward its rival.

This public hostility can be a double-edged sword. As animosity toward a rival grows, the public may come to view any compromise with the rival as undesirable, even if that cooperation advances a shared interest. As such, domestic resentment toward a rival may inhibit a government’s ability to cooperate with its rival selectively for mutual benefit.

This dynamic is likely to have a substantial effect on the US ability to cooperate with China on Korean denuclearization. US presidents’ electoral prospects, and those of their political party, hinge on public support. As such, they are often sensitive to public opinion on policy matters. This may make the president hesitant to work too closely with China on the DPRK for fear of a potential public backlash. Additionally, the US Congress, which is even more accountable to the electorate, will at times act to constrain or compel the executive on matters of foreign affairs through the legislative process. Even if the president were to attempt to coordinate with China on Korean denuclearization, Congress might actively undercut this effort due for political purposes.

Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party are more insulated from public sentiment due to the Chinese state’s authoritarian character; nevertheless, scholars have pointed out that China’s foreign policy may still be shaped by public opinion. China’s leaders cannot claim the political legitimacy that comes from having been chosen in a free, fair, and transparent electoral process. Instead, they must look for political legitimacy elsewhere. China’s authoritarian leaders often do this by emphasizing their performance, particularly the improvements they have made to China’s economic prosperity. But Chinese leaders also attempt to bolster their political legitimacy by appearing sensitive and responsive to the public will (Fang, Li, and Liu 2022). As such, Xi may be reluctant to pursue any policies that directly contradict public sentiment and could undermine his legitimacy. If the Chinese public grows too hostile toward the United States, it may constrain Xi’s ability to work with the United States even to pursue the shared goal of DPRK denuclearization.

These dynamics are already at work in the US-China relationship. The American public increasingly views China negatively. A series of Gallup polls found that an average of 51% of American respondents viewed China unfavorably between 2010 and 2018. From 2019 to 2023, this figure rose by an average of 6.6% points each year. The most recent Gallup poll, collected in February of 2023, indicates that 84% of Americans now view China unfavorably. Similarly, while only 11% of American survey respondents viewed China as the US greatest enemy in 2018, as of 2023 50% of survey respondents now hold this view (Gallup, n.d.). This view has led to skepticism of any cooperation with China. A 2023 Pew survey indicates that only 33% of Americans think the United States and China can cooperate to resolve international conflicts. Similarly, only 32% think climate change cooperation is possible (Silver et al. 2023).

This public hostility has raised the political costs of any US cooperation with its rival. Perhaps most noticeably, the Biden administration’s efforts in mid-2023 to promote a “thaw” in relations with China prompted significant domestic pushback. Republican legislators criticized Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping as “weak” and “unacceptable”, arguing that it undermined national security (Demirjian 2023; Shaw 2023). In response to the trip, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael McCaul, subpoenaed the State Department for documentation detailing US competitive policies toward China (AP News 2023). Legislators similarly pushed back against efforts to revive bilateral climate cooperation by the US President’s Special Envoy for Climate, John Kerry. The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on China, Mike Gallagher, emphasized that “John Kerry and many others in the Biden administration fail to see what is obvious, which is that the CCP itself, not climate change is the greatest threat we face” (Silverio 2023). House legislators have also emphasized that they will block the Biden administration if it attempts to remove human rights sanctions on China in exchange for counter-narcotics cooperation (Elkind 2023).

Importantly, negative views of China have risen among US allies as well, creating additional political constraints to regional cooperation. Pew surveys indicate that the percentage of Japanese citizens with unfavorable views of China rose from 42% in 2002 to 86% in 2020. Similarly, the percentage of ROK citizens who view China unfavorably rose from 31% in 2002 to 75% in 2020 (Silver, Devlin, and Huang 2020).

China has also seen a decline in its public’s views of the United States. In 2012, 48% of Chinese surveyed by the BBC World Service viewed US influence in the world as mostly negative (BBC World Service 2012). By 2017, that number had risen to 61% (BBC World Service 2017). Other surveys indicate that Chinese views of the United States have only continued to decline; for instance, a recent survey found that 75% of Chinese citizens viewed the United States unfavorably in 2021 (Liu, Li, and Fang 2021). With the Chinese nationalist online community of “netizens” frequently calling for more confrontational policies toward the United States, the Chinese government may well face greater pressure to refrain from cooperating with its rival (Baptista 2022).

Coercive Bargaining

Finally, strategic rivalry gives states greater incentives to withhold cooperation on key issues as part of coercive bargaining with their rivals. When a state faces a serious dispute with a partner engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation, the state may elect to suspend that cooperation until the partner grants concessions in the dispute. States are especially likely to use this approach when they believe that the stakes of the dispute are more significant than the benefits of cooperation and when they believe that withholding cooperation will be more harmful for their partner than for themselves. While even friendly states may make use of this tactic, strategic rivals are particularly likely to employ it. This is in part because disputes between strategic rivals will be more severe and frequent than those between other states. Furthermore, strategic rivals may be less concerned about the reputational costs of this tactic. Violating past commitments by withholding cooperation on an issue undermines a state’s reputation as a reliable partner in the eyes of its counterpart. Given that states in strategic rivalries are focused primarily on comprehensive competition with their rival, however, it is doubtful that they will see too much value in maintaining their reputation for reliable cooperation with that rival.

Even if the United States and China were to strike a grand bargain to work together on Korean denuclearization, the bargain’s survival would be constantly threatened by clashes between the two rivals elsewhere in the world. If, for instance, China sought to ramp up pressure on the United States over a dispute in the South China Sea, China could open the floodgates for DPRK sanctions evasion and return to shielding the DPRK from UNSC action. If the United States aimed to pressure China to scale back its harassment of American naval vessels in the South China Sea, it could reinstate suspended sanctions or deploy additional forces to the Korean peninsula. Of the two states, however, the United States cares most about the denuclearization issue while China is primarily concerned with maintaining the DPRK as a buffer state. As such, China is more likely than the United States to use cooperation on Korean denuclearization as a coercive tool.

While neither the US nor China has taken this approach to Korean denuclearization so far, China has repeatedly shown it is willing to withhold cooperation for coercive purposes. Most notably, in August 2022, China suspended a slew of cooperative initiatives with the United States in an attempt to punish the United States for the former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This included cooperation on military affairs (The Theater Commanders and Defense Policy Coordination talks), homeland security (repatriation of illegal immigration, legal assistance on criminal matters, cooperation on transnational crime, and counternarcotics cooperation), and talks on climate change (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). While China has resumed talks with the United States on climate change, the other suspensions remain in place (Kine and Lau 2023). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi summarized China’s rationale for this approach to cooperation with the United States succinctly: “For cooperation to be win-win, there needs to be necessary conditions and atmosphere. It won’t do if the US undermines China’s core interests … on the one hand, and on the other, expects China to cooperate unconditionally” (Wang et al. 2022). In other words, China will only engage in cooperation with the United States if United States is willing to comply with Chinese demands on issues that China views as its “core interests”, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.

China has engaged in this approach in the past as well. In 2018, China temporarily suspended the US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in an attempt to ramp up pressure on the United States over disputes over trade and the East China Sea (Tiezzi 2018). It also has a long track-record of suspending military-to-military contacts and confidence-building measures in order to coerce the United States into ending arms sales to Taiwan and reconnaissance collection in the West Pacific (Kan 2014).

The United States has made use of this strategy to a more limited extent outside the Korean peninsula. The Trump administration suspended its extradition agreement with Hong Kong and its Fulbright program in mainland China and Hong Kong in 2020 to punish China for its rising repression in Hong Kong (Zheng 2020). The United States also disinvited China from the Rim of the Pacific multilateral naval exercise in 2018 in retaliation for China’s growing militarization of the South China Sea (Eckstein 2018).

Conclusion

None of these obstacles makes cooperation impossible; even the fiercest of strategic rivals have occasionally been able to surmount them in the past. Nevertheless, they render cooperation far more challenging and therefore less likely. In the absence of US-China coordination, the DPRK will likely continue to pursue nuclear proliferation. The current regime sees nuclear forces as vital to the survival and strength of the country. It is unlikely to pursue disarmament unless it is convinced that a) it cannot survive if it maintains the nuclear weapons and b) it can survive if it gives up nuclear weapons. Without China’s cooperation, the economic pressure the United States, Japan, and ROK can bring to bear against the Kim regime is likely to be inadequate to convince the DPRK of the former. Without security guarantees from the United States and its allies, similarly, any Chinese efforts to discourage DPRK nuclear proliferation will be unlikely to convince the DPRK of the latter. In particular, the DPRK would likely require reassurances from the allies in the form of concrete changes in their conventional military postures before it felt secure enough to denuclearize (Bowers and Stålhane Hiim 2021). Ultimately, a lack of US-China cooperation incentivizes the DPRK to continue its weapon program. For the United States, Japan, and the ROK, this creates a significant – perhaps insurmountable – challenge when it comes to denuclearization. This does not mean that denuclearization should be abandoned; but it does mean that the allies should temper their expectations about denuclearization for the foreseeable future.

In light of these challenges, we recommend the allies focus their efforts on deterrence and containment of the DPRK threat first and foremost. They can do this most effectively by continuing to upgrade their bilateral and trilateral cooperation with one another. The recent Washington Declaration clarifying and reaffirming the US commitment to the ROK’s security is a vital positive step in this direction (White House, 2023). The Camp David principles laid out by Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul to facilitate coordination and consultation between the three states will similarly enhance their ability to deter DPRK provocations. The United States, Japan, and the ROK will also need to improve their conventional military capabilities to offset the DPRK’s growing nuclear arsenal. Seoul should continue to enhance its three-axis deterrence system, bolstering its ability to deny or punish a DPRK nuclear attack (Song 2022). Japan, similarly, should seek to enhance its missile defenses and civil defenses.

Despite the considerable obstacles that exist to denuclearization, there are a few measures the United States, ROK, and Japan could pursue to attempt to mitigate these obstacles. In particular, the allies must consider how to confront the challenge of relative gains. China is unlikely to agree to a cooperative deal if it believes the deal would ultimately leave it at a disadvantage compared to its rival. As such, the allies should consider how to ensure the potential benefits of a denuclearized peninsula are balanced evenly between the United States and China. For instance, given the sensitivity of some Chinese analysts to the possibility of closer DPRK-United States relations if denuclearization moves forward, it might be necessary for the allies to guarantee that the DPRK would remain neutral and not establish military ties with the United States in the event of denuclearization.

The allies should also consider how to minimize the influence of strategic mistrust in US-China cooperation on Korean denuclearization. As the United States and China are likely to view each other’s policy proposals with considerable suspicion, it may be advisable for the allies to seek out a more neutral arbitrator or mediator to help play a role in developing and overseeing collaborative solutions to this policy problem.¹ Any proposed cooperation should also start small, focusing on incremental changes to the status quo that pose little initial risk and could allow the United States and China to begin rebuilding mutual trust on the issue of DPRK denuclearization.

Secret talks have occasionally been used by statesmen to bypass political opposition to cooperation with a rival. Kissinger’s secret trips to China in 1971, for instance, gave the United States and China the opportunity to discuss rapprochement without significant domestic political costs. The United States, Japan, and ROK should consider taking a similar approach to cooperation with China on Korean denuclearization. Covert negotiations might allow US and Chinese diplomats to circumvent the growing animosity between their publics and explore mutually acceptable policy solutions.

In conclusion, the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China significantly reduces the chances that these two states will coordinate in pursuit of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula. Any US-China cooperation will be hampered by the problem of relative gains, mutual suspicion and mistrust, domestic political sentiment, and incentives to engage in coercive bargaining. Without support from both of these great powers, it will be virtually impossible to convince Pyongyang to give up its growing nuclear arsenal. As such, we recommend that the allies hedge against the possibility that DPRK nuclear weapons are here to stay by strengthening their ability to deter nuclear aggression by the DPRK. At the same time, the allies should explore opportunities to overcome the constraints of US-China strategic rivalry given the importance of this issue to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jihoon Yu

Jihoon Yu is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. His expertise includes the ROK-US alliance, ROK-Europe security cooperation, inter-Korean relations, defense policy, and maritime security. He earned his MA in National Security Affairs from US Naval Postgraduate School and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

Erik French

Erik French is an assistant professor of political science at SUNY Brockport and an affiliated scholar with the America in the World Consortium. His teaching and research focuses on alliance politics and deterrence. He received his Ph.D. at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

Notes

¹ Some have suggested Mongolia could play this role given its regional ties (David, Moon, and Park 2015).