Sino-international film collaboration and co-production: policy and practice

ABSTRACT

In light of the shift from the first phase to the second phase of transnational cinema studies, this volume examines a set of practices of transnational cinema that have been taking place between China and its counterparts. In exploring transnational cinema activities in the form of film collaborations and co-productions, this volume puts the spotlight on critical trends in transnational cinemas that are not limited to Western spheres of influence. Focusing on practical applications of case studies between China, Arab countries, Denmark and the U.S. it contributes to the debates on the definition and practical applications for research on film collaboration and co-production and transnational cinema studies.

KEYWORDS:

• International collaboration
• co-production
• transnational cinema
• soft power
• Sino-international production
• film

Introduction

Co-production in cinema, as with almost all media, is a ‘complex and contested term’ (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric, and Redvall 2019, 12). In its broadest sense, cinematic co-production refers to any type of economic, industrial or creative collaboration involving ‘more than one party in the production process, through partnership, joint venture or any other means of co-operation’ (Neumann and Appelgren 2007, 4). There is no reason why such co-production activity should have any transnational dimension. However, in film studies scholarship, as with the international film business, the term refers overwhelmingly to international co-production and tends to be viewed as a strategic priority by many national film councils, serving both screen industry and diplomatic interests (Gregson 2012). The activity related to co-production in this context varies in terms of focus, scale, and structure. International co-production can refer just as easily to a low budget, auteur-led production, destined primarily for the festival circuit as it can to a mainstream blockbuster. It can be bilateral or indeed multi-lateral, with the majority producer working with one of more minority or delegate co-producers, who are required to provide distinct levels of financial support, expertise and creative input and thus take on varying levels of risk. It may even fall outside of the boundaries of official co-production treaties, if either co-producing partner feels the specific requirements and restrictions of the treaty (e.g. the proportion of finance or cast and crew that must come from the territory of a given co-producing partner) outweigh the (largely financial) benefits that may be gained – as characterised by Hollywood’s approach to (unofficial) co-production.

Understanding a co-producing partner’s involvement within a project is further complicated by the proliferation of tax incentive schemes that attract inward investment by relocating production or post-production to a different country (inward investment in the UK from Hollywood studios, or Morocco’s reputation as a production service location for international film and high-end TV, for example). This gives rise a situation whereby local producers may be brought on and identified as co-producers, ‘simply to meet the criteria to access the tax incentive’ (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric, and Redvall 2019, 12).

Finally, the global rise of the streamers since the mid-2010s has also impacted on certain practices, business models and funding structures that have traditionally underpinned international co-production. Like the Hollywood studios, streamers such as Netflix, Amazon and Apple operate outside of the official co-production treaty structure. However, as multinational technology companies, they do not constitute part of the legacy media ecosystem that includes the Hollywood studios. Consequently, the streamers are not wedded to the established structures of distribution and exhibition – such as a windowing system that privileges theatrical exhibition and a pre-sales model based on licensing films to individual territories – that have constituted the business model against which investors and funders would traditionally back feature film production. As a result, co-production with streamers is built round commercial partnerships between local producers and the streamers, rather than bilateral or multilateral treaties between national cinemas. Such activity cannot unlock the usual sources of national and pan-regional funding available to official co-production, and risks fostering an environment where the relationship between global streamer and local producer is more akin to that of ‘contractor and subcontractor’ rather than co-producing partners in the traditional sense (Kim 2022, 416).

To date, most academic research and industry analysis of international co-production (see for example: Finney 2015; Gregson 2012; Jones 2016; Pardo 2007) concludes that international co-productions are financially rather than creatively driven. Nevertheless, as Huw David Jones notes, even where decisions are dominated by economic concerns, ‘the logistics of co-production may still have consequences for the film’s cultural identity’ (Jones 2016, 373). The extent to which the input of the various co-production partners is visible on-screen in terms of language, talent, cultural input to the narrative and the geographical location of the film itself results in what Hjort (2010, 13–14) refers to as ‘marked’ or ‘unmarked’ transnationalism. In some films such visibility can be almost inconsequential for filmmakers and audiences; in others, how and where a film chooses to locate its narrative and represent a particular culture, people or history can raise the stakes in what might be termed the cultural politics of co-production.

Requirements or conditions may be attached to funding (especially from individual national funding bodies) for the film to meet certain criteria set out in the co-production treaty may include: use of a specific language, a defined level of funding or personnel from a specific co-producing nation, or inclusion of scenes shot on location in one or more of the co-producing countries. In such cases, it becomes important to consider the extent to which the inclusion of these elements has an inherent logic in the narrative world presented on screen, or if they are simply a form of cultural compromise.

International co-productions can, of course, offer something more than a cynical exercise in maximising the financial value of transnational collaboration. New knowledge, fresh perspectives and insights into working practices can be gained by all parties from collaborating with experienced producers from another country. In artistic terms, such collaboration and exchange between filmmakers on both sides of the camera can engender a genuinely enriching approach to the creative process and transnational shared storytelling. Viewed less positively, the co-production process can be fraught with complications, compromises and potential controversies surrounding the influence of funding on the politics of representation: which producer exerts a greater control over narrative and editorial content? How are culture, society and history represented on screen? What is the broader worldview of the film itself? In the context of so call ‘north-south’ co-productions (often between former European coloniser and former colonies), the concern is of a neo-colonial or Eurocentric perspective being imposed on the film (whether consciously or not) by the demands of the Western funder or producer (Denton 2021). In some cases, filmmakers from the so-called global south are pressured to modify scripts and ideas to appease international funders (Falicov 2010, 7). In the context of sub-Saharan African cinema, this dynamic lead to the ‘often problematic collaboration with a European producer … [which] favours a certain type of film where the emphasis is placed on supposed “artistic quality” as rather than access to market (potentially alienating popular African audiences with films that tend to be seen as too intellectual or too much of a social statement).’ (Barlet 2007). Finally, co-production may operate between, within and across national borders as a form of soft power. As Lim reminds us, in this context film is not simply part of political and cultural strategy exclusively deployed to serve the interest of the most powerful nations governments or corporations but can also generate impact in ways that contravene state policies, challenge official ideologies and have the potential to disrupt the dominant social or economic norm (Lim 2022, 5).

In their study of co-production in European film and television, Hammett-Jamart, Mitric and Redvall (2019, 5–7) divide academic studies of co-production into three main categories: conceptual, which ‘contend with co-production as an idea and how the very concept of co-production unsettles the category of national cinema or confirms the notion of transnational cinema’; evaluative which consider co-productions either as ‘cultural artefacts’, or as an ‘expression of national cultural policies’; and finally industry studies, in which they note there has often been a difference of approach and understanding of co-production between academic researchers and industry professionals, emphasising the need for a greater appreciation of ‘industrial and policy mechanisms that underpin co-production’ (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric and Redvall 2019, 7). These categories offer a useful starting point from which to develop a deeper understanding of how the mechanics of co-production intersect with film history and textual analysis. They point to the transnational as an obvious reference point for the study of cinematic co-production that necessitates a more nuanced evaluation of the interplay between the national and the transnational. However, the approaches summarised also reveal limitations or blind spots in the existing approach to studies of co-production, which the collection of essays in this series of Transnational Screens in their separate ways attempt to address. Firstly, there is a need for a geopolitical decentring of the object of study. By this, we mean an approach that, whilst not discounting the very real and enduring impact of power asymmetries, acknowledges co-production practices, policies, and histories in areas of the world that once considered peripheral are now integral to a more complete understanding of international co-production. Concomitant to this decentring act (and influenced by a polycentric approach to film studies (Nagib, Perriam, and Dudrah 2012, xxii–xxiii) is the recognition of multiple centres and spheres of influence and collaborative activity and a focus on interconnectedness rather than difference.

Finally, the decision to title this series of transnational screens ‘Sino-International Collaboration and Co-production’ indicates one further way that the object of study needs to be simultaneously de-centred and enlarged. To date, the overwhelming focus on scholarship concerned with international co-production has been on industrial practices, funding and policy. This focus is entirely understandable but neglects to fully acknowledge a much wider nexus of activity between national and transnational industry bodies, organisations and co-operatives (including, but not limited to screen agencies, cultural foundations, film festivals and markets, development labs and industry fora) which functions as a catalyst for transnational collaboration between filmmakers, institutions and audiences and itself informs international co-production. We need, therefore, to not only expand our definition of what kind of activity and actors ‘co-production’ might include but also to understand how even peripheral or contingent activity and engagement can contribute to the ‘formal’ process of international co-production.

The second phase of transnational cinema studies and ‘cinemas of Sinosphere’

Transnational cinema (or now, increasingly, Transnational Screen Studies) can be understood as a dynamic practice that varies according to historical, geopolitical, and social contexts rather than as a static ontological category or methodological approach (Fisher, Smith et al. 2016). As a sub-section of film studies, transnational cinema studies has been subject to diverse interpretations and applications, encompassing film theory and history, postcolonial studies, production studies and (geo-)political economies of cinema, to name but a few. Scholars have critiqued the tendency to use the term broadly, imprecisely, and often without clear definition (Hjort 2010) and for the need to engage critically with attentive to questions of politics and power, scrutinising the tensions and dialogic relationship between national and transnational whilst simultaneously promoting the potential for local, regional and diasporic film cultures to affect, subvert and transform (politically speaking) national and transnational cinemas (Higbee and Lim 2010a). This critique aligns with the need to move beyond theoretical abstraction and incorporate more concrete research applications. Chris Berry has argued that ‘knowledge is situational and perspectival; what transnational cinema is varies depending on what transnational cinema you are examining and where and when you are looking from’ (Berry 2021, 183).

Recent theoretical developments, following from the interventions and observations of Shaw (2017) and Fisher and Smith (2019) have proposed a ‘second phase’ of transnational cinema studies. For Yang, (2020a), writing in the context of Inter-Asian (co-) production and cinematic exchanges, this second phase transnationalism emphasizes that the transnational always intersects with the national and must be understood through specific cases, rather than creating a binary opposition between the national and the transnational. Second phase transnationalism in fact finds its origins in the emerging transnational cinema scholarship of the late 2000s and early 2010s. Whilst acknowledging the ‘impossibility of assigning a fixed national identity to much cinema’ (Ezra and Rowden 2006, 1), Ezra and Rowden nonetheless remind us that the transnational ‘at once transcends the national and presupposes it’. (Ezra and Rowden 2006, 4). Newman asserts that ‘current scholarship on the transnational scale of cinematic circulation now takes for granted a geopolitical decentring of the discipline (Newman 2010, 4), while Higbee and Lim’s concept of Critical Transnationalism advocates ‘moving away from a binary approach to national/transnational and from a Eurocentric tendency of how such films might be read’ (Higbee and Lim 2010b, 10) This second phase of transnational cinema is further indebted to scholars whose work has a particular focus on the cinemas of East Asia (on which more detail below), Latin America and the MENA region. It is notable that much of this research has focused on industry studies with a particular focus on asymmetries of power in co-production, the cultural politics of co-production and soft power.¹

The geo-political decentring that is integral to second phase of transnationalism, exists in solidarity with scholarship that calls for a departure from the dominance of Euro-American theoretical models, advocating for the exploration of new theoretical perspectives originating outside traditional Western spheres and the utilization of case studies from diverse global film cultures to enrich contemporary debates in film studies.² Leading scholars also argue that transnational cinema studies would benefit from a deeper engagement with the concept of soft power when analyzing cinematic collaborations that have evolved over the past decade, particularly Sino-international collaborations (Lim 2019, 10). In the past several decades, there has been a growing interest in studying transnational cinema in the context of China. Existing studies have provided insights into Sino-international collaborations from theoretical, industrial, and aesthetic perspectives with various counterparts such as the U.S. (Su 2019). South Korea (Yecies 2016), Hong Kong (Bettinson 2020), Italy (Fu and Indelicato 2017), France (Bloom 2016), India (Y. Yang 2020a), and Singapore (Fong and Lim 2024). This field addresses the integration between China and its counterparts. The tension between China’s film censorship system and creative freedom is considered in these studies as hindering the positive role that films could play in shaping China’s soft power. Such case studies of Sino-international collaboration referenced above have been widely adopted in transnational cinema research, with a particular focus on explaining the power dynamics, particularly those from the 2010s onwards. Research on film collaboration and co-productions with China faces similar challenges as it does in the West, primarily due to the absence of a centralized database on the topic (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric, and Redvall 2019, 64). Acknowledging this gap, this volume adopts a multifaceted approach to counter this deficit of co-production data. The articles gather qualitative data through in-depth interviews with film producers and practitioners. Additionally, the authors’ individual contributions utilize textual analysis and archival studies to examine secondary data from diverse sources, including literature in Arabic, Chinese, English, industry and media reports, and speeches from key stakeholders.

While current research predominantly focuses on China-U.S. relations over the past decades, this volume expands the scope to cover four key periods of China’s film development, especially the recent post-COVID period, and includes the smaller Sino-Nordic territory. The case studies in this volume therefore focus on China and its collaborative partners, covering Sino-Arab countries (mainly Egypt and Iraq), Hong Kong, Denmark, and the United States. This research considers both macro-level factors, such as state politics, and micro-level dynamics, such as individual production decisions. These dynamics range from ‘strategic hybridization’ to feminism, encompassing both industrial and production aspects. The range of case studies, geographies and thematic approaches in this series are nonetheless organised around a set of common and recurring questions which can be summarised as follows:

1. What are the motivations and policy arrangements for China to collaborate with their counterparts during different periods?

2. How did China collaborate with international counterparts?

3. What are the outcomes of the collaborations and co-productions, and how should they be viewed?

In addressing these questions this volume aims to address and clarify the vagueness and conflation often associated with the terms and practices of film collaborations and co-productions.

International film collaborations and co-productions

The decision to designate this special edition of transnational screens ‘Sino-International Collaboration and Co-production’ posits the need for the object of study itself (co-production) to be simultaneously de-centred and enlarged. To date, the overwhelming focus on scholarship concerned with international co-production has been on industrial practices, funding and policy. This approach is entirely understandable but neglects to fully acknowledge a much wider nexus of activity between national and transnational industry bodies, organisations and co-operatives (including, but not limited to screen agencies, cultural foundations, film festivals and markets, development labs and industry fora) which functions as a catalyst for transnational collaboration between filmmakers, institutions and audiences and itself informs international co-production. We need, therefore, to not only expand our definition of what kind of activity and actors ‘co-production’ might include but also to understand how even peripheral or contingent activity and engagement can contribute to the ‘formal’ process of international co-production.

Notions of international film collaborations and co-productions can therefore be interpreted in various ways and in different contexts. These terms are often combined, exchanged, and interpreted to mean different things by film officials, scholars and professionals (Hammett-Jamart, Mitric, and Redvall 2019). There is similarly no consensus on the definitions and activities that constitute international film collaboration and co-production in the context of China between academics, researchers, and industry professionals. The main differences between these two categories arguably result from the exceptional quota systems and economic benefits in the context of China. In other words, co-production has clear criteria to enable the films to by-pass the quota system and thus gain the benefits of effectively being treated as a domestic film in China.

On the one hand, in the context of China, among the various definitions provided by scholars, we propose viewing international film collaboration as the broadest possible umbrella term that covers all types of cross-border activities or collaborative projects (Neumann and Appelgren 2007). International film collaboration thus refers to an all-encompassing umbrella term that covers Sino-international cinema in all its forms. Under this umbrella, there are indeed many specific transnational projects, from Chinese cinema’s participation in different film festival circuits to co-production agreements with other countries. On the other hand, co-production in the Chinese context necessitates that producers from various countries collaborate both creatively and financially, in accordance with China’s co-production regulations(Y. Yang 2020b, 212).

The benefits of qualifying as a co-production in China include bypassing the quota system, thereby avoiding competition with Hollywood for market entry, and generating a significantly greater income – about 40% of box office profits compared to the 25% available to non-co-production films. To clarify any confusion or misunderstandings regarding the terms of film co-production and collaboration, this volume defines film co-production in China as films that have gained official approval and certification as co-productions, regardless of the existence of a co-production treaty. For example, although there is no co-production treaty between China and the US, some films, such as The Great Wall (Y. Zhang 2016), are registered as co-productions and released in China. Additionally, many films produced between countries with official treaties often opted to avoid the lengthy and cumbersome co-production registration process. It is nonetheless important to indicate that all kinds of films must go through extremely strict procedures to pass the regulations from the stage of script, shooting, and release in China. Even though many films initially gain permission at the initial script stage, this does not automatically result in a co-production release – and numerous films have suffered this fate, including Iron Man 3 (Bay 2013) and Transformers 4 (Black 2014)

China collaborating with the world: from film exchanges to co-production treaties

Scholars have proposed several frameworks for understanding international film collaborations and co-productions. In the context of international collaborations, there appear to be two primary approaches: the European cultural approach and the US financial preference approach (Berry 2021, 188). Regarding film co-productions, there are three main models: market-driven and profit-seeking partnerships, policy and power negotiations, and brave experimental ventures (Su 2017, 1). Recently, a politically driven model of co-production has emerged based on research into Sino-Indian collaborations (Y. Yang 2020b). However, studies on Sino-Singapore film co-productions suggest that ‘conventional models for understanding drivers of co-productions may not work for small partners collaborating with China’ (Fong and Lim 2024, 1).

Existing research on Sino-international collaborations and co-productions is often fragmented and case-specific. As the essays in this series make clear, the Chinese government has long employed film to achieve its objectives from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the post-pandemic era. In this respect, Sino-international film collaborations and co-productions align with the four key stages of film development in China. Throughout these four periods, the Chinese film industry has transitioned from nationalization to decentralization, gradually opening up from operating exclusively with state actors to include non-state private actors, including those from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The industry expanded to the West starting in 2001 with China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), eventually reaching Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries and broader global partners. Despite various motivations and policy arrangements that align with economic and cultural transformations, and the increasingly diverse models for international collaboration, the Chinese government’s strict control and censorship regime, as well as the use of film collaboration and co-production to serve the ruling party’s interests, have remained constant. This opening up aligns with state strategy, and the government continues to maintain control over the film industry through regulations and censorship. Let us now consider each of these four stages in more detail.

Stage one 1949–1976: film exchanges with the socialist bloc

This period, spanning from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, saw film used extensively as a political tool by the Communist Party (Clark 1987). Chinese propaganda films were instrumental in introducing the newly founded PRC to other socialist countries strengthening ties with allied nations, and fostering a Third World coalition against the First World, particularly the United States (B. B. T. Yang et al. 2009). Chinese film policy during this time aimed ‘to present a work of art only as an illustration of a current political slogan, and only as propaganda for Mao’s instruction and slogans’ (Chen 1994, 27). The distribution of films abroad was strictly controlled by state institutions, which primarily engaged in international film festivals and organized Chinese Film Weeks overseas (Huang and Hu 2012, 23–26). Activities such as film exchanges and the hosting of film festivals in each other’s countries were intended to promote mutual understanding and solidarity within the Third World.

The first essay in this series by Ying Huang and Yanling Yang addresses the period of the ‘Seventeen Years’ from 1949 to 1966, focusing on the film collaborations between China and socialist bloc countries, particularly in the Arab world. It emphasizes film exchanges and the hosting of mutual film festivals. Despite a prolific film production era during the period, Maoist cinema has not been extensively analyzed to date. While recent scholarship has started to examine Chinese film production and exchanges within the socialist bloc, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding Sino-Arab film collaboration during this period. This essay aims to fill this gap through textual analysis and archival research, exploring Sino-Arab film weeks as a form of cultural diplomacy.

Building on the three schools of thought on cultural diplomacy, the essay suggests that Sino-Arab film collaboration in the 1950s and 1960s operated within the framework of ‘people’s diplomacy’, a term describing a uniquely Chinese form of cultural diplomacy within the Cold War context. This essay also extends the third trend that focuses on the transcendental realm of the state by investigating the interactions between film screenings and reality during Sino-Arab film weeks. Under the shared goals of anti-imperialism and nation-building, people’s diplomacy deviates from the conventional bipolar rivalry and embodies the spirit of internationalist solidarity among Third World countries.

Stage two 1977–2000: opening to non-state actors and Hong Kong and Taiwan

The second period, from the end of China’s Cultural Revolution in 1977 until 2000, marks an era of reform and opening-up. This era is best known for introducing elements of a market economy into what had previously been a rigidly planned system. This period witnessed radical changes across political, cultural, and economic sectors, leading to comprehensive reforms in the film industry. In terms of film policy, one of the most fundamental changes was the introduction of non-state actors into the film market for the first time. Additionally, the state reopened the film market to foreign financial investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan, ending a ban that had lasted over three decades. Significant strides were also made in promoting Chinese films abroad, particularly in the early part of this period. For instance, in 1981, Chinese films were showcased 682 times across 34 nations and regions.

This second essay in the series, Hening Zhang examines the Sino-Hong Kong co-production era from 1978 to the 1990s, emphasizing the emergence of co-productions and the role of policy interventions, cross-cultural collaborations, and financial factors in shaping the co-production model between Hong Kong and the mainland. The essay specifically investigates strategic hybridization in Jeffrey Lau’s four reinterpretations of the classic ‘Journey to the West’, and extends the analysis to Hong Kong-mainland film co-productions from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s. Utilizing a media industries perspective, it examines how strategic hybridization responds to economic pressures and policy environments, influencing production decisions, creative choices, and industrial imperatives. Zhang demonstrates that strategic hybridization is not merely a byproduct of co-production but a deliberate strategy reflecting the collaborative dynamics between Hong Kong and the mainland. This collaboration has contributed to a more integrated and mainland-centric co-production model. By analyzing strategic decisions across industrial and production dimensions, the essay highlights the significant impact of policy interventions, cross-cultural collaborations, and financial factors on shaping co-production models. The evolution of co-productions is further illustrated through a detailed analysis of Lau’s films, positing that strategic hybridization functions as a set of adaptive strategies. These strategies foster a symbiotic, though predominantly mainland-centric, relationship between the two film industries, mirroring broader trends and transformations of the period.

Stage three 2001– 2020: from the West to the BRI

China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 catalyzed significant transformations within the country, notably impacting its film industry. This period also marked the rise of discussions around the concept of soft power. According to Joseph Nye (Nye 2004, x), soft power is ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’. This concept has gained substantial traction in China for two main reasons. Firstly, soft power is seen as a way to counter the ‘China threat theory’, fostering a more favorable international environment for China’s development. Secondly, it is viewed as a tool for maintaining the Communist Party’s national power and supporting domestic stability (Blanchard and Lu 2012).

Building on the rapid expansion of the Chinese film industry, government officials in China have implemented a strategic ‘Going-out’ policy aimed at increasing the international presence of Chinese cinema and enhancing China’s soft power. A key element of this strategy is the promotion of co-productions to elevate the global visibility of Chinese films and strengthen China’s soft power (Su 2017). The official strategy endorses four primary channels for the international distribution of Chinese films: (1) organizing Chinese film exhibitions and festivals abroad, (2) active participation in international film festivals, (3) fostering robust co-production partnerships, and (4) inviting renowned international producers to China.

Significantly, the reach of Chinese films has expanded beyond North America and Western Europe to include partners in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), thereby amplifying China’s soft power (Peng and Keane 2019). Liu Chun, the General Manager of the China Film Co-Production Corporation, noted that China has signed film co-production agreements with 22 countries. From 2000 to the end of 2019, China co-produced and released 244 films with other countries, with 49 of these films grossing over 100 million yuan at the mainland box office (M. Zhang 2020).

In the third essay, Poppy Qian Zhai explores Sino-Nordic film co-productions, specifically focusing on Sino-Danish collaborations from 2000 onwards. The film co-production agreement signed between Denmark and China was the first and only Nordic country to establish such a treaty with China in 2017. Using two recent China-Denmark co-productions as case studies, the essay examines the cultural and film policies that catalyzed the emergence and development of this new co-production partnership. The essay aims to address two emergent trends in transnational screen studies: conceptual engagement with soft power (Lim 2019) and transnational talent development (Hjort 2019). It discusses how cinema serves as a tool for states, institutions, and corporations to mediate diplomatic and political goals, generate soft power, and engage in nation branding. The essay argues that the transformation in geopolitical relationships between China and Denmark, along with their respective film and cultural policies over the past decade, has led to this new collaborative partnership. Furthermore, it suggests that recent European cultural policies supporting Sino-European co-production and transnational talent development have facilitated Sino-Danish film co-productions.

Stage four 2020 onwards: the cinemas of Sinosphere?

Amidst the rapid expansion of China’s economy, the Chinese film industry ascended to become the world’s largest film market in 2020. Berry (Berry 2021, 183) critically examined the developments of the past decade within the Chinese context and introduced the concept of the ‘cinemas of the Sinosphere’ to articulate these shifts. He posited that the ‘cinemas of the Sinosphere’ encompasses two dimensions: one that transitions from a definition rooted in the Chinese language to one based on cultural representation, encapsulating diverse cinematic expressions of Chinese identity. The other dimension pertains to an era characterized by dual globalizations, wherein PRC cinema is integral to Chinese globalization, and the responses from other cinematic traditions form part of the cinemas of the Sinosphere. Berry highlights that the rising tensions, as US-based Hollywood and PRC-based Chollywood transnational globalization projects vie for influence, might engender a ‘Second Cold War’ narrative. He contends that the cinemas of the Sinosphere intersect with and occasionally compete against the cinemas shaped by American-led globalization, while at other times, they collaborate (Berry 2021, 184–188).

China remains central to this discussion due to its political significance and market influence. Historically, Chinese cinema has faced a consistent challenge: while films often perform well at the domestic box office, their international appeal remains weak. This disparity creates tension between China’s domestic political ideology, enforced by censorship, and its credibility on the international stage. This tension aligns with the historical trajectory of the state’s film policy, which has remained consistent from the establishment of the PRC to the present day. Although the CPC acknowledges the commoditized nature of film, it continues to enforce a sophisticated system of regulation and censorship to maintain control over the industry. For instance, regulations on the ‘going out’ policy mandate that all those working within China’s film industry adhere to the correct political ideology. Consequently, there is limited room for film collaborations and co-productions to drive genuine changes within this framework. The primary challenge is that all film collaborations and co-productions require prior approval from the Chinese government, and the regulatory hurdles can be exceedingly burdensome. As a result, many international producers have determined that the restrictions needed to make these deals feasible are not justified by the potential benefits (Roxborough and Patrick 2017).

Moreover, as the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed global media industries and altered audience habits, accelerating digital distribution, a timely examination of China’s film distribution and exhibition sector has been conducted. This study focuses on digital giants iQIYI, Maoyan, and Tao Piao Piao, concluding that their strategies have accelerated platformization, though coexistence with traditional practices remains likely. However, how China collaborates with its international counterparts in the field of digital distribution remains unresearched (Su 2022).

The fourth essay examines the case of Mulan in 2020 (Caro 2020) as a Sino-US collaboration, exploring recent trends against the backdrop of geopolitical shifts and the COVID-19 pandemic. Through in-depth interviews and a case study, it investigates the reception of Mulan in 2020 in China. The study explores how external pressures have disrupted the previously thriving partnership, leading to investment uncertainty, intensified censorship, and shifts in audience consumption towards online platforms, which have exacerbated piracy issues. It also addresses the political tensions surrounding Mulan (2020), including controversies related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong, which hindered its box-office success in Mainland China despite domestic support.

A comparative analysis with Mulan in 1998 (Bancroft and Cook 1998) assesses the evolution of feminist themes and filial piety in the 2020 adaptation. The findings indicate that while efforts were made to enhance feminist narratives and cultural motifs, the execution was superficial, treating complex cultural themes as mere embellishments rather than integral elements of the narrative. The film’s portrayal of these themes within a predominantly Western framework highlights ongoing challenges in bridging cultural narratives in Sino-US film productions. The findings underscore the profound impact of geopolitics and reveal the contentious portrayal of feminism and cultural integration in Mulan (2020), emphasizing the challenges in Sino-US film collaborations.

Conclusion

In light of the transition to the second phase of transnational cinema studies and the concept of the ‘cinema of the Sinosphere’, this volume delves into the policies and practices of transnational cinema, with a particular focus on China and its international counterparts. Contrary to the prevailing academic research and industry analysis suggesting that international co-productions are predominantly driven by financial rather than creative motives, the four essays contained in this series suggest that in the context of China, such co-productions are more likely to be dominated by political considerations, driven by government interests and political agendas.

Since the establishment of the PRC, the ruling party has acknowledged the powerful role of film in shaping perceptions of China. Films have consistently been utilized to serve statecraft and advance state interests. While the primary collaborators and policies have evolved over time, they have remained closely aligned with the PRC’s statecraft objectives. Despite numerous reforms and progressive developments within China and its film industry, the state continues to fundamentally view film as an ideological instrument, maintaining strict control through a complex censorship mechanism to further its political agenda, particularly in international collaborations.

This alignment is evident across various periods, from the establishment of the PRC to the post-COVID era, and through collaborations with non-Western countries, extending to non-state actors within the country, and beyond Mainland China to regions such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as First World countries like the U.S., and currently, to the strategically significant BRI countries. Despite these developments and diverse partnerships, the model of working with China remains state-led, with non-state actors playing increasingly crucial roles within the censorship system.

While there is some flexibility and occasional representative cases, film practitioners face significant challenges in identifying shared ideologies and cultural specifics that can establish common ground for Sino-international film collaborations and co-productions appealing to both Chinese and international audiences. Additionally, they must navigate the intricate censorship system in China. Consequently, Chollywood has very limited influence outside of China and lacks the power to compete with Hollywood, even if it aspires to do so. For the Chinese market, foreign filmmakers must collaborate with Chinese entities due to regulatory requirements to access box office revenues. However, the risks associated with political issues and censorship can make some foreign producers think twice before engaging in co-production or collaboration activity. The Sino-US experience of (unofficial) co-production is therefore not without its challenges for both Chinese and American partners. It emphasises the need for Chinese co-producers to look beyond the Sino-US axis and cultivate a broader network of collaborative partners, effecting the kind of geo-political de-centring that this special edition attempts to highlight and that characterises more broadly the approach of second phase transnationalism within transnational screen studies.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their gratitude to the editors of Transnational Screens and the peer reviewers—Chris Berry, Pei-Sze Chow, Peter Shih Chien Chang, Yongchun Fu, Yuxiang Hou, Carla Mereu Keating, and Wendy Su—for their valuable feedback and suggestions. Finally, we extend our thanks to our contributors for making this special issue possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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Notes on contributors

Yanling Yang

Yanling Yang is a Lecturer of Communications and Languages at the University of Exeter (UK). Her research interests include film co-production, cultural policy, digital media, soft power, and international communications. Before joining the University of Exeter, she was the Principal Investigator for the Leverhulme Trust-funded research project ‘Film Co-Production as Soft Power Between the UK and China’ (2018-2021). She has also collaborated with local cinemas in both the UK and China to screen films for the public. Her current projects include a monograph titled ‘Making Film with China’ and essays on the policy and practice of international collaborations in the creative industry.

Will Higbee

Will Higbee is Professor of Film Studies at the University of Exeter (UK). His research focuses on questions of national and transnational cinemas, with a particular interest in French cinema, cinemas of the Maghreb and its diaspora and industry studies. He is the (co-) author of Moroccan Cinema Uncut (EUP, 2020), Post-beur cinema (EUP 2013) and Mathieu Kassovitz (MUP, 2005) and the co-editor of De-Westernizing Film Studies (Routledge, 2012). He was the Principal Investigator of the AHRC-funded Transnational Moroccan Cinema project (2015-18) and the subsequent project (2019-22) to restore, digitise and distribute two key Moroccan films from the 1980s and 1990s - A Door to the Sky (Benlyazid, 1989) and The Cliff (Bensaïdi, 1997) - to new audiences in Morocco and around the world.

Notes

1. Key contributions in the field of Transnational Latin American cinema studies include – but are not limited to – Dennison (2013), Shaw (2016), Perriam et al (2007), Tierney (2018). In Transnational cinema studies focusing on the MENA region, we could cite (amongst others): Higbee and Lim, (2010a), Hjort (2020) Martin (2023) and Van de Peer and Davies-Hayon (2024).

2. Such perspectives emerge through the pioneering work of Third Cinema and postcolonial theory of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, to Shohat and Stam’s Unthinking Eurocentrism (1994) via Global Art Cinema: new theories and histories (Galt and Schoonover 2010), Theorizing World Cinema (Nagib et al 2012), De-Westernizing Film Studies (Bâ and Higbee 2012) and, most recently to the work of the Screen Worlds: decolonising film and Screen Studies project, led by Prof Lindiwe Dovey https://screenworlds.org/and. the Global Circulations of Film Theory Network, led by Professor Sarah Cooper and Dr Aboubakar Sanogo https://www.kcl.ac.uk/research/global-circulations-of-film-theory-network#:~:text=The%20AHRC%2Dfunded%20Global%20Circulations,film%20theory’s%20western%20imperialist%20foundations.