The role of Sino-Arab film collaboration on cultural diplomacy during the ‘Seventeen Years’

ABSTRACT

Despite the prolific film production in the nascent People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the ‘Seventeen Years’ from 1949 to 1966, Maoist cinema received limited critical analysis. While recent scholarly attention has shifted towards examining Chinese film production and exchange within the socialist bloc, a notable gap remains in the literature concerning Sino-Arab film collaboration during this period. This paper seeks to address this gap by utilizing textual analysis and archival studies to explore the practice of Sino-Arab film weeks through the lens of cultural diplomacy. Building upon the framework of the three schools of thought on cultural diplomacy, this study posits that Sino-Arab film collaboration from the 1950s to 1960s operated within the realm of people’s diplomacy. This term denotes cultural diplomacy with distinctively Chinese attributes within the Cold War context. This paper also complements the third trend that focuses on the transcendental realm of the state by exploring the little-studied interactions between film screenings and reality in Sino-Arab film weeks. Under the common goal of anti-imperialism and nation-building, people’s diplomacy deviates from the conventional paradigm of bipolar rivalry and embodies the spirit of internationalist solidarity among Third World countries.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural diplomacy
• third Cinema
• the Seventeen Years
• Sino-Arab film collaboration
• cold War

Introduction

In September 1957, the art section of the widely circulated Arab newspaper, al-Ahram (the Pyramids), featured an extensive photograph capturing a Chinese woman alongside an Egyptian artist. The esteemed film actress Qin Yi was noteworthy among the rare Chinese visages depicted in the Egyptian press. Also present was Huda Sultan, an illustrious Egyptian figure renowned for her accomplishments in both acting and musical theatre. The occasion of this convergence was illustrated by a visual representation on the page, featuring a poster adorned with traditional Chinese lanterns and clouds. It bore the inscription ‘Chinese Film Week’ in both Chinese and Arabic artistic fonts. As elucidated by the article, the Chinese film delegation presented cinematic productions emblematic of the transformative narrative encapsulated by the ‘rise of the new China in cinema’ (Al-Malāgh 1957, 20–33).

This cinematic convergence marked the pioneering instance of a Chinese film week held in the Arab world. Film week, as a Chinese local film festival practice, was one of the main forms of cultural diplomacy between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s, specifically Egypt and Iraq. Arab film weeks held in China during this period included the Egyptian Film Week in September 1957, the Iraqi Film Week in July 1959, and that of the United Arab Republic¹ in May 1965. Correspondingly, film weeks showcasing Chinese cinema were organized in several Arab countries, including Egypt in 1957, Tunis in July 1962, and Iraq in August of that same year.² Such mutual cinematic engagement catalysed film exchanges between China and Arab countries. However, the history of Sino-Arab cinematic contacts during this period remains a gap in academic discourse.

The study focuses on the pivotal period of ‘Seventeen Years’ following the inception of the PRC in 1949 and before the Cultural Revolution in 1966, which witnessed abundant film production of the nascent PRC. However, the volume and caliber of the produced Maoist cinema received a limited level of critical analysis, experiencing a notable upsurge only in the past decade. This circumstance was characterized by Braester and Chen (2011, 6) as the descent of cinema into the obscurity of what they term the ‘missing years’. In their analysis, the rationale lies in the projection of the harsh repression experienced during the Cultural Revolution onto its early stages, affecting the Western reception of this period. Additionally, Chinese scholars faced challenges reconciling Maoism’s totalitarianism with the concurrent blossoming of revolutionary art.

Recent scholarship has increasingly directed its focus toward Chinese film production and exchange from the 1950s to 1960s (Yee Chan 2019a), though neglecting the fact that interstate cinematic interactions primarily manifested through film weeks. However, scholarly attention regarding film weeks predominantly centres on the import and export of films within the socialist camp (Hou 2022; Ruan 2023), particularly between the PRC and the Soviet Union amidst the dynamic political split (Hong 2006; Li 2014). Additionally, the icebreaking practice of film weeks between the PRC and capitalist countries such as Italy and France during the early Cold War era has also been examined (Pan 2021). Cinematic encounters are seen as part of a cultural endeavour to firmly anchor the PRC in the socialist bloc (Volland 2008, 52). In this way, the socialist network of film screenings is interpreted within hierarchical structures, expanding from the PRC and the Soviet Union to Asian countries such as Burma and Indonesia (Chen 2009). Despite these insightful explorations, previous studies have neglected Chinese cinematic engagements with the Afro-Asian states, particularly the Arab states.

Meanwhile, film festivals have been recognized as important venues for pursuing broader foreign policy objectives within the Cold War rivalry (Frost 2023). Regional film networks established by the bipolar powers since the mid-1950s have been extensively documented. Lee (2020) analyses the inaugural post-war pan-Asian film network represented by the Asian Film Festival since 1953, which implemented the American-designed goal of ‘Free Asia’. In addition, the Moscow International Film Festival since 1959 and the Afro-Asian Film Festival from 1968 to 1988, initiated by the Soviet Union, are considered more inclusive platforms for showcasing films from South countries³ (Razlogova 2020). Comparing with Eurocentric international film festivals, Ma (2016) contributed to the argument that Chinese film weeks, as local practices, diverge from rather than converge with Soviet or European models of the same period. In this context, film festivals are perceived as manifestations of cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, cinematic contacts involving the PRC are often construed as communist propaganda aimed at ideological infiltration (Z. Wang 2014, 11), ignoring the dynamics of South-South cooperation. Meanwhile, the Arab world’s involvement in Asian film networks has received little attention (Dickinson 2018a).

Unlike co-production, which examines the economic and political dynamics of transnational film production and related policies, the collaboration discussed in this article revolves primarily around film weeks as platforms for alternative distribution, intercultural exchange, and cultural diplomacy. It should also be noted that that the Sino-Arab collaborative activities highlighted in this article discourse are predominantly situated within the context of cultural events, rather than manifested in the co-creation of films. This study employs textual analysis and archival research to explore the role of Sino-Arab Film collaboration through the lens of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy holds a significant position within nation-states’ foreign policy paradigms and cultural discourse. However, scholarly inquiry reveals a lack of cohesive definition, leading to cultural diplomacy appearing more as a fragmented concept rather than a coherent body of policies and strategies (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 365). Similarly, the examination of China’s cultural diplomacy reflects this inherent ambiguity to a certain degree. In terms of conceptual definitions, certain scholars opt to integrate related concepts. For instance, Ma’s (2010, 36) encompasses cultural diplomacy from the inception of the PRC to the contemporary era, collectively labelled as cultural public diplomacy. Therefore, it is crucial to first reconcile the prevailing consensus among researchers in delineating distinct concepts within cultural diplomacy.

The widely cited definition of cultural diplomacy, articulated by political scientist Milton Cummings (2009, 1), entails the intentional exchange of ideas, information, artistic expressions, and other cultural elements among nations and their citizenry. In addition, cultural diplomacy is conceived as a subset of the broader domain of public diplomacy. The latter represents a comprehensive public relations endeavour on the international stage, including information programs and advocacy (Cull 2009, 1). More importantly, Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010, 9–10) contributed to clarifying the term by outlining three schools of thought concerning cultural diplomacy, based on the degree of state involvement. The first group perceives culture as a tool of state policy with minimal private participation. Conversely, the second faction underscores cultural diplomacy as a mechanism for political exclusion. Furthermore, the third perspective characterizes it as diplomacy extending beyond the realm of the state, aiming to promote national culture overseas and foster interactive international cultural exchanges. Following Gienow-Hecht’s definition, this study posits that the Sino-Arab film collaboration during the Seventeen Years was operated within the realm of people’s diplomacy. It is a special term for cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the early years of the founding of the PRC.

Through a comparative analysis of the three schools of cultural diplomacy, this research argues that people’s diplomacy cannot be directly classified into any single category for explanation. Firstly, the study defines the concept of people’s diplomacy within the context of Cold War rivalry and explores the transformative shift in global dynamics at the advent of Bandung from the perspective of the Third World. Secondly, given the stark contrast in governmental participation between the first and second schools of thought, they are collectively examined alongside people’s diplomacy within a single section. From the perspective of dependency theory, the study explains the necessity of people’s diplomacy for powerful governmental involvement and South-South cooperation. Notably, the main practitioners are non-professional diplomatic actors from semi-official and unofficial entities under governmental patronage and oversight. Accordingly, people’s diplomacy diverges markedly from the first trend that excludes private entanglements and the second one that emphasizes depoliticization. In the final section, the study introduces the concepts of dependency theorists’ cultural delinking and the cultural decolonization of Third Cinema to examine Sino-Arab film collaboration rooted in the ethos of internationalist solidarity. As a cultural and political positioning, Third Cinema gained influence and visibility towards the end of the 1960s, shortly after the end of the Seventeen Years. However, this study argues that the Sino-Arab cinematic interactions within film weeks of the Seventeen Years were essentially part of a precursor to Third Cinema. Moreover, through anti-imperialist and nation-building perspectives, the study resonates with and complements the third category of cultural diplomacy in the realm of the Third World beyond national boundaries.

Emergence of people’s diplomacy amidst Cold War constraints and South-South cooperation

The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the terminology of cultural diplomacy is echoed, to some extent, in the Chinese scholarly discourse on the notion of people’s diplomacy. Within Chinese academia, it has often been construed as a subset of cultural diplomacy (W. Liu 2015, 49), with the latter being characterized as a distinctive and specialized facet of public diplomacy (C. Liu 2017, 44). However, some scholars have also compared Chinese people’s diplomacy with Western-originated public diplomacy. While similar in content, the essence of the former is imbued with unique attributes due to its communist class identity (Chu 2016, 65). Such distinctiveness is primarily encapsulated in the term ‘people’. On one hand, ‘people’ carries political connotations, denoting a collective subjectivity comprised of liberated and conscious individuals transcending class and national boundaries (Yin 2018, 276). On the other hand, participants in people’s diplomacy predominantly consist of non-state actors operating independently or through unofficial or semi-official groups, often funded and directed by the government, a dynamic that will be elucidated in subsequent sections.

While the formal delineation of people’s diplomacy was not explicitly articulated in official diplomatic documentation, insights into its cultural scope were gleaned from accounts provided by Chinese foreign ministers during the 1950s and 1960s, as documented in memoirs and firsthand recollections. Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Zhou Enlai, serving as both Premier of the State Council and the inaugural Minister of Foreign Affairs, played a pivotal role in shaping and advancing diplomatic institutions and strategies. Zhou not only personally engaged in foreign affairs but also spearheaded the conceptualization and implementation of ‘people’s diplomacy’. This approach extended beyond traditional diplomacy, encompassing not only political, economic, and military domains but also placing significant emphasis on cultural exchange such as literature, art, education, sports, religion, and scientific advancements (Gan 1989, 133). However, the ideological underpinnings of people’s diplomacy gradually faded over time amidst theoretical revaluations and policy adjustments. In its stead, the concept of people-to-people diplomacy emerged in the 1970s, representing a continuation and evolution of the principles inherent in people’s diplomacy (S. Zhang 2017, 16).

The emergence of people’s diplomacy unfolded within the specific geopolitical and temporal frameworks of the Cold War rivalry, when the nascent PRC led by Chinese communists posed a perceived threat to American policies in East and Southeast Asia (Westad 2005, 110). Amidst the fervent anti-communist sentiments of the Cold War era, the United States, driven by its policy of containment, not only refused to recognize China’s sovereignty but also actively sought to undermine diplomatic initiatives by the PRC in the Third World (Brazinsky 2017, 125). Cultural diplomacy played a pivotal role in the ideological battleground of the ‘Cultural Cold War’. Film exchanges, theatrical productions, and cultural journals became potent tools for advancing ideological objectives. However, Western film circuits, under U.S. influence, blocked the participation of the PRC, exemplified by the exclusion of Chinese films from prestigious festivals like Cannes and Venice (Y. Wang 2016, 84). Chinese films appeared as ‘peripherals’ on the cultural battlefield of Western film circuits (Pan 2021, 70). This cultural isolation extended to economic measures, with the United States restricting trade and imposing embargoes on China from the outset of the Korean War in 1950, persisting until 1971. The term ‘Cultural Cold War’ aptly encapsulates this struggle for cultural prestige and influence within the ideological realms of the two opposing blocs (Barnhisel 2015, 2). Amid such political, economic, and cultural containment from the West, the nascent China was unable to adopt formal intergovernmental diplomatic engagement.

Furthermore, the political non-recognition of the PRC by the Arab world exacerbated China’s isolation during the Cultural Cold War. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the communist government found itself excluded from the United Nations and unrecognized by any Arab country. The Arab nations, such as Iraq and Egypt maintained diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), which was the sovereign representative of China at the time (Behbehani2016, 2).

Apart from political non-recognition, widespread misconceptions and fears fueled by the perceived incompatibility between communism and religion in non-communist countries posed significant obstacles for the PRC in conducting formal diplomacy. The prevailing narrative within the Arab states, shaped by influential publications emphasized the perceived antagonism between communism and Islam. In 1955, the Islamic journal Majallat al-Azhar (Journal of al-Azhar) in Egypt issued an article entitled The Islamic Congress of Indonesia declares that Communism is a religion opposed to Islam (Al-Azhar 1955, 208–209). With al-Azhar University being renowned as the most prestigious and influential Islamic academic institution, the readership of its affiliated journal extends far beyond the borders of Egypt to all Islamic and Arab countries. Such lack of understanding is evidenced by the experience of a young Iraqi visitor to China in 1954, who described the PRC as a ‘closed world’ for Arabs, marked by fear and minimal comprehension (Al-Adhamī 1954, 176).

However, the transformative shift in global dynamics materialized with the advent of the Bandung Conference in 1955, marking an alternative framework outside the bipolar confines of the Cold War (Bradley 2010, 480). This landmark event resonated with the collective aspirations of the oppressed peoples, comprising over half the world’s population in Asian and African states of the Third World. The term ‘Third World’ emerged in the late 1950s and reached widespread usage during the 1960s. The significance of the Bandung Conference lies in its role as a threshold from which the concept of the Third World can be meaningfully articulated. The conference implied two necessary preconditions for the adoption of the Third World terminology: the rivalry between the two camps and the burgeoning colonial independence movements (Armes 1987, 10). Stavrianos (1981, 26) defined the Third World as encompassing countries or regions that are dependent upon, and subordinate to, the developed First World of the center. Instead of a fixed set of countries or statistical criteria, dependency theorists conceptualize the Third World as a constellation of unequal relationships. Within the world capitalist system, such an unequal structure between the metropolises of monopolistic exploitation and the dependent peripheral zones has engendered a distorted trajectory of development in the latter, which Frank (1966) describes as underdevelopment. Poverty and underdevelopment, resulting from exploitation, are outcomes of colonial expansion in the oppressed regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Rodney 1972, 28). Accordingly, Bandung provided a platform of solidarity and cooperation for the peripheral South to resist such unequal structures.

Rejecting economic subordination and cultural repression, the Bandung spirit, as delineated by Vijay Prashad (2007, 54), encapsulates the core principles guiding the darker nations during this transformative era. Beyond addressing economic structures, Bandung’s delegates recognized colonization’s cultural dimensions, emphasizing the imperative to overcome cultural estrangement (Pham and Shilliam 2016, 14). Rooted in a genuine desire to revive old cultural ties and forge new paths in the modern world, the Bandung spirit, as articulated in the conference’s Final Communiqué, prioritized cultural cooperation as a potent means of fostering international understanding (Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference 1955). Inspired by the spirit of Bandung, a wide range of transnational cultural exchanges, including film exchanges, flourished between Third World countries since 1955. It also enabled the nascent communist China, politically isolated from the Cold War rivalry and suffering from political non-recognition in the Arab countries, to initiate people’s diplomacy conducted mainly by non-professional diplomats, as it was difficult to conduct intergovernmental diplomacy.

The pivotal Conference marked the PRC’s inaugural diplomatic engagement on the global stage, effectively dismantling its isolative stance among Asian neighbors (Friedman 2015, 27). With Arab region’s ongoing national independence and liberation movement, the Chinese government believed that the PRC and Arab countries were both third world countries and shared common goals of decolonization and nation-building. In consonance with the cultural objectives outlined in the Bandung Conference, an official religious delegation led by Ahmed Hassan Elbagoury, the Egyptian Minister of Religious Affairs, visited China in May 1955.

In response, it took over four months for the initial Chinese culture and art delegation to tour and perform in Middle Eastern states – including Egypt, Sudan, Syria, and Lebanon – from February until June 1956. The delegation’s work report cited 54 performances during their overseas visit, garnering an audience of over 76,000 spectators and receiving substantial acclaim from Arab populations (Shahidi 1989, 49). Concurrently, the China-Egypt Cultural Cooperation Agreement was formalized, encompassing reciprocal visits by cultural and artistic groups, mutual art exhibitions, exchanges of recordings and art reproductions, and the facilitation of cinema presentations and film exchanges (‘China-Egypt Cultural Cooperation Agreement’ 1958, 159–161). Within this framework, Egypt and China exchanged the film week in 1957, challenging Western blockades and dispelling Arab suspicions. These cultural alternatives, embraced by the nascent Chinese policymakers, epitomized people’s diplomacy.

The role of government and non-state actors in diplomatic engagement

Cultural diplomacy, as articulated by Ptáčková et al. (2021, 4), refers to intentional initiatives or endeavours facilitated or overseen by governmental bodies and their agencies, aimed at leveraging culture as a means to promote political, strategic, or national interests. This aligns with the primary focus of the inaugural school of thought outlined by Gienow-Hecht on state-driven cultural diplomacy. Consistent with the above emphasis on political agendas, people’s diplomacy is undoubtedly state-orientated. This is primarily evidenced by the prominent role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership nucleus in shaping the nation’s foreign policy decisions, a hallmark characteristic of China’s foreign policy implementation (N. Lu 1997, 190).

Moreover, such governmental oversight and financial backing are channeled organizationally through the Bureau of External Cultural Liaison Affairs, a pivotal governmental diplomatic entity. Established under the Ministry of Culture in November 1949, it oversees and allocates funds for external affairs across various official bodies such as the Ministry of Higher Education, Religious Bureau, Xinhua News Agency, and Writers’ Association (Zhou 2010, 54). Through streamlining management and support for foreign cultural exchange projects, this centralized management structure further highlights the government’s supervisory role. Notably, the organization of Arab film weeks in Chinese cities also falls under the purview of the Bureau.

Beijing’s governmental involvement in cultural interactions echoes the basic consensus among the Afro-Asian countries at the Bandung Conference. It underscores the understanding that mere symbolic political independence is insufficient. Rather, effective governance within the Third World countries is imperative to facilitate intergovernmental cultural cooperation, fostering mutual understanding among the peripheral peoples. In this way, cultural subjectivity could be constructed as a response to the cultural hegemony of colonial metropolises (Yin 2022, 54). Moreover, Chinese governmental oversight and funding in people’s diplomacy correspond to the remedies proposed by dependency theorists, which prioritize effective governmental governance and South-South cooperation as essential components of resistance against the capitalist world system.

According to dependency theorists, the underdevelopment of the (so-called) Global South⁴ is rooted in its placement within the lower strata of the capitalist world hierarchy. Central to this process of exploitation is the interlocking relational chain between the industrialised core and the subordinated periphery (Frank 1979). Implicit in this argument is the recognition that the underdeveloped countries that constitute the periphery of the system, lack the capability, in isolation, to counter organised and coordinated monopolistic exploitation from the developed core. To address the inequalities of the capitalist world system, Samir Amin, an Egyptian intellectual, advocated for strong governmental support, including the imposition of barriers such as quotas and tariff controls to enable domestic industries to survive. Additionally, such a centre-periphery structure necessitates South-South cooperation as a viable alternative to exploitative economic relations between the core and periphery countries (Amin 1990). Consequently, it was argued the cinema industry in what was then referred to as the Third World, could only thrive through powerful state policies and coordinated, transnational cooperation rather than individual efforts (Armes 1987, 40). However, despite governmental involvement, the scope of protection for cinema in these countries remains limited due to the film’s peripheral status in the government’s modernization agenda and its disconnection from traditional culture.

In a similar way, the practice of Sino-Arab film weeks by Arab states during the 1950s and 1960s reflected the powerful governmental involvement advocated by dependency theorists. In Egypt, the impact of American Hollywood and Indian cinema on Egyptian film began in the 1940s (Shafik 2017, 133). Following the Free Officers’ Revolution in 1952, the Egyptian government launched interventions such as establishing the Syndicate of Film Professions and the Fine Arts Department to rescue the local film industry from foreign influence transformed by war profiteers (Maatouk 2019b, 10). Following the Suez Canal War of 1956, the Nasser government issued seizure orders and Egyptianisation decrees, leading to the departure of foreign shareholders from the film industry, thereby affecting local cinema, theatres, and distribution companies, as well as causing shortages of film and specialized equipment (Maatouk 2019b, 13). Accordingly, the establishment of the Cinema Support Institution (CSI) in June 1957 marked the emergence of the public sector in Egyptian cinema. Alongside partial nationalisation, the state-regulated professional education, funding, censorship, screening and distribution, while allowing parallel operation of the private sector (Dickinson 2018b, 25). Similar to the PRC’s governmental organ mentioned above, the purpose of Egypt’s CSI was not profit-making, but rather to provide services and develop the film industry infrastructure. In line with the Bandung spirit, the Egyptian CIS organised film tours to communist China and other Asian and Latin American countries for reciprocal visits in the late 1950s, as well as holding film weeks in Cairo.

Such Sino-Arab cultural networks, financially supported and supervised by the governments, were established within foreign policy agendas and objectives. On one hand, the Sino-Arab film weeks during the Seventeen Years were typically organized following the signing of governmental Cultural Cooperation Agreements with corresponding Arab nations (Renminribao 1959b). In addition, these film weeks transcended mere cinematic displays, bearing a political and commemorative significance that mirrored the nuanced nature of Sino-Arab relations during that era. For instance, in 1957, mutual Sino-Egypt film weeks were convened shortly after Egypt became the first Arab country to formally establish diplomatic ties with Communist China. Similarly, the Iraqi Film Week in 1959 was inaugurated to commemorate the first anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Iraq following the successful overthrow of the monarchy and the attainment of political independence. In this context, Sino-Arab film collaboration reflects the financial guarantee and political supervision in the film industry of the South. It resonates with the call of the Bandung for direct engagement and collaboration through powerful governments in peripheral underdeveloped countries, in opposition to the cultural monopoly of the colonial center. In this way, cinematic practices within people’s diplomacy underscore significant governmental involvement and political will, diverging from the perspective of the second school of thought, which advocates for the exclusion of politics and transcends government control.

Meanwhile, people’s diplomacy embraces and even encourages the participation of non-state actors in the realm of film exchange. The ambiguity surrounding the definition of ‘cultural diplomacy’, as highlighted by Ang, Isar, and Mar, largely arises from the conflation of cultural diplomacy with cultural relations. While they argue that the former is fundamentally governmental practice motivated by interests, cultural relations, the latter, are characterized by idealistic pursuits rather than profit that are primarily conducted by non-state actors (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 365). In this sense, people’s diplomacy distinctly embodies this amalgamation, given its reliance on non-state actors such as intellectuals, filmmakers, and directors who assume diplomatic roles. Consequently, this study characterizes this emphasis on individual participation as people’s orientation.

Generally, there are three types of diplomatic activities in the PRC in terms of setup and inner organization in charge: official, semi-official and non-governmental. The notion of people’s diplomacy should therefore be understood pragmatically in its historical context. Following the turmoil caused by colonial intervention, foreign invasion, and civil war, a newly independent China prioritized state-building and nation-building in the mid-20^th century. It necessitated the transition of military personnel into civilian roles to staff newly established public offices. Additionally, party cadets and military personnel assumed roles in the private sector, which faced challenges following the brain drain resulting from the retreat of the Nationalist government (Fairbank 1987, 122). Amidst these fluctuating circumstances, distinguishing between non-governmental organizations and semi-governmental groups became increasingly challenging, as both could include individuals with party affiliations. Furthermore, as elucidated in the preceding section on state involvement, both types of institutions are subject to supervision by the Chinese government.

Non-state actors participating in Sino-Arab film weeks during the period considered in this article were mainly from the aforementioned semi-official and non-governmental institutions. Founded in May 1954, the Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Culture was a non-governmental association focusing on interstate cultural exchanges. Its mandate was to further develop friendly relations between the Chinese people and people of other countries and to promote cultural exchanges (Enfan and Jiasong 1997, 136). In addition, the Filmmakers’ Association fostered cinematic exchanges with global film communities. Moreover, the Islamic Association of China had, since 1952, assisted in developing cultural contacts with Arab countries, reflecting the cooperation between ethnic-religious groups and the Communist central government.

People’s orientation is evident not only in the organizational structure of dedicated people’s diplomacy but also in its participants. Unlike traditional scholarship’s depiction of cultural diplomacy as conducted mainly by formal diplomats (Arndt 2005, xviii), practitioners of people’s diplomacy, both leaders and members, are not primarily recruited from the inner circle of the state’s foreign office. In principle, both non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations engaging in diplomatic activities should manifest the principle of the mass line.⁵ Therefore, leadership positions often involve individuals without CPC membership, including prominent intellectuals and religious leaders. One notable example in this context was Burhan Shahidi – a reputable ethnic Uighur scholar and then the chairman of the PRC’s Xinjiang Provincial People’s Government. Shahidi was appointed head of the Islamic Association of China in 1953 as well as the chairperson of the China-Egypt Friendship Association (‘Burhan Shahidi’ 2024).

The endeavours undertaken by institutions within the scope of people’s diplomacy are featured in the form of reciprocal visits by delegations between the new PRC and the Arab countries. One such example is the Chinese Film Week in Egypt in 1957 mentioned at the beginning of this article. It sees a delegation comprising Chinese film actresses, a technician, and a director. Despite lacking diplomatic rank, the delegates were accorded diplomatic status at the opening of the cinematic activities, where they were received by President Nasser (Situ 1957, 17). The Egyptian president’s wife even hosted the guests from China in the parlor of her house. The gracious and modest lady narrated the ousting of Egypt’s extravagant monarchical rulers before the 1952 revolution. Such an experience, ‘similar to that of being a guest in the home of an ordinary Egyptian’ impressed the Chinese filmmakers (Y. Bai 1958, 25). Interestingly, Chinese film magazines focused on the interaction between the leading actress and President Nasser, rather than highlighting the presence of the Chinese ambassador in Egypt. The invisibility of Chinese government officials was accompanied by media coverage that replaced the label ‘star’ with ‘film worker’, emphasising the socialist egalitarian narrative (Yee Chan 2019b, 129).

As a result, people’s diplomacy highlights its uniqueness in Sino-Arab film collaboration for its governmental oversight and financial support. More importantly, the pivotal role played by non-state actors acting as diplomats is beyond conventional diplomatic channels. This feature, particularly evident in the visibility of the state, distinguishes it from both the first and second schools of thought on cultural diplomacy, as summarized by Gienow-Hecht. Consequently, this form of cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics cannot be exclusively categorized under either school.

Nonetheless, the Chinese people’s diplomacy of non-state actors playing diplomatic roles is not an exclusive case. During the Cold War, Hollywood representatives switched roles with Washington diplomats in film festivals during the 1960s (Frost 2023, 88), while the American government dispatched black race dancers to the Third World in the 1950s to enhance the national image (Prevots 1999, 5). However, what truly sets people’s diplomacy apart from conventional cultural diplomacy is its internationalist outlook, which transcends national boundaries, as evidenced in the subsequent comparison with the third trend.

Anti-imperialist and nation-building perspectives in Sino-Arab film collaboration

In her comprehensive analysis of the classification of cultural diplomacy, Gienow-Hecht outlines a third trend in terms of its transnational role. However, her volume omits the PRC as a case study or any endeavours towards internationalist cultural diplomacy within the Third World. In an attempt to address this potential oversight, the final section of this article introduces the concept of cultural delinking by dependency theorists and the decolonizating essence of Third Cinema, to shed light on the spirit of internationalist solidarity among the South countries. Third Cinema as a concept, manifesto or cultural-political movement, had its origins at the Bandung Conference of 1955 (Chanan 1997, 374). It emerged in Latin America in the late 1960s, shortly after the end of the Seventeen Years. By analysing the common goals of anti-imperialism and nation-building during the reciprocal film weeks, this study argues that the Sino-Arab cinematic collaboration of the Seventeen Years was essentially part of a precursor to the Third Cinema. The dynamic interactions between film screenings and reality within the framework of people’s diplomacy enhanced the image of socialist China in the Arab world.

In the light of the Bandung spirit, an internationalist sentiment, rooted in the notion of ‘solidarity’, permeated cultural exchanges during film screenings, not only between China and the Arab nations but also extending to the subordinated South. Moreover, the solidarity essence is embedded in the pursuit of reciprocity and equitable membership within a shared moral community, aligning with anti-imperialist and anti-colonial goals in an internationalist context (Yee Chan 2019c, 163). Amin and Bush (2014) characterizes the post-Bandung political and cultural solidarity of the peripheral South as ‘delinking’, a resistance within the capitalist world system aimed at compelling core powers to adjust and retreat. Such resistance practices are directed at dismantling the center-periphery structure of inequality by prioritizing domestic developments over external connections. In the realm of film collaboration, the concept of Third Cinema helps to elucidate Sino-Arab approaches to film production and distribution as a cultural delinking endeavor. In essence, such effort seeks to embed anti-imperialist struggles in cinema to construct the emancipatory personalities of Third World peoples, a concept referred to as cultural decolonization by Solanas and Getino (1970), pioneers of the Third Cinema movement.

The notion of the Third Cinema was built in the late 1960s to oppose the two existing privileged elite-driven forms. Namely, the ‘first cinema’ of Hollywood’s commercial model, and the ‘second cinema’ represented by the 1950s film movements of the French New Wave and the Brazilian Cinema Novo, which highlighted depoliticized individualistic aspirations (L. Zhang 2021, 8). In this way, the proponents of Third Cinema resisted the imposition of terms by the industrially and ideologically dominant cinemas, asserting their autonomy in opposition (Pines and Willemen 1989, 7). By empowering cinema for social and political transformation, Third Cinema advocates seek collective revolutionary productions with a pluralistic approach to exhibition. It also mirrors the political backdrop of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement in the 1950s and 1960s, where Sino-Arab interactions extended beyond socialist and communist parties since Arab states were not aligned with the socialist camp. According to Yin (2023, 139), Afro-Asian and Latin American solidarity, combined with traditional bilateral diplomacy between states, has been central to the PRC’s diplomatic practice since its inception. Accordingly, the dynamics within Sino-Arab film weeks reflect China’s strategic self-positioning within the geopolitical landscape of the Arab world.

In response to the ongoing liberation struggles and decolonization movements against social injustice and post-imperial exploitation, the idea of the Third Cinema equates the cinema with a political weapon and the camera with a gun (Guneratne, Dissanayake, and Chakravarty 2003, 4). Thematically, the Chinese and Arab films on display reflect the shared goals of anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism. The films revolve around the exploitation by feudal landowners and the corrupt rule of the aristocracy before the countries’ independence, as perceived from the standpoint of ordinary citizens. For instance, The New Year’s Sacrifice (1956), China’s first color feature film based on a novel written by the famous Chinese writer Lu Xun, was screened at the Egyptian Film Week in 1957. Introducing themes of women’s liberation, this film narrates the tragic tale of a Chinese woman exploited to her demise by feudal oppression. Chinese films garnered substantial popularity among Egyptian audiences, as recorded in the memoirs of the cinematic delegation’s head, that Arab viewers engaged in discussions between screenings and even made late-night calls to the delegation’s hotel to express their appreciation (Situ 1957, 17).

Similarly, the Egyptian government provided four feature films during the 1957 Film Week, including The Blazing Sun (1954), which depicted the oppression of peasants by Egyptian landowners before the 1952 revolution, and Allah Maana (1955), which showed patriotic Egyptian military officers overthrowing the Farouk regime colluded with the British colonialists. As early as 1956, the Egyptian government recognized the mobilizing effect of distributing films related to the Suez Canal War. Whether fictional or documentary, such films would stir public resentment against blatant violations of Egyptian sovereignty, as well as bolster support for the military government’s challenge to colonial hegemony (Maatouk 2019a, 12). Consequently, the documentary Tell the Whole World (1957), presented as a gift from Nasser’s government, was translated and screened in Beijing six months before the film week’s commencement. As the first Egyptian film to be screened in Beijing, it employed a comparative approach to document Egypt before and after the destruction of the Suez Canal and Port Said by Israeli, British and French forces (Renminribao 1957). The Arab documentaries exchanged during the cinematic events conveyed the process of national liberation in content, free in format from the standard cinematic structure imposed by bourgeois culture, Western art theorists and critics. Such cinema from Third World countries was described by the Cuban filmmaker Garcia Espinosa (2014) as ‘imperfect cinema’. It contrasts with the dominant Hollywood model and the prevailing Western perspective by disavowing the technical and artistic perfection of filmmaking.

Imperfect Cinema aims at reaching a mass audience, unlike film festivals in Cannes and Venice, which are accessible only to artistic elites or professionals. These Arab movies received an impressive response from the Chinese audience. For example, the Iraq Film Week held in July 1959, featured one feature film depicting Iraqi daily life and four documentaries in major cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan. In Beijing, Iraqi films were shown in five cinemas, giving a total of 40 screenings and an estimated audience of 14,000 spectators (A. Bai 1999, 123). In this way, the Third World’s common experience of internal opposition to feudalism and monarchical rule, and its external anti-imperialist and anti-colonial aspirations, have enabled the construction of an internationalist imagination for the Chinese and Arab audiences through the screenings on the platform of the film week.

Furthermore, the fraternal solidarity advocated by the PRC is reflected in the understanding of the films during exhibition week. One example is Saladin (1963), a color widescreen feature film about Saladin, the iconic Muslim figure leading local forces’ resistance to the Crusaders in medieval times. It was well received during the Film Week of the United Arabic Republic in 1965. According to a review published by Cai Chusheng⁶ in the People’s Daily, the film reveals that ‘in the struggle for freedom and justice, even if the enemy is strong and we are weak, as long as we can be in solidarity, we are sure to win in the end’ (Cai 1965). This interpretation of the relationship of ‘solidarity will surely win’ maps the aspiration for victory in the context of the Third World’s real struggle against colonialism and the surging wave of independence after the Bandung Conference. It also reflects China’s conscious search for a ‘united front’ with the newly decolonized countries against Western imperialism (Bradley 2010, 481).

For Arabs, Saladin establishes a credible link between contemporary and past heroic revolts against colonial rule from an Arab nationalist perspective. With the victory of the Suez Canal War of 1956 over the tripartite aggression of Britain, France and Israel, and the short-lived alliance of UAR between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, President Nasser emerged as the symbol and leader of Arab unity by leading a pan-Arab movement against imperialism and Zionism. He was thus seen as ‘the new Saladin who would unite all Arabs and liberate the land of Palestine from the Zionists’ (Armes 1987, 247). Although this almost blind adoration of the leader was greatly diminished after the Egyptian army was severely defeated by Israel in 1967, President Nasser is still considered the heroic figure that his director, Youssef Chahine, wanted to portray when he shot Saladin the Victorious in 1963 (Armes 1987, 247). In this context, an understanding of the historical narratives of the Chinese and Arab films screened at the film weeks transcends the moments of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan, the Suez Canal War in Egypt, or the overthrow of monarchical rule in Iraq. Instead, it depicts the participation of Third World countries in contemporary global struggles.

Notably, the significance of internationalist ‘solidarity’ extended beyond the visual screenings and textual forms of film criticism to actual political mobilization through the appeals of organizations affiliated with people’s diplomacy during the film screenings. Two days after the opening of the 1959 Iraqi Film Week in Beijing, a mass rally was organized to celebrate the first anniversary of Iraq’s national day by people’s diplomatic organs such as the China-Iraqi Friendship Association, the Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Cultures, and the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity. The producer of the Iraqi film Neighbors (1956), released in China, was also invited to the event (Renminribao 1959a). In his statement, the Special Representative of Iraq, Aziz Sharif, combined Iraq’s war of independence with the solidarity of Arab and Third World countries. ‘Although what Iraq went through was not a socialist revolution’, as Sharif emphasized, ‘Iraq was born and grew in a struggle of solidarity with Arab countries and peace-loving countries like the PRC’ (Renminribao 1959a). With the shared colonial historical past being screened as an artistic subject during the film week, this simultaneous mass mobilization by the organs of people’s diplomacy created an internationalist anti-colonial imaginary that enhanced the image of socialist China in the Arab world.

On the other hand, Chinese and Arab films screened at the cinematic weeks also celebrated the efforts to achieve modernization in both countries. Arab countries predominantly presented news documentaries, as evidenced by Egypt’s offering of eight documentaries in 1957, double the number of feature films, and Iraq’s presentation of one feature film and four documentaries in 1962. For instance, the Egyptian documentary film The Revival of Industry (1954) depicted the nation’s strides in modernization, showcasing advancements in heavy, light, and handicraft industries, including the inauguration of a new hydroelectric power plant and the expansion of an oil smelter along the Nile (Shi 1957). Correspondingly, Chinese films exhibited in Arab countries include the feature film Beacon Fire on a Frontier (1957), which was shown in Iraq in 1962. It depicts China’s modernization efforts, focusing on constructing sluice gates and irrigating fields to improve agriculture (Renminribao 1959b). These films showed the transformative progress of the country after political independence, which embodied the common desire of both the PRC and the Arab countries for nation-building when they were still facing the challenges of colonialism on the economic and social fronts.

Moreover, Chinese scientific documentaries were also exported to Arab countries during this period. One example is Nasonia and Pink Bollworm (1959) which won second prize at the Second Afro-Asian Film Festival held in February 1960 in Egypt. It introduces cotton farmers to effective methods of preventing pink bollworm, the most serious cotton pest, by utilizing its natural enemy Nasonia. This storytelling film is characterized by breaking away from the rigid imitation of the Soviet documentary model (Zhao 2005, 37). By exporting the film through the Afro-Asian Film Festival, which has a wider geographic coverage, this film has practical significance for the process of agricultural modernization in Egypt, where cotton farming and its export are the main sources of income. According to Tina Mai Chen (2009, 156), the export of Chinese scientific films simultaneously advertised China to non-socialist countries as a provider of modernizing knowledge and a leader of the socialist future. However, China’s participation in the modernization process of the Arab countries cannot be utilitarianly viewed through the lens of the construction of intergenerational hierarchies across geographical regions. The fraternal solidarity advocated bilaterally is based on mutual assistance on an equal footing.

It is noteworthy that the involvement of the PRC in Arab modernization was not only witnessed in the exhibition of films but was supported by China’s national economic agenda. During the reciprocal Sino-Egyptian Film Week in 1957, al-Ahram published news of 250 tons of frozen meat from the PRC arriving at Port Said. The Egyptian public learnt that the Ministry of Supply had sent experts to guide the loading and shipment to other locations in the country to be sold at favorable prices (Al-Ahram 1957). Unlike conventional trade patterns, China’s economic support to Egypt is a barter trade model between underdeveloped countries.

Following Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt faced intensified economic blockade from imperial forces in 1957. President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1963) exposed the imperialists’ conspiracy to employ economic blockade as a peaceful means of aggression. However, this embargo spurred mutual economic assistance and fostered interdependencies among Third World nations. Only four months after the 1955 Bandung Conference, Egypt and China signed a trade agreement and protocol, predating the formal establishment of diplomatic relations. This three-year trade agreement outlined bilateral trade details and payment methods (Mishuting 1955, 911–915). In response to the 1957 economic blockade, China provided Egypt with a 20 million Swiss franc loan amidst Britain’s freeze of Egypt’s sterling deposits. Additionally, China increased imports of Egypt’s primary export, cotton, and expedited exports of essential materials, bolstering bilateral ties. Remarkably, these commodities could be credited upfront without requiring foreign exchange and could be repaid later by Egypt with supplies, reflecting a trade model supporting Arab countries’ modernization and embodying the spirit of solidarity through reciprocity (Yao 1956, 5). Such a trade model, which supports the modernisation process in the Arab countries, likewise embodies the spirit of solidarity based on the concept of reciprocity.

Furthermore, in the case of the export of frozen beef and mutton being carried out during the film week, the ethical community and equal respect advocated by the Chinese government in solidarity with its Arab brothers is better demonstrated in detail. Adhering to Islamic tradition, the meat was slaughtered by a mosque’s imam for export and processed by Muslim workers before being wrapped in white cloth and loaded onto trucks. Each product underwent inspection and approval by the imam before departure (NCNA 1957). More than material commitments, these measures constituted a stronger moral promise (Calabrese 1991, 11). Feedback from local Arabs on this fraternal solidarity was documented by members of organizations of people’s diplomacy. Lu Jian, a member of the Chinese Youth Delegation, recorded how Arab locals expressed gratitude for the Chinese frozen lamb sent during challenging times when visiting the UAR in March 1958. As Lu (1958, 14) wrote in his travelogue, the Arab locals referred to the Chinese as ‘not only friends but also the closest brothers’.

Conclusion

The practice of reciprocal Sino-Arab film weeks during the 1950s and 1960s exemplifies people’s diplomacy as a model of cultural diplomacy in China, which challenges easy categorization within existing frameworks outlined by Gienow-Hecht. Amid the Western blockade of the Cultural Cold War and political non-recognition of the Arab states, the study sees people’s diplomacy as necessary as a type of government-led diplomacy. From the perspective of dependency theory, the study underscores the necessity of powerful governmental involvement and South-South cooperation to resist the unequal development structures of the capitalist world system. While receiving governmental oversight and financial sponsorship, people’s diplomacy also encourages private engagement, with non-state actors such as intellectuals, filmmakers, and performers assuming diplomatic roles. Accordingly, it diverges markedly from the first trend that disregards private involvement and the second one that stresses depoliticization.

Furthermore, this study supplements the third trend that emphasizes the state’s transcendental role by delving into the underexplored interactions between film screenings and reality in Sino-Arab film collaboration. It introduces the concepts of dependency theorists’ cultural delinking and the cultural decolonization of Third Cinema to shed light on the spirit of internationalist solidarity among the South countries. Moreover, this study argues that the Sino-Arab cinematic interactions within film weeks of the Seventeen Years were essentially part of a precursor to Third Cinema. On the one hand, the organisations of people’s diplomacy broke through visual and textual interactions to extend to practical mass mobilisation, enhancing the image of the PRC in Arab countries. On the other hand, the documentaries screened reflect the common aspirations of Sino-Arab nation-building, while the export of scientific documentaries also reflects China’s involvement in the Arab modernization process. However, such participation cannot be viewed utilitarianly in terms of building a trans-regional hierarchical order. It is because ‘fraternal solidarity’ is based on mutual support on an equal footing, which also transcends the cinematic screening in the actual bartering pattern of trade between the PRC and Arab states. In this way, people’s diplomacy deviates from the conventional paradigm of bipolar rivalry and embodies the internationalist notion of ‘mutual assistance and solidarity’ among Third World countries. While the current academic definition of cultural diplomacy remains multifaceted and ambiguous, this study seeks to carve out a distinct space for Chinese people’s diplomacy by comparing it with different schools of thought.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ying Huang

Ying Huang is Lecturer in the Arabic Language at the School of Middle Eastern Studies of Beijing International Studies University. Based on textual analysis and archival studies, her research interests focus on Sino-Middle Eastern relations during the 20th century, specifically the role of cultural decolonization within the third world countries in countering colonialism and nation-building in the 1950s and 1960s.

Yanling Yang

Yanling Yang is Lecturer of Communications and Langueages at the University of Exeter in the UK. She is the co-editor of South and East Asian Cinemas Across Borders Critical Trends in Transnaitonal Cinema (2021), and the author of seveal notable works, including The Emergence of China-India Film Co-production: Policy and Practice (2020), The Role of the Non-state Film Industry in Promoting China’s Soft Power (2019), and Filim Policy, the Chinese Government and Soft Power (2016).

Notes

1. The United Arab Republic (UAR) existed as a sovereign entity in the Middle East between 1958 and 1961. Initially conceived as a political alliance between Egypt (incorporating the occupied Gaza Strip) and Syria, this union persisted until 1961 when Syria opted out after a coup d’état.

2. Due to the lack of bilateral cinematic activities, there is no reference in the article to Arab countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), except for the one reference to Tunis in this paragraph.

3. The South countries/Global South refers to countries and regions predominantly situated in the southern hemisphere, marked by lower economic development than their northern counterparts. Originating from socio-economic disparities, it includes Africa, Latin America and Asia, defined not only by geography but also by shared colonial legacies and independence struggles.

4. Although they continue to have common currency, terms ‘Global South’ and ‘underdeveloped’ are charged with meaning and seen as contested terms by many of those they purport to describe.

5. The mass line in Maoist politics emphasizes relying on and organizing the masses, with a focus on serving their needs and drawing inspiration from their collective wisdom.

6. Head of the Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Culture and the Chinese Filmmakers’ Association.