![Sample our Urban Studies journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110826/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Urban-Studies.jpg"})
Notes
1 Hall P (1962) The Industries of London since 1861. London: Hutchinson, at 9.
2 Our focus in this book is on the economic dimensions of becoming “left behind”, and we fully acknowledge “left behind places” may also suffer from, and be defined by, a range of social, environmental and cultural disadvantages, which will also need to be the focus of policy. But many such problems—such as poor-quality housing, poor health, low educational achievement, poor air quality, run-down social infrastructures and a lack of cultural facilities—are inextricably bound up with the economic opportunities and prosperity of an area, as both consequences and causes.
3 Streeck W (2016) How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System. London: Verso.
4 Rosés J and Wolf N (2021) Regional growth and inequality in the long run: Europe, 1900–2015. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 37: 17–48.
5 Kemeny T and Storper M (2020) Superstar Cities and Left Behind Places: Disruptive Innovation, Labour Demand and Inter-Regional Inequality (Working Paper No. 41). LSE International Inequalities Institute.
6 Sandbu M (2020) The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All, pp. 50–70. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7 Sandbu (2020), pp. 71–92, see Reference 6.
8 Rodrik D (2018) Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9 The “South” is defined as London, the South East, East of England (East Anglia), the South West and the East Midlands regions. The North comprises all other regions. Much of our empirical analysis refers to Britain, that is, the UK minus Northern Ireland, as consistent and comparable data for Northern Ireland are unfortunately not always available; Martin RL (1988) The political economy of Britain’s North–South divide. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, n.s., 13: 389–418; Martin RL (2006) The contemporary debate over the North–South divide: Images and realities of regional inequality in late twentieth century Britain. In Baker ARH and Billinge M (eds.), Geographies of England: The North–South Divide, Imagined and Material, pp. 15–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Smith D (1989) North and South: Britain’s Economic, Social and Political Divide. London: Penguin; Lewis J and Townsend A (1989) The North–South Divide: Regional Change in Britain in the 1980s. London: Paul Chapman.
10 Geary F and Stark T (2015) Regional GDP in the UK, 1861–1911: New estimates. Economic History Review, 68: 123–144; Geary F and Stark T (2016) What happened to regional inequality in Britain in the twentieth century? Economic History Review, 69: 215–222.
11 The cumulative differential growth is the running sum over successive years of the difference between the percentage growth rate of a region’s employment (or output) in each year minus the corresponding growth rate for the national economy as a whole in that year.
12 Blanchard OJ and Katz F (1992) Regional evolutions. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1–61.
13 London had been one of the country’s largest industrial centres. At the beginning of the 1970s, it employed more than 1 million workers in manufacturing. Over the period 1971–91, it shed some 685,000 of those jobs. During those decades, London also experienced a substantial decline in its population, so that its relative per capita GDP actually rose (see ).
14 Martin RL (2013) London’s economy: From resurgence to recession to rebalancing. In M Tewdwr-Jones, N Phelps and R Freestone (eds.), The Planning Imagination: Peter Hall and the Study of Urban and Regional Planning, pp. 67–84. London: Routledge.
15 Jackman R and Savouri S (1999) Has Britain solved the “regional problem”? In P Gregg and J Wadsworth (eds.), The State of Working Britain, pp. 29–46. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
16 HM Government (1997) Sharing the Nation’s Prosperity, p. 7. London: Cabinet Office.
17 It might be questioned why we focus on LADs on the grounds that they do not represent “functional economic areas”. Travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) would be more meaningful in this sense, since they are intended to represent “self-contained” labour catchment areas. However, not only does the “self-containment” threshold used by the ONS to delimit TTWAs vary significantly (from 75% of those both working and living in the same area to as low as 66%), but also the definition of the TTWAs that span the UK has changed significantly several times over the past 40 years or so (there were 308 in 1991, 243 in 2001, and 228 in 2011), much more so than have LADs. Also, importantly, LADs are the official units that raise local business taxes, and which administer financial grants from central government for the delivery of a range of social services and functions. Further, and importantly, LADs are the spatial units eligible to apply for the UK government’s new Levelling Up Fund (see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/966138/Levelling_Up_prospectus.pdf). While LADs have undoubted limitations as units of study, the 370 LADs do give a more granular picture of the country’s economic geography than do the 228 TTWAs or the 38 English Local Enterprise Partnerships.
18 Moretti E (2012) The New Geography of Jobs. Boston: Mariner; Storper M, Kemeny TY and Osman T (2015) The Rise and Fall of Urban Economies: Lessons from San Francisco and Los Angeles. Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books; Hendrickson C, Muro M and Galston WA (2018) Countering the Geography of Discontent: Strategies for Left Behind Places. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
19 Pike A (2018) The limits of city centrism? We need to rethink how we approach urban and regional development. British Politics and Policy, LSE online. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-limits-of-city-centrism/
20 Pike (2018), see Reference 19.
21 Although, of course, high housing costs in the capital reduce this advantage. Very recently, however, cities such as Oxford, Cambridge and Winchester have had more unfavourable “affordability” indices than parts of London.
22 Centre for Progressive Policy (2020) Beyond Hard Hats: What It Will Take to Level Up The UK. https://www.progressive-policy.net/publications/beyond-hard-hats/.
23 Martin RL, Sunley PJ, Gardiner B, Evenhuis E and Tyler P (2018) The city dimension of the productivity growth puzzle: The relative roles of structural changes and within-sector slowdown. Journal of Economic Geography, 18: 539–570.
24 Beatty C and Fothergill S (2019) Local Productivity: The Real Differences across UK Cities and Regions. Sheffield: Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University.
25 Cuadrado-Roura JR, Mancha-Navarro T and Garrido-Yserte R (2000) Regional productivity patterns in Europe: An alternative approach. Annals of Regional Science, 34: 365–384.