Abstract
Objective: To consider the state of knowledge in psychiatry with reference to the ‘Osheroff debate’ about the treatment of depression.
Method: A review of the key philosophical issues regarding the nature of knowledge applied to the Osheroff case.
Results: There is an apparent dichotomy between knowledge derived from a reductionist scientific method, as manifest in evidence-based medicine, and that of a narrative form of knowledge derived from clinical experience. The Focauldian notion of knowledge/power and knowledge as discourse suggests that scientific knowledge dominates over narrative knowledge in psychiatry. The implication of this applied to the Osheroff case is the potential annihilation of all forms of knowledge other than science.
Conclusions: Knowledge in psychiatry is a pluralist, rather than singularly scientific enterprise. In the Osheroff case, the potential for scientific knowledge to abolish other forms of knowledge posed a serious threat of weakening the profession. In the light of the current debate about best practice, there is a need for reconsideration of the implications of Osheroff.
Notes
*In cases of medical negligence in UK courts, the appropriate legal test is the so-called ‘Bolam test’, which compares clinical practice in a case of alleged negligence with the standard of practice that is deemed so by a ‘respectable body of the profession’. This was clarified in Australian courts by Rogers-v- Whittaker. As yet, there is no specific test case in psychiatry.