LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN RUSSIA

Abstract

Competent administration is fundamental to successful reform of social assistance programs in transition economies. Only with such administration is there assurance that benefits are being delivered as intended in enabling legislation. Moreover, the perceived efficiency and fairness of administration influences the public's views of the new programs. In the Russian Federation local governments have primary responsibility for the administration of social assistance programs enacted by all levels of government.

This paper presents the results of surveying nine offices charged with administering social assistance programs in four Russian municipalities. The accent is on the basics of program administration and management. Topics studied include client flow, eligibility verification procedures, the presence of a procedures manual for in-take workers, quality control procedures, and training. The findings are sobering and emphasize the need for the Russian government to assist municipalities to strengthen their administrative capacity through a combination of exhortation and leadership, provision of written guidance materials—on good administrative practices and program-specific regulations and procedures—and a national program of seminars for supervisors of various programs.

Acknowledgments

Notes

This article was previously published in the NISPAcee Occasional papers, Vol. II, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp 3–23. The article is reproduced here with the permission of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee), Bratislava, Slovakia, the holder of the copyright.

Mr. Struyk is a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute, Washington, DC. Between 1992 and October 1998 he was the resident director of the Housing Sector Reform Program in Russia. Mr. Richman, the former Director of Temporary Assistance Programs for the Virginia Department of Social Services, is currently resident director of the Local Government Social Sector Reform Program in Moscow. The fieldwork reported upon herein was conducted under the Social Sector Reform Project, sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The authors would like to thank reviewers for very helpful comments on a draft of the paper. The opinions expressed are the authors' and not necessarily those of the Urban Institute or USAID.

Wallich (1994); Freinkman, Treisman, and Titov (1999) for Russia. Note that under funding by the Russian national government initially places the burden on regional governments (Subjects of the Federation). But the regions are able to vary their contributions to local governments' revenues through an elaborate set of negotiations. In the end, municipalities can end up bearing much of the burden of the national-level funding shortfalls.

See, for example, McAuley (1994), Tacis (1998), Klugman (1997), Grootaert and Braithwaite (1998), World Bank (1999c) World Bank (1999d), Freinkman (1998).

World Bank (1999b), Annex 8 for a summary; and Struyk, Puzanov and Kolodeznikova (forthcoming). In addition PADCO (1996a, 1996b) have investigated controlling fraud in the Ukrainian housing allowance program.

Nunberg (1999a, 1999b), Verheijen and Nemec (2000), Krawchenko (1999).

Jabes (2000, p. 10) asserts that in Eastern Europe, “reform in most countries is characterized by the passing of laws, which are severely hampered by implementation deficits and enforcement gaps. These gaps are now systemic and serious throughout the region …”

The procedure also has features in common with what Newcomer (1996, pp. 565–566) terms “economy and efficiency reviews” and “evaluability assessments” and with field office inspections (Glover, 1989). However, in our case there are few national program standards available to use in assessing performance.

The Russian names for theses agencies are

a. Arzamas

1.	Munitsipalni Tsentr Sotsialnoi Pomoshchi Naselniyu
2.	Otdyel Zhilishchnykh Subsidyi
3.	Komitet Poh Voprosam Semyi

b. Novgorod

1.	Sluzhbah Subsidyi Zhilishchnoh-Kommynalnogo Khozyaistvah
2.	Tsentr Pomoshchi Semye I Detyam

c. Perm

1.	Raionnyi Otdel Sotsialnoi Zashchity

d. Tomsk

1.	Upravleniye Sotsialnoi Zashchity Yuzhnogo Okrugah (Otdyel Zhilishchykh Subsidyi)
2.	Otdel Sotsialnogo Obespechenya (Rabota Poh Detskim Posobiyam)
3.	Upravleniye Sotsialnoi Zashchiy Severnogo Okruga

On training interviewers for such interviews and conducting them, see Patton and Sawicki (1996), pp. 97–107, and Hatry et al. (1981), pp. 90–91. Also see Newcomer (1996, pp. 562–563) for commentary on possible biases in responses.

The limitations of self-monitoring data and key informant opinions are well-known (Valadez and Bamberger, 1994, pp. 353–354; Kumar, 1989, p. 4; Hummel, 1994, pp. 225–245).

Broadly, we followed the procedures outlined in Patton and Sawicki (1996, pp.109–113) to assess quality.

In the Russian Federation, the highest level of subnational government is called a Subject of Federation, of which there are 89. These consist of oblasts, krais, republics, autonomous orkugs, one autonomous raion, and two cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) that have Subject status. Although formally they are equal in their powers, separate treaties between the “federal center” and some of the Subjects of the Federation (mostly republics) signed under President Yeltsin give the latter more budget autonomy.

See, for example, Braithwaite (1997); Connor (1997); World Bank (1994).

Participants must also live in a qualifying type of housing, e.g., a privatized or state unit, coop, etc., and must not be in arrears on its rent payments. For details, see Struyk, Lee, and Puzanov (1997).

More specifically, different income definitions and eligibility standards (as well as verification procedures) are defined for the housing allowance and child allowance programs. Among municipal programs, the programs administered by the social protection committee tend to have uniform definitions and standards. But different definitions and standards are often used for programs administered by other committees, e.g., kindergarten fees and prices for school lunches which are determined by the education committee.

For example: Government of Russia Resolution No. 152 of February 2000, “Procedure for Recording and Counting Average per Capita Income of Low-Income Families and Low-Income Single Individuals;” Government of Russia Resolution No. 1096 of September 29, 1999, “Procedure for Recording and Counting the Average per Capita Income Eligible for a Monthly Housing Allowance;” Federal Law No. 134 of October 24, 1997, “On Subsistence Level in the Russian Federation.”

For the period of July 1994 through May 2000 there were several cases where workers were denied bonuses because of serious errors made by them, but none of them was terminated for this reason.

District administrations keep statistics on appeals filed in their districts but these were not obtained.

Doubtless, higher salaries could improve morale and probably productivity. But given the extremely low benefit levels and the fact that benefits are not paid consistently in many cities (Gallagher et al., 2000), it is difficult to argue for this as a priority.

In its early years, the housing allowance program devoted considerable energy to the verification issue. It went so far as to develop profile of households who were likely to hid income from informal sources in an interview (using data from comprehensive household income surveys). In such cases where applicants were profiled as likely to be underreporting, HAOs were advised to add home visits and other checks to eligibility tests, as done in Novgorod. Shorter periods between recertifications were also recommended—in effect raising the cost of participation. For details see Holcomb and Puzanov (1996).