Making contact with the primitive mind: The contact‐barrier, beta‐elements and the drives

Abstract

A clinical vignette is used as the starting point for an exploration of Bion's notion of a contact‐barrier, which “separates mental phenomena into two groups one of which performs the functions of consciousness and the other the functions of unconsciousness” (Bion, 1962a, p. 22), and its relation to Freud's drive theory. Bion's concept is compared to Freud's (1950[1895]) description of the ‘contact‐barrier’ in the Project for a scientific psychology. Through this comparison, light is shed on various aspects of Bion's metapsychology, especially on the notion of ‘beta‐elements’, described by Bion in quantitative/energetic terms as ‘accretions of stimuli’. The processing of beta‐elements through the function of the contact‐barrier is understood as an elaboration of Freud's notion of the ‘binding’ of the drives, with the difference that beta‐elements encompass ‘unprocessed’ external stimuli as well as impulses arising from within. The ‘beta‐element’ and the ‘drives’ are both understood as concepts that delimit what is knowable in the psyche. Further clinical material is presented to illustrate the author's argument that Bion's contact‐barrier and related concepts (alpha function, containment) should be understood with reference to the economic/energetic aspect of Freud's metapsychology.

Translation of summary

Kontakt mit dem primitiven Sinn: Die contactbarrier, Beta‐Elemente und die Antriebe

Eine klinische Vignette dient als Ausgangspunkt für eine Untersuchung des Bionschen Verständnis der Kontaktschranke, die „geistige Phänomene in zwei Gruppen trennt, von denen die eine die Funktionen des Bewusstseins erfüllt und die andere die Funktionen des Unbewussten” (Bion, Lernen durch Erfahrung), und seiner Beziehung zu Freuds Triebtheorie. Bions Konzept wird mit Freuds Beschreibung der „Kontaktschranke” im Entwurf einer wissenschaftlichen Psychologie (1950[1895]) verglichen. Dieser Vergleich wirft Licht auf mehrere Aspekte der Bionschen Metapsychologie, insbesondere auf das Konzet der „Beta‐Elemente”, die Bion unter quantitativem/energetischem Aspekt als „Reizzuwächse” beschreibt. Die Verarbeitung der Beta‐Elemente durch die Funktion der Kontaktschranke wird als Weiterentwicklung der Freudschen „Bindung” der Triebe verstanden – mit dem Unterschied, dass „unverarbeitete” äußere Stimuli ebenso zu den Beta‐Elementen zählen wie innerlich erzeugte Impulse. Das „Beta‐Element” und die „Triebe” werden als Konzepte verstanden, die das, was in der Psyche erkennbar ist, abgrenzen. Weiteres klinisches Material illustriert die These des Autors, dass Bions Kontaktschranke und damit zusammenhängende Konzepte (Alpha‐Funktion, Containment) unter Bezugnahme auf den ökonomischen/energetischen Aspekt von Freuds Metapsychologie verstanden werden sollten.

Tomando contacto con la mente primitiva: la barrera‐contacto, los elementos Beta y las pulsiones

Una viñeta clínica se usa como punto de partida para la exploración de la noción de Bion de barrera‐contacto (contact‐barrier), que “separa los fenómenos mentales en dos grupos, uno de los cuales realiza la función de la conciencia y el otro la función de lo inconsciente” (Bion, 1962a, p. 22), y su relación con la teoría pulsional de Freud. El concepto de Bion es comparado con la descripción de Freud de las “barreras‐contacto” en el Proyecto de psicología para científicos (1950[1895]). A través de esta comparación se iluminan diferentes aspectos de la metapsicología de Bion, especialmente la noción de “elementos‐beta”, descritos por Bion en términos cuantitativos/energéticos como “incrementos de estímulos”. El procesamiento de elementos‐beta por medio de la función de la barrera‐contacto se comprende como una elaboración de la noción de Freud de ‘ligadura’ de las pulsiones, con la diferencia de que los elementos‐beta incluyen estímulos externos ‘no procesados’ así como impulsos que surgen del interior. Los ‘elementos‐beta’ y las ‘pulsiones’ son comprendidos como conceptos que delimitan lo que es cognoscible de la psique. Se presenta material clínico para ilustrar el argumento del autor según el cual la barrera‐contacto y los conceptos relacionados (función‐alfa, continente) deben comprenderse en referencia al aspecto económico/energético de la metapsicología de Freud.

Entrer en contact avec le psychisme primitif: la barrière de contact, les éléments bêta et les pulsions

A partir d'une vignette clinique, l'auteur de cet article examine la notion de barrière de contact de Bion – une entité « qui sépare les phénomènes psychiques en deux groupes, l'un remplissant les fonctions de la conscience et l'autre les fonctions de l'inconscience » (Bion, 1962a), et la met en relation avec la théorie des pulsions de Freud. L'auteur compare cette notion à la description de la « barrière de contact » de Freud, dans son Projet de psychologie scientifique (1895). A travers cette comparaison, il met en lumière différents aspects de la métapsychologie bionienne, en particulier la notion d'« éléments bêta » que Bion définit en termes quantitatifs/énergétiques comme des « accumulations de stimuli ». L'auteur considère la transformation des éléments bêta via la fonction de la barrière de contact comme une élaboration de la notion freudienne de « liaison » des pulsions, à la différence près que les éléments bêta englobent tout aussi bien des stimuli externes « bruts » que des impulsions venues du dedans. Les « éléments bêta », de même que les « pulsions », sont conçus comme des concepts qui délimitent ce qui est connaissable dans le psychisme. L'auteur présente également quelques exemples cliniques pour illustrer sa thèse quant au fait que le concept bionien de barrière de contact et les notions connexes de fonction alpha et de contenance doivent être envisagés en référence aux aspects économique/énergétique de la métapsychologie freudienne.

A contatto con la mente primitiva: Barriera di contatto, elementi Beta e pulsioni

Partendo da un esempio clinico viene esplorata la nozione bioniana di ‘barriera di contatto’. Quest'ultima separa i fenomeni mentali in due gruppi, di cui uno presiede alle funzioni consce e l'altro a quelle inconsce (Bion, 1962a, p. 22). Si esamina quindi la relazione fra questa nozione e la teoria pulsionale di Freud. Il concetto di Bion viene confrontato alla barriera di contatto descritta da Freud in ‘Progetto per una psicologia scientifica’. Mediante questo confronto, vengono elucidati vari aspetti della metapsicologia bioniana, in particolare il concetto di elemento beta che Bion, partendo da una prospettiva energetica, attribuisce a un' ‘accumulazione di stimoli’. Il processo degli elementi beta mediante la funzione della barriera di contatto viene inteso come un'elaborazione della nozione freudiana di ‘legame delle pulsioni’. La differenza sta nel fatto che gli elementi beta comprendono elementi non processati di natura endogena oltre che quelli esogeni. Elemento beta e pulsione sono entrambi intesi come concetti che delimitano ciò che è conoscibile nella psiche. L'autore presenta poi ulteriore materiale clinico per dimostrare come la barriera di contatto ed altri concetti bioniani ad essa associati (funzione alfa, contenimento) debbano essere compresi nel contesto della prospettiva dell'economia energetica proposta da Freud.

Key words:

• alpha function
• beta‐element
• binding
• contact‐barrier
• drive
• excorporation
• free and bound energy
• Freud's Project
• metapsychology
• primitive mind

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association of Child Psychotherapists annual conference in Birmingham, UK, with the title ‘Some thoughts on the contact‐barrier and psychic structure’, June 2012.

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association of Child Psychotherapists annual conference in Birmingham, UK, with the title ‘Some thoughts on the contact‐barrier and psychic structure’, June 2012.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Maria de Fatima Sarsfield Cabral, Gregorio Kohon, Valli Shaio Kohon and Rosine Perelberg for their helpful responses to an earlier draft. I would like to thank Sue Coulson for her intuitive and creative clinical supervision.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Association of Child Psychotherapists annual conference in Birmingham, UK, with the title ‘Some thoughts on the contact‐barrier and psychic structure’, June 2012.

2. Wollheim's (1971, pp. 42–64) may be the best attempt at a coherent summary. See also, from very different perspectives, Pribram and Gill, 1976; Di Orio and Klimkiewicz, 2005. Helpful further commentary on the Project can be found in the papers collected in Van de Vijver and Geerardyn (2002).

3. Freud's account in the Project of how consciousness arises depends not only on a quantitative conception (i.e. the displacements of ‘Q’ in a chain from one neuron to the next), but on a notion of the “period of the neuronal motion” (p. 310). This ‘periodicity’ directly anticipated the landmark neurophysiological work of Crick and Koch (1990), which showed experimentally how neurons that are not directly linked to each other are activated simultaneously by oscillations of the same frequency in the visual cortex. This solves the issue of how we perceive the wholeness of objects in our visual field. Interestingly, this is known in neuroscience as the ‘binding’ problem in perception (see Smith, 1999).

4. The role of perceptual processes in psychoanalytic metapsychology is extremely complex and my considerations in this section are inevitably oversimplified. See Botella and Botella, 2005, pp. 151–80.

5. I do not directly address the complex technical issues that arose when working with Alex in this paper, nor attempt to describe the evolution of his treatment. Over a number of years he made some progress and I believe had an experience of being treated as a thinking and feeling human being which was limited but nonetheless valuable. For technical and theoretical elaborations that have made it possible to work psychoanalytically with severely disturbed children, see Alvarez, 1992; Canham, 2004; and the papers collected in Boston and Szur, 1990. I should also add that it would have been impossible to treat Alex without the committed support of another clinician who worked extensively with the family and wider professional network.

6. ♂♀ and –(♂♀) correspond to K and –K. In terms of the Grid (Bion, 1963), perhaps –(♂♀) would be ‘in’ A1.

7. Klein repeatedly described both the anal–sadistic attack on the maternal object by trying to fill it with excrement, and the phantasy of babies equated with faeces (e.g. 1928, p. 189; 1955, p. 134).

8. The link between animism and a lack of differentiation between self and other is made by Freud in Totem and Taboo (1913), where animistic thinking is linked to an undifferentiated state of primary narcissism (see pp. 75–99).

9. With regards to the question of how differentiation from such a state becomes possible, it may be worth developing Bion's notion of a situation where the contact‐barrier is a ‘beta‐screen’ composed of beta‐elements that agglomerate into some sort of primitive structure. Bion posits the ‘beta‐screen’ as a pathological phenomenon, but it also suggests the idea of some residual tendency towards differentiation. Bion writes that the beta‐screen “has a quality enabling it to evoke the kind of response the patient desires, or, alternatively, a response from the analyst which is heavily charged with counter‐transference & Thanks to the beta‐screen the psychotic patient has a capacity for evoking emotions in the analyst&” (1962a, pp. 23–4).

10. “It is a great weakness of Freud's model that it gives no scope for affects as qualitative factors in mental life, but necessarily reduces them to the status of a variable quantity of excitation&” (Meltzer, 1978, p. 42). “Freud's clinging to the neuro‐physiological and hydrostatic view of mental life of ‘The Project’ interfered with the formulation of a satisfactory theory for describing and partially explaining the very complicated phenomena of the transference process. The concept of ‘quantities of excitation’ as a basis for pleasure and unpleasure left unformulated the whole area of mental pain; and tended strongly towards a view of life which was essentially denuded of meaning&” (op. cit., p. 127). “Freud himself preserved & his own preoccupation with the quantitative aspect of things. I think that this category of meta‐psychology (the economic category: the preoccupation with the quantitative relationships) is without doubt theoretically correct; but it is practically quite useless&” (op. cit., p.141). “Freud's formulation of the constancy principle reflects the influence of now outmoded neurological conceptions & and the influence of hydrolic metaphors & It is not one of the most palatable elements of the drive model” (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 25).

11. Actually the notion of ‘free’ and ‘bound’ energy, as described by Freud, and attributed to him, is in current use in neuroscience. This is from a 2010 paper in Brain: The Journal of Neurology:

&the psychoanalytic distinction between the primary and secondary processes& fits comfortably with modern notions of functional brain architecture, at both a computational and neuro‐physiological level & there is in fact an enormous amount of empirical evidence from neuropsychology, neuroimaging and psychopharmacology to support it& [Freud] recognized in certain non‐ordinary states & a mode of cognition that is characterized by a primitive, animistic style of thinking. Freud conjectured that the exchange of neuronal energy is relatively ‘free’ in this mode and he named this the ‘primary process’. Simultaneously, Freud recognized in non‐ordinary states the loss of certain functions& He ascribed these function to a central organization (the ego) which works to minimize the mind's free‐energy. Freud named this function the ‘secondary process’ and defined its aim as one of converting ‘free energy’ into ‘bound energy’& Free‐energy is not an abstract concept; it is used routinely in modelling empirical data (Friston et al., 2007) and in neuronal simulations of perception and action (Friston et al.,2009). (Carhart‐Harris and Friston, 2010, pp. 1265–7)

Of course, its usefulness in biological science does not in itself demonstrate that it has relevance to psychoanalysis. I believe the concept of drives, which cannot be divorced from a ‘quantitative’ or ‘energetic’ notion, is important in understanding clinical phenomena and for the coherence of psychoanalytic theory.

12. See also the distinction between ‘unintegration’ and ‘disintegration’ introduced by Bick (1968) and discussed by Alvarez (2006), Urwin (2006), Waddell (2006).