Understanding Freud's conflicted view of the object‐relatedness of sexuality and its implications for contemporary psychoanalysis: A re‐examination of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality

Abstract

Through a re‐examination of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), this paper reveals a fundamental tension in Freud's thinking on the nature of the individual and of his sexuality. In this text Freud portrays the individual and sexuality as inherently object‐related and at the same time as inherently independent of such relatedness. The way in which Freud presents these contradictory ideas suggests that he was not merely undecided on object‐relatedness and sexuality but rather that the contradiction was integral to this thinking. The paper offers an explanation of the meaning of this contradiction, of why it has been neglected in the analytic literature, and of some implications for contemporary psychoanalysis and its approach to sexuality.

Pour une compréhension de la conception paradoxale de freud sur la relation d'objet comme partie intégrante de la sexualité et ses conséquences sur la psychanalyse contemporaine. une relecture des trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité

A travers une relecture des Trois essais sur la théorie de la sexualité (1905), l'auteur met en lumière une tension fondamentale à l’œuvre dans la pensée de Freud sur la nature de l'individu et sa sexualité. Dans ce texte, Freud décrit l'individu et sa sexualité comme intrinsèquement liés à l'objet et, en même temps, comme intrinsèquement indépendants de cette relation. La façon dont Freud expose ces idées contradictoires donne à penser qu'il ne s'agit pas là d'une simple indécision de sa part quant à la relation d'objet et la sexualité, mais plutôt d'une contradiction inhérente à sa pensée. L'auteur éclaire le sens de cette contradiction, explique pourquoi elle a été laissée de côté dans la littérature analytique et enfin, interroge ses conséquences sur la psychanalyse contemporaine et son approche de la sexualité.

Zum verständnis von freuds widersprüchlichen sichtweisen der objektbezogenheit der sexualität und ihrer implikationen für die heutige psychoanalyse: eine neuerliche untersuchung der drei abhandlungen zur sexualtheorie

Durch eine abermalige Untersuchung der Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905) tritt eine grundlegende Spannung in Freuds Überlegungen zur Natur des Individuums und seiner Sexualität zutage. Freud porträtiert in diesem Text das Individuum und die Sexualität als inhärent objektbezogen und gleichzeitig als inhärent unabhängig von solcherart Bezogenheit. Die Art und Weise, wie er diese widersprüchlichen Sichtweisen darlegt, lässt vermuten, dass er nicht unentschlossen war, was Objektbezogenheit und Sexualität anging, sondern dass der Widerspruch tatsächlich ein integraler Bestandteil seiner Überlegungen war. Die Autorin erarbeitet eine Erklärung der Bedeutung dieses Widerspruchs und der Gründe, weshalb er in der analytischen Literatur vernachlässigt wurde. Sie beschreibt außerdem Implikationen für die heutige Psychoanalyse und ihr Verständnis der Sexualität.

Per una comprensione delle contrastanti visioni di freud della relazione d'oggetto nella sessualità e sue implicazioni per la psicoanalisi contemporanea: una rilettura dei tre saggi sulla teoria sessuale

Attraverso una rilettura dei Tre saggi sulla sessualità (1905), questo articolo si propone di mostrare la fondamentale tensione che esiste nel pensiero di Freud sulla natura dell'individuo e della sua sessualità. In questo testo Freud rappresenta l'individuo e la sua sessualità come intrinsecamente legati all'oggetto e, al contempo, come intrinsecamente indipendenti dalla relazione con l'oggetto. Il modo in cui Freud presenta queste concezioni contraddittorie suggerisce che non si tratta di una mera indecisione sulla relazione che la sessualità ha con l'oggetto, ma che la visione contraddittoria era parte integrante del pensiero freudiano. Questo articolo avanza una spiegazione del significato di questa contraddizione, del perché è stata trascurata nella letteratura psicoanalitica, nonché di alcune implicazioni pe la psicoanalisi contemporanea di questo approccio alla sessualità.

Para comprender la visión conflictiva de freud sobre la condición de relación objetal de la sexualidad y sus implicaciones para el psicoanálisis contemporáneo: un nuevo examen de tres ensayos sobre teoría sexual

Mediante un nuevo examen de Tres ensayos sobre teoría sexual (1905), este trabajo revela una tensión fundamental en las ideas de Freud acerca de la naturaleza del individuo y su sexualidad. En dicho texto, Freud describe al individuo y a la sexualidad como inherentemente relacionados a objetos y, a la vez, inherentemente independientes de tal relación. La manera en que Freud presenta estas ideas contradictorias sugiere que no estaba meramente indeciso respecto a las relaciones objetales y la sexualidad, sino más bien que la contradicción era fundamental en este pensamiento. El artículo ofrece una explicación del significado de esta contradicción, el por qué ha sido ignorada en la literatura psicoanalítica, y algunas implicaciones para el psicoanálisis contemporáneo y su enfoque a la sexualidad.

Key words:

• Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
• Freud
• Klein
• sexuality
• object‐relatedness
• instincts
• narcissism
• auto‐eroticism
• Andre Green

1. By the term ‘sexuality’ I refer to a quality of the person in so far as he is a sexual, instinctual, desiring, psychological being. The term has some ambiguity and may be misleading in light of certain contemporary uses of the term (e.g., in the sense of sexual orientation) but the alternatives (e.g., sexual activity, instinct, experience etc.) are less appropriate and this is the broad and ambiguous term Freud himself opted for in the title of the Three Essays.

1. By the term ‘sexuality’ I refer to a quality of the person in so far as he is a sexual, instinctual, desiring, psychological being. The term has some ambiguity and may be misleading in light of certain contemporary uses of the term (e.g., in the sense of sexual orientation) but the alternatives (e.g., sexual activity, instinct, experience etc.) are less appropriate and this is the broad and ambiguous term Freud himself opted for in the title of the Three Essays.

Notes

1. By the term ‘sexuality’ I refer to a quality of the person in so far as he is a sexual, instinctual, desiring, psychological being. The term has some ambiguity and may be misleading in light of certain contemporary uses of the term (e.g., in the sense of sexual orientation) but the alternatives (e.g., sexual activity, instinct, experience etc.) are less appropriate and this is the broad and ambiguous term Freud himself opted for in the title of the Three Essays.

2. In the course of the review process of this paper I was reminded that there are analytic schools which consider reference to the primacy of objects to be a denial of the fact that in all relationships instincts and drives are necessarily involved. For this reason I emphasize that the positions that I contrast here both regard the drives as essential and omnipresent but differ in their understanding of their relationship to objects.

To avoid additional possible misunderstanding and critique it should be noted that the fact that this paper does not elaborate the different kinds of objects that Freud introduced throughout his writing is not an oversight. Rather it is because the question the paper considers is whether according to Freud an object qua object is integral to the drives.

3. In this context Klein's comments on the differences between her use of the term ‘object’ and Freud's are interesting. While emphasizing that Freud at points posits primary object‐relations, not autoerotism, she adds that “Freud's use of the term object is here somewhat different from my use of this term, for he is referring to the object of an instinctual aim, while I mean, in addition to this, an object‐relation involving the infant's emotions, phantasies, anxieties, and defences. Nevertheless & Freud clearly speaks of a libidinal attachment to an object, the mother's breast, which precedes auto‐erotism and narcissism” (1952, p. 435).

4. Freud's concern here with sexuality as tied to ingestion and pleasure is particularly interesting in light of the view which he soon develops of sexuality as essentially masculine (sending out rather than taking in) and altruistic (preserving the species, rather than oneself).

5. Freud's emphasis in the third preface (of 1909) that in this book his concern is with ontogenesis, not phylogenesis, is relevant in this context (p. 131).

6. E.g., Laplanche and Pontalis simply state that Freud's theory of auto‐eroticism posited a primary object. They write: It “does not assume the existence of a primitive, ‘objectless’ state. The action of sucking, which Freud takes as the model of auto‐erotism, is in fact preceded by a first stage during which the sexual instinct obtains satisfaction through an anaclitic relationship with the self‐preservative instinct (hunger), and by virtue of an object – namely, the mother's breast. Only when it becomes detached from hunger does the oral sexual instinct lose its object and, by the same token, become auto‐erotic” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 46).

7. It may be seen that it does so only partially because it is clear throughout the text that Freud doesn't only downplay the object, but outright has as an agenda to correct our misguided conception of the value of the object (as expressed in some of the earlier quotes).

8. Ricoeur (1970) uses the term ‘prehistory’ in this context, but seems to tie the prehistory of the instincts to that of Totem and Taboo, which contains the object‐related story.

9. In this context one may consider Laplanche's (1970) view of sexuality as originating in childhood seduction to be another kind of attempt to retain its otherness, the un‐interpretability of sexuality and hence its irreducibility (see also Stein, 1998). But I think it would be more in line with Freud's legacy to keep the irreducibility without shifting to an external source. The otherness of sexuality (according to Freud) is integral to it, not introduced into it.

10. On the one hand he says that this is in order to keep the instinct within its normal range of expression. On the other hand the normal range of expression is determined by what arouses these feelings.

11. One might recall here that Freud speaks in this context (as well as in Dora's case) of the hysteric as one who is disgusted by sexuality. However, it is interesting to see that for Freud in the Three Essays what seems to set the hysteric apart from the normal person is not the disgust per se, but rather the fact that in contrast to the normal the hysteric lacks a strong sexual instinct that “enjoys overriding this disgust” (p. 152).

There may, however, be one true exception to my claim that Freud dismisses evaluation when he considers sexuality from his instinct centred perspective. At several points in the first of the Three Essays Freud suggests that the domination of an aim or practice may justify referring to it as pathological. This occurs when the aim or practice becomes independent of other aims and practices; it becomes exaggerated and fixed; it becomes the only means to satisfaction, replacing so‐called normal aims and practices (e.g., in certain fetishes or sadistic sexual behaviour) (e.g., pp. 154, 157, 158). It is unclear why the domination of a sexual aim or practice justifies referring to it as pathological. Perhaps one could argue that from the impersonal instinctual perspective there is value to diversity, or that domination stands opposed to Freud's pervasive value of recognizing truth. But Freud doesn't develop such arguments and so this exception remains without reason and out of line with the more general trend of Freud's thinking in regard to the instinct from this perspective, which does not include any evaluative considerations.

12. More broadly, from this perspective certain sexual practices may be deemed objectionable for the very way they regard object‐relatedness. For example, in sharp contrast to the non‐evaluative stance that Freud takes towards pregenital sexual practices in his Three Essays, in his 1908“‘Civilized’ sexual morality and modern nervous illness” Freud writes the following: “These activities cannot, however [i.e., despite increased social acceptance], be regarded as being as harmless as analogous extensions [of the sexual aim] in love‐relationships. They are ethically objectionable, for they degrade the relationships of love between two human beings from a serious matter to a convenient game, attended by no risk and no spiritual participation” (p. 200).

13. Alternatively, one could reject Freud's Oedipus complex. If, for example, people are thought to have only loving relational wishes which could cause no harm, then one could more readily bracket any evaluation of sexual practices.