Beyond Difference: From Canonical Geography to Hybrid Geographies

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Acknowledgments

The encouragement of Bill Black, Caroline Desbiens, Margaret FitzSimmons, Dan Griffith, Jan Monk, Morton O'Kelly, Nadine Schuurman, Barney Warf, and other colleagues is very much appreciated. In addition, I am grateful to Trevor Barnes, Pat Burnett, Derek Gregory, Matt Hannah, Ron Johnston, Daniel Sui, Jennifer Wolch, and the reviewers for their thoughtful comments and insights that greatly improved the article. I would also like to thank Trevor Barnes, Jennifer Wolch, and Elvin Wyly for providing me a copy of their forthcoming papers, which were very helpful for my work on this article. The views expressed in this article remain my responsibility.

Notes

1. This is an overgeneralization that lumps a considerable variety of geographical perspectives and practices into an oppositional binary. By “social-cultural geographies” I refer to critical and interpretative perspectives that emphasize the qualitative understanding of place, human experiences, and social life. I use “spatial-analytical geographies” to refer to those perspectives that seek to analyze spatial patterns and processes through quantitative and GIS methods. This scheme ignores the “internal” discord between different perspectives within a group (e.g., between humanism and historical materialism in social-cultural geographies; see Kobayashi and Mackenzie 1989). I am also aware of the problem of perpetuating a binary that I seek to undo through this article.

2. An example is Fred Schaefer's (1953, 228) statement that, “Spatial relations are the ones that matter in geography, and no others.”

3. An example is Peter Gould's (1979) reference to the formative moment of the quantitative revolution as “the Augean Period,” with clear connotations of a purification or clean-up process—in this case traditional regional geography of the early twentieth century.

4. The processes of purification, canonization, polarization, boundary enforcement, and imputation outlined here are processes through which identities are constructed or perceived within the discipline (see Sibley 1995 and Hess 1997 for helpful discussions of these processes). The binarized identities produced by these processes, however, often do not reflect the actual practices of many geographers who work at the intersection of several different traditions and try to keep the social-cultural and spatial-analytical together in their work (e.g., Sheppard 1995). The realties of research practice within the discipline tend to be less binary than is often conveyed in the conflictual rhetoric.

5. See Felix Driver (2001) and John Marino (2002) on the improving status of the arts and the humanities tradition in geography.

6. Geographers in the spatial-analytical tradition have different views about science and the relationship between quantitative methods and positivism (Taaffe 1993). For instance, considerable differences exist between the views of four previous editors of Geographical Analysis: Michael Goodchild (1995,;1999), Emilio Casetti (1999), William Clark (1999), and Reginald Golledge (1999). Particularly intriguing is Casetti's (1999, 337) remark that, “when many voices are speaking up against science, its claims, role, validity, and impact … [i]t is important to keep in mind … that these voices may raise issues and themes that need to be addressed to redefine science and to produce better science.”

7. See Gillian Rose (1995) and Katharyne Mitchell (1997) for a critical assessment of the concept. It should also be noted that there are limits to hybridization in human geography since some fundamental differences or incompatibility may be difficult to eradicate entirely. In addition, there may be other promising strategies besides hybridity. For instance, Jennifer Wolch's (2003) notion of “radical openness” neither entails a grand synthesis nor advocates the dominance of a singular perspective or a succession of approaches.

8. This notion of hybridity is in some way similar to the concept of “the third culture” discussed in Daniel Sui (2004, 67), by which he refers to the “synergy and cross-fertilization of creative ideas from both arts and sciences.” See also David Gilbert (1995) and David Woodward (2001) on crossing the boundary between science and arts.

9. I am aware of the issues associated with any attempt to provide a vision for the discipline (e.g., Sayer 1999; Gregson 2003). My view here should be taken as personal reflections rather than an attempt to provide another overriding vision for the future of geography.

10. See, for instance, Heidi Nast (1994); Melissa Gilbert (1994); Richa Nagar (2002); Alison Mountz (2002); Geraldine Pratt (2002); Saraswati Raju (2002); Rachel Silvey (2002); Lynn Staeheli and Richa Nagar (2002); and Gill Valentine (2002).

11. It should be emphasized that it was geographers' “interpretations and use” of Kuhn's work that had been influential in geography rather than Kuhn's work itself. See Andrew Mair (1986, 345) for a helpful discussion on how Kuhn's work was misread and misused in geography—especially Kuhn's theory on the subjective and persuasion-based nature of scientific change and Kuhnian paradigms as tacit, taken-for-granted “rules of conduct” rather than formal statements of philosophy and theory.