Organization and Management Challenges of Russia's Icebreaker Fleet

Abstract

The and now Russia have employed a fleet of large icebreakers to gain access across the Russian maritime Arctic and facilitate traffic through the Northern Sea Route (). Since 2008, Atomflot has played a very influential role, not only in the management and operation of Russia's icebreakers, but in laying premises for the as a whole. The current Administration within the Ministry of Transport does not appear to have roles in policy formation, icebreaker management, or planning. Several of the Soviet‐era nuclear‐powered icebreakers are in need of replacement, but the construction program for new ships is marked by controversies. There is no integrated management of nuclear and conventional icebreakers, and it is unclear how the icebreaker fleet will be used to enhance the effectiveness of operations, and also to what extent the authorities will allow the independent navigation of icebreaking commercial carriers without convoy escort by icebreakers.

Key words:

• Arctic Ocean
• Atomflot
• icebreakers
• Northern Sea Route

Research for this article has been financed by the Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway as part of the project Drivers for Arctic Shipping.

Research for this article has been financed by the Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway as part of the project Drivers for Arctic Shipping.

Notes

Research for this article has been financed by the Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway as part of the project Drivers for Arctic Shipping.

1. Official Russian definition: “The water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be considered as the water area adjacent to the Northern coast of the Russian Federation, comprising the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent zone and the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and confined in the East with the Line of Maritime Demarcation with the United States of America and Cape Dezhnev parallel in Bering Strait, with the meridian of Cape Mys Zhelania to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the West, with the eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the western borders of Matochkin Strait, Kara Strait and Yugorski Shar.” (Russian Federation 2012).

2. A detailed presentation of the early organizational issues can be found in State archive of Murmansk oblast’ 2016.

3. The program for constructing floating nuclear power stations has not been given up, but has proceeded slowly. In 2016 it was announced that the first station will be completed in 2017 (Neftegaz.ru).

4. A branch office was opened in Arkhangelsk, however (Northern (Arctic) Federal University 2013). Its functions are unclear and it was perhaps mainly a political concession. By 2016 it seemed to have been closed or have no functions. But proposals to move the administration out of Moscow continue, including from the chairman of the State Commission for Development of the Arctic, Deputy prime minister Dmitriy Rogozin, at the commissions first meeting 13 April 2015 (Yemelyanenkov 2015).

5. The support from the President was indirect, though, as Atomflot was exempted from a list of state enterprises not to be transformed into joint‐stock companies (President of the Russian Federation 2011a). Nevertheless, this was widely interpreted as a go‐ahead from President Medvedev for Rosatom's plans. In a new edict signed by President Putin two years later, privatization of the nuclear icebreaker fleet was explicitly forbidden, however (President of the Russian Federation 2013).

6. Dollar values have been calculated according to historical exchange rates retrieved from X‐Rates 2016.

Additional information

Funding

Fram Centre in Tromsø, Norway

Notes on contributors

Arild Moe

Arild Moe Senior Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute P.O. Box 326, 1326 Lysaker, Norway; [[email protected]].

Lawson Brigham

Dr. Lawson Brigham Distinguished Fellow, Center for Arctic Policy Studies & Faculty, International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska Fairbanks, P.O. Box 757200, Fairbanks, Alaska 99775‐7200, USA; [[email protected]].