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Abstract
Drawing from agency theory and the attention‐based view of the firm, this study extends the understanding of the conditions under which CEO duality is negatively associated with board monitoring in a privately held firm context. Measuring monitoring in terms of board members’ involvement in behavioral control, output control, and strategy control tasks (Huse Citation2005), results show that CEO duality is significantly and negatively related only to the behavioral control task. In addition, we show that this negative effect is contingent on whether ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling shareholder as well as the type of controlling shareholder.
Financial support from the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT, grant no. SBO 90061) and Antwerp Management School is gratefully acknowledged.
Financial support from the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT, grant no. SBO 90061) and Antwerp Management School is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
Financial support from the Flemish Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT, grant no. SBO 90061) and Antwerp Management School is gratefully acknowledged.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Robin Deman
Robin Deman is doctoral researcher in the Department of Accounting and Finance at University of Antwerp, Belgium.
Ann Jorissen
Ann Jorissen is professor of Accounting at University of Antwerp, Department of Accounting and Finance, and academic director of the Antwerp Management School, Belgium.
Eddy Laveren
Eddy Laveren is professor of Financial Management and Entrepreneurship at University of Antwerp, and academic director of the Competence Center Family Businesses at Antwerp Management School, Belgium.