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Resumen
Este dossier trata de una manifestación “específca” de la especificidad de dominio en el desarrollo: la distinción entre una mente física y una mente social. En él se analizan y presentan algunos datos y teorías que han contribuido durante las dos últimas décadas al establecimiento de esta distinción en la psicología evolutiva. Más concretamente, se analizan, discuten e integran las influencias y aportaciones de: (1) La primatología y su propuesta sobre la evolución de una “inteligencia maquiavélica” en los primates cuyo producto más elaborado da lugar a una “teoría de la mente”—la habilidad de inferir las intenciones, creencias etc. que subyacen al comportamiento con fines predictivos y explicativos—. (2) La psicología de la primera infancia y los datos sobre habilidades expresivas, comunicativas e interactivas de los bebés que se dirigen de manera diferenciada a los “objetos sociales” (las personas) y cómo la lectura reciente de estas habilidades las considera como precursores ontogenéticos de la teoría de la mente. (3) La ciencia cognitiva en una de sus acepciones de la “arquitectura” del sistema cognitivo: la idea de la mente modular. (4) Las aportaciones que desde la psicología evolucionista reciente defienden una estructura modular de procesos mentales especializados en problemas de intercambio social que habrían evolucionado por su valor adaptativo para la cooperación en las primeras sociedades de homínidos (como los mecanismos para la detección de tramposos); en este punto se analizan también los datos que desde el desarrollo apoyan o van en contra de las teorías evolucionistas. (5) Por último, se presentan los datos y teorías que desde el estudio del autism—como un déficit específico en el desarrollo de una teoría de la mente—han contribuido a establecer la distinción entre mente física y mente social en el desarrollo.
Abstract
This monograph deals with the issue of domain specificity in development; more “specifically”, it deals with the distinction between the physical and the social domains of knowledge. In particular, it analyses how the distinction between a social mind and a physical mind became established within developmental psychology in the eighties and nineties. This paper introduces and analyses the evidence and concepts contributing to this distinction from five different sources of influence: (1) From primatological studies it takes the idea of a “Machiavellian intelligence” as the most characteristic evolution of primate minds. Its end product being the development of a “theory of mind”, i.e., the ability to infer internal mental states underlying behaviours in order to predict and understand other people's actions. (2) From infant development, it focuses on the early expressive and communicative abilities specifically addressed to “social objects” (people) as the ontogenetic precursors of a theory of mind. (3) From cognitive science, the idea of modularity as the characteristic architecture of the cognitive system. (4) From evolutionary psychology, the idea of modular mechanisms specialized in solving social exchange problems -assumed to be highly adaptive in promoting and regulating cooperation in the first hominid societies. Here, the developmental evidence that supports or goes against these evolutionary hypotheses is also analysed. (5) Finally, the evidence and theories that from the study of autism—as a specific deficit in the development of some aspects of social intelligence—have contributed to establish the distinction between a social and a physical mind in development.
Extended Summary
One of the current debates within developmental psychology focuses on whether knowledge develops within domain specific processes or across domain general processes. This monograph deals with a particular manifestation of that debate: the distinction between social knowledge and physical knowledge from both an evolutionary and a developmental perspective. The evidence and theories that have contributed to establish this distinction in developmental psychology are various and are complexly interrelated. In this paper, we concentrate upon the factors we consider to be more relevant for the develomental psychologist. First, evidence on non-human primate problem-solving abilities shows that their social skills overcome their physical or technical abilities. This led some primatologists to propose the “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis, according to which the most characteristic evolution of the primate mind would be a specialized set of social abilities adapted to deal with the problems that arise from their complex social structures quickly and efficiently. The most sophisticated by-product of such an intelligence would be the development of a “theory of mind”. Primates possesing this tool would be able to predict and understand other individuals' behaviour by inferring their underlying intentions, desires, beliefs etc. (i.e., their internal mental states).
The idea of theory of mind as a domain specific cognitive tool came to developmental psychology during the eighties. A wealth of social cognitive studies showing an early differentiation between social and physical objects in infants was already in place and merged with the new concepts and evidence emerging from the theory of mind approach. A number of the early communicative and expressive behaviours began to be considered as the cognitive “precursors” of theory of mind. Furthermore, developmental psychologists were more successful than primatologist in designing “theory of mind” tests for children, such as the false belief tests easily passed by children as young as four. A third factor that made an enormous contribution to the popularity and success of this approach was the finding that autistic children had a specific deficit in theory of mind while other areas of cognitive development seemed to remain relatively intact. Autistic children's impairment seemed to involve a specific deficit in the most sophisticated aspects of social or “Machiavellian” intelligence, independently of their abilities in the physical domain.
The ideas and evidence mentioned above would not have had the same effect, however, without the growing influence of the concept of “modularity” upon developmental and cognitive psychology. This concept implies that the mind is articulated in very specific autonomous systems of information processing (modules) specialised in carrying out very precise, domain-specific functions. Although the concept of module was originally created to refer mainly to perceptual systems, more recent versions try to apply it to higher level processes (e.g., reasoning) as well. A good example of these are cognitive models defending specialized mechanisms of social intelligence, such as algorithms specialized in the detection of cheaters in social contracts. Recent findings show that traditionally complex tasks, such as falsing conditional rules, may be easily solved by both adults and young children if the rule being tested involves a social contract. An important part of the debate among developmental psychologists working in theory of mind is the extent to which this can be explained as the development of innately specified modules or as the active construction of a theory in the particular domain of mental representations following the same domain general principles and mechanisms as theory construction in other domains. Other approaches to psychological development try to reconcile constructivist ideas with domain specificity. All in all, the idea of domain specific knowledge, and specially of the need to distinguish between social and physical cognition processes, plays a fundamental role in current debates in developmental psychology and cognitive science in general.