Status quo or evolution: What next for the intersessional process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?

Abstract

Treaties are more than just pieces of paper. In order to fulfill the obligations set forth on paper, a vitalized process is created that can be affected both positively and negatively by the actions of those who are members and by the geopolitical context in which the treaty resides. It is the actions of those who are party to a treaty that largely determine the success or failure, as each member periodically examines whether the benefits of being part of the treaty outweigh any negative obligations and other costs. In 2001, the members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) decided upon a series of intersessional meetings which, although instigated as a rescue operation from a series of major internal and external shocks, were judged as useful, and a second series was approved. In December, States Parties to the BWC will gather for a seventh time to review the operation of the treaty and make decisions about the next five years, including whether to approve a third series of annual meetings. But would a third series in its current format be for the good of the BWC? Would a third intersessional process support States Parties in their evaluation that they are better off as members of the BWC? By reviewing the origins of the intersessional process and providing an analysis of activities thus far, the author offers suggestions to be considered for organizing a third intersessional review process.

• annual meeting
• Biological Weapons Convention
• decision making
• intersessional process
• Seventh Review Conference
• topics

Concluding thoughts

Despite shortcomings, statements and writings in various forums⁹ suggest that the second intersessional process will be positively assessed at the Seventh Review Conference, making a third intersessional process a real possibility. While agreement should not be assumed, if another intersessional process is favored, States Parties need to decide now between two paths: an intersessional process that is more of the same, or one that builds on the progress made in the past, yet seeks a more ambitious approach to dealing with the challenge of biological weapons in the twenty-first century. In contemplating which path to take, States Parties should make the future health of the treaty the decisive factor.

Funding

This work was supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-1192).

Notes

Notes

1 External shocks can be treaty-related—for example, acknowledgement of an offensive biological weapons program in the Soviet Union and later the discovery of an Iraqi biological weapons program—or related to more general trends such as the end of the Cold War, shifts in economic and geopolitical power bases, the changing nature of warfare, and concerns that it will be non-state actors, such as terrorists and others, that will be sources of risk for biological weapons development and use.

2 Much has been written about the public collapse of the protocol negotiations in which the US bears the brunt of the responsibility. However, a number of other countries also opposed the final text, but remained silent. For more, see Littlewood (2005) and Mahley (2010).

3 According to Guthrie (2007), the reduction in the time of the meeting of experts from two weeks to one was a result of the “considerable financial burden on many states.”

4 Regarding the topics for 2007—2010, Becker (2007: 24) notes that “there was broad consensus to have items on national implementation … biosafety and biosecurity, oversight and education/awareness-raising. Also, the inclusion of assistance and cooperation in the case of suspected biological weapons use as well as cooperation to improve disease surveillance and health systems, while requiring certain efforts to find an acceptable wording, were consensual in principle.” However, other topics were either dropped or considered inappropriate.

5 The issue of support needed for a third intersessional process has been consciously left out of this paper. The future of the Implementation Support Unit should not be reliant upon the future of the intersessional process. (See Sims, 2009, 2010, for more.)

6 Measures supporting the exchange of information “in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful biological activities” were agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986. These confidence-building measures were elaborated in 1987 and modified and expanded considerably by the Third Review Conference in 1991. They have not been modified since.

7 Various States Parties proposed action plans for national implementation, universality and Article X. According to Pearson (2006), the first two appeared to have wide support in the general debate. In addition to these, Ambassador Masood Khan, president of the review conference, proposed the creation of an action plan for comprehensive implementation of the treaty.

8 For examples of statements made in support of decision-making power, see statements from the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 by New Zealand (2006), the Group of Latin American States (2006), and France and the UK (2006) on behalf of the European Union, and statements made at the Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 by Canada on behalf of the JACKSNNZ states, the United States, Germany, South Africa, and Switzerland (Canada, 2010; Germany, 2010; South Africa, 2010; Switzerland, 2010; United States, 2010). For examples of those who are less supportive of the idea, see India (2006, 2010) and also Guthrie (2010).

9 In addition to those statements from the Meeting of States Parties in 2010 referenced in note 8, see also the co-chair’s summary of the International Workshop on Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Biological Weapons: The Role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (2010) held in Beijing Nov. 4—6, 2010 as well as Pearson (2010) for his report and Smith (2010) for his statement to the Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 in which he described a recent Wilton Park meeting on prospects for the 2011 BTWC Review Conference. Available at: www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FC58F794E6B421BEC12577F20037F077/$file/BWC_MSP_2010-Bradford-101206.pdf and www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DD37DFE85CBB13E1C12577F20038666F/$file/BWC_MSP_2010-Wilton+Park-101206.pdf.

Additional information

Author biography

Caitríona McLeish is a senior fellow at SPRU — Science and Technology Policy Research at the University of Sussex, UK and has been part of the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons since 1996. Her research interests focus on the dual-use problem in both the chemical and biological warfare environments, including analysis of past programs, terrorism, international treaties, contemporary policies, and the roles played by industry and global civil society.