Salafi activism and the promotion of a modern Muslim identity

Abstract

Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of a market of Islamic goods, services and media platforms that have catalysed a qualitative shift in the ways individuals come to express their religious convictions. Salafi Islam is no exception to this transformation, and this article provides a case study of contemporary Salafi propagation amongst Yogyakarta’s students and graduates. Through description and analysis of campus based religious lectures, websites, magazines and fashion outlets linked to the al-Atsary Islamic Education Foundation, this article explores the intricacies of campus affiliated da’wa. Linked to a ‘literalist’ interpretation of Islam reliant on scholars in Saudi Arabia, Salafism is frequently denounced as foreign to Indonesian norms. Yet, while activists do indeed promote a rigid adherence to Islamic tenets, they also align Islamic values to concerns with a modern Muslim identity. By framing Salafism as sensitive to ideas of professional employment, while juxtaposing it against images of a less well-educated rural Islam, they have thus have created a unique strand of urban Salafi propagation.

• Indonesia
• Islamic activism
• Islamic modernity
• religious consumption
• Salafism
• Yogyakarta

Notes

Declaration of conflicting interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was conducted with the assistance of a grant provided by the Evans Fund, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, UK.

1. Concerning Salafism specifically, see: Bonnefoy (2011); Hasan (2006); Pall (2013). Concerning religious revivalism more broadly, see: Bayat (2005); Lehmann and Siebzehner (2006); Wiktorowicz (2007).

2. A preliminary list of these poles within the movement includes: those who follow scholars such as Abu Nida, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Faiz Asifuddin and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron, who are the main focus of this article; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Luqman Ba’abduh, Muhammad as-Sewed and Ayip Syafruddin; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Dzulqarmain, who was in charge of fatwa for Laskar Jihad; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Abu Thurob al-Jawi; those affiliated with the Makassar based religious organisation Wahdah Islamiyah. While not the focus of this article, it is interesting to note that fragmentation has been most common amongst those formerly linked to Laskar Jihad, as these groups more commonly engage in activities that discredit the legitimacy of other Salafis (Sunarwoto, 2016).

3. As Ibn Manzur recorded, it is linked to ‘the preceding group of people; those who have preceded you, from your forefathers and closest relatives, who are more advanced than you in age and virtue’ (as quoted in Hassim, 2010: 9).

4. Banned from direct political participation by Suharto’s New Order, Natsir saw the DDII as a move away from ‘top-down’ Islamic politics to ‘bottom-up’ social activities that would renew Islamic piety amongst the Indonesian citizenry.

5. It should be noted, however, that not all LIPIA graduates were advocates of Salafi doctrine. By the 1990s, teaching staff supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired Sahwi (awakening) movement had taken up positions at LIPIA. Much like religious institutions in the Saudi kingdom itself, LIPIA’s staff thus competed against each other for influence and, as Sahwi-inspired ideas gained ground, many Salafi scholars began to advise their students against further study at LIPIA.

6. The Islamic Centre Bin Baz was named after the former Saudi grand mufti Shaykh ‘Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz (1910–1999), who proved to be a patron for global Salafi initiatives as well as a prominent scholar whose works are frequently quoted within Salafi circles.

7. Aside from UGM, these take place at Ahmad Dahlan University, Yogyakarta State University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University.

8. This phrase, ‘obligatory points of passage’, derives from the work of Michel Callon who uses it in relation to actor network theory to stress a point through which actors are forced to converge on a certain topic and/or purpose. My use of the phrase loosely converges with this idea of passage, although I envisage it as a physical space where actors engage with each other rather than a potential group of actors or problems one must pass through in a given network. For further information, see Callon (1986).

9. Crucially, such observations are hardly unique to Salafism, as comradery has become a key characteristic of contemporary Islamic revivalism more broadly. For further examples of the role of halaqah or study circles, see: Bruinessen (2002); Mahmood (2005).

10. This style of prayer sees one touching feet with one’s peers and follows the method outlined by Al- Albani. For further information see Al-Albani (2000).

11. Valentine’s Day has frequently been an issue around which religious conservatives hold annual demonstrations, berating it as Christian, Jewish, secular or even just a ‘sex holiday’. For example, see: Gade (2013); Jakarta Post (2014); Telegraph (2013).

12. To do so it utilised a Google Custom Search Platform to comb across multiple sites that are part of an ever-increasing database of virtual sources whose ‘Salafi-ness’ can be confirmed by Yufid’s network of employees and associated preachers.

13. These include www.aqidatuna.com; www.carasholat.com; www.konsultasisyariah.com; www.kajian.net; www.khotbahjumat.com; www.kisahmuslim.com; www.nasehat.net; www.pengusahamuslim.com; www.sahabatnabi.com; www.yufid.tv; www.yufid.org; www.yufidedu.com; www.syaria.com; and www.whatisquran.com. List sourced in 2014 from Yufid.inc: http://www.yufid.org/.

14. A list of iPhone and iPad applications is available at: https://itunes.apple.com/id/artist/yufid-inc./id369656348 (accessed 26 October 2014). A list of Android applications is available at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=Yufid+Inc (accessed 26 October 2014).

15. For more information about moral entrepreneurs, (see Becker, 1973: 147). Bonnefoy is not alone in noting the confluence of business ethics and Islamic faith. Indeed, this topic has been covered more extensively by Rudnyckyj (2009a, 2009b).

16. I am not the first to denote the derision of the kampung amongst Islamically inspired students; Brenner observed such a dichotomy in her study of Muslim women university students, who rejected the ‘Western’ elitist culture of the political classes but also the backwardness of one’s parents’ generation (Brenner, 1996).

17. I am specifically referring to the translation published by Media Hidayah (Al-Albani, 2000).

18. Moreover, the lack of questions, I believe, was linked to a general uncertainty as to how an Ustadz would be received in such an environment. Questions necessarily open the door for representatives of ‘local’ Islamic practice to critique them. At one further event I attended in Yogyakarta, a local Kyai, while respectful and in general agreement with Salafi principles, created a degree of confusion and embarrassment by using several Javanese phrases that the Ustadz could not understand. It caused a level of furore amongst the audience and underlines the challenges experienced by preachers in gaining local credibility and the risk they run in encountering hostility (observation, Yogyakarta, 15 February 2012).

19. Class means more than correlation between a group’s income, but refers to a particular consciousness that explains the differences between different social behaviours over matters of ‘the common good’ (of one’s class) (Klinken and Berenschot, 2014).