Global identification and monitoring of UF₆ cylinders

Abstract

An expansion of global commerce in nuclear material will accompany the forecast worldwide renaissance in nuclear power. The increased commerce amplifies the risk that uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) in cylinders could be lost as a result of an accident or mishandling, stolen by non-state actors (e.g. terrorists), or diverted by nation states/governments. While there are very few problems with UF₆ cylinder shipments, the complicated logistics of international truck, rail and sea transport can increase difficulty in locating shipments at any given time and significantly delay transport and reporting. The recent revelations about undeclared enrichment plants, such as Qom in Iran and the newly revealed 2000-centrifuge plant in North Korea, have underscored the threats of undeclared production of low enriched uranium and the attempted diversion in which low enriched uranium could be transported to a relatively small, clandestine plant and enriched up to weapons grade (or weapons usable) highly enriched uranium in a short period of time. A global system of registering, identifying and monitoring UF₆ cylinders would provide more robust and timely assurance that no UF₆ in legitimate nuclear commerce is mishandled or diverted. The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security of the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has formed a multilaboratory team to focus on universal UF₆ cylinder identification and global monitoring. The team produced an overview report discussing the current situation and potential solutions and identified future tasks that fall into three general categories. The first category involves policy initiatives to bring together all relevant stakeholders, i.e. facility operators and industry, state regulators and government agencies, international inspectorates and technology developers, to reach consensus on universal identification and the importance of cylinder monitoring. Such policy level discussions would include standardisation of components, protocols and procedures. The second category concerns a deeper investigation of the concepts involved, reflected in the research and publication of papers and technical reports. Such background work is merely the ‘tip of the iceberg’ but may facilitate acceptance of a global regime by the stakeholders. The third category involves technology assessments and field trials to enable the development of theoretical concepts into practical approaches. This paper gives an overview of the progress to date and examines the next steps for governments and international agencies (from the policy side) and industry and national laboratories (from the technology and development side).

Keywords:

• National Nuclear Security Administration
• Next Generation Safeguards Initiative
• Uranium hexafluoride
• Global tracking
• Cylinder monitoring
• Diversion

This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The United States Government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for United States Government purposes.