MetLife and its corporate allies: dust diseases and the manipulation of science

Abstract

Background: The dust diseases silicosis and asbestosis were the first occupational diseases to have widespread impact on workers. Knowledge that asbestos and silica were hazardous to health became public long after the industry knew of the health concerns. This delay was largely influenced by the interests of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife).

Objectives: To understand how MetLife influenced the science and politics of asbestos and silica exposure in the first half of the twentieth century.

Methods: We examined previously secret corporate documents produced in litigation, deposition, and trial testimony, as well as published scholarship.

Results: MetLife established itself as an authority in public and industrial health in the early part of the twentieth century, gaining the trust of the public and government. They were able to use this trust and authority to avoid financial loss, including the firing of sick workers, and avoid legal liability by organizing a network of experts to testify on their behalf in silica- and asbestos-related damage suits. They further manipulated the results of scientific findings from major research institutions, delaying important knowledge about the asbestos–cancer relationship. They also influenced law and public policy through writing and implementing worker compensation laws in numerous states and concocting an arbitrary “protective” standard to monitor asbestos exposure. This standard was known by MetLife to not protect against disease.

Conclusions: The actions of MetLife and its allies had real human and scientific consequences and an effect on the industry lasting until now.

Keywords:

• Asbestos
• Mesothelioma
• State-of-the-art
• Corporate corruption
• MetLife
• Insurance company knowledge

Notes

i On Lanza and his role in industrial health: “He served as special adviser on industrial hygiene to the government of Australia, as special staff member of the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, and as executive director of the National Health Council. He guided Met Life’s research and educational services. According to MetLife: ‘His fame as an authority on certain industrial diseases such as silicosis is both national and world wide.’ He was a prominent member of industrial hygiene committees of the American Medical Association, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the American Public Health Association, and served on the board of trustees of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation.”40

ii Lanza instructed Johns Manville’s physicians to not warn workers of dust disease problems. 41

iii MetLife provided funding to the USPHS and paid the salaries of some USPHS personnel. It also provided funding for animal and human studies of the effects of dust disease.42

iv The modern recognition of asbestos as a hazard followed soon thereafter: a 1918 US Bureau of Labor paper (by Hoffman of Prudential) noted that “…asbestos workers…[worked] under health-injurious conditions.”24

v Efforts were made to hide the participation of the mining association. Lanza wrote: “It is probable that the mining companies in the Tri-State Zinc and Lead Association will also give financial support. The Association does not wish to participate in the management of the project; they prefer to be in the position of being able to say to the employees that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and the officials of the US Government jointly advised them and their employees to do thus….”68

vi Full quote: “No individual’s records are ever divulged by the Government. You may recollect that the Pioneer Clinic in Oklahoma was run jointly by the Public Health Service, the mine operators, and the Metropolitan. We had in our files the physical examination records of more than 50,000 individuals. We were often solicited by interested parties to permit them to have access to our records and our reply was always the same, namely, that they were Government records and not available for any purpose whatsoever, with the single exception of the United States Marshall in the performance of his duty in trying to apprehend criminals. I am sure that the federal department would not make available individual records to the State Board of Health. As a rule, the Public Health Service studies are published but I believe that this is not an invariable custom, depending upon their number and their general interest.”72

vii The term “pneumoconiosis” was used by Johns Manville to differentiate the condition of workers with any history of previous dust exposure or handling of mixed fibers from asbestosis. According to Johns Manville, only workers who had ever handled asbestos and no other “potentially toxic material” could develop asbestosis.40

viii At the time, companies shared amongst themselves, especially insurance companies. In the 1945 this was codified: Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, exempting insurance companies from anti trust regulations so they could share risk information.90 But this general understanding of the law was established after 1869, according to Richards: “The size and influence of commercial insurance had grown rapidly after 1869, when the Supreme Court ruled that insurance was not interstate commerce and, therefore, was not subject to federal antitrust laws or indeed, to any other regulation by the federal government!”35

ix The Browns, Vandiver and his brother and Manville president, Louis, were proud of their role in limiting worker knowledge: A Unarco official described a conversation with the Browns, “I’ll never forget, I turned to Mr. Brown, one of the Browns made this crack (that Unarco managers were a bunch of fools for notifying employees who had asbestosis), and I said, ‘Mr. Brown, do you mean to tell me you would let them work until they dropped dead?’ He said, ‘Yes. We save a lot of money that way.’”8

x “...It appeared that among the problems common to all industries were the following: 1. The menace of ambulance chasing lawyers in combination with unscrupulous doctors. The uncertainties surrounding diagnosis of any of the various forms of pneumoconiosis are so many that a question of fact is presented in every case. Expert testimony can be produced by both plaintiff and defendant and it is for the jury to decide whose experts are correct in their interpretations. In making this decision, the jury is not likely to favor the opinion of the experts produced by the employer. 2. The desirability of making various dust diseases compensable under properly drawn workmen’s compensation laws. One of the speakers stated that ‘the strongest bulwark against future disaster for industry is the enactment of properly drawn occupational disease legislation.’ Such legislation would (a) eliminate the jury and empower a Medical Board to pass upon the existence of the disease and the extent of the disability; (b)eliminate the shyster lawyer and the quack doctor since fees would be strictly limited by the law; and (c) permit the correcting of initial mistakes in the making of awards by providing for hearings to reduce or eliminate awards if proof could be adduced that the claimant was not disabled or that the extent of his disability had been overestimated.”102

xi “Dr. Lanza is very strongly of the opinion that asbestosis should be made compensable under the New Jersey law. He feels that this is the only protection which the industry has, and that permitting the disease to remain outside the compensable class lends encouragement to unethical lawyers and physicians to work up claims.”106

xii As of 2004, 4 years has been changed to 2 and 8 years to 10.114

xiii As per the recommendation of MetLife, Johns Manville had all 1140 of its workers examined at its factory (one of the plants in this study) for a separate 1932 report. Twenty-nine percent of the worker’s X-rays showed signs of “pneumoconiosis.” Over 16% of the asbestosis cases were found in the textile department, where the dust counts were found to be 2·5 mppcf or less in the original five plant study.119,120

xiv In a conversation with one of the authors, (DE) Harriet Hardy recalled her first (and last) dinner conversation with the Drinkers where they complained that she was too concerned with worker health.

xv Besides serving as the chief toxicologist for the USPHS, Stokinger also served as the editor of the AMA’s Archives of Industrial Health, and served 25 years as a member and 15 years as chairman of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).136 ACGIH claimed it was an “independent” organization, controlled by government and corporate representatives, that published TLVs. TLV™ is a registered trademark of the ACGIH.