A Voyage to East Asian STS Theories; Or, What Might Make an STS Theory East Asian

Abstract

This article explores some possible forms that a special East Asian approach to STS studies might take. The goal is to build a methodology of East Asian STS theories. The first step is the articulation of a theoretical basis for such an approach. The author considers the potential for an East Asian STS theory by looking at two journals: Taiwanese Journal for Studies of Science, Technology and Medicine and East Asian Science, Technology and Society. To encourage regional theory building, the author suggests gathering concepts from different theories into a rudimentary theory or constructing a theory version based on current theories, making it explicit, and developing a family of East Asian versions.

Keywords:

• STS
• East Asia
• theory building
• politics of identification

Acknowledgments

This article was presented as part of the session “What Are East Asian STS Theories?” at the 2010 4S conference in Tokyo. I thank all who commented—they gave me valuable stimulus. I also thank three anonymous referees for valuable questions, comments, and opinions. I want to single out for special thanks Joel Stoker, whose many comments, revisions, and suggestions have been invaluable, not just for the present article. I also want to thank Sam Gilbert for his excellent copyediting—it makes this article more readable. This article is part of my 2010 Taiwan National Science Council (NSC) project (NSC97–2410-H-194–106-MY3), and I thank the NSC for its financial support.

Notes

1 Reacting to a group of articles that appeared in EASTS in a section titled “East Asian STS and Area Studies,” Anderson wrote that STS studies might usefully model itself on the finer aspects of area studies: “As we struggle to find useful analytic frameworks to explain the contemporary globalization of science and technology, we might benefit from trying to re-imagine science studies as a form of area studies. Setting aside for a moment the cold-war origin and instrumentalist character of much area studies, we could perhaps learn to admire the emphasis on linguistic competence, the importance of fieldwork, the tendency toward a multidisciplinary approach, the opportunity provided for interaction of scholars within and beyond the region, and the desire, often thwarted, for bounded comparison” (2009: 169).

2 Some STS scholars may think that membership in their community must involve both academic and social commitments. They may feel that the latter commitment is necessary, because identification with a group implies engagement. But I think that social involvement is supererogatory rather than obligatory and certainly not necessary for academic identification.

3 STS scholars tend to accommodate a variety of theories, as can be seen in several important collections, including Science as Practice and Culture (Pickering 1992), The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1989), and the first and third editions of The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Jasanoff et al. 1995; Hackett et al. 2008). Articles in Science as Practice and Culture (Pickering 1992) are presented in two parts: positions and arguments. The position part introduces Ian Hacking's philosophy of experimentation, David Gooding's theory of experimental agency, and Joan Fujimura's theory of social worlds. The argument part presents the disputation between David Bloor's strong program and Michael Lynch's ethnomethodology, and the debate between Harry Collins's empirical program of relativism and Michel Callon and Bruno Latour's actor network theory (ANT). In the first edition of The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Jasanoff et al. 1995), the editors title the second part “Theory and Methods” (This implies that it is difficult to distinguish between STS theories and methods.) Callon (1995) defines four “models” of dynamics of science: science as rational knowledge, science as competition in the market of knowledge, science as sociocultural practices (social constructivism), and science as an extended translation (ANT). Sal Restivo (1995) introduces Robert Merton's and Thomas Kuhn's functionalist theories, the conflict theory grounded in the sociological theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim, and the interest theory of social constructivism. In the third edition of The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Hackett et al. 2008), the editors title the first part “Ideas and Perspectives,” which has eight readings. One can observe the proliferation and hybridization of STS theories from 1995 to 2008. Warwick Anderson and Vincanne Adams (2008) introduce postcolonial studies of technoscience. One can see that politics, institutions, and economy of science and technology begin getting attention. However, there is still a lack of attention to cultural aspects of technoscience.

4 Advocates of the social worlds framework characterize it as a theory/methods package (Clarke and Star 2008).

5 A theory version is an individualistic “theory.” One may call it a theory variant by using a biological metaphor. What we call a theory is really a family of theory versions, because most advocates of the theory would tend to develop their own version (see Chen 2000, 2011), which are both similar and different and share a family resemblance. For example, ANT is really a family of theory versions, including Callon's, Latour's, Law's and others'.

6 Here I am casting high doubt on the so-called globalization phenomena and the very idea of globalization. One can at most detect cross-regional or cross-contextual phenomena. There is too hurried a generalization from the cross-regional to the general in the whole globe.

7 A theory is cross-contextual when it can be applied from its original context A to another context B. A theory can cross from context A to context B only in the case that B is structurally similar to A; otherwise, the theory does not cross. Thus, cross-contextuality does not ensure that a theory can cross to another context, because not all contexts are similar. Therefore, cross-contextuality does not imply generality and universality. This is why a cross-contextual theory is still local. Here readers can see that I am distinguishing among four different scopes: local or contextual, cross-contextual, global (general in the globe), and universal (general in the universe).

8 Here I am using wholeness or integration rather than organic to distinguish between assemblages of concepts and theories. We can go further, drawing an enlarged analogy between discursive phenomena and organic phenomena. Thus, genes, cells, tissues, organs, and organisms (living individuals)—the basic units in biology—are compared to concepts, conceptual schemes, perspectives, approaches, methods, methodologies, and theories. Like an organism, a theory is a whole made up of other units—specifically, concepts, perspectives, methodologies, and so on. One may manipulate genes, cells, tissues, and organs separately and artificially reassemble them in a variety of ways, and one may do the same with concepts, approaches, and so forth. An assemblage of genes or organs is not an organism (a living individual); similarly, an assemblage of concepts is not a theory (an integrated “gestalt”). An assemblage of concepts can be developed into a theory if it can be integrated into an “organic” (interconnected) whole.

9 In Reassembling the Social (2005), Latour identifies three key characteristics of ANT: the assignment of precise roles to nonhumans, the assumption of explanatory symmetry in the natural, and the commitment to reassembling the social. He wrote, “So if an account employs either a symbolic or a naturalistic type of causality, there is no reason to include it in the ANT corpus even though it might claim to be” (10). It is apparent that naturalistic causality is thought to conflict with ANT. Thus, introducing naturalistic causality to ANT would construct a new version of ANT.

10 It is worth quoting Dung-Sheng Chen's statement: “The emphasis on social networks in both the sociology of organizations and STS study may lead to a new interpretation of ‘area study.’ Obviously, social networks are established in a given location, but they keep expanding outside the boundary and including external actors. An open social network in an area can function as a strong engine for maintaining local distinctiveness by means of clustering effects.…It is very important to notice that an area-based network must remain open as well as relatively autonomous in order to develop a contextualized area study” (2008: 441). I want to supply a cross-contextualized area study to his good idea.

11 This view also echoes the falsificationist methodology. However, the recognition of a new (STS) theory may be similar to that of a new scientific discovery. It is both methodological and social. Readers may refer to Brannigan (1981) on the sociology of scientific discoveries.