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Abstract
High modernism, the dominant sociotechnical imagination in postwar Taiwan, manifested in tacit answers to the questions of what a better society would look like and the most pragmatic and viable approach to make the particular dreamed-of future become reality. This article explores the exclusion of alternative energy futures brought about by a high modernist imaginary. This imaginary underlies a strategy of emphasizing shortage at present and prosperity in the future—as long as the current shortage is solved in a reliable way. Focusing on the contention over energy supply between 2011 and 2015, this article provides an analysis of how power shortages are presented in discursive ambiguity, how the claimed crisis over the electricity shortage moves to the center of public debate via the institutional practices of power rationing, and how its public authority is established through collective witness. Renewable energy is continually represented as an “immature” and “unviable” technology when it comes to satisfying the nation’s need, through particular routinized practices in the calculation of “reserve margins” in electricity planning and the collective witnessing of (limited) operating reserves. We argue that both of these come with their own assumptions and political implications and therefore invite scrutiny.
Abstract
極度現代主義是戰後臺灣具有主導優勢的社會科技想像,尤其,它透過對「我們該追尋的更好社會為何?而又該由何最務實與可行的途徑來達成它?」一問題,提供默會不宣的答案來獲得彰顯。本文探索,在極度現代的想像下,對於不同能源未來選擇的排除。該合理性經由對當下的短缺與未來的富裕之強調,也就是,透過暗示當下的短缺需由「可靠」方式解決。本文聚焦在介於 2011 年與 2015 年之間,能源供給面上的爭論,由此來分析,「缺電問題」是如何經由論述上的模糊來呈現,所宣稱的「缺電危機」又是如何經由環繞在限電上的制度實做而位移到公眾爭論的核心,且其對於公眾的權威又是如何透過共同的見證而獲確認。當談到滿足國家需求時,再生能源不斷的被描繪成為一種「不成熟」與「不可行」的科技,而這是由電力規劃上,備用容量計算時的特定例行慣常化實做與對於有限備轉容量的集體見證而達成。我們強調,上述兩者皆帶有其自身的假定與政治上的意涵,因此,必定要招致仔細審視。
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Gordon Walker and the journal’s reviewers and editors for their helpful suggestions in response to earlier drafts. C.-Y. Yang is financially supported by the Government Scholarship to Study Abroad (GSSA) of the Ministry of Education (Taiwan) and the Risk Society and Policy Research Center, National Taiwan University.
Notes
1 In this anthropological-STS/SSK (sociology of scientific knowledge) approach, we are interested in the practical forms of reasoning (or sense making) among Taipower engineers, which have become an established culture by dint of internal repetition and collective reinforcement, with little or no significant contradiction or challenge. This is a different understanding of rationality from a scientific one, where at least in public it is taken that the evidence which leads to that rationality’s particular propositional stance can be identified and clearly stated. This more cultural approach which we would take is far more difficult to cleanly document, precisely because of its historical nature, accumulating and gaining “natural” authority and de facto monopoly by repetition and reinforcement. Although the creation (or design) of certain institutional habits, identities, and relations is possible, an imaginary as a form of cultural asset does require a process of slow and often tacit accumulation. Conventions and routines are often performed unconsciously or, at least, inadvertently. Shared values, visions, and aspirations (or fears) can be repeatedly enacted (or coproduced) through protocols, assessment schemes, and technical choices along ingrained storylines.
2 The group at least includes Chia-Kan Yen 嚴家淦, Chung-Jung Yin 尹仲容, Chi-Tseng Yang 楊繼增, Kwoh-Ting Li 李國鼎, Kuo-Hwa Yu 俞國華, Hung-Chun Yu 俞鴻鈞, Po-Yuan Hsu 徐伯園, Meng-Lin Jiang 蔣夢麟, Tsung-Han Shen 沈宗翰與, and Yun-Suan Sun 孫運璿 (CitationChang 2013).
3 By naming nationalist high modernism the dominant sociotechnical imaginary in postwar Taiwan, we do not claim that the imaginary in Taiwan was homogeneous or deny that nationalist high modernism was confronted by other challenging imaginaries. However, it is crucial to point out the dominant version of a sociotechnical imaginary can establish the perimeter of acceptable legitimacy. The key features of the high modernist imaginary we are illustrating here includes the fear of lagging behind (latecomer); a mighty state; a belief in the prowess of science and technology; a “pragmatic,” depoliticized engineering; engineers with a savior morality; a nationalist expanding economy; and rapid industrialization.
4 Alongside the nationalist high modernism discussed here, an alternative imaginary can also be observed in the same period. This can basically be conceptualized as a native, land-oriented modernism and as a cultural and political reformism (CitationHsiau 2013), both of which can be traced back to the civil moments in the Japanese colonial era; this point is advanced further in the concluding section. Additionally, with the ongoing tide of democratization in Taiwan since the late 1980s, the face of high modernism changed while still remaining pervasive as a latent and common cultural and political resource. The impact of democratization on nationalist high modernism can be further analyzed in three dimensions: industrial policy, engineer’s identities, and the forms taken by the democratic and civil movement in Taiwan. However, our aim here is not to provide a comprehensive diagnosis or to predict if there will be power shortages in the near future, but to highlight the legacy of high modernism in electricity planning and to provide a cultural explanatory insight to the technical choices made and practices done by the Taipower engineers to reveal their technopolitics.
5 The calculation of a reasonable reserve margin is a key part of the nationalist-pragmatist storylines observed in the energy politics during this period of time. The statutory reserve margins decreased from 25 percent in 1983 to 15 percent in 2012. An “emergent power rationing” was recorded as the latest incident in August 2017 due to an operation error attributed to the fuel provider CPC Corporation (Taiwan). Dissidence can also be found within Taipower, as implied by the interviewee D2: forecasting a negative margin is totally unacceptable; this is the power development plan that should be negotiated in the internal coordination meeting.
6 The BOE is an administrative body under the MOEA. Both of them are under the command of the Executive Yuan.
7 When facing the proposal of Zero Electricity Demand Growth advocated by activists in 2012, the BOE’s reply stressed the premise of a “persistent and favourable economic growth” and a “pragmatic” approach in terms of energy-saving and energy-efficiency.
8 While more reserve margin does bring higher system reliability, it is not the only way to ensure a sufficient supply. After all, the figure of reserve margins depends on multiple factors such as the frequency of unplanned generator outage (supply side) and the ability of accurate demand forecast (demand side). Official prediction of economic growth historically tends to be too optimistic. To predict a lower and even negative economic growth seems to be hard enough for the Nationalist administration to swallow. Additionally, the delays of overhaul schedules and unplanned outages can be left in ambiguity. The consequence is that a large and arguably wasteful reserve margin is “required.” Also see nn. 14 and 19.
9 One of the Nationalist administration’s key political pledge, the “Liùsānsān zhèngcè” 六三三政策 633 policy, is to achieve a continuous annual 6 percent GDP growth and the goal of US$30,000 GDP per capita. Sufficient power provision and no power rationing are their main concerns.
10 The promised state citizenship of electricity accessibility would create a new identity: the electricity-desiring citizen with the basic human right to electricity. Like the high-energy American way described by CitationNye 2010, electricity and its consumption gradually have become an infrastructure of modern life in urbanized areas. It is the new normality.
11 An executive order does not need to be approved by the parliament, but is issued directly by the competent authority—in this case, the MOEA.
12 “After implementing power rationing measures, 1100MW peak demand can be curbed. This can add 3 percent more operating reserves to the system” (CitationMOEA 2015).
13 As we clearly argued, by treating science and technology as a cultural enterprise does not mean that we are seeking the creator or the instructor of a sociotechnical culture. A culture is accumulated across time and (re)performed by numerous actors and materials, consciously or inadvertently, who may have different interests. However, we do think that the planners who have an engineering background and are at the position of bridging the two different concerns possess the key power of—implicitly or otherwise—making choices and elevating agendas.
14 Mindful readers may have noticed that exactly the same equation is used for both reserve margins and operating reserves. This may result from Taipower’s high modernist belief in making “factual certainty” that we are going to discuss at the end of this article. This peculiar situation indeed raises a deep question: How does one make sense at all of the difference between reserve margin (as a matter of the planned) and operating reserve (as a matter of fact), which is unrecognized uncertainties such as unplanned outages and delayed overhauls? We believe the answer is surprisingly simple: they are left in ambiguity (CitationWynne 1992). Also see n. 19.
15 According to the British government’s Electricity Market Reform Delivery Plan, the calculation of derated margin only takes account of the output records during the peak season—that is, the winter season in the United Kingdom. The policy document can be accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/268221/181213_2013_EMR_Delivery_Plan_FINAL.pdf.
16 Habituated know-how, expertise (e.g., NPFs), and the deemed legitimate technical qualifications are all constitutive components of what CitationThomas P. Hughes (1987) calls “technological momentum.” However, as has been demonstrated by our interviewees, the momentum in this case study is best described as having been “passed through peers without facing challenges,” rather than being created for a particular purpose. If we trace back to the point when this scheme of margins was created, we may find that its creation is a part of the pragmatic problem solving that engineers do on a daily basis, and which bears no clear wider intention. We argue this is exactly how technopolitics are “in-the-making” and may reflect a distinctive feature of technopolitics, that it is not necessarily done with a clear self-explanation.
17 “In the past, the CEGB [Central Electricity Generating Board] would typically have planned the system on the basis of maintaining a 20 percent gross capacity margin” (CitationRoyal Academy of Engineering 2013: 9). However, regarding the forecasted margins, such as in CitationOFGEM 2014, they are treated as highly constructed scenarios and therefore, indicative and suggestive futures. This point is clearly stated by OFGEM.
18 The idea of a buffer zone (the reserve margins) is quite common and understandable. However, if the operator always expects unplanned outages and delayed overhauls and does not seek the reasons why they happen and where possible reduce them, then a huge buffer zone would be indeed “required.” Also see nn. 8 and 14.
19 Derated capacity/margin is a concept enjoying increasing preference and replacing reserve margins as the main concept of electricity planning task in the United Kingdom. The preference for derated margins comes from the growing contribution made by renewables in the generation system, which makes the concept of reserve margin obsolescent. Under this concept, the nameplate capacity is derated by “a factor which reflects the statistically expected level of reliable availability from that plant type during a given season” (CitationRoyal Academy of Engineering 2013: 9). This gives renewables and traditional generation technologies equal footing, as the available capacity of both technologies are now equally evaluated through historical records of availability in the peak season.
20 Drawing on the experience of the British electricity industry, it is possible to treat renewable energy as a stable source of provision. The emergence of the concept of “equivalent firm capacity” of renewable energy is a good example. Of course, it will still depend on an auxiliary power storage system.
21 Through the long history of the anti-NPP4 movement, Taipower came under serious criticism from several “outsider” experts, such as Mo-Shing Chen 陳謨星 (IEEE Fellow, a doctor of electrical engineering), Li-Wei Ho 賀立維 (a doctor of nuclear engineering), and Ming-Hui Peng 彭明輝 (a doctor of control engineering) for its electricity planning decisions; however, these criticisms were rejected and deemed as fallacious by Taipower and had only minimal impact. The Chinese Institute of Engineers (Taiwan) mostly stayed outside the debate while dismissing public fears of nuclear power as based on ignorance. This illustrates how Taipower’s planning decisions and practices are mainly sheltered from critique. Despite many changes being made to the Electricity Act in 2016, since which the prediction of reserve margins is not announced to the public and the procedure of power rationing has been explained thoroughly by the MOEA in the latest development in August 2017, this does not mean that the whole regime of incumbent power development has been examined and reformed.
22 In a liberal democracy, when encountering more and more critiques, the instinct of high modernists is often to intensify their high modernity, deploying yet more mathematical equations and formulas. The renewable energy’s FITs (feed-in tariffs) committee is a good example.
23 This is not to assume any teleological dynamic of inevitable progress toward a democratic ideal in the absence of effective countervailing factors.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Chih-yuan Yang
Chih-Yuan Yang has a PhD in sociology from Lancaster University, UK. The title of his thesis is “Sociotechnical Imaginary and Rationality: Political Factuality and Public Authority in Taiwanese Energy Politics.” He emphasizes the cumulative process of meaning-making and tacitly exerted power in the technoscientific knowledge “informed” policy-making. Observing the making-and-doing of mundanity and exploring different ontologies grounded in civil society, he seeks to enrich the democratic understanding of technoscience through STS research. His analytical approach includes anthropological-STS/SSK and interpretive policy analysis.
Bronislaw Szerszynski
Bronislaw Szerszynski is a reader in sociology at Lancaster University, UK. His research combines approaches from the social and natural sciences, humanities, and the arts. He has researched and published on religion and technology, environmental movements and societal conflicts over biotechnology, food futures, and climate engineering. His recent work seeks to situate the changing relationship between humans, environment, and technology in the longer perspective of human and planetary history.
Brian Wynne
Brian Wynne is professor (emeritus) of science studies at Lancaster University, UK, and professor II of radioactivity and public risk at the Norwegian University of the Life Sciences. He has worked on the social construction of scientific knowledge as authority in public arenas where public issues involving scientific knowledge are mistakenly described as scientific issues. As he has described in many publications, a key arena where this is enacted is that of risk assessment, which has become a key domain where this ambiguity is often mistakenly scientized, with self-defeating consequences for the public authority of such science.