Primitive mental states and the body: A personal view of Armando B. Ferrari's concrete original object

Abstract

The author explores some psychoanalytic hypotheses about primitive mental states and their implications for a direct focus on body experience in clinical work. Some aspects of current clinical research about the patient's difficulty in achieving awareness of his emotional life as it emerges from object relations are presented, and this problem is viewed in connection with the relation of the analysand to his own body and to his capacity to pass through the different levels of mental elaboration, from motor discharge to abstraction. Ferrari's theories on the body—mind relationship are discussed and compared with the work of other authors. Ferrari calls the body the Concrete Original Object to indicate that it is the first source, differing from person to person, from which mental phenomena are generated and against which they are constantly measured. A clinical case serves as an illustration of the importance of the perception of the body for the birth of genuine, non‐imitative mental activity.

Initial version received 25/5/00; Final revised version received 30/01/01

Initial version received 25/5/00; Final revised version received 30/01/01