Getting the Middle East Holdouts to Join the CWC

Abstract

Egypt, Israel, and Syria have yet to fully embrace the Chemical Weapons Convention, but movement is possible. Breaking this impasse would be a powerful move toward a universal ban on chemical weapons.

Notes

1. John Eldridge, Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence 2006/2007, 19th ed. (2006), pp. 3, 25; E. J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997, pp. 35—39.

2. All have appeared on lists of probable chemical weapon states. Javes Ali et al., Jane’s Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook (1999), p. 398; For more recent assessments see Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence, p. 6 (Egypt), p. 20 (Israel), pp. 22-23 (North Korea), and p. 33 (Syria); Crisis Group Asia Report, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, no. 167 (June 18, 2009), p. 21.

3. William Claiborne, “Egypt’s Army Experienced in Waging Chemical Warfare,” Washington Post, August 17, 1990. For a survey regarding the use of phosgene and mustard agents see Andrew Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 109-119 (1991).

4. Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992), p. 91.

5. For U.S. views see House Armed Services Committee, “Statement on Intelligence Issues before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee,” March 7, 1991, p. 107. For independent experts’ assessments see Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” p. 37; Jane’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence, p. 6.

6. Moukhtar El Fayoumi, “The CWC in the Present Middle East Environment: An Egyptian View,” OPCW Synthesis, November 2000, p. 28.

7. An overview of Syria’s chemical weapons program is available at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Chemical/2973_2974.html; Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 105 (Fall 1997).

8. Daniel Feakes, “Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC Universality,” Arms Control Today, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 15 (March 2008).

9. For Pfirter’s effort, see OPCW document EC-55/DG.14 (February 17, 2009), p. 10. For the OPCW’s mission, see OPCW Document C-13/DG.9 (December 2, 2008), p. 14.

10. Al-Hiat (London), January 15, 1993, quoted in Dany Shoham, Chemical Weapons in Egypt and Syria [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: BESA Center, June 1995), p. 72.

11. “We Won’t Scrap WMD Stockpile unless Israel Does, Says Assad,” Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2004.

12. Jasani Bhupendra, “Chemical Romance: Syria’s Unconventional Affair Develops,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 50-53 (March 2009).

13. Magnus Normark et al., “Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities,” Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2005, pp. 35—36.

14. Moukhtar El Fayoumi, “The CWC in the Present Middle East Environment: An Egyptian View,” pp. 26—28.

15. Regarding Israel’s signature of the CWC, a state is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty it has signed until it makes clear its intention not to become a party to that treaty. See “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” May 23, 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, pt. 2, sec. 1, art. 18(a) 1.

16. CBW Conventions Bulletin 18, December 1992, p. 14; Miles A. Pomper and Michael Nguyen, “Steps toward Universality: An Interview With Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” Arms Control Today, September 23, 2005; Aluf Benn, “Israel Readies to Join Regional WMD Clean-up after Libyan, Iranian Moves,” Ha’aretz, January 2, 2004.

17. OPCW document C-13/DG.13, December 2, 2008, p. 7.

18. Supervision on Export in the Chemical, Biological, and the Nuclear Field, Israeli decree 2004, Kovetz HaTakanot (Collection of Regulations), no. 6306, p. 387; OPCW document EC-57/DG.15, p. 10.

19. Aluf Benn, “Israel’s Decision Time,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/ April 2001, pp. 22—24.

20. For analysis of these scenarios, see Eitan Barak, “Where Do We Go from Here? The Chemical Weapons Convention in the Middle East in the Post-Saddam Era,” Security Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 130-37 (Autumn 2003).