Decades of transition for the US reserves: Changing demands on reserve identity and mental well-being

Abstract

The US strategic defence policy has undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades, with more recent changes having placed increased demands on members of the reserve components. Rapid and often unexpected call-ups of reserves for operational missions, both domestic and international, required meeting standards for mobilization and deployment. Standards were in place but not necessarily met. Mobilizations pointed to several areas of unpreparedness; at first, obvious areas, such as members being physically unfit, inadequately trained and improperly equipped and less than competent unit leaders; and later, less obvious areas, in particular, emergent personal adjustment problems. During these mobilizations, unique consequences of stressors on individual reservists were evident, including worries about family and civilian job during deployment, adjustments to returning and reintegration, post-deployment post-traumatic stress disorder and related symptoms, and now suicide. Some have explained these findings, though lacking is a broad explanatory framework. Reserve identity is offered as a preliminary concept to interpret reservists’ deployment experiences, post-deployment adjustment, and associated mental health needs, providing a basis for preventive intervention strategies.

Declaration of interest: Views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the US Department of the Army. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this paper.

Notes

1. In this article, the use of the term ‘US reservists’ applies primarily to the US Army Reserve component and not necessarily to other reserves, such as Marine, Navy, and Air Force, though issues may be similar. The US Army is the largest, in personnel and equipment, of the US military. Two components comprise the US Army – active and reserve. The reserve component consists of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Both consist primarily of part-time ‘citizen soldiers’, who perform military duties one weekend a month and 15 days annual training.

2. Throughout the discussion, ‘identity theory’ draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and identity theory (Stryker & Burke, 2000). Each theory explains the individual's relationship to others and the larger society in terms of a socially constructed self, yet the perspectives have subtle differences. Originating from the discipline of sociology, identity theory (Stryker & Burke, 2000) relies on the concepts of role identification and salience (contexts that determine more self-relevance of a role) to explain individual identity. Originating from the discipline of social psychology, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) focuses on processes in the developmental of self-identity in the context of groups, and thus elaborates on the social-cognitive processes underlying self-identity, such as self-categorization and attributes of the idealized, prototypical group member. For a more extended discussion of the similarities and inferences, see Hogg et al. (1995).

3. In terms of individual adjustment, veterans of the First Gulf War reported greater occurrence and severity of post-war symptoms and distress than did non-veterans (Gray et al., 1998; Iowa Persian Gulf Study, 1997; Unwin et al., 1999). Many were categorized as formal psychiatric symptoms of war trauma but other symptoms such as fatigue, headaches, muscle and limb numbness, loss of concentration and memory problems came to be referred to as the Gulf War syndrome. Studies have since reported no plausible etiolo-gical explanation of these symptoms and no actual new syndrome has yet to be determined (Iverson et al., 2007).

4. The current Soldier's Creed is available at http://www.army.mil/soldierscreed/flash_version/index.html (accessed 10 May 2010).

5. As time progresses, those who ascribed to past identities likely become fewer, and those who ascribe to emergent identities become more prevalent, especially when considering the turnover rates among personnel serving in the Reserve, estimated permanent loss range from 12% to 22% annually (depending on unit type and deployment status), most of whom are the most recent serving, i.e. junior ranking enlisted (Lippiatt & Polich, 2010).