Does self-policing reduce chemical emissions?Footnote

This research has been partially supported by a grant from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Science to Achieve Results (STAR) program. Although the research described in the article has been funded in part by the EPA's STAR program through grant R829686, it has not been subjected to EPA review and therefore does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency, and no official endorsement should be inferred.

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