- See Robert C. Rowland, “Standards for Paradigm Evaluation;” David Zarefsky, “The Perils of Assessing Paradigms;” Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, “Policy Dispute and Paradigm Evaluation: A Response to Rowland;” Walter Ulrich, “Flexibility in Paradigm Evaluation;” and Robert C. Rowland, “The Primacy of Standards for Paradigm Evaluation;” all in Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Winter 1982), 133–160.
- David Zarefsky, “A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption,” Central States Speech Association, Chicago, 7 April 1972.
- See David Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” in Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory and Practice, Ed. David Thomas, 2nd ed. (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook Company, 1979), pp. 427–437; Bill Henderson, “Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth Through Hypothesis Testing,” in Advanced Debate, pp. 419–426; Tennyson Williams, “A Defense of the Hypothesis Testing Analogue for Argument,” University of Nebraska Argumentation Seminar, 27 February 1981; J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983); and David Zarefsly and Bill Henderson, “Hypothesis-Testing in Theory and Practice,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (Winter 1983), 179–185.
- See Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, “Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption,” Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, Ed. James I. Luck (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 1973), pp. 38–45; Robert Rowland, “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation,” in Dimensions of Argument, Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, Ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 448–475; Alfred C. Snider, The New Debate (Privately published, Detroit, Michigan, 1981), pp. 9–14; Thomas A. Hollihan, “Conditional Arguments and the Hypothesis Testing Paradigm: A Negative View,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (Winter 1983), 171–178; Jerry Corsi, “Zarefsky's Theory of Debate as Hypothesis Testing: A Criticial Re-Examination,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 19 (Winter 1983), 158–170; and Walter Ulrich, “Philosophical Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate,” CEDA Yearbook, 1983, Ed. Don Brownlee (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1983), pp. 23–24.
- See Henry W. Johnstone Jr., Philosophy and Argument (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959); and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument: An Outlook in Transition (University Park: Dialogue Press, 1978).
- Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 435. See also Zarefsky, “Perils of Assessing Paradigms,” pp. 143–144, and Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 179.
- Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 435; Zarefsky and Henderson, pp. 179–180.
- Zarefsky and Henderson, pp. 181–182.
- Zarefsky and Henderson, pp. 182–184; Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 436.
- Zarefsky, “The Perils of Assessing Paradigms,” p 141.
- Zarefsky, “A Reformulation of the Nature of Presumption,” p. 2.
- Several persons have argued that the analogy between debate and either the hard sciences or the social sciences is not very accurate. See, for example, Lichtman and Rohrer, “Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption;” Rowland, “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation;” and Corsi.
- Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180. For a discussion of the problems created by using figurative analogies as the basis for a paradigm, see Rowland, “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation,” p. 464.
- Some of the implications of hypothesis testing have been accepted uncritically by other judging paradigms. For example, the way many teams argue the competitiveness of counterplans makes sense only from the hypothesis testing perspective since it permits the affirmative team to argue conditionally that we could adopt both policies (not that we should do so), thus allowing the affirmative team to defend two positions conditionally (the plan alone or the plan plus the counterplan).
- Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 431.
- David Zarefsky, “The Role of Causal Argument in Policy Controversies,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 13 (Spring 1977), 184. This particular feature may not be inherent to hypothesis testing, although most advocates of hypothesis testing support this view of inherency.
- Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, pp. 48, 86–89.
- This attack would obviously not apply to policy making or any other judging paradigm since they would be evaluated using the standards they create for examining other arguments.
- Zarefsky, “The Perils of Assessing Paradigms,” p. 144; Zarefsky and Henderson, pp. 184–185.
- The view that the best rule is not simply a good rule but the best formulation of the rule is discussed by Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal Justification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 118–171.
- J. Robert Cox, “A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 11 (Fall 1974); John D. Cross and Ronald J. Matlon, “An Analysis of Judging Philosophies in Academic Debate,” Journal of the American Forensic Association, 15 (Fall 1978), 110–123; and Austin J. Freeley, “Judging Paradigms: The Impact of the Critic on Argument,” in Dimensions of Argument, p. 437.
- The argument that judges reject hypothesis testing because they have different perspectives is, of course, a tautology: judges view debate differently because they view debate differently.
- Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180; Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 430.
- Ulrich, “Philosophical Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate,” pp. 23–24; Rowland, “Standards for Paradigm Evaluation,” p. 160; Rowland, “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation;” Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (N.Y.: Free Press, 1977), pp. 21–25; George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), pp. 6–8; E. Frank Harrison, The Managerial Decision-Making Process, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), esp. pp. 76–102.
- Henderson, p. 251.
- Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” pp. 427–429.
- David Zarefsky, “Policy Systems Debate: A Response to Lichtman and Rohrer,” Speech Communication Association, San Antonio, November, 1979, p. 5.
- Zarefsky, “Argument as Hypothesis Testing,” p. 429.
- Social scientists have long recognized that there are both type I and type II errors. To attempt to avoid the commitment to a false claim inevitably increases the risk of failing to affirm a true claim. It is unclear why one of these two errors should always be the error we should attempt to avoid. See Paul C. Cozby, Methods in Behavioral Research (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1977), pp. 114–117; and Frederick Williams, Reasoning With Statistics (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 68–71.
- Allan J. Lichtman, Daniel M. Rohrer, and Joseph Misner, “The Role of Empirical Evidence in Debate: A Systems Approach,” in Advanced Debate, p. 284.
- Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), chapter 2.
- Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, pp. 21–41.
- Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180.
- Rowland, “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation,” pp. 448–475.
- Kenneth M. Strange, “An Advocacy Paradigm of Debate,” Speech Communication Association, Anaheim, 13 November 1981, pp. 1–9.
- Strange, pp. 6–9. The testing of a hypothesis against multiple counter-hypotheses could also be accomplished by having the negative team, prior to the round, decide which of the options open to them is closest to the truth.
- Robert H. Aronson and Donald T. Weckstein, Professional Responsibility in a Nutshell (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1980), pp. 266–267.
- See, for example, Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, “The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report,” Science, 20 August 1976, pp. 653–656. For a critical view of the science court, see Albert R. Matheny and Bruce A. Williams, “Scientific Disputes and Adversary Procedures in Policy-Making: An Evaluation of the Science Court,” Law and Policy Quarterly, 3 (July 1981), 341–364.
The Journal of the American Forensic Association
Volume 21, 1984 - Issue 1