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Logic's God and the natural order in late medieval Oxford: The teaching of Robert Holcot

Katherine H. Tachau History Department, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, 52242, USA
Pages 235-267 | Received 21 Sep 1995, Published online: 23 Aug 2006

References

  • Moody , Ernest A. 1958 . Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy . The Philosophical Review , 67 : 145 – 163 . reprinted in his Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic (Berkeley, 1975), 287–304. See also the valuable historiographic study by John Murdoch, ‘Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Latin West’, in Gli Studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento, edited by A. Maierù (Rome, 1991), 253–302. Not all members of this first category agree with Duhem in seeing early modern conceptual revolutions in science as reducible to those of fourteenth-century scientific thought.
  • For example, Knuuttila Simo Modalities in Medieval Philosophy London 1993 and Calvin Normore, ‘Walter Burley on Continuity’, in Infinity and Continuity in Ancient and Medieval Thought, edited by Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, 1982), 258–69.
  • For example Oberman Heiko Reformation and Revolution: Copernicus’ Discovery in an Era of Change The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought Edinburgh 1986 in his especially 192–8; and William Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987).
  • Moody . 1958 . Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy . The Philosophical Review , 67 : 150 – 150 . Murdoch, ‘The Involvement of Logic in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy’, in Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy, edited by Stefano Caroti (Florence, 1989), 3–28 (3), states of his own intellectual formation: ‘I have on more than one occasion … voiced my agreement with Ernest Moody's well-known distinction of fourteenth-century philosophy as essentially analytic and critical when compared to its basically speculative and cosmological thirteenth-century predecessor’.
  • Moody . 1958 . Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval Philosophy . The Philosophical Review , 67 : 156 – 156 .
  • See, especially, Murdoch John Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages The Interaction between Science and Philosophy Elkana Yehuda Atlantic Highlands 1974 51 74 in ‘Propositional Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Natural Philosophy: A Case Study’, Synthèse, 40 (1979), 117–46; and ‘“Scientia mediantibus vocibus”: Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy’, in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, 2 vols [Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1], edited by J. P. Beckmann et al. (Berlin, 1981), i, 73–106.
  • Murdoch . 1974 . “ Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages ” . In The Interaction between Science and Philosophy Edited by: Elkana , Yehuda . 59 – 60 . Atlantic Highlands in 64, 68–9; idem, ‘Pierre Duhem and History’ (note 1), 282–3, 291–2. Murdoch's support for the connection between theses (1)–(2) and (3)–(5) was at most tepid and early in his æuvre, and has since been explicitly abandoned. Other historians, however, have inferred the dependence of the latter theses upon the former: Edward Grant, ‘The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages’, Viator, 10 (1979), 211–44; idem, ‘Science and Theology in the Middle Ages’, in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science, edited by David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers ( Berkeley, 1986), 49–75 (especially 54–62). See also the discussion of Murdoch's theses by Alain de Libera, ‘La problèmatique de “l'instant du changement” au XIIIe siècle: Contribution à l'histoire des sophismata physicalia’, in Caroti (note 6), 43–93 (especially 44–7).
  • These are the characterization of Carey Hilary M. Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle Ages New York 1992 4 4
  • Carey . 1992 . Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle Ages 14 – 14 . New York Paola Zambelli, The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma: Astrology, Theology, and Science in Albertus Magnus and his Contemporaries. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 135 (Dordrecht, 1992), 11, 41.
  • There are variants to the distinction drawn between the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century intellectual enterprises: thus, Moody strongly implied that the shift was either parallel to or constituted the rejection of Neoplatonism (sometimes read ‘Augustinianism’) for Aristotelian thought Murdoch Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Latin West Gli Studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento Maierù A. Rome 1991 286 286 in (and in note 6), reads Moody as having contrasted fourteenth-century thought with ‘its basically speculative and cosmological thirteenth-century predecessor’.
  • Grant . 1979 . The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages . Viator , 10 : 211 – 244 .
  • Grant . 1979 . The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages . Viator , 10 : 217 – 217 .
  • Grant . 1979 . The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages . Viator , 10 : 217 – 217 .
  • Courtenay , William J. 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo Eugenio Randi, ‘Onnipotenza divina e futuri contingenti nel XIV secolo’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 1.2 (1990), 605–30.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 16 – 17 . Bergamo 19, 189–91.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 12 – 13 . Bergamo treating C. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel und ihre Stellung innerhalb der nominalistischen Schule (Münster, 1925).
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 14 – 15 . Bergamo
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 15 – 15 . Bergamo bracketed insertions are mine.
  • As, for example, Leonard Kennedy still does; see, for example, the articles listed by Courtenay Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 23 23
  • See especially Grant Edward Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus, and the Scientific Revolution Journal of the History of Ideas 1962 23 197 220 and André Goddu, ‘The Dialectic of Certitude and Demonstrability According to William of Ockham and the Conceptual Relation of His Account to Later Developments’, in Caroti (note 6), 95–153 (especially 119–31).
  • Grant . 1979 . The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages . Viator , 10 : 216 – 216 .
  • Funkenstein , Amos . 1986 . Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 117 – 201 . Princeton (especially 122–4).
  • I have in mind especially the arguments over Descartes' hypothesis of the Dieu trompeur or a Malin génie. For literature that brings together the seventeenth-century and late medieval discussions on this issue, see Randi Onnipotenza Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 607 609 and J.-F. Genest, ‘Pierre de Ceffons et l'hypothèse du dieu trompeur’, in Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie, et théologie au XIVe siècle, edited by Zenon Kaluza and Paul Vignaux (Paris, 1984), 197–214.
  • Courtenay , W.J. 1974 . “ Nominalism and late Medieval Religion ” . In The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval Religion Edited by: Trinkaus , Charles and Oberman , Heiko . 26 – 59 . Leiden in (39–43). In idem, Capacity (note 16), 115, 120, 194–5, etc., Courtenay frequently terms the theological ‘usage’ of the distinction as achieved c. 1245 ‘traditional’; also ‘classic’ (p. 74). As he argues, legal interpretations proposed a generation later in Canonist sources ‘did violence to … the theological distinction’ (p. 92) or ‘radically distorted’ it (p. 93).
  • The wording is Courtenay's Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 29 29 speaking of the Augustinian ‘background’ to the distinction. To see the core of the distinction thus is implicitly to treat Augustine's ‘poterat per potentiam, sed non poterat per iustitiam’ as a subsidiary or corollary to his ‘potuit, sed noluit’ formulation rather than vice versa. Funkenstein (note 24), 126, however, by citing the earlier writings of Origen, suggests a case for reversing the emphases.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 19 – 19 . Bergamo where this theological motivation is referred to as a ‘theological truth’.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 19 – 20 . Bergamo 95–6, 190, 192–4.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 18 – 18 . Bergamo
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 74 – 74 . Bergamo (diagram); historians of philosophy are also familiar with Courtenay's conceptualization from his earlier ‘The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence’, in his Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought (London, 1984), iv, 1–37.
  • Knuuttila , Simo . 1989 . “ Natural Necessity in John Buridan ” . In Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy Edited by: Caroti . 155 – 176 . Florence (164–5).
  • Knuuttila . 1989 . “ Natural Necessity in John Buridan ” . In Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy Edited by: Caroti . 166 – 166 . Florence citing Johannes Duns Scotus, I Ordinatio, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–2, 86 from the standard Vatican edn, Ioannis Duns Scoti O. F. M. Opera omnia, edited by C. Balic (Vatican City, 1951-present); see also Simo Knuuttila (ed.), ‘Time and Modality in Scholasticism’, in Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies of the History of Modal Theories (Dordrecht, 1981), 163–257 (217–34). For a helpful appreciation of the twentieth-century history of the philosophic notions at issue for Knuuttila (and his teacher, Jaako Hintikka), see Luca Bianchi, ‘Onnipotenza divina e ordine del mondo fra XIII e XIV secolo’, Medioevo, 10 (1984), 105–53 (121–3).
  • Knuuttila . 1989 . “ Natural Necessity in John Buridan ” . In Studies in Medieval natural Philosophy Edited by: Caroti . 170 – 170 . Florence
  • Knuuttila . 1989 . “ Natural Necessity in John Buridan ” . In Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy Edited by: Caroti . 172 – 173 . Florence for explicit discussion of the merits of Moody's article, ‘Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt: the Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340’ (1947), reprinted in idem, Studies (note 1), 127–60.
  • See, most recently Knuuttila Modalities in Medieval Philosophy London 1993 idem, ‘Interpreting Scotus’ Theory of Modality: Three Critical Remarks’, in Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, edited by Leonardo Sileo, 2 vols (Rome, 1995), i, 295–303.
  • For example, Alain de Libera La Philosophie Médiévale Paris 1993 423 425
  • Randi , Eugenio . 1987 . Il sovrano e l'orologiaio: Due immagine di Dio nel dibattito sulla ‘potentia absoluta’ fra XIII e XIV secolo Florence
  • Randi , Eugenio . 1987 . Il sovrano e l'orologiaio: Due immagine di Dio nel dibattito sulla ‘potentia absoluta’ fra XIII e XIV secolo 33 – 36 . Florence Courtenay, Capacity (note 16), 92–5, and, for the date ‘by 1245’, 74.
  • Randi . 1987 . Il sovrano e l'orologiaio: Due immagine di Dio nel dibattito sulla ‘potentia absoluta’ fra XIII e XIV secolo 58 – 58 . Florence idem, ‘A Scotist Way of Distinguishing Between God's Absolute and Ordained Powers’, in From Ockham to Wyclif, edited by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford, 1987), 43–50 (44–5). It should be noted that, as a composite of ex and fero, the noun ‘legislator’ technically denotes ‘one who produces (brings forth) the law’. The significance of this juristic distinction as conveyed by theologians for the development of early-modern political theories of absolutist monarchy has been argued in a series of studies by Francis Oakley, recently in his Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca, 1984), 93–118.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 92 – 92 . Bergamo Randi, Il sovrano (note 38), 54–5.
  • Hence, the preference of some scholars in the early thirteenth century for contrasting a potentia conditionata to potentia absoluta; see Courtenay's reference Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 72 72 to Godfrey of Poitiers (c. 1210) and Hugh of St Cher.
  • 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 74 – 74 . Bergamo ‘by 1245’; see also note 39.
  • Randi , Eugenio . 1984 . Potentia Dei conditionata. Una questione di Ugo di saint-Cher sulla onnipotenza divina . Rivista di storia della filosofia , 39 : 521 – 536 . n.s. idem, Il sovrano (note 38), 35. Courtenay, Capacity (note 16), 72–3, also dates Hugh's Sentences lectures to 1230–39, while tracing his conception of the dichotomy to his Parisian theology teachers.
  • Courtenay . The Dialectic as quoted in Randi, ‘Scotist Way’ (note 40), 44–5 (bracketed insertions are mine). Courtenay repeats his earlier statement regarding Scotus in Capacity (note 16), 100–2.
  • I translate from Scotus, I Ord., d. 44, q. un. (Vatican edn, Opera omnia VI 363 365 whose editors cite the Decretales of Pope Gregroy IX (d. 1241) as Scotus' source for jurists' views. This passage is quoted and discussed in Randi, ‘A Scotist Way’ (note 40), 44–5; and Courtenay, Capacity (note 16), 101.
  • Courtenay . 1990 . Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power 18 – 18 . Bergamo
  • I adopt the spelling of Holcot's surnane with a ‘c’, rather than with the German ‘k’ as the spelling required by Holcot's puns explaining his own name. Scholarly attention to these puns was drawn by Smalley Beryl Robert Holcot Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 1956 26 5 97 this remains the starting place for any serious study. Through note 56 I summarize the more detailed treatment in my introduction to Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot, edited by Paul A. Streveler, Katherine H. Tachau, Hester G. Gelber, and William J. Courtenay, in Studies and Texts, 119 (Toronto, 1995), 1–27. All citations in what follows to Holcot's third Quodlibetal disputation, questions 1–3 and 8 [henceforth Quodl.], or to his second question on book two of Lombard's Sentences [Sent. 2.2] are to that edition (as ed. Streveler, Tachau]. In addition, I will refer in these notes to several manuscripts under the following sigla: A = Cambridge, Pembroke College 236; B = Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 15884; C = Oxford, Corpus Christi College 138; D = Munich, Bayerische Staatsbib. Clm 4400; F = Vatican, Bibl. Apostolica, Ottob. lat. 591; G = Oxford, Merton College 113; M = Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 915; O = Oxford, Oriel College 15; P = Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15853; R = London, British Library, Royal 10.C.VI; T = Cambridge, Trinity College, B.2.25; and V = Vatican, Bibl. Apost., Vat. lat. 1110.
  • See especially Gelber Hester Goodenough Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335 University of Wisconsin-Madison 1974 (PhD thesis Heinrich Schepers, ‘Holkot Contra Dicta Crathorn’ [I] Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 77 (1970), 320–54, and [II] Philosophisches Jahrbuch 79 (1972), 106–36; W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden, 1978); K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988); and W. J. Courtenay, ‘Was there an Ockhamist School?’ in Philosophy and Learning. Universities in the Middle Ages, edited by Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, et al. (Leiden, 1995), 263–92 (especially 270).
  • Smalley , Beryl . 1960 . English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century 66 – 74 . New York
  • See especially Gilbert Neal Richard de Bury and the “Quires of Yesterday's Sophisms” Philosophy and Humanism. Renaissance Essays in Honor of P.O. Kristellar Mahoney E. Columbia 1976 229 257 in
  • Molland , George . 1996 . Addressing Ancient Authority: Thomas Bradwardine and Prisca Sapientia . Annals of Science , 53 : 213 – 233 .
  • In addition to Murdoch's works (note 8) see also his Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons Machaut's World: Science and Art of the Fourteenth Century Cosman M.P. Chandler B. New York 1978 51 86 in
  • See Smalley's amusing recital of Holcot's classical allusions in English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century New York 1960 133 202
  • On this generation, see now Courtenay Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif The History of the University of Oxford, II, Late Medieval Oxford Catto Jeremy I. Evans Ralph Oxford 1992 1 34 in [henceforth HUO 2]
  • In fact, however, these are not entirely independent works, and they preserve, to varying extents, the record of oral lectures and disputations, written response, and partial revision into an ordinatio which Holcot never finished. For our purposes we may treat the relevant Quodlibetal Questions as contemporary with Holcot's Sentences lectures and revisions; so, while they reveal evolution in his views, we are in effect dealing with one work in terms of Holcot's composition and revision, not with three; see my Introduction to Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot Studies and Texts Streveler Paul A. Tachau Katherine H. Gelber Hester G. Courtenay William J. Toronto 1995 119 16 22 The Postillae in librum Sapientiae were probably composed in the academic year 1334–35.
  • For the chronology of Holcot's debates with other bachelors, see my Introduction to Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents by Robert Holcot Studies and Texts Streveler Paul A. Tachau Katherine H. Gelber Hester G. Courtenay William J. Toronto 1995 119 and the chart in my ‘Robert Holcot on Contingency and Divine Deception’, in Filosofia e teologia nel trecento: studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, edited by Luca Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), 157–96 (159–60). What follows (to note 110) repeats the latter study. In Holcot's œuvre, the names of Ockham, Chatton, and Campsall sometimes appear; more often, their views, like those of Duns Scotus and FitzRalph, are tacitly absorbed. For the dating of FitzRalph's ‘Quaestio biblica’, see Jean-François Genest, ‘Contingence et révélation des futurs: La Quaestio biblica de Richard FitzRalph’, in Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), edited by Jean Jolivet, Zenon Kaluza, and Alain de Libera (Paris, 1991), 199–246 (especially 201–3).
  • The scope of such a comprehensive treatment is sketched in Randi Onnipotenza divina e futuri contingenti nel XIV secolo Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 1990 1.2 605 630 and much more fully in several important recent studies: Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology Among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310–1340 (Princeton, forthcoming); Genest, ‘Contingence’ (note 57); and, most recently, Genest, Prédétermination et liberté creéé à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine (Paris, 1992).
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 7, lin. 758–79 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 146–7) tacitly quotes Campsall, on whose importance see also Katherine Tachau, ‘The Influence of Richard Campsall on Fourteenth-Century Oxford Thought’, in From Ockham to Wyclif (note 40), 109–23. Because surviving copies of William Chitterne's Sentences questions have not been securely identified, his side of the debate is known mostly from Holcot's reports of it in (perhaps unfair) detail; but see also my ‘Holcot on Contingency’ (note 57), 184.
  • ‘Walter’ is not Walter Chatton, Ockham's usual opponent; Genest Prédétermination et liberté creéé à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine Paris 1992 137 139 The title by which Holcot alludes to Walter, ‘worth one’ (valens, in the text adduced at note 63), indicates that he had obtained the magisterial rank in theology.
  • Courtenay . Schools and Scholars , 281 – 281 . (note 3) 322-4; idem, ‘Augustinianism at Oxford in the Fourteenth Century’, Augustiniana, 30 (1980), 58–70 (67). Genest, finding this opinion in FitzRalph's work, correctly argued that the author of this opinion is not Thomas Bradwardine, as some have suggested; Genest, ‘Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine’, Recherches Augustiniennes, 14 (1979), 249–336 (265).
  • Wodeham , Adam . O.F.M. Questiones in libros Sententiarum Vol. 3 , d. 14, q. 4 (lectures delivered, Oxford 1334), recorded as a Reportatio (V, f.57r) and revised as an Ordinatio (M, f.180va): ‘Hic respondet magister quidam modernus, gratia tamen exercitii sine assertione, et nonnulli alii de Villa minus bene ut estimo (om. V), quod facta revelatione absoluta, qualis est de resurrectione mortuorum et aliis articulis fidei de futuro, quod non potest evenire oppositum, nec impediri, quia posse contra veritatem non esset possibile. Dices: nulla obstante revelatione, Deus de potentia absoluta potest adhuc in contrarium. “Dico” inquit <Gualterus>, “quod hec propositio potest habere duplicem intellectum: unus est secundum communiter intelligentes, quod Deus potest dimittere ordinationem factam et facere oppositum, ita quod hec est simpliciter vera et absolute: ‘Deus potest facere oppositum’. Alius sensus est iste: nisi Deus sic ordinasset, posset facere oppositum, ita quod absolute considerando potentiam Dei ut potentia eius est sine alia eius ordinatione, non repugnat potentie eius oppositum facere, nec in ea est defectus vel insufficientia potentie aliqua (ad oppositum facere V). Primus sensus negatur et secondus conceditur”’.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 91) 1.253–60.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 91 – 92 . 1.260–73. For Wodeham, see note 62.
  • See Courtenay W.J. Nominalism and late Medieval Religion The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval Religion Trinkaus Charles Oberman Heiko Leiden 1974 26 59 in 9.
  • See Courtenay The Dialectic 6. Holcot argues elsewhere against a colleague who treats the dialectic of divine power in this way, Quodl. 3, q. 7, ‘Utrum observantia legis mosaycae fuit Judaeis meritoria vitae aeternae’, in P. Molteni, Roberto Holcot O. P. Dottrina della grazia e della giustificazione: con due questioni quodlibetali inedite (Pinerolo, 1968), 200–1: ‘Unde quod ista fuit ymaginatio sua, colligi potest tam ex verbis quae dixit <socius iste>, quam ex scriptis, quod non obstante lege communi <i.e. ordinata> de gratia informante per quam, regulariter loquendo, et ut communiter et frequenter, homines iustificantur et salvantur … tamen de lege speciali, hoc non requiritur, quia Deus non alligat potentiam suam aliquibus legibus secundum eum <i.e. socius iste>, et bene in hoc. Unde ymaginatur quod Deus de facto, quasi ex privilegio et lege speciali quosdam iustificat sine gratia et sine baptismo, et quosdam, quasi per ius commune, iustificat per gratiam et per baptismum’.
  • That is, literally removing that person from the law's coverage. See above at Randi Il sovrano e l'orologiaio: Due immagine di Dio nel dibattito sulla ‘potentia absoluta’ fra XIII e XIV secolo Florence 1987 58 58 Randi, ‘Onnipotenza divina’ (note 16), 606; and idem, ‘Lex est in potestate agentis. Note per una storia della idea scotista di potentia absoluta’, in Sopra la volta del mondo: onnipotenza e potenza assoluta di dio tra medioevo e età moderna (Bergamo, 1986), 129–38.
  • This worry, like the dialectic of divine power itself, is already present in Augustine's analysis; see Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 29 29
  • FitzRalph , Richard . 1991 . “ Contingence et révélation des futurs: La Quaestio biblica de Richard FitzRalph ” . In Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987) Edited by: Jolivet , Jean , Kaluza , Zenon and de Libera , Alain . 218 – 218 . Paris in ‘Secunda via solvendi difficultatem est, supposita revelacione absoluta de futuris, negando hoc quod accipitur facta revelacione talis futuri: “Hoc est contingens: B non erit”. Dicitur enim quod facta revelacione talis futuri a Deo, necessarium est illud evenire, nec Deus potest illud impedire, nec creatura. Deus non potest, quia non conveniet ejus justicie aliquid sic intimare alicui quod non eveniret, et omne inconveniens sibi est impossible secundum Anselmum, primo Cur Deus homo, c. 10; igitur etc. Nec creatura potest tale revelatum impedire a multo forciori’.
  • Holcot holds that the worry about divine justice is misplaced; that God, as the ‘law-maker’ (legislator) who makes all existing order or law, is now, like a prince above the law, able to set aside the law he has ordained. In addition to Holcot's statements Quodl. 3 3 see Quodl. 3, q. 8, a. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 103), 1.532–48. See further Randi, ‘Onnipotenza divina’ (note 16), 610–12.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 3, a. 1 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 77), 1.52–63.
  • Some of the hypothetical cases outlined by Holcot seem to depend on such a paradox, as at the outset of Quodl. 3 3 q. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 75), 1.7–24, and repeated in Sent. 2, q. 2, arg. 8.21 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 140–1), 1.634–58. On ‘undoing’ the past, see especially C. Normore, ‘Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An Overview’, in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Tamar Rudavsky (Boston, 1985), 3–22; W. J. Courtenay, ‘John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on whether God Can Undo the Past’, 2 parts (1972–73; reprinted as articles 8a and b in his Covenant and Causality [note 31]), part 1, 224–56 (especially 248–56). This formulation is more explicitly posed by Thomas Buckingham, as Randi noted, ‘Onnipotenza divina’ (note 16), 619 (at his footnote 46).
  • As argued in Tachau Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 Leiden 1988
  • Genest . 1991 . “ Contingence et révélation des futurs: La Quaestio biblica de Richard FitzRalph ” . In Lectionum Varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987) Edited by: Jolivet , Jean , Kaluza , Zenon and de Libera , Alain . 204 – 205 . Paris in (at his footnotes 37–9).
  • As Genest recognized, pointing to parallels beween Holcot's and FitzRalph's reasoning as early as his Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine Recherches Augustiniennes 1979 14 259 260
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 76), 1.26–32.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 76), 1.33–44: ‘Pertractando tamen quaestionem ad intentionem quaerentis, ut sit sensus quaestionis talis: “si fiat revelatio de eo quod nunc est futurum contingens, an ipsum maneat contingens post revelationem”, sic est de ista quaestione apud modernos studentes maxima difficultas. Occurrit enim ex una parte, si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati potest contingere, quod Deus potest decipere, mentiri, periurare, non solvere quod promisit, et fieri infidelis, et huiusmodi, quae bonis moribus repugnare videntur. Ex alia parte, si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati, vel promissi, vel asserti seu iurati a Deo non potest evenire, videtur derogare divinae potentiae, quae in nullo minuitur propter revelationem, vel iuramentum, vel promissionem factam creaturae. Item, videtur derogare humanae libertati…’. Compare Richard FitzRalph, Sent. 1, q. 16 ‘Utrum Deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia’ (O, f.55rb-va; P, f.86va): ‘Quero istam questionem: utrum Deus possit revelare creature rationali futura contingentia. Et probo quod non, quia si posset aliqua revelare, illis revelatis illa necessario et inevitabiliter evenirent. Consequens impossibile, quia tunc non essent futura contingentia. Et consequentia probatur, quia facta revelatione, si ista revelata possent non evenire, cum ille cui fuit facta revelatio necessario credidit ista, sequitur quod possible est quod Deus aliquem deciperet, quod negat Augustinus, 83 Questionibus, q. 14, et Anselmus in Meditacione humanae redemptionis …’. Also FitzRalph's Quaestio biblica (ed. Genest, ‘Contingence’ [note 57] 218–9; continuing from note 69): ‘Dicitur enim quod facta revelacione talis futuri a Deo, necessarium est illud evenire, nec Deus potest illud impedire, nec creatura…. Alia inconveniencia videntur insuper sequi, dato quod post revelacionem tale posset impediri, scilicet quod Deus deciperet per seipsum immediate, contra Augustinum, 83 Questionibus, q. 14 et 53, et contra Anselmum in Meditacione humanae redemptionis, et quod Deus posset mentiri, et alia que infra tangentur …. Preterea ista sentencia tollit libertatem arbitrii respectu cujuscumque revelati’.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 76), 1.44–6: ‘Item, videtur derogare humanae libertati, quia facta revelatione de aliquo cadente sub libera facultate voluntatis, iam fieret necessarium si eius oppositum evenire non posset’. See also Holcot, Sent. 1, d. 1, q. 1, ‘Utrum voluntas creata in utendo et fruendo sit libera libertate contradictionis’, arg. 1 princ. (F, f.7va–b, 14ra–b).
  • See Holcot Sent. 2 2 see also Holcot, Sent. 2. q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 154), 1.919–24.
  • Thus, for example, in Quodl. 3 3 q. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 76), 1.35–6: ‘sic est de ista quaestione apud modernos studentes maxima difficultas … (as note 77)’; q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 97), 1.398–400.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 149–50), 1.827–34: ‘Et ideo haec quae in hac materia scribo vel dico, sine pertinacia gratia investigationis scribo. Et licet nullam responsionem haberem ad concordandum cum rerum contingentia divinam praescientiam et revelationes, non minus ideo crederem quin verae simul stent: Deum tales propositiones posse revelare, et illas post revelationem esse contingentes. Et argumenta omnia quae possunt fieri in contrarium sophistica reputarem, licet non foret homo in mundo qui ea screit solvere’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 7 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 145–6, 148), 1.745–52, 758–65, 800–82, designates the class of propositions that remain contingent even after revelation. For Holcot's acceptance of the concomitant possibility of divine deception, see a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 157–8), 1.984–95; also Quodl. 3, q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 97), 1.402–19; Sent. 3, q. 1, a. 8 (D, f.134r; O, f.177ra; F, f.47ra): ‘Octavus articulus est an Deus possit aliquem fallere. In isto articulo quando tangebatur alias de futuris contingentibus, dixi quod Deus potest fallere et decipere, licet non possit iniuste vel viciose vel deordinate fallere. Contra istud arguit socius frater Willelmus de Chitterne …’. FitzRalph, Sent. 1, q. 16 (P, f.92va; quoted in Genest, ‘Le De futuris’ [note 61], 260): ‘Dico … quod facta revelatione, hec est contingens: “iste credidit illa fore”, quia contingens est quod illa sunt revelata; nisi enim sint futura, non sunt revelata proprie …. Et concedo ulterius quod hec <est> contingens: “Deus fecit ipsum credere aliter quam erat ex parte rei”, et hec similiter: “Deus decepit ipsum”’.
  • FitzRalph . Sent. , 1 – 1 . (continuing from ‘Non enim videtur <mihi> impossibile Deum aliquem decipere; sed tamen numquam decepit aliquem sicut nos pie credimus. Unde Augustinus vult concludere tanquam unum inconveniens secundum legem ordinatam quod Deus aliquem decepit, non tanquam aliquod impossibile’. Again (P, f.93va): ‘Ideo concedo quod postquam Christus predixit futura contingentia discipulis suis, fuit hec propositio contingens: “Christus asseruit falsum”, et nego consequentiam, “ergo hec fuit contingens: tunc Christus mentitus est, vel dixit mendacium”, quia non sufficit ad mendacium sola assertio, sed requiritur intentio fallendi’.
  • For Holcot, in addition to notes 89–90, see his Sent. 3 3 q. 1, a. 8 (O, f.177ra-va; F, f.47rb-vb): ‘Circa istum articulum sic procedam: primo, quia istum articulum pertractat Augustinus in multis locis, ideo super hoc ponam sententiam Augustini; secundo, ostendam per rationes quod Deo non repugnat decipere aut fallere, et potest hoc <facere> si vellit … tertio adduco Sacram Scripturam, que hoc satis innuit, videlicet quod de facto Deus decipit, hoc est, causat errorem non solum per malos sed etiam per bonos, et immediate per seipsum … Lucae ii habetur quod beata Virgo erronie estimavit … sed certum est quod erroris causa partialis fuit ipsemet Christus …. Preterea, Deus iussit Abraham immolare filium suum, sicut superiori articulo tractatum est; sed per illud preceptum causavit in eo errorem …. Preterea, exempla multa sunt in vetere testamento, <e.g.> de Rebecca et Iacob de familiari consilio spiritus sancti excusantur a mendacio quando deceperunt Isaac …. Item, Judith Holofernem …. Ad secundum, quando arguitur <Chitterne> et respondetur de ista auctoritate Ieremiah 20, “seduxisti me domine, etc.”, dicitur quod illa verba non fuerunt verba Ieremiae, sed verba Phasur, qui fuit falsus propheta, et sic non sunt ad propositum. Salva pace cuiuscumque dicentis, aliter exponit Scripturam quam deberet, et contra Glossam Communem … ecce plane quod verba predicta fuerunt verba Ieremiae et non Phasur …’. See also Genest, ‘Contingence’ (note 57), 207; idem, ‘Pierre de Ceffons’ (note 25), 201–2; and Gelbert, It Could Have Been Otherwise (note 58), chapter 4.
  • FitzRalph . Sent. , 1 – 1 . q. 16 (O, f.59ra; P, f.92vb): ‘Dicitur enim sic ibi <3 Reg. 22>: “et ait Dominus: quis decipiet regem Achab ut ascendat et cadat in Ramoth Galaad? Egressus est autem spiritus et stetit coram Domino, et ait: ego decipiam. Cui Dominus: in quo? Et ille ait: egrediar, et ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium prophetarum eius. Et dicit Dominus: decipies et prevalebis; egredere et fac ista”. Haec iste; et Augustinus ubi supra dixit hoc non fuisse factum sine iudicio divino. Et quod etiam Deus decipiat aliquem per se simpliciter sine mendacio, non credo impossibile’. On the significance of terming such divine action de facto action, see above at note 46.
  • FitzRalph . Sent. , 1 – 1 . q. 16 (O, f.59ra; P, f.92vb): ‘Dico ergo quod Deus in sua persona propria neminem umquam decepit, sicut dicit Augustinus ubi supra. Nec dico decipere potest per se mendaciter, quia mentiri non potest, sed per alium Deus decepit de facto, sicut ibi dicit Augustinus, quia rex Achab, sicut dicitur III Regum ultimo <capitulo>, deceptus fuit per sperando prophetas …’.
  • See Courtenay Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power Bergamo 1990 92 95 on canonist theorizing about the ability of popes (and other human sovereigns) acting de facto to suspend or dispense from particular laws in order to accomplish a greater good than could be brought about by acting according to the law.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 156), 1.955–7: ‘Et credo quod daemones meruerunt decipi a Deo in multis, et quod Deus multa facit cum intentione fallendi eos, et fecit’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 156), 1.957–66: ‘Nec video causam quare Deus non potest velle decipere creaturam immediate per seipsum, cum manifeste dicat Augustinus De 83 quaestionibus, quaestione iii, quod Deus decipit per malos angelos et per malos homines, et quod Deus iussit filios Israel decipere Aegyptios, ubi alludit Augustinus historiae de rege Achab, III Regum, cap. xxii, et de spiritu qui dixit: “Egrediar, et ero spiritus mendax”, etc. Et sequitur: “Decipies et praevalebis; egredere et fac ista”, etc. Ubi manifestum est secundum Augustinum quod Deus dixit malo angelo ut deciperet malum regem Achab’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 157), 1.967–76: ‘Similiter, Christus voluit nasci de virgine ut deciperet Diabolum, eius nativitatem celando secundum sanctos. Similiter, Rebecca et Iacob de familiari consilio Spiritus Sancti deceperunt Isaac, Genesis xxvii. Similiter, Iudith decepit Holofernem. Unde videtur quod Deus possit decipere etiam per bonos, et satis verisimile est quod frequenter decepit diabolum et malos homines cum quibus tractavit. Similiter, Deus praecepit Iosue quod poneret insidias urb Hai quando debuit eam capere; ergo dixit Iosue quod deciperet eos. Similiter, nullum inconveniens video si dicatur quod Deus possit iurare falsum vel promittere se facturum et non facere, sicut potest homo’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 10 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 165), 1.1120–5: ‘Et concedo quod haec est possibilis: quod Abraham meruit in fide falsa, et quod homo potest mereri per fidem falsam ita bene sicut per fidem veram. Quia non ideo meretur homo credendo, quia creditum ab eo est verum vel falsum, quia hoc non est in potestate sua; sed ideo credendo meretur, quia Deus praecipit sibi quod sic credat et vult acceptare actum credendi, si credat’. Again, Quodl. 3, q. 8, a. 3 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 100), 1.461–3.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 1 – 1 . q. 3, ‘Utrum viator teneatur frui solo Deo’, a. 3 (R, f.29ra-b; C, f.25v; O, f.137rb; F, ff.22vb-23ra): ‘Secunda conclusio est ista: homo potest licite et meritorie frui quacumque creatura. Hec probatur sic: videat Petrus Christum et Iacobum, et estimet Iacobum esse Christum, et stante illo errore invincibili in Petro, volo quod Petrus velit Iacobum esse Deum et diligat eum super omnia. Iste fruitur creatura, et tamen meritorie, quia ignorantia sua est invincibilis…’.
  • On this point, see Gelber It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology Among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310–1340 Princeton chapter 6.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 1 – 1 . q. 3, a. 3, (R, f.29rb; C, f.25v; O, f.137rb; F, ff.22vb-3ra): ‘Eodem modo causetur error [opinio] invincibilis in aliquo quod diabolus est Deus si <in> creaturam transfiguret se; et sic de quacumque creatura argui potest. Tertia conclusio est ista: quod homo potest summe odire Deum meritorie stante lege que modo est. Probatur: per talem errorem vel ignorantiam invincibilem credat aliquis Christum esse pessimum et subversorem morum deceptor, et principiatur a Deo quod quemlibet talem odiat et prosequatur’. That this constitutes idolatry is made clear in the recapitulations of the casus in unattributed theological questions (G, ff.218v-33rb) that are either by William Chitterne, O. F. M., or report his debates in detail (f.218vb): ‘Secunda conclusio: quod aliquo actu dilectionis in casu licitum esset creaturam aliquam ipsi Deo preponere, probatur … quod si diabolus transfiguraret se in angelum Lucis vel crederetur esse Christus, et Christus crederetur esse subversorem legis, sicut forte fuit apud aliquos simplices iudeorum, in isto casu satis liceret ex errore tali sic preponere creaturam solo sub ista apparitione, non sic tamen quin propter actum vel habitum diligeret Deum super omnia…. Contra: si in tali casu liceret creatura preferre Deo quantum ad actum diligendi, eadem ratione quantum ad effectum dilectionis, et ita liceret talem creaturam adorare, colere, et per consequens liceret ydololatrare’. (This same manuscript contains a copy of Holcot's Sentences lectures, ff.1r-106va.) For Holcot's explicit conclusion that one simultaneously merits heaven and sins mortally, see his treatment of a similar casus, in his Sent. prol. q. un., ‘Utrum quilibet viator existens in gratia, assentiendo articulis fidei, mereatur vitam aeternam’ (A, f.lra; B, f.3ra; C, f.lr; R, f.7ra): ‘Pono quod Deus praecipiat Sorti quod credat illam propositionem esse veram: “Sortes damnabitur”, et simul cum hoc, quod Sortes ei obediat. Tunc <arguo> sic: Sortes credit se damnari propter auctoritatem praecipientis; igitur Sortes meretur per conclusionem. Et iterum: Sortes credit se damnari; ergo desperat, at per consequens peccat mortaliter; igitur simul et semel meretur et peccat mortaliter’.
  • Anon. (Chitterne?), questio (G, f. 218vb): ‘Responsio: posset uno modo concedi quod aliquis posset talem creaturam sic apparentem adorare, et non sequitur quod licite posset ydololatrare, quia ydololatrare plus dicit quam creaturam pro Deo adorare…. In casu tali adoratione licita presupponitur adoratio saltim mentalis ipsi veri Dei, et quod principaliter intendat adorare ipsum Deum. Hec patet per <Alexander de> Hales, tertia parte Summe, titulo “de preceptis”, etc., articulo xi. Ibi dicit quod in isto casu, non debet talis absolute adorare; ymmo si sic absolute adoraret, peccaret …. Tamen etiam fatale posset vitare periculum adorando sub conditione, “si tu es Deus”’.
  • For further discussion and supporting texts, see Tachau Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 Leiden 1988 246 253
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 151), 1.853–8: ‘Prima distinctio erit de isto termino “scire” qui accipitur tripliciter. Uno modo largissime, et sic convertitur cum “cognoscere”, et est verorum et falsorum, complexorum et incomplexorum. Secundo modo accipitur magis stricte pro notitia evidenti assentiva alicui complexo vero qua homo assentit quod ita est in re sicut per illud verum denotatur sine formidine; et sic Sortes potest scire istam propositionem: “sol orietur cras”’. See also Quodl. 1, q. 1, ‘Utrum Theologia sit Scientia: A Quodlibet Question of Robert Holcot, O.P.’, edited by J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies, 20 (1958), 127–53 (129).
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 152), 1.870–4: ‘Primo modo Deus scit omnia apprehensa a creatura, vera et falsa, possibilia et impossibilia, complexa et incomplexa, sicut manifestum est. Secundo modo Deus scit futura contingentia. Tertio modo non, quia propositiones tales sic sunt verae quod possunt numquam fuisse verae, sicut dictum fuit articulo vii’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 152), 1.874–6: ‘Secundo modo accipiendo “scire”, eadem notitia potest successive esse scientia et opinio falsa sive error, per mutationem rei, sicut si videam Sortem currere … (continued in note 100)’. Also, see Quodl. 1, q. 6, ‘Utrum Deus possit scire plura quam scit’, 1.40–6, 346–62, in ‘A Revised Text of Robert Holcot's Quodlibetal Dispute on Whether God is Able to Know More Than He Knows’, edited by Courtenay, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 53 (1971), 1–21.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 152), 1.876–7: ‘… si videam Sortem currere, tunc assensus quo credam Sortem currere vocatur “scientia” isto modo communiter loquendo de scientia. Si autem Deus manuteneat assensum in mente mea, et species in sensu sicut prius, et adnihilet Sortem, idem assensus erit error et falsa opinio, quia scientia non dicitur de assensu sicut nomen absolutum, sed simul cum hoc quod supponit pro assensu, connotat sic esse in re sicut per assensum denotatur. Et ideo haec est concedenda: “per scientiam potest homo errare et per scientiam potest homo opinari falsum”; similiter ista: “per certitudinem potest homo decipi”. Sed tales sunt negandae: “homo potest errare per scientiam”, “homo potest decipi per certitudinem”; denotatur enim quod haec sit possibilis: “homo decipitur per certitudinem”’. Again, Sent. 2, q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 157–8), 1.984–95. The ‘species in sensu’ mentioned by Holcot here are the multipliable species discussed in §4, at notes 119–25.
  • The worry that a creature's voluntary choices might affect divine knowledge is at least implicit in several examples, as at Holcot Sent. 2 2 q. 2, argumenta 8.1, 8.19, 9.2 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 130–1, 139, 143), 1.397–413, 596–603, 694–703. For the unknowability most strictly speaking of genuine future contingent propositions, see, e.g., Holcot, Sent. 2, q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 151–2), 1.858–68: ‘Tertio modo accipitur iste terminus “scire” strictissime pro assensu quo homo credit alicui vero sine formidine assentiendo quod sic est sicut per illud verum denotatur et quod non potest aliter esse; et sic loquitur de “scire” Aristoteles primo Posteriorum, cap. ii in principio, dicens: “Scire est rem per causam cognoscere”. Et in fine, subdit: “Et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere”. Sic forte de “scire” loquitur Anselmus, De casu diaboli, cap. xxi. “Si”, inquit, “de illa scientia quaeritur quae non est, nisi cum certa ratione aliquid intelligitur, omnino respondeo non posse sciri quod potest non esse. Quod enim non esse potest, nequaquam esse certa ratione colligi potest”. Haec ille…’. Again, Quodl. 3, q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 106–7), 1.623–50.
  • Several of J. Murdoch's papers Murdoch John Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages The Interaction between Science and Philosophy Elkana Yehuda Atlantic Highlands 1974 51 74 in 53) have helped us to appreciate this feature of Oxford thought (and its eventual Parisian impact). See also Courtenay, Schools and Scholars (note 4), 218, 238–40, 258–63; Tachau, Vision and Certitude (note 49), 355–7; and Grant, ‘Science and Theology’ (note 9), 54–62.
  • Calvin , Normore . 1981 . “ Future Contingents ” . In Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy Edited by: Kretzmann , Norman , Kenny , Antony and Pinborg , Jan . 358 – 381 . Cambridge in idem, ‘Ockham on Prophecy’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13 (1982), 179–89; and Knuuttila, ‘Natural Necessity’ (note 32).
  • These italicized terms are the signals of the hypothetical reasoning from considerations of divine omnipotence on Murdoch's early theory (as discussed at Murdoch Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages The Interaction between Science and Philosophy Elkana Yehuda Atlantic Highlands 1974 59 60 in see also Murdoch, ‘The Development of a Critical Temper: New Approaches and Modes of Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy, Science, and Theology’, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 7 (1975), 51–79. There (especially 53; 55, at his footnote 13), Murdoch refers the reader back to his influential article, ‘From Social into Intellectual Factors: an Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning’, in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, edited by Murdoch and Edith D. Sylla (Dordrecht, 1975), 271–348 (289–97).
  • Thus, Grant summarizes Murdoch's views on the interactions of mathematics, science, and theology in Grant Science and Theology in the Middle Ages God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science Lindberg David C. Numbers Ronald L. Berkeley 1986 60 61 in (at his footnotes 34–5), illustrating hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning by an imaginary casus from Holcot's Sentences lectures (Sent. 1, q. 3), as quoted by Murdoch, ‘From Social into Intellectual’ (note 104), 327 (his footnote 101). This is the question from which we draw the related casus at note 94. On hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning at Oxford in the 1320s–30s, see especially Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise (note 58).
  • That the ‘expansion of the boundary of the logically possible’ is involved has often been stated by Murdoch The Development of a Critical Temper: New Approaches and Modes of Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy, Science, and Theology Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1975 7 51 79 as, e.g., in 55 (at footnote 13); ‘Philosophy and Enterprise’ (note 8), 59–60.
  • Holcot . Quodl. , 3 – 3 . q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 92–3), 1.275–311. Indeed, Holcot here concludes, ‘ideo, si Deus omnia statuta sua abrogaret et faceret quod numquam fuissent statuta et nihil faceret de promissis, non minus bonus foret quam fuit ante mundi constitutionem, quando nihil fuit nisi ipse’.
  • Here I have been persuaded by H. Gelber that, however much Holcot thought certain knowledge was attainable regarding sensible features of the world (which are soteriologically irrelevant for Holcot), I erred in viewing him as not admitting scepticism at all, in Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 Leiden 1988 250 251
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . q. 2, a. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 155–6), 1.943–55; Quodl. 3, q. 8 (ed. Streveler, Tachau: 108), 1.670–78.
  • Gabriel , Naudé . 1625 . Apologie pour les grands hommes soupçonnes de magie , as cited by W. Shumaker, Renaissance Curiosa, in Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 8 (Binghamton, 1982), 59–62.
  • Lynn , Thorndike . 1957 . A New Work by Robert Holkot (Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 138) . Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences , 10 : 227 – 235 .
  • Gelber . 1983 . Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three Questions on the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, O.P. 17 – 17 . Toronto W. J. Courtenay, ‘The lost Matthew Commentary of Robert Holcot O.P.’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 50 (1980), 104–12 (109); Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi (Rome, 1980), III, 318; John D. North, ‘Astronomy and Mathematics’, HUO 2, 103–74 (134).
  • Holcot . Sent , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (A, f.117ra; at the word ‘Utrum’, joined by R, f.64va; O, f.164ra): ‘Distinctione 15a secundi libri Sententiarum agit Magister de opere quarte diei creacionis mundi, declarans quomodo Deus die quarta ordinavit Celum per luminaria maiora et stellas ut circumirent terram et illuminarent eam et essent in signa et tempora et dies et annos. Et quia tam planete quam stelle fixe communi nomine “stelle” nuncupantur, ideo circa istam distinctionem quero istam pro materia pretacta questionem: Utrum stelle sint create ut per lumen et motum sint in signa et tempora. Et quod non arguitur…’. The wording of the question itself (my italics) is that of Genesis 1:14; Holcot's choice of it probably alludes to the distinction drawn by Thomas Aquinas (Summa theologiae, p. 1, q. 70, a. 2 ad 2) between ‘the [heavenly] luminaries … made as signs [which they were not, and as] causes of things happening on earth’, as North quotes, ‘Astronomy and Mathematics’ (note 112), 103.
  • In addition to the passages quoted in notes 136–43, 146–7, cf. Holcot Sent. 2 2 d. 15, q. un. (O, f.167rb; R, f.69va): ‘Secundus articulus est an celum moveatur per se et ex natura aliqua corporea vel ab intelligentia. Et hic tenetur communiter quod corpora celestia moventur ab intelligentiis et non a seipsis, sicut gravia et levia…. Unde sicut recitat Albertus super secundum <librum> Sententiarum, omnes Philosophi Arabum dixerunt et probaverunt multipliciter quod celum movetur ab anima coniuncta sibi; et hoc dicunt Aristoteles, et Avicenna, et Avveroys, Algazel, Alfarabius, <Albumasar> Maurus, et Rabbi Moyses, “et sicut communiter” dicit Albertus “ponit celum habere triplicem motorem, scilicet causam primam que est desiderativum primum intelligentie ….”’ quotes from Albertus Magnus, Sent. 2, d. 14, a. 6 (ed. P. Jammy [Lyon, 1651], xv: 147b). Again, Holcot, ibid. (O, ff.169vb-70ra; R, f.73rb): ‘Tertio, in loco illo est perpetuum equinoctum sicut dictum fuit in isto articulo, puncto primo secundum Petrum de Alvernia et ideo est satis conveniens habitationis; et huic sententie concordat Albertus, secundo Sententiarum, d. 17, quod sit in linea equinoctali in oriente versus habitationem nostram, et in rei veritate ibi est locus temperatissimus et optimus …’ citing Albertus Magnus, Sent. 2, d. 17, a. 4 (ed. Jammy, xv, 168a–b).
  • Gelber . It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology Among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310–1340 Princeton Courtenay, ‘Theology and Theologians’ (note 55), 22–6.
  • This is also surprising in light of the contrast that late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century Parisian theologians drew between the ‘healthy’ theology of Albertus Magnus and Bonaventure on the one hand and, on the other, the errors of various fourteenth-century currents, including English authors. On this issue, see especially Kaluza Zenon Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles Bergamo 1988
  • Holcot . Postillae in librum Sapientiae , lectio 99 (T, f.115ra): ‘Notandum quod ista tria miracula maxima que umquam in corporibus celestibus contingerunt, adducit Dionysius contra quemdam philosophum in <sua> Epistola ad Policarpum, que est septima in ordine epistolarum beati Dionysii. Ad quorum evidentiam, intentionem dicte epistole breviter explanabo sequens expositionem fratris Alberti <Magni>, qui omnes libros Dionysii exponit satis clare’. Because fourteenth-century intellectuals did not uniformly distinguish between astrology and astronomy, Richard LeMay's label, ‘science of the stars’ (from the late-medieval scientia stellarum) more nearly describes the subject treated in what follows; LeMay, ‘The Teaching of Astronomy in Medieval Universities, Principally at Paris in the Fourteenth Century’, Manuscripta, 20 (1976), 197–217 (198).
  • See Holcot Sent. 158 160 The Neoplatonic metaphysics and physics at the core of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century optical theories has long been well known to historians of optics; among recent discussions aimed at a broader audience of historians of science, see especially: David C. Lindberg, ‘The Genesis of Kepler's Theory of Light: Light Metaphysics from Plotinus to Kepler’, Osiris, ser. 2, 2 (1986), 5–42; J. D. North, ‘Natural Philosophy in Late Medieval Oxford’, HUO 2, 65–101 (65–6, 96) stressing the central role of the pseudo-Dionysius's opera upon Robert Grosseteste, and thereby upon Roger Bacon; and idem, ‘Astronomy and Mathematics’ (note 112), 102 regarding al-Kindi.
  • Lindberg . 1976 . Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler 94 – 116 . Chicago
  • See especially Tachau Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 Leiden 1988 244 255 for the delineation of Holcot's acceptance of this theory as required for adequate accounts of vision, memory, and in epistemology.
  • In addition to Lindberg Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler Chicago 1976 94 116 see: idem, Roger Bacon's Philosophy of Nature: A Critical Edition, with English Translation, and Notes, of De multiplicatione specierum and De speculis comburentibus (Oxford, 1983), xliv–lxxi; idem, ‘Kepler's Theory’ (note 118), 14–22; Tachau, Vision and Certitude (note 49), 3–26; and James McEvoy, ‘The Sun as “res” and “signum”: Grosseteste's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus ch. 43, vv. 1–5’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 41 (1974), 38–91. Most recently, George Molland, ‘Roger Bacon and the Hermetic Tradition’, Vivarium, 31 (1993), 140–60 (151), puts the point well: ‘Bacon saw the whole science of optics as embedded in the wider doctrine of the multiplication of species’.
  • Lindberg . 1983 . Roger Bacon's Philosophy of Nature: A Critical Edition, with English Translation, and Notes, of De multiplicatione specierum and De speculis comburentibus lvi – lvi . Oxford lxiii; idem, ‘Kepler's Theory’ (note 118), 19.
  • Roger , Bacon . Opus maius , pt. 4, d. 2, c. 1, quoted from Lindberg, Theories of Vision (note 119), 113; again, Lindberg quotes from Grosseteste's De lineis, angulis, et figuris, which Bacon here follows closely.
  • Lindberg . 1986 . The Genesis of Kepler's Theory of Light: Light Metaphysics from Plotinus to Kepler . Osiris , 2 : 20 – 20 . ser. 2
  • Irène , Rosier . 1994 . La Parole comme acte 206 – 223 . Paris (especially 212, quoting from Roger Bacon, Opus maius, pt. 4, d. 4 Astrologia in Fratris Rogeri Bacon, Ordinis minorum, Opus maius, edited by John Henry Bridges, 2 vols [Oxford, 1897], 1, 399); Tachau, Vision and Certitude (note 49), 16–20; Molland, ‘Hermetic Tradition’ (note 121), 158–9. Note also Holcot's statement of al-Kindi's view, note 158.
  • Zambelli . 1992 . “ The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma: Astrology, Theology, and Science in Albertus Magnus and his Contemporaries ” . In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 135 , xiii – xiii . Dordrecht
  • Carey . 1992 . Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle Ages 12 – 12 . New York See also the remarks of North, ‘Astronomy and Mathematics’ (note 112), 103.
  • de Bagnorea , Bonaventura . 1891 . Collationes de donis Spiritus Sancti Vol. v , 498 – 498 . Quaracchi (in Opera omnia as quoted by Zambelli (note 11), her footnote 49 (to 41): ‘Secundus error est de necessitate fatali, sicut de constellationibus: si homo sit natus in tali constellatione, de necessitate erit latro, vel malus, vel bonus. Istud evacuat liberum arbitrium et meritum et praemium: quia, si homo facit ex necessitate quod facit, quid valet libertas arbitrii? Quid merebitur? Sequitur etiam, quod Deus sit origo omnium malorum’. Bonaventure's own response, was that ‘aliqua dispositio relinquitur ex stellis; sed tamen solus Deus principiatur animae rationalis.’ This passage invites comparison to Edmund's speech in Shakespeare's King Lear, I, ii, 115–122: ‘This is the excellent foppery of the world … we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, the stars; as if we were villains on necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obediance of planetary influence; and all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on’.
  • Zambelli . 1992 . “ The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma: Astrology, Theology, and Science in Albertus Magnus and his Contemporaries ” . In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 135 , 11 – 11 . Dordrecht her footnotes 46, 48–9 (to 41); and Lindberg, ‘Kepler's Theory’ (note 118), 17–18.
  • Tachau . 1988 . Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 75 – 79 . Leiden
  • See Holcot Sent. 2 2
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.165rb, R, f.65va): ‘Sexto ad principale: si stelle sint create, etc., sequeretur quod stelle agerent in ista inferiora, et sic mundus iste inferior guberneretur a celo, sicut dicit Aristoteles primo Metheororum. Consequens falsum, ut probabitur multipliciter. Primo namque sequitur quod vel movens et motum non sunt simul, vel sol calefaciens ista inferiora calefaciat spheras medias, quod falsum est, cum dicit primo Metheororum cap. 4, quod celum non recipit peregrinas impressiones’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.166ra; R, f.67va): ‘Preterea, ad conclusionem istius sexti <argumenti> principalis, videlicet quod stelle non transumtent per lument et motum ista inferiora, arguitur: quia si sic, omnia evenirent ex necessitate. Consequens falsum, sicut patet secundo Physicorum et sexto. Consequentia probatur, quia celum naturaliter transmutat aliquod corpus et illud corpus aliud naturaliter; et celum non potest impediri; igitur omnia evenirent ex necessitate. Preterea, si sic, celum gerit in liberum arbitrium. Consequentia patet, quia agit in potentias sensitivas et organicas; sed ab eis dependet actus intellectus et voluntatis; ergo per consequens agit in liberum arbitrium’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.166ra; R, f.67va-b): ‘Preterea, si sic, tunc per motum causaret calorem <in spheris celestibus et in istis inferioribus> sicut dicit Aristoteles secundo De celo et primo Metheororum. Consequens falsum, quia si motus ex natura propria causaret calorem, omnis motus causaret calorem…. Confirmatur ista ratio, quia si sol staret continue in eodem loco, magis calefaceret locum in terra sibi oppositum quam nunc facit. Preterea, si celum et stelle transmutarent ista inferiora, sequeretur quod cessante motu celi, non posset esse actio in istis inferioribus, nec inter mixta et elementa, secundum Aristotelem. Consequentia probatur, tum <1> quia destructo primo in aliquo ordine essentiali destruitur reliquum; sed motus localis est primus motuum, ut patet octavo Physicorum; et inter omnes motus localis motus celi est perfectissimus; ergo etc. Tum <2> etiam quia causa primaria plus influat quam causa secundaria; ergo subtracta primaria, secundaria non potest in suum effectum; igitur nullum corpus potest in suam actionem, destructo motu celi. Consequens falsum, quia in dampnatis post diem iudicii erit actio et passio et transmutatio. Tum <3> quia istud est dampnatum Parisius articulo 156, quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret.’ The second reason tacitly draws upon the first axiom (which provides the incipit) of the Neoplatonic Liber de causis, which circulated as a work of Aristotle's. The ‘Parisian Article 156’ to which Holcot refers is from the condemnations of suspect opinions issued in 1277 under the authority of bishop Etienne Tempier, number 79 in the now standard arrangement of Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain, 1977), 142–3: ‘Quod si caelum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret, quia natura deesset’.
  • Carey . 1992 . Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle Ages 13 – 13 . New York
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.116ra; R, f.67vb): ‘Preterea, si celum et stelle transmutarent ista inferiora, tunc agerent in corpora humana, et diversificarent complexiones hominum. Et tunc foret homini licitum iudicare quod constellationes de moribus hominum sunt vere. Consequentia videtur habere evidentiam etiam de factis hominum, tum <1> quia videmus aliquando Astronomos vere predicere de bellis inter regna et de pace futura et de morte principum—unde et Ovidius De vetula libro primo versus finem, descripsit ex coniunctione Iovis ad Mercurium fidem Christianam et Virginem Gloriosam et adoravit eam. Tum <2> quia Aristoteles dicit in libro De proprietatibus elementorum quod regna vacua sunt et terre depopulate apud coniunctiones duarum magnarum stellarum, scilicet Iovis et Saturni’.
  • Magnus , Albertus . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, a. 5 (ed. Jammy, xv: 153b), on which see Zambelli (note 11), chapter 3 at footnotes 24–5. Holcot may have known the ps.-Ovidian De vetula directly as did his contemporary Bradwardine, for which see Molland, ‘Ancient Authority’ (note 52); Holcot could have been directed to this passage by Roger Bacon's allusion in his Opus Maius, p. 4, Judicia Astronomiae (Bridges, ed., 1, 263–4).
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.116ra; R, f.67vb): ‘Tum <3> quia demones in suis apparitionibus utuntur constellationibus, unde sicut in libris ymaginum, demones luna existente in uno signo facilius invocantur quam luna non existente in eodem. Sed hoc non est <nisi> quia sentiunt se iuvari in suis effectibus et constellationibus certis et aspectibus planetarum. Unde Aristoteles in libro <De> mansionibus lune—sicut allegat Albertus—dicit sic: quando descendit Selmy <rev. Selym> Albechaym facit ad <amorem> dominatorum terre ydola confla Angelos ad te clama. Constat autem quod intellegit de malis angelis: Selmy <rev. Selym> enim idem est quod luna, Albechaym, que est quedam constellatio que est in secunda mansione lune; ergo constellaciones iuvant demones. Ergo licitum est illas considerare et secundum eas iudicare’. See Albertus Magnus, Sent. 2, d. 7, a. 9 (ed. Jammy, XV: 87b).
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.116ra-b; R, f.67vb): ‘Tum <4 quia> Ptholomeus in Quadripartito dicit quod luna <rev. sole> existente in quadam parte non erit generatio, et si cadat semen in matricem monstrum nascetur. Et ut credatur ei probavi[t] hoc experimentum in duabus matronis honestis et bonis, a quibus ego <scil. Albertus> percepi quod monstra pepererunt, et querens tempus ab eis et equans stellas, inveni quod sole existente circa eundem gradum et minutum conceperant secundum estimationes suas. Avicenna etiam libro suo De animalibus dicit quod nulla causa est ex parte seminis quod partus habeat capud canis vel pedem porci, vel huiusmodi, nisi aspectus stellarum ad actus et faciem ascendentis in hora casus seminis in matricem. Tum <5> quia in certis constellationibus fiunt ymagines habentes efficaciam contra infirmitates varias ex sola virtute stellarum’. Compare Albertus Magnus, Sent. 2, d. 7, a. 9 (ed. Jammy, XV: 88a). On the scientific interest of this passage in Albert's lectures, see Luke Demaitre and Anthony A. Travill, ‘Human Embryology and Development in the Works of Albertus Magnus’, in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980, edited by James A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980), 405–40 (434–5).
  • See also the astute remarks of North Astronomy and Mathematics HUO 2 105 105
  • Magnus , Albertus . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 7, a. 5 (ed. Jammy, XV: 82b–3b): ‘Utrum daemones possunt futura praedicere et quae sit differentia inter daemones futura praedicentes et Prophetas, et per quem modum daemon inspirat suos prophetas…. Quod autem homines possunt scire futura patet per Astronomos iudicantes de eventibus in tota vita per constellationem nativitatis, et de eventibus in toto anno per scientiam revolutionis a principio anni, et de eventibus in decem annis per scientiam circuli in coniunctione Iovis et Saturni de triplicitate in triplicitatem; ergo multo magis hoc praevalent daemones’.
  • Magnus , Albertus . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 7, a. 5 (ed. Jammy, XV: 83a): ‘Ulterius quaeritur, cum ipsi <i.e. astrologi> quaedam futura praedicant, quae differentia sit inter eos et Prophetas? Videtur quod nulla, quia Propheta dicit contingentia futura, et daemon similiter; ergo non differunt. Ulterius queritur, per quem modum inspirant suos Prophetas, sicut dixit spiritus nequam, “Decipiam Achab, egrediar et ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum eius”…’.
  • Magnus , Albertus . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 7, a. 5 (ed. Jammy, XV: 83a–b): ‘Solutio. Ut sine praeiudicio loquar de rebus occultis, dico quod daemones futura scire possunt corporalia aliquo modo ad cursum naturae ordinata tribus modis, scilicet per cursum siderum et per dispositiones rerum naturalium et per revelationem sibi factam. Quae autem non habent cursum redigibilem in ordinem causarum naturalium, puto quod nullam habent de his praecognitionem, sicut nec homo qui de divinationibus se intromittit…. Ad hoc quod obicitur de his quae dependent a libero arbitrio, dico quod secundum quod a libero arbitrio pendent, non sciuntur per astra; sed secundum quod significantur in dispositionibus corporum, coniectura incerta habetur de eis … et sunt signa quae frequenter fallunt’.
  • Zambelli . 1992 . “ The Speculum Astronomiae and its Enigma: Astrology, Theology, and Science in Albertus Magnus and his Contemporaries ” . In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 135 , 165 – 166 . Dordrecht at texts quoted in her footnotes 21–36.
  • See Holcot Sent. 2 2
  • Magnus , Albertus . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 7, a. 5 (ed. Jammy, xv: 83b): ‘Ad id quod quaeritur de differentia inter Prophetas et daemones futura praedicentes, dicendum quod daemon dicit ea quae ab alio accipit vel in cursu naturae videt. Propheta autem dicit ea quae novit per inspirationem’.
  • See FitzRalph sent. 1 1 6, 89, 142.
  • In addition to note 84 in which Holcot discusses Jeremiah, see Holcot Sent. 2 2 q. 2, 1.984–98, 1282–337. For Holcot, after all. God cannot most strictly speaking know which of two contradictory propositions concerning future contingencies is true; that being so, He cannot reveal infallibly either of them as true to His prophets.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171va, R, f.76ra), responding to the arguments cited above, note 133: ‘Ad decimum, quando arguitur quod nihil eveniret a casu, dicendum negando consequentiam, quia quod est per se in totum a duabus causis est casu respectu utriusque; unde illud quod fit a casu respectu unius cause fit per se per duas…. Ad 12um, dico quod possunt coerege liberum arbitrium sine dispositione’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15. q, un. (O, f.171vb; R, f.76ra), responding to the argument above, note 136: ‘Ad 15um, concedatur quod diversificiant complexiones et diversimode disponunt ad mores, et licet iudicare de dispositionibus hominum secundum complexiones, non tamen sequitur quod homines tales sunt de facto quales essent si dispositiones suas sequerentur propter usum liberi arbitrii’.
  • See Holcot Sent. 2 2
  • Holcot . Postillae in librum Sapientiae , lect. 99 (T, f.114rb-va): ‘“Ipse enim dedit michi horum que sunt scientiam veram, ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum, et virtutes elementorum, initium et consummationes et medietatem temporum, et vicissitudinum permutationes et commutationes temporum, morum mutationes et divisiones temporum, anni cursus et stellarum dispositiones, naturas animalium, et iras bestiarum, vim ventorum, et cogitationes hominum, differentias virgultorum, et virtutes radicum, et quecumque sunt abscondita et improvisa, enim, didici: omnium artifex docuit me sapientiam” <Sapientia 7.17–21>. Postquam Salomon regratiatus est Deo generaliter et summatim se sapientia sibi data, hic eidem regraciatur specialiter et inductive et transcurrendo per diversas materias diversarum scientiarum et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ennarat quorum scientiam habuit; secundo qualiter ad eam pervenit …. <Pro> declaratione dictorum in littera, quero istam questionem, utrum de motibus stellarum possit esse sapientia vel scientia’.
  • Holcot . Postillae in librum Sapientiae , lect. 99 (T, f.115ra): ‘Ad questionem dicendum quod de motibus stellarum potest esse scientia, non ergo demonstrativa quomodo omni tempore movebuntur, sed demonstrativa quomodo in omni tempore sunt nata moveri, si Deus miraculose aliter non disponat’.
  • Holcot . Postillae in librum Sapientiae , lect. 99 (T, f.115ra): ‘Sicut autem docet Beatus Augustinus, sic Deus rebus creatis motus et operationes indidit ut tamen pro libito voluntatis exerceant eas vel ommittant. Unde quamvis experimentaliter et sensibiliter videamus quod ignis natus est comburrere, contingit tamen aliquando quod ignis quibusdam pueris approximatus non nocuit, et tamen alios qui magis distabant, occidit, sicut patet Danielis 3. Et ideo, quamvis sciamus qualiter res sunt nate agere, et qualiter frequenter egerunt, quia hoc vocamus “naturale” quod semper vel frequenter contingit, qualiter tamen res certo tempore aget nescimus, quia hoc est in manu Dei’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171ra; R, f.75ra): ‘Ad sextum, quando arguitur quod si stelle essent create ut per lumen et motum essent in signa et tempora, tunc sequeretur quod mundus iste gubernaretur a celo, et sic stelle et celum transmutarent ista inferiora, concedo consequentiam et consequens, sicut sensibiliter experimur in omnibus generationibus et corruptionibus que variantur—crescendo et decrescendo, incipiendo esse et desinendo esse—secundum accessum et recessum solis ad habitationem nostram. Unde nec magis negarem corpora celestia regere et transmutare ista inferiora quam ignem comburere lignum’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171ra; R, f.75ra-b): ‘Ad primum argumentum in oppositum, de illo generali dicto Aristotelis 7 Physicorum, quod movens et motum sunt simul quantum ad propositum spectat: dico quod ipse intellegit de movente immediate, et non quod omne movens sit simul cum quolibet quod ab eo movetur. Et concedo quod corpus celeste superius causat aliquid in orbe inferiori, et sic descendendo ita quod terra transmutitur per lumen et radios provenientes a corporibus celestibus; et sic movens instrumentale et motum sunt simul et adinvicem immediata, licet movens principale distet’. See also Sent. 2, d. 15, q. un. (O, f.170ra-b; R, f.75ra): ‘Ad primum, quando arguitur quod si sol esset creatus ut lumen et motum circuendo terram causaret diem et noctem, sequeretur quod omni tempore possemus videre lumen solis super orizontem nostrum, nego consequentiam. Et ad probationem …dicendum quod argumentum concludit verum pro parte, videlicet quantum ad hoc quod dicit firmamentum octavam spheram semper illuminari a sole et similiter totum spacium residuum extra umbram terre. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod lumen illud possit a nobis videri qui sumus infra umbram eius, cuius causa est raritas corporis qui recipiunt lucem; habent eam non ita densam sicut stelle, et ideo non possunt multiplicare lumen suum ad nos qui habitamus infra umbram eiusdem solis; etiam non potest radio recto causare lumen infra umbram. Et ideo non possumus videre lumen solis de nocte: radius autem reflexus est debilis et similiter distantia a puncto reflexionis est nimia per comparationem ad visum. Unde etiam ad corpora maxima stellarum non apparent nobis nisi parva valde, quia ergo stelle habent lucem fixam et sunt corpora densa, non sufficiunt ad multiplicandum speciem luminis ad nos infra umbram…. Sed quando sol appropinquat ad ortum—et hoc est quando est in <decimo> octavo gradu circuli sue depressionis ad horizontem secundum Ptholomeo Almagestis—tunc radii eius cadunt in aere propinquiori ad nos et ingrediuntur summitatem umbre et latera eius, et sic potest aer illuminatus propinquiori et fortiori lumine facere speciem fortiorem ad oculum. Et sic apparet in aurora, et maxime quando lux venit ad aerem vaporosum, in quo recipitur fortior lux; et eius altitudo est propinqua, quia altitudo maxima vaporum ascendentium non nisi ad quinque miliaria et parvum ultra, sicut probatur libro primo De crepusculis. Et sic videtur aurora certo tempore et non lumen solis tota nocte. Sic respondet frater Rogerus Bacoun in sua Perspectiva, <parte 2>, distinctione 3, capitulo 1’. Holcot here summarizes Roger Bacon, Opus maius, pt. 5: Perspectiva, pt. 2, d. 3, c. 1 (ed. Bridges, II, 101–2). For citations of Alhazen, see note 159.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171ra; R, f.75rb): ‘Et quando arguitur contra istam rationem quod corpora celestia non agunt in ista inferiora per lumen, quia Saturnus habet suos effectus in profundo terre et constat nullum lumen penetrare terram et in profundum per operationem Saturni: sive dicatur lumen sive aliquid aliud, non est cura, quia qualitas ista non est sensibilis de facili, sicut nec species sensibilium in medio vel in sensu’. Holcot similarly treats the debate as to whether species in the soul are habits as a merely verbal disagreement; see Tachau, Vision and Certitude (note 49), 249, 253–5.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171rb; R, f.75rb): ‘Ista diffuse declarat Alkyndus libro secundo De theorica artium magicarum, capitulo “de radiis stellarum”, licet dicta multa eiusdem libri sunt dampnata, quia videntur libero arbitrio repugnare. Dicit enim in dicto capitulo quod omnis locus continet radios omnium rerum et totus mundus est plenus talibus radiis; vult etiam infra, capitulo “de theorica possibilium” quod sola celestis <h>armonia per tales radios omnia operatur. Dicit etiam quod ymago alicuius rei concepta in mente emittit radios similes illi rei cuius est ymago, et habentes actiones similes illi rei; et sic ponit intelligentias ex sola ymaginatione posse producere voluntas formas, contra Augustinum, 3 De Trinitate, capitulo 9 et 10’. For Holcot's quotations of al-Kindi, see the edition in M.-T. d'Alverny and F. Hudry, ‘Alkindi, De radiis’, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 41 (1974), 139–260 (chapter 3, 224; chapter 4, 228).
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171rb; R, f.75rb-va): ‘Ad secundum, quando arguitur quod si sol et stelle causarent lumen in medio vel causarent subito, vel successive, etc., hic est difficile videre veritatem, et sunt diverse opiniones circa questionem istam. Communiter enim tenetur quod multiplicatio lucis in medio … fit subito. Et hoc pretendit Aristoteles libro De sensu et sensato, capitulo 19, ubi querit utrum sensibilia successive immutent medium vel subito. Et respondet quod aliter est de colore et luce et sono et odore, quia ista successive immutat. Unde qui est propinquior sono vel <odore> prius sentit quam iste qui est remotius; sed non sic est de lumine et colore, quia lumina simul immutant medium et sensum…. Item, probat Iacobus Alkindus libro De aspectibus per talem rationem: capit aliquam partem modicam aeris. Tunc sic: in hac parte multiplicatur <lumen> in hoc tempore determinato, igitur in secunda parte determinata in duplo tempore, et in tripla in triplo, et sic quando lumen veniret ad occidens, fieret unum tempus multiplex ad primum in magna proportione, et sicut sensibiliter percipitur, multitudo luminis ab oriente in occidentem. Idem innuit secundo libro capitulo 12 contra Empedoclem, qui posuit lumen moveri in aere in tempore imperceptibili. Quod contrarium istius arguit Alhacen in Perspectiva sua libro 2 et 7, et Frater Rogerus Bacoun in Perspectiva sua distinctione 9, capitulo 3, primo sic ab eodem <termino> ad eundem terminum fit citius radius perpendicularis quam non perpendicularis. Sed “citius” et “tardius” non sunt nisi cum tempore; ergo cum lumen veniat secundum radium perpendicularem et non perpendicularem ad eundem terminum, hoc non erit nisi in tempore…. Hee sunt rationes istius Bachon preter primam, que est Alkyndi, et valde parvum valent …. Ad rationem Alkyndi in contrarium, respondet Bacoun, quod sicut primum tempus datum—in quo modica pars illuminatur—est insensibile, ita duplum est et triplum et millesimum unde tante velocitatis est illuminato medii quod potest fieri in tempore insensibili in maximo spacio …’. Holcot condenses and summarizes (with some verbatim phrasing) Roger Bacon, Opus maius, pt. 5: Perspectiva, pt. 1, d. 9, c. 3–4 (ed. Bridges, II, 68–73). These chapters were historically significant in focusing Latin scholars on the issues of the speed of light and vision; Lindberg, Bacon's Philosophy (note 121), lxiii; idem, ‘Medieval Latin Theories of the Speed of Light’, in Roemer et al vitesse de la lumière (Paris, 1978), 45–72.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.171rb-va; R, f.75va-b): ‘Quantum ad istam conclusionem quam pro nunc teneo, quod aliquod lumen generatur subito et aliquod successive; unde dico quod lumen potest utroque modo generari. Et quia non semper est necesse quod luminosum illuminet partem ante partem, sed simul potest illuminare aliquod totum spatium—et hoc non contingit evenire de sono vel de odore—ideo significanter dat Aristoteles differentiam inter lucis illuminationem, soni, et odoris <multiplicationem>. Quod autem lumen subito multiplicatur, apparet, quia destructo aliquo corpore opaco po<si>to in lumine solis existentis in oriente, in eodem instanti apparet lumen solis in occidente in quo est illud corpus consumptum. Vel ponatur quod Deus adnihilaret illud corpus; tunc simul erit adnihilationem et lumen causatum in occidente. Unde potest dici probabiliter quod luminosum debile habet aliquod spatium quod potest totum simul illuminare, sicut candela domum, et tantum spatium non illuminat successive sed subito. Quod autem aliquod lumen causari possit in tempore continue et successive, patet multipliciter. Primo, quia constat quod umbra terre continue est in alia parte et in alia propter motum continuum solis, idest corporis luminosi; ergo lumen succedat continue; ergo aer iste successive et in tempore illuminatur, sicut manifestum est per rationem et etiam ad sensum de umbra cuiuscumque rei …. Similiter, illud idem probant rationes quinque in arguendo in isto sexto <argumento> principali’. For Buridan's views, see Lindberg, ‘Speed’ (note 159), 58–61.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.166rb-va; R, f.68rb): ‘Ad questionem dicendum est quod sic, sicut Scriptura expresse testatur …. <Et> formabo articulos novem …. Primus articulus erit de numero celorum vel celestium orbium. Secundus <articulus> erit an illi celi moveantur a natura propria sicut gravia et levia, vel ab angelis. Tertius, an celi sint corpora animata. Quartus, an stelle et orbes in quibus sunt, sunt eiusdem speciei. Quintus, an orbes inferiores moveantur motu duplici, ut motu raptus et motu proprio. Sextus, an ad salvandum apparentias visibiles necesse sit ponere planetas in circulis eccentricis et epiciclis moveri (iuxta materiam secundi argumenti principalis). Septimus, an motus solaris annivus veraciter mensuretur 365 diebus et quarta, secundum suppositionem Kalendarii communis. Octavus, an iuxta distinctiones spaciorum in celo sit terra distincta in partes habitabiles et non habitabiles. Nonus, solvende sunt rationes que in arguendo facte sunt’.
  • Holcot . Sent. , 2 – 2 . d. 15, q. un. (O, f.165rb-vb; R, ff. 66ra-7rb): ‘Secundo, quero: aut sol illuminat medium subito aut successive. Non successive tum quia lumen non habet contrarium in medio, nec medium sibi resistit, tum quia si fieret successive, capio unam partem pedalis quantitatis quam dicis forte illuminari successive sed in tempore imperceptibili. Istud ergo est pars aliquanta alicuius temporis; ergo dupla pars aeris illuminaretur in duplo tempore, ad tempus istud imperceptibile, et tripla in triplo, supposita uniformi dispositioni medii. Igitur totus <h>orizon noster illuminaretur a sole, nisi in tempore valde sensibili, cuius oppositum apparet ad sensum. Et consimilem rationem facit Alkyndi ad probandum quod visio fit subito vel sine diversitate aspectuum. Tum quia Commentator dicit hoc, sexto Physicorum commento 32, reprobans Alexandrum qui negavit transitum comes in non tempore, ponit illuminationem fieri in tempore insensibili …. (O, f.165va; R, f.67ra) Preterea, ex illuminatione solis in medio videntur sequi alia inconvenientia. Nam primo sequitur ista conclusio, quod aliqua umbra pedalis quantitatis continue et uniformiter abbreviabitur per horam secundum longitudinem, et tamen in fine erit umbra illa infinita secundum longitudinem. Conclusio falsa, sicut notum est, et consequentiam probo ex duabus suppositionibus manifestis…. Iste due suppositiones ad sensum patent in figuris inferius protractis …. Preterea, ex illuminatione solis in medio, sequitur ista conclusio: quod aliqua duo mobilia incipiunt simul movere et simul desinent et equale spacium pertransibunt, et tamen <unum> continue movebitur velocius alio. Conclusio falsa, manifestum est. Consequentiam probo ex tribus suppositionibus, quarum prima est quod corpus luminosum positum inter duo corpora opaca spherica equalia maiorato tamen corpore luminoso spherico similiter causabit duas umbras figure calathoidos. Secunda suppositio est quod quanto corpus opacum est maioris corpore luminoso et magis approximatur luminoso corpori, tanto basis umbre erit latior; et quanto magis distat, tanto erit umbra minor. Tertia suppositio est <illam> quam prius in precedenti argumento supposui, quod corpore opaco et luminoso existentibus equalibus, umbra erit contenta inter lineas equedistantes. Istis suppositis, pono duo corpora opaca inter se, quorum unum sit “A” et aliud “B”; et in medio istorum sit sol minus utroque. Dicatur ergo umbra <ab> A “C”, et umbra B “D”; tunc causabuntur due umbre quarum base erunt procedentes a corporibus opacis, et coni curti in superficiebus corporum eorundem. Volo tunc quod in latere umbre C ponatur “E” mobile, et in latere umbre D ponatur “F” mobile. Et sequantur mobilia umbras illas ita quod secundum ymaginationem continue tangat umbras istas; pono etiam quod A et B continue diminuantur per horam uniformiter donec sint equalia soli, et simul cum hoc, quod A continue elonge[n]tur a sole et C maneat in eadem distantia. Istis suppositis et positis, arguo sic: E et F incipiunt simul moveri et pertransibunt equale spatium, quia non movebuntur nisi preter ad lineam equedistantem, et tamen E semper velocius movebitur continue usque ad finem hore quam F; et hec est conclusio probanda. Probatur sic: B, continue propter diminutionem ipsius A, et F, propter diminutionem ipsius B; et A et B equaliter diminuntur, ergo ista diminutio equaliter facit E et F moveri; sed ex ista causa E movetur que et sufficeret ad motum E si esset sola, puta elongatio a sole. Per secundam suppositionem ergo hanc causam habet E velocitatem motum suum quam non habet F, patet. Confirmatur ratio, quia quantumcumque A movetur, dummodo equaliter diminuatur sicut B, non citius causabit umbram inter lineas equidistantes quam B, sicut argumentum patet per figuram protractam in margine’. On the production of truncated infinite cones of shadow (calathoidos), see John Pecham, Perspectiva communis 1.24 in John Pecham and the Science of Optics, edited and translated by D. C. Lindberg (Madison, 1970) 102–3, 246–7. To see how closely Holcot's method parallels hypothetical cases (casus) offered as exemplifying the English calculatory tradition, compare, e.g., Murdoch, ‘Social into Intellectual’ (note 104), 324–5, his footnotes 89 (citing Robert Halifax), 90 (Richard Kilvington), 91 (Adam Wodeham), 92 (Roger Rosetus), 93 (Jean Mirecourt), 94–6 (Robert Holcot), and 99 (Kilvington). On the espousal of the perspectivist theory of the multiplication of species by these authors, see Tachau, ‘The Problem of the Species in Medio at Oxford in the Generation After Ockham’, Mediaeval Studies, 44 (1982), 394–443 (especially 432–43).
  • See Molland Roger Bacon and the Hermetic Tradition Vivarium 1993 31 140 160 and ‘Ancient Authority’ (note 52). As I have also remarked, Vision and Certitude (note 49), xvi–xvii, the diversity of late medieval theologians' sources should not be underestimated; they do not reduce simply to ‘Augustinian’, ‘Neoplatonic’, and ‘Aristotelian’ traditions.
  • Bradwardine, at least, deplored Holcot's convictions concerning (1) the contingency of the future and (2) the consequent impossibility for God and humanity of absolute certainty regarding it, precisely because, on Holcot's view, these limitations arose in the actually constituted orders of nature and salvation (and not just de potentia absoluta). Thus, in addition to the texts from Bradwardine cited in Molland, ‘Ancient Authority’ (note 52), at his footnotes 11–17, see Bradwardine De causa Dei 1 c. 6, in the edition of Henry Savile (London, 1618), 183 (where Holcot's stance matches that of an unnamed ‘philosopher’): ‘Praescientiam quoque Dei specialiter probant clarae Prophetiae, clarae visiones, et veracia somnia, vera presagia futurorum …. In ista quoque sententia concordant omnes philosophi de quibus audiverim praeter unum, qui in ea parte non est philosophus, sed magis vaniloquus et sophista’. On Bradwardine and Holcot, see Genest, Prédétermination (note 58).

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