Essential Contestability and Evaluation

References

• Benbaji, Y. 2009. Parity, Intransitivity, and a Context-Sensitive Degree Analysis of Gradability, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87/2: 313–35.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blackburn, S. 1992. Through Thick and Thin, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 66: 285–99.
   Google Scholar
• Collier, D., F. Hilgado, and A. Maciuceanu 2006. Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications, Journal of Political Ideologies 11/3: 211–46.
   Google Scholar
• Dancy, J. 1995. In Defense of Thick Concepts, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20: 263–79.
   Google Scholar
• Dworkin, R. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth.
   Google Scholar
• Gallie, W. B. 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–98.
   Google Scholar
• Gibson, S. 2004. The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy, Bioethics 18/3: 221–33.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Glanzberg, M. 2007. Context, Content, and Relativism, Philosophical Studies 136: 1–29.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grafstein, R. 1988. A Realist Foundation for Essentially Contested Political Concepts, The Western Political Quarterly 41: 9–28.
   Google Scholar
• Gray, J. 1977. On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts, Political Theory 5/3: 331–48.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gray, J. 1983. Political Power, Social Theory, and Essential Contestability, in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 75–101.
   Google Scholar
• Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Helm, B. W. 2002. Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain, American Philosophical Quarterly 39/1: 13–30.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hurley, S. 1989. Natural Reasons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• IASP (International Association for the Study of Pain) Task Force on Taxonomy 1994. Part III: Pain Terms: A Current List with Definitions and Notes on Usage, in Classification of Chronic Pain, 2nd edn, ed. H. Merskey and N. Bogduk, Seattle: IASP Press: 209–14.
   Google Scholar
• Kaplan, D. 1989. Demonstratives, in Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 481–563.
   Google Scholar
• Kekes, J. 1977. Essentially Contested Concepts: A Reconsideration, Philosophy and Rhetoric 10/2: 71–89.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kennedy, C. 2007. Vagueness and Grammar: The Semantics of Relative and Absolute Adjectives, Linguistics and Philosophy 30/1: 1–45.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ludlow, P. 2008. Cheap Contextualism, Philosophical Issues 18: 104–29.
   Google Scholar
• Lukes, S. 1974a. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 48: 165–89.
   Google Scholar
• Lukes, S. 1974b. Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Mason, A. 1990. On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept, Inquiry 33/1: 81–98.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nelkin, N. 1994. Reconsidering Pain, Philosophical Psychology 7/3: 325–43.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plunkett, D. and T. Sundell forthcoming. Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms, Philosophers’ Imprint.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Reitan, E. 2001. Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept, Hypatia 16/2: 43–66.
   Google Scholar
• Rhodes, M. 2000. Coercion: A Nonevaluative Approach, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
   Google Scholar
• Roberts, D. 2013. It's Evaluation, Only Thicker, in Thick Concepts, ed. S. Kirchin, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 78–96.
   Google Scholar
• Ruben, D.-H. 2010. W. B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts, Philosophical Papers 39/2: 257–70.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sassoon, G. W. 2013. A Typology of Multidimensional Adjectives, Journal of Semantics 30/3: 335–80.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Swanton, C. 1985. On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts, Ethics 95/4: 811–27.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Väyrynen, P. 2013. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Waldron, J. 2002. Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, Law and Philosophy 21/2: 137–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wiggins, D. 1998. Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wilson, R. A., ed., 1999. Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar