The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat

References

• Baker, Derek 2018. Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 13, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 230–52.
   Google Scholar
• Baker, Lynne Rudder 1987. Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Booth, Anthony Robert 2014. Epistemic Ought Is a Commensurable Ought, European Journal of Philosophy 22/4: 529–39.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boyd, Richard 1988. How To Be a Moral Realist, in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 181–228.
   Google Scholar
• Case, Spencer 2016. Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name Is False, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11/1: 1–20.
   Google Scholar
• Churchland, Paul S. and Patricia M. Churchland 1998. On the Contrary: Critical Essays 1987–1997, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cooper, John M. (ed.) 1997. Plato: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett. Reference is to the Republic (trans. G.M.A. Grube; rev. C.D.C. Reeve): 971–1223.
   Google Scholar
• Copp, David 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Côté-Bouchard, Charles 2017. Belief’s Own Metaethics? A Case Against Epistemic Normativity. Ph.D. dissertation, King’s College London.
   Google Scholar
• Cowie, Christopher 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cuneo, Terence 2007. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Foot, Philippa 2002. Are Moral Considerations Overriding? in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 181–8.
   Google Scholar
• Hintikka, Jaakko 1962. Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Huemer, Michael 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Huemer, Michael 2005. Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Huemer, Michael 2007. Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief in Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, ed. Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 142–57.
   Google Scholar
• Husi, Stan 2013. Why Reasons Skepticism Is Not Self-Defeating, European Journal of Philosophy 21/3: 424–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hyun, Alexander and Eric Sampson 2014. On Believing the Error Theory, The Journal of Philosophy 111/11: 631–40.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Joyce, Richard 2001. The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kolodny, Niko 2005. Why Be Rational? Mind 114/455: 509–63.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lillehammer, Hallvard and Niklas Möller 2015. We Can Believe the Error Theory, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18/3: 453–9.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
   Google Scholar
• Moore, G.E. 1993. Moore’s Paradox, in G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin, New York: Routledge: 207–12.
   Google Scholar
• Olson, Jonas 2014. Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Parfit, Derek 2011. On What Matters: Volume One, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Priest, Graham 2006. In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Reid, Thomas 1997. Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, ed. Derek R. Brookes, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shafer-Landau, Russ 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Slote, Michael 1983. Admirable Immorality, in his Goods and Virtues, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 77–109.
   Google Scholar
• Streumer, Bart 2013. Can We Believe the Error Theory? The Journal of Philosophy 110/4: 194–212.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Streumer, Bart 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about all Normative Judgements, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Stroud, Sarah 1998. Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79/2: 170–89.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tiffany, Evan 2007. Deflationary Normative Pluralism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37/S33: 231–62.
   Google Scholar
• Way, Jonathan 2010. The Normativity of Rationality, Philosophy Compass 5/12: 1057–68.
   Google Scholar
• Williams, John N. 2015a. Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey, Philosophy Compass 10/1: 10–23.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williams, John N. 2015b. Moore’s Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey, Philosophy Compass 10: 24–37.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy 1996. Knowing and Asserting, The Philosophical Review 105/4: 489–523.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar