On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself

References

• Chang, Ruth 2009. Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity, in Reasons for Action, ed. David Sobel and Steven Wall, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 243–71.
   Google Scholar
• Cholbi, Michael 2015. On Marcus Singer’s ‘On Duties to Oneself’, Ethics 125/3: 851–53. doi: 10.1086/679554
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cholbi, Michael 2018. Paternalism and Duties to Self, in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, ed. Kalle Grill and Jason Hanna, Abingdon, UK: Routledge: 108–18.
   Google Scholar
• Darwall, Stephen 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Darwall, Stephen 2010a. Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1: 216–28. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00367.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Darwall, Stephen 2010b. Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal, Ethics 120/2: 257–78. doi: 10.1086/651427
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dougherty, Tom 2015. Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication, Philosophy & Public Affairs 43/3: 224–53. doi: 10.1111/papa.12059
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Habib, Allen 2009. Promises to the Self, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39/4: 537–57. doi: 10.1353/cjp.0.0061
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hill, Thomas E. 1991. Promises to Oneself, in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 138–54.
   Google Scholar
• Hills, Alison 2003. Duties and Duties to the Self, American Philosophical Quarterly 40/2: 131–42.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hobbes, Thomas 1651 (1991). Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hohfeld, Wesley N. 1917. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, The Yale Law Journal 26/8: 710–70. doi: 10.2307/786270
   Google Scholar
• Hurd, Heidi M. 1996. The Moral Magic of Consent, Legal Theory 2/2: 121–46. doi: 10.1017/S1352325200000434
   Google Scholar
• Kant, Immanuel 1797 (2017). The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Lara Denis and trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kant, Immanuel 1785 (2011). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, A German-English Edition, Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann (eds. and trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Korsgaard, Christine M. 2007. Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint, Ethics 118/1: 8–23. doi: 10.1086/522019
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lavin, Douglas 2004. Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error, Ethics 114/3: 424–57. doi: 10.1086/381695
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• MacCormick, Neil and Joseph Raz 1972. Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 46: 59–102.
   Google Scholar
• May, Simon C. 2015. Directed Duties, Philosophy Compass 10/8: 523–32. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12239
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mill, John S. 1859 (1989). On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Muñoz, Daniel forthcoming. The Paradox of Duties to Oneself, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oakley, Tim 2017. How to Release Oneself from an Obligation: Good News for Duties to Oneself, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95/1: 70–80. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1149735
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Owens, David 2011. The Possibility of Consent, Ratio 24/4: 402–21. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00509.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raz, Joseph 1985. Authority and Justification, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14/1: 3–29.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Raz, Joseph 1999. Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rosati, Connie 2011. The Importance of Self-Promises, in Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, ed. Hanoch Sheinman, New York: Oxford University Press: 125–55.
   Google Scholar
• Schaab, Janis 2019. Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 73/4: 511–32. doi: 10.3196/004433019827816789
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schofield, Paul 2015. On the Existence of Duties to the Self (and Their Significance for Moral Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90/3: 505–28. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12034
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schofield, Paul 2019. Practical Identity and Duties to the Self, American Philosophical Quarterly 56/3: 219–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Singer, Marcus G. 1959. On Duties to Oneself, Ethics 69/3: 202–5. doi: 10.1086/291210
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Singer, Marcus G. 1963. Duties and Duties to Oneself, Ethics 73/2: 133–42. doi: 10.1086/291439
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strawson, Peter 1962 (1993). Freedom and Resentment, in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, ed. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 45–66.
   Google Scholar
• Thompson, Michael 2004. What Is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 333–84.
   Google Scholar
• Timmermann, Jens 2006. Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended, Philosophy 81/3: 505–30. doi: 10.1017/S0031819106317056
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zylberman, Ariel forthcoming. Relational Primitivism, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research.
   Google Scholar