Truthmaker Noumenalism

References

• Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. 2017. Causal Theories of Mental Content, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017), ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/content-causal/
   Google Scholar
• Adickes, E. 1924. Kant Und Das Ding an Sich, Berlin: Rolf Heise.
   Google Scholar
• Allais, L. 2004. Kant's One World: Interpreting ‘Transcendental Idealism’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12/4:655–84.
   Google Scholar
• Allais, L. 2015. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Allison, H.E. 2004. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (rev. and enlarged edn), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ameriks, K. 1990. Kant, Fichte, and Short Arguments to Idealism, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 72/1: 63–85.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aquila, R.E. 1979. Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61/3: 293–308.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Armstrong, D.M. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bader, R.M. 2010. The Transcendental Structure of the World, Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Andrews.
   Google Scholar
• Bird, G. 2006. The Revolutionary Kant: A Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, Chicago: Open Court.
   Google Scholar
• Cameron, R.P. 2008. Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology Without Getting into Trouble, Philosophical Studies 140/1: 1–18.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chiba, K. 2012. Kants Ontologie der raumzeitlichen Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer anti-realistischen Interpretation der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Berlin: De Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Devitt, M. 1991. Realism and Truth, 2^nd edn, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dummett, M. 1982. Realism, Synthese 52/1: 145–65.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, K. 2001. The Question of Realism, Philosophers’ Imprint 1/1: 1–30.
   Google Scholar
• Frege, G. (trans. M. Black) 1948 (1892). On Sense and Reference, The Philosophical Review 57/3: 207–30.
   Google Scholar
• Grier, M. 2001. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Guyer, P. 1987. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hanna, R. 2001. Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Jankowiak, T. 2016. Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant, Journal of Philosophical Research 41: 623–49.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jankowiak, T. 2017. Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism, Kantian Review 22/2: 205–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kant, I. 1772. Letter to Hertz. Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799, ed. and trans. Arnuld Zweig, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
   Google Scholar
• Kriegel, U. 2015. The Varieties of Consciousness, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McDaniel, K. 2015. A Philosophical Model of the Relation Between Things in Themselves and Appearances, Noûs 49/4: 643–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moore, G.E. 1899. The Nature of Judgment, Mind 8/30: 176–93.
   Google Scholar
• Paek, C.H. 2005. Kant’s Theory of Transcendental Truth as Ontology, Kant-Studien 96/2: 147–60.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Posy, C. 1983. Dancing to the Antinomy: A Proposal for Transcendental Idealism, American Philosophical Quarterly 20/1: 81–94.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2006. Truthmaker Maximalism Defended, Analysis 66/3: 260–64.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Russell, B. 1903. The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Simons, P. 2000. Truth-Maker Optimalism, Logique et Analyse 43/169–70: 17–41.
   Google Scholar
• Stang, N.F. 2013. The Nonidentity of Appearances and Things in Themselves, Noûs 47/4: 106–36.
   Google Scholar
• Stang, N.F. 2015. Who’s Afraid of Double Affection? Philosophers’ Imprint 15/18: 1–28.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stang, N.F. 2016. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
   Google Scholar
• Underwood, L.J. 2003. Kant’s Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Analysis and Critique of Anglo-American Alternatives, New York: Peter Lang.
   Google Scholar
• van Cleve, J. 1999. Problems from Kant, New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vaihinger, H. and Schmidt, R. 1922. Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft.
   Google Scholar
• Vanzo, A. 2010. Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth, Kant-Studien 101/2: 147–66.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Willaschek, M. 2003. Der mentale Zugang zur Welt: Realismus, Skeptizismus und Intentionalität, Göttingen: Klostermann.
   Google Scholar