Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference

References

• Arntzenius, Frank (2003) ‘Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection’, Journal of Philosophy 100: 356–70. doi: 10.5840/jphil2003100729.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bostrom, Nick (2007) ‘Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model’, Synthese 157: 59–78. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9010-7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Braun, David (2016) ‘The Objects of Belief and Credence’, Mind 125: 469–97. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzv137.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Briggs, R. A. (2009) ‘The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug’, Noûs 43: 428–49. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00713.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Castañeda, Hector-Neri (1989) Thinking, Language, and Experience. University of Minnesota Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David J. (2004) ‘Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics’, Philosophical Studies 118: 153–226. doi: 10.1023/b:phil.0000019546.17135.e0.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David J. (2011) ‘Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence’, Mind 120: 587–635. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzr046.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davies, Martin and Lloyd Humberstone (1980) ‘Two Notions of Necessity’, Philosophical Studies 38: 1–30. doi: 10.1007/bf00354523.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dorr, Cian (2002) ‘Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga’, Analysis 62: 292–96. doi: 10.1111/1467-8284.00371.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Easwaran, Kenny (2014) ‘Regularity and Hyperreal Credences’, Philosophical Review 123: 1–41. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2366479.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Easwaran, Kenny (2019) ‘Conditional Probabilities’, in Richard Pettigrew and Jonathan Weisberg, eds., Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology: 131–98. PhilPapers Foundation.
   Google Scholar
• Elga, Adam (2000) ‘Self-locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem’, Analysis 60: 143–47. doi: 10.1111/1467-8284.00215.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fitts, Jesse (2014) ‘Chalmers on the Objects of Credence’, Philosophical Studies 170: 343–58. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0223-6.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry A. (1975) The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Frege, Gottlob (1892) ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschriift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25–50.
   Google Scholar
• Gallow, J. Dmitri (2021) ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Deterministic Chance’, Synthese 198: 4339–72. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02346-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hájek, Alan (ms) ‘ Staying Regular?’.
   Google Scholar
• Hall, Ned (1994) ‘Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance’, Mind 103: 505–18. doi: 10.1093/mind/103.412.505.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Halpern, Joseph Y. (2004) ‘Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems’, Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncertainty in AI: 226–34.
   Google Scholar
• Hawthorne, John and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2009) ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’, in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, eds., Williamson on Knowledge: 92–108. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hitchcock, Christopher (2004) ‘Beauty and the Bets’, Synthese 139: 405–20. doi: 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024889.29125.c0.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Horgan, Terrence (2004) ‘Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New odds at the Dawn of the New Day’, Analysis 64: 10–21. doi: 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00454.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ismael, Jenann (2008) ‘Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug’, Noûs 42: 292–307. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00681.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaplan, David (1989) ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals’, in John Perry, Joseph Almog, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan: 481–563. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. (1979) ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Philosophical Review 88: 513–43. doi: 10.2307/2184843.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. (1980) ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, in Richard C. Jeffrey, ed., Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. II: 263–93. University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. (1988) ‘Relevant Implication’, Theoria 54: 161–74. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1988.tb00716.x.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. (1994) ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’, Mind 103: 473–90. doi: 10.1093/mind/103.412.473.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. (2001) ‘Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga’, Analysis 61: 171–76. doi: 10.1111/1467-8284.00291.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Meacham, Christopher J. G. (2008) ‘Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Belief’, Philosophical Studies 138: 245–69. doi: 10.1007/s11098-006-9036-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Meacham, Christopher J. G. (2010) ‘Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61: 407–31. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axp044.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Monton, Bradley (2002) ‘Sleeping Beauty and the Forgetful Bayesian’, Analysis 62: 47–53. doi: 10.1111/1467-8284.00329.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moschvakis, Yiannis N. (1994) ‘Sense and Denotation as Algorithm and Value’, in Juha Oikkonen and Jouko Väänänen, eds., Logic Colloquium ‘90: 210–49. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Nolan, Daniel (2016) ‘Chance and Necessity’, Philosophical Perspectives 30: 294–308. doi: 10.1111/phpe.12076.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Salmón, Nathan (2019) ‘Impossible Odds’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99: 644–62. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12517.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Salmón, Nathan (1986) Frege’s Puzzle. The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schulz, Moritz (2011) ‘Chance and Actuality’, Philosophical Quarterly 61: 105–29. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.668.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schwarz, Wolfgang (2014) ‘Proving the Principal Principle’, in Alastair Wilson, ed., Chance and Temporal Asymmetry: 81–99. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Singer, Daniel Jeremy (2014) ‘Sleeping Beauty Should be Imprecise’, Synthese 191: 3159–72. doi: 10.1007/s11229-014-0429-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spencer, Jack (2020) ‘No Crystal Balls’, Noûs 54: 105–25. doi: 10.1111/nous.12252.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stalnaker, Robert C. (1978) ‘Assertion’, in Peter Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics: 315–32. Academic Press.
   Google Scholar
• Thau, Michael (1994) ‘Undermining and Admissibility’, Mind 103: 491–503. doi: 10.1093/mind/103.412.491.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Titelbaum, Michael G. (2008) ‘The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs’, Philosophical Review 117: 555–606. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2008-016.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Fraassen, Bas C. (1984) ‘Belief and the Will’, Journal of Philosophy 81: 235–56. doi: 10.2307/2026388.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• van Fraassen, Bas C. (1995) ‘Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens’, Philosophical Studies 77: 7–37. doi: 10.1007/bf00996309.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Weintraub, Ruth (2004) ‘Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution’, Analysis 64: 8–10. doi: 10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00453.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy (2007) ‘How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?’, Analysis 67: 173–80. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00671.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilson, Alastair (2014) ‘Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65: 573–98. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axt018.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar