Coherence as Joint Satisfiability

References

• Anscombe, G E M (1957) Intention. Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Baker, Derek (2018) ‘Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter’, in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13: 230–52. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bratman, Michael (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Broome, John (1991) Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Basil Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Broome, John (2013) Rationality through Reasoning. Wiley Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Brunero, John (2010) ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, Philosophical Quarterly 60: 28–49. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.596.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brunero, John (2020) Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Copp, David (1997) ‘The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and The Unity of Reason’, Social Philosophy and Policy 14: 86–106. doi:10.1017/S0265052500001680.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Crawford, Sean (2004) ‘A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle about Belief’, Analysis 64: 223–29. doi:10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00489.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de Finetti, Bruno (1974/2017) Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment. Wiley.
   Google Scholar
• Eder, Anna-Maria (2019) ‘Evidential Probabilities and Credences’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Online first. doi:10.1093/bjps/axz043.
   Google Scholar
• Eriksson, Lina and Alan Hájek (2007) ‘What Are Degrees of Belief?’, Studia Logica 86: 183–213. doi:10.1007/s11225-007-9059-4.
   Google Scholar
• Frankfurt, Harry G (1971) ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20. doi:10.2307/2024717.
   Google Scholar
• Friedman, Jane (2013a) ‘Suspended Judgment’, Philosophical Studies 162: 165–81. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman, Jane (2013b) ‘Question-Directed Attitudes’, Philosophical Perspectives 27: 145–74. doi:10.1111/phpe.12026.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman, Jane (2017) ‘Why Suspend Judging?’, Noûs 51: 302–26. doi:10.1111/nous.12137.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman, Jane (2019) ‘Inquiry and Belief’, Noûs 53: 296–315. doi:10.1111/nous.12222.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goldstein, Simon (2016) ‘A Preface Paradox for Intention’, Philosopher’s Imprint 16: 1-20.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harman, Gilbert (1976) ‘Practical Reasoning’, Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–63.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harman, Gilbert (1986) Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Holton, Richard (2009) Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Holton, Richard (2014) ‘Intention as a Model for Belief’, in Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, eds., Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Jeffrey, Richard C (2004) Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Joyce, James M (1998) ‘A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Philosophy of Science 65: 575–603. doi:10.1086/392661.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2017) The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kolodny, Niko (2005) ‘Why Be Rational?’, Mind 114: 509–63. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi509.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kolodny, Niko and John Brunero (2020) ‘Instrumental Rationality’, in Edward N Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/rationality-instrumental/.
   Google Scholar
• Lance, Mark Norris (1995) ‘Subjective Probability and Acceptance’, Philosophical Studies 77: 147–79. doi:10.1007/BF00996316.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David (1976) ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’, Philosophical Review 85: 297–315. doi:10.2307/2184045.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lord, Errol (2018) The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lord, Errol and Kurt Sylvan (2021) ‘Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat’, in Jessica Brown and Mona Simion, eds., Reasons, Justification, and Defeat: 116–45. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Masny, Michal (2020) ‘Friedman on Suspended Judgment’, Synthese 197: 5009–26. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01957-1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McGrath, Matthew (2021) ‘Being Neutral: Agnosticism, Inquiry and the Suspension of Judgment’, Noûs 55: 463–84. doi:10.1111/nous.12323.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pettigrew, Richard (2016) Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ross, Jacob (2012) ‘Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment’, in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 7: 138–81. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rosenkrantz, Roger (1981) Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability. Ridgeview Publishing Co.
   Google Scholar
• Scanlon, T M (2007) ‘Structural Rationality’, in Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, eds., Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit: 84–103. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schiffer, Stephen R (2003) The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schroeder, Mark (2012) ‘The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons’, Ethics 122: 457–88. doi:10.1086/664753.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Setiya, Kieran (2007) ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason’, Ethics 117: 649–73. doi:10.1086/518954.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Searle, John R (1983) Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shpall, Sam (2016) ‘The Calendar Paradox’, Philosophical Studies 173: 801–25. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0520-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Smith, Michael (1987) ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, Mind 96: 36–61. doi:10.1093/mind/XCVI.381.36.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Smith, Michael (2004) ‘Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 93–109. doi:10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00117.x.
   Google Scholar
• Staffel, Julia (2020) ‘Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100: 463–68. doi:10.1111/phpr.12675.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tiffany, Evan (2007) ‘Deflationary Normative Pluralism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39: 231–62. doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0076.
   Google Scholar
• Titelbaum, Michael (2019) ‘Precise Credences’, in Richard Pettigrew and Jonathan Weisberg, eds., The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology: 1–55. PhilPaper Foundation.
   Google Scholar
• Wagner, Verena (2022) ‘Agnosticism as Settled Indecision’, Philosophical Studies 179: 671–97. doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01676-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wedgwood, Ralph (2002) ‘The Aim of Belief’, Noûs 36: 267–97. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Williamson, Timothy (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Worsnip, Alex (2018) ‘What Is (In)Coherence?’, in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13: 184–206. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Worsnip, Alexander (2021) Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar