References
- At certain places, the text tends to lean more toward one interpretation than the other. For example, on pp. 220–221, Quine describes and appears to endorse Chisholm's view that intuitive semantics can be adequately explained only by reference to intensional discourse; he then suggests that to accept intensional idioms requires that the thesis of indeterminacy be incorrect. ‘To accept intensional usage at face value is … to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions. Such postulation promises little gain in scientific insight if there is no better ground for it than that the supposed translation relations are presupposed by the vernacular of semantics and intention.’ (p. 221) All this tends to favor the first interpretation. But does he actually endorse Chisholm's view? After all, as I pointed out above, Quine provides non-intentional explanations of our intuitions. In his article Quine on Meaning and Existence Review of Metaphysics 1967 Sept. 135ff 135ff Gilbert Harmon appears to endorse the second interpretation.
- On p. 68, Quine sums up how much the behavioral evidence can yield. This passage is discussed in detail by Dolan John A Note on Quine's Theory of Radical Translation Mechanical Translation March 1967 10 in his
- 1968 . Ontological Relativity . Journal of Philosophy , April : 189 – 189 . 4
- See, for example, Blanshard Brand The Nature of Thought chapter 9 and also Chomsky's review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior reprinted in The Structure of Language, edited by Fodor and Katz.
- Ontological Relativity 191 – 191 .
- Ontological Relativity 191 – 191 .
- e.g. Brunner Jerome On Perceptual Readiness Readings in Perception Beardslee Wertheimer 1958 in especially p. 699. See my discussion of this topic and of the problem of the influence of language on thought in ‘Does Language Embody a Philosophical Point of View?’, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. xiv, 1961.
- Koffka , K. 1959 . The Growth of the Mind , : 342 – 342 .
- ‘Univerifiable’ is the term Quine uses; see 71 71 72.
- See also part 6 of his Two Dogmas of Empiricism From a Logical Point of View in
- 1966 . The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays , 241 – 241 . New York : Random House . On pp. 75–6 of Word and Object Quine mentions a way in which the indeterminacy of theories in general differs from the indeterminacy of radical translation, but it is not clear how this difference bears on the question of objective reality.
- Ontological Relativity 186 – 187 .
- For an insight into the dimensions of this problem see Grice's H.P. Meaning, Philosophical Review, 1957 and his more recent follow up discussion in ‘Utterer's Meaning and Intentions Philosophical Review 1969