- Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 49.
- Cf., Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 159–181.
- Ibid., p. 178.
- “Situation de Merleau-Ponty,” Les Temps Modernes, Nos. 184–5 (1961), pp. 277–298. Also see the English translation, “The Philosophical Position of Merleau-Ponty” in Philosophy Today, 7, No. 2/4, (Summer 1963), p. 135.
- See Erwin W. Straus’ penetrating analysis. “Chronognosy and Chronopathy,” in Phenomenology: Pure and Applied, The Third Lexington Conference (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 1964), pp. 142–165.
- Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, Bk. XI, Chap. xv.
- Straus, loc. cit., p. 143.
- Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 234. Hereafter, Ideas.
- Cf. the English translation, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Ed.) Martin Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). These lectures recently reappeared in Husserliana, Band X, under the editorship of Rudolf Boehm (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
- Husserl, loc. cit., p. 236.
- Husserl, Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time—Consciousness, pp. 46–47. Hereafter Time—Consciousness. Cf. Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, 1939. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Zweite unveränderte Auflage (Hamburg: Claassen, 1954), pp. 116–117. “A simple example of a fundamental grasping is the hearing of a sounding tone. It is continually the same (in intensity and pitch) in the temporal flow and continual change of the phases of its sounding; it sounds in the individual phases; they are forms of appearance of the temporal object, the tone, which endures in time and whose duration expands itself continually with every moment. It appears in the form of a concrete present with the now-point, the horizon of the continual past, on one side, and that of the future, on the other. This present phenomenon is in a continual, original flux from Now into an ever new Now, under corresponding alteration of the past and future horizons. Thereby the tone will be given mostly as spatially localized, conceived as sounding in spatial nearness or distance—determinations which refer to a spatial zero-point, our own body, with respect to which all ‘here’ and ‘there’ is oriented. In this manner the tone is passively grasped as an enduring whole.”
- Husserl, Time-Consciousness, p. 45. Also see pp. 78–79.
- Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). p. 52.
- Husserl Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 121–122: ‘The maintaining-in-one's grasp as a modified activity, as passivity within activity, must be distinguished from the maintaining of retention, sometimes called “fresh memory’. [Retention] is an intentional modification within the framework of pure passivity: it is brought into play according to an absolutely rigid lawfulness without any contribution from the activity radiating from the Ego-center.”
- Husserl, Time-Consciousness; p. 30.
- Ibid., p. 61.
- Ibid., p. 62.
- Ibid., p. 49 and 121.
- Ibid., p. 50.
- Ibid., pp. 108–109.
- Ibid., p. 86.
- Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 118.
- Husserl, Ideas, p. 237.
- Ibid., pp. 45–46.
- Ibid., pp. 89–90.
- Husserl is careful to distinguish “phenomenological temporal intervals” [phänomenologisch-temporale Abstände] from “objective intervals of time” [objektive Zeitabstände].
- Husserl frequently remarks that the final court of appeal in all analyses of consciousness is “intuition.” i.e., to “see”. Cf. Time-Consciousness, p. 103.
- Ibid., p. 87.
- Ibid., p. 93.
- Ibid., p. 90–91.
- Ibid., p. 77.
- Ibid., pp. 107–108.
- Husserl, Ideas, p. 237.
- Husserl, Time-Consciousness, pp. 23–24.
- Ibid., p. 23.
- Husserl, Ideas, p. 235.
- Husserl, Time-Consciousness, passim.
- Kant, we are reminded, distinguished temporal ‘succession’ from other temporal modes of ‘permanence’ and ‘coexistence’.
- Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 425.
- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (London: Macmillan & Co., 1958), p. 77 (B. 50).
- Phenomenology of Perception, p. 417.
- Ibid., p. 411 (My translation).
- Phenomenology of Perception p. 411.
- Ibid., p. 432.
- Ibidem.
- Ibid., p. 411.
- Ibidem.
- J. N. Findlay. The Discipline of the Cave (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966). p. 108.
- Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 410–433.
- Ibid., p. 415.
- Ibid., pp. 415–416.
- Ibid., p. 416.
- Ibid., p. 421.
- Ibid., p. 433.
- Ibid., p. 432. Cf. R. C. Kwant. The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1963), p. 61.
- Ibid., p. 417. Compare Husserl's Time-Consciousness with Merleau-Ponty's reproduction of Husserl's diagram and observe the intentional modification of Husserl's descriptive account. It is interesting to observe that Merleau-Ponty subtitles his diagram “from Husserl” [d'après Husserl].
- Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 21.
- Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 54.
- Ibid.
- Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l'invisible (France: Editions Gallimard. 1964). p. 268. Here Merleau-Ponty refers to his earlier Phenomenology of Perception and Husserl's time lectures. (My translation.)
- Ibid., p. 248.
- Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 417.
- I owe this expression to O. K. Bouwsma, whose perceptive analysis of time, “The Mystery of Time,” is reprinted in his Philosophical Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 99–127.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
Volume 4, 1973 - Issue 3