- I am very grateful to the American Council of Learned Societies for the Grant-in-aid which was awarded to me for the Summer, 1972, which made it possible for me to make this study.
- Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (München: Hueber Verlag, 1926), Band I, pp. 145–6. Grabmann refers to Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift which he submitted to the University of Freiburg in 1915: Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Sotas (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1916). It was published with the addition of a “Conclusion” a year later, apparently with Husserl's help. See the “Vorwort”. It has since been reprinted in Martin Heidegger, Frühe Schriften (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1972). Included in Frühe Schriften also are Heidegger's doctoral dissertation of 1914, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus, and the trial-lecture at Freiburg “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft.”) Our references to the 1916 edition of the Scotus book (hereafter “DS”) will include cross-references to Frühe Schriften (hereafter “FS”) and will appear in parentheses in the body of the text.
- No explicit study of the Habilitationsschrift has been made to our knowledge. It is discussed however in: Karsten Harries, “Martin Heidegger: The Search for Meaning.” in Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, ed. G. Schrader (New York. McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 164–8; Otto Poeggler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), pp. 17–26; Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 56–73; Herbert Spiegelberg. The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), v. 1, pp. 292–7.
- Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press. 1970) (hereafter “LI”).
- Nor is it today as the current discussions of “depth grammar” indicate.
- Husserl covers such counter-examples as “‘To if but’ is an utterance composed of three English words.” This is an example of “material supposition” (mention, not use), in which “to if but” refers to itself as a string of words. In this case the words no longer belong to the same categories of meaning. They are now instances of the category of nominal meaning which may always be significantly combined with the category of verbal meaning. Cf. LI, 513–4.
- Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer. 1969). pp. 82 ff. and Hans Siegfried, “Martin Heidegger: A Recollection”, Man and World 3. No. 1 (February, 1970), p. 4.
- The notion of a “doctrine of categories” is of Kantian vintage and Heidegger refers us to the works of Windelband, von Hartmann, Lotze and Lask for its elaboration.
- “Der Zeitbegriff in der Geisteswissenschaft”, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 161 (1916), 173–88/FS, 357–75.
- See Heidegger's publications from 1912 to 1914 in H.-M. Sass, Heidegger Bibliographie (Meisenheim a/G: Hain, 1968), p. 5.
- Heidegger's analysis of the one is heavily influenced by Heinrich Rickert's article “Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Bemerkungen zur Logik des Zahlbegriffes”, Logos II (1911–12), 26 ff. The Habilitations-schrift is dedicated to Rickert; it is only after 1916 that Heidegger is associated with Husserl's circle. See Spiegelberg, 294. The only work of Rickert in English is Science and History, trans. G. Reisman (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962).
- Hence all of the “how many angels…?” questions are, for important scholastic thinkers like Scotus, so many category mistakes.
- Scotus emphasized the uniqueness (haecceitas) and analogicity of the empirical realm and contrasted it to the univocity of the conceptual; in like manner Rickert distinguished the “heterogeneity” of the real from the “homogeneity” of the logical. See Rickert, 34 ff.
- See Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 1892.
- It is well known that a basic claim of the mature Heidegger's thought is that what is called above the truth of being is the essential meaning of truth, and that prepositional truth is merely derivative. See Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1943).
- Like most traditional logicians Scotus takes the categorical proposition as the paradigm case of a proposition.
- Presumedly Heidegger would say—if it were put to him—that the traditional A, E, I and O propositions have existential import because of the reference of their terms, not the “is” whose function is “copulative”. The concept of Gelten as the meaning of the “is” is also defended in the doctoral dissertation. Cf. FS, 107 ff., especially 118–22.
- Up to now Heidegger has been referring to authentic works of Scotus; he only now turns to the Grammatica speculativa. We will make use of the separate edition of this work to which Heidegger refers us (DS, 15, n. 1): B. Joannis Duns Scoti, O.F.M., Grammaticae speculativae nova editio cura et studio P. Fr. M. F. Garcia (Quaracchi: St. Bonaventure, 1902) (hereafter “de mod.”).
- Spiegelberg, p. 294.
- In Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 69, Heidegger cites the following text from Husserl: “Nicht von den Philosophien sondern von den Sachen und Problemen muss der Antrieb der Forschung ausgehen.”
- A full account of this fact would have to center on a study of Karl Braig's Vom Sein: Abriss der Ontologie, 1896. See Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 81.
- We have chosen, as is now common practice, to leave “Dasein” untranslated.
- Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) (hereafter “BT”). §3. We will ordinarily use this translation with occasional adaptations.
- Because we are explaining the term “Dasein”, we prefer not to use it; we do not need to be reminded of the difference between Dasein and man for Heidegger.
- Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre voti der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den “Humanismus” (Bern: Francke, 1947), p. 77.)
- Otto Poeggeler, “Heidegger's Topology of Being“ in On Heidegger and Language, ed. J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 107–46.
- We are indebted to Schmitt's excellent treatment of the relationship between the Scotus book and Being and Time on the problem of language. See Schmitt, p. 73.
- Heidegger will pursue the same line of argument in his later works and, if anything, even more radically. See Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
- For an account of Vossler's views see Herman Parret, “Husserl and the Neo-Humboldtians on Language”, International Philosophical Quarterly XII, no. 1 (March, 1972), 46–52.
- Schmitt, p. 72. In discussing Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift, Schmitt devotes most of his attention to Husserl himself and simply assumes that Heidegger's views and Husserl's are, at this point, identical. He takes no account of the “Introduction” and “Conclusion” to the book and so fails to recognize the tension that already was moving Heidegger towards the position that he adopted in Being and Time. The “Antrittsrede” of 1915 also reveals Heidegger's great interest in the concrete and historical even in these early years.
- The Antrittsrede (FS, 357) begins with a citation from Meister Eckhart. In 1919 Heidegger gave a course at Freiburg entitled “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism” from out of which eventually issued Käte Oltmann's Meister Eckhart, 2. Aufl. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1957).
- I have made an extensive study of the relationship between Heidegger and Eckhart in my “Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought”, forthcoming in The Journal of the History of Philosophy.
- The best introduction to Meister Eckhart in English is James Clark's translations of some basic vernacular sermons preceded by a lengthy introduction to Eckhart's life and works: Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of His Works With an Anthology of His Sermons (London: Nelson & Sons, 1957). His works have received a definitive translation into modern German in Meister Eckehart: Deutsche Predigte und Traktate, hrsg. u. übers, v. Josef Quint (München: Carl Hanser, 1963).
- Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit (Pfullingen, Neske, 1959), p. 36. English translation: Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 62.
- Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit, p. 26 (Discourse on Thinking, p. 55).
- On the Way to Language, p. 10. I have translated this text myself from Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 96.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
Volume 5, 1974 - Issue 2