References
- Crat. 424a ff. 434 ff. The letter rho suggests flux, iota the subtle elements pervading everything, alpha stands for bigness, omikron for round things etc. The word is thus a mimema of the thing, Crat. 431a, and therefore physei and not thesei (syntheke) or a conventional sign, Crat. 383a, 433e—a position called in question Crat. 434 ff. Interestingly, the meanings Plato has in mind concern qualities, quantity and processes only.
- Theaet. 191d. 197c.
- De Anima 430a. Aristotle knows he is picturing when discussing picture; the more rigorous version is in terms of potency and act: what consciousness thinks must be within it, and for this to be possible, it must possess the faculty of reception.
- Essay Concerning Human Understanding III, 1, 1.
- Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht § 39 (Academy Edition VII, 192 f.) The lack of clarity is heightened by the fact that Kant interprets thought as “Reden mit sich selbst”, p. 192, so that signification through words becomes circular. On the other hand, the faculty of signification is seen as “Vermögen der Erkenntnis des Gegenwärtigen”, thus object-oriented, and this as “Mittel der Verknüpfung der Vorstellung des Vorhergesehenen mit der des Vergangenen”. Kant's Anthropology, we have to remember, is a work of pragmatic intent. The place of thought or of representation in a context involving words and referent remains obscure. For Kant's use of picture, see infra.
- Logical Investigations, tr. by J. N. Findlay, London 1970, vol. I, 269 ff., vol. II, 533 ff.
- For Frege, ‘Bedeutung’ is what is meant, the object, while ‘Sinn’ is what is meant about the object. See Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, ed. by G. Patzig, Göttingen 1962, 38–63, esp. 44. For Husserl, ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ are synonyms: for Frege, evening-star and morning-star share the same ‘Bedeutung’, for Husserl these are different ‘Bedeutungen’ or meanings obtaining of an identical object.
- We may note the difficulty to accommodate the copula in a meaning-oriented position. Is its meaning the positing of the predicate? In that case, its meaning functions in a way different from most or all other meanings.
- First Log. Inv., § 19.
- Apperception is the key term which explains to what extent Kant could manage to avoid a picture theory of knowledge. In being apperceived, intuitive material counts as something objective for us, however subjective its status may have been considered beforehand. We need not here enter into the problem involved in this solution.
- First Log. Inv., § 23.
- Fifth Log. Inv., pp. 593–596, esp. 593–595: Critique of the ‘image-theory’.
- Cf. Locke's famous triangle with a general essence, Essay III, 3, 18. Cf. Husserl, Second Log. Inv., § 11.
- First Log. Inv., § 7.
- First Log. Inv., § 5.
- First Log. Inv., § 8. The section remains unclear on the issue of whether words are needed for articulate meaning-conferring acts in ‘solitary life’. Cf. above where we wondered if the dispensability of expressions or words may differ as between nominal representations and judgements.
- First Log. Inv., § 10, p. 282. § 23.
- See Sixth Log. Inv.
- For a criticism see E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Berlin 1967, 107 ff.
- Cf. Ideas, New York 1962, tr. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (translation of vol. I. of Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie), §§ 3 and 4.
- Critique of Pure Reason A 141; cf. more generally A 137.
- Critique of Pure Reason A 144.
- Cf. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd edition, Frankfurt 1951, §§ 19–23.
- As far as we can see, Husserl has not discussed Kant's schematism (in spite of his treatment of schema in Ideas II, §§ 15 d. 32). We should avoid the conclusion that a relationship between concept or meaning and intuition permits no theoretical treatment. Kant's and Husserl's doctrines on apperception show, on the contrary, that notions like ‘interpretation’ (Auffassung) of the sensuous through concept have their place. The problem is, though, whether concept has to be regarded as sensified or not. In his Transcendental Deduction, Kant does not seem to think so, but he does in his Analytic of Principles. Again an occasion to voice criticism. The pure solution is that of a translation of anything sensuous into thought and the entelechy of non-metaphorical thought. Cf. below on Metaphor.
- Fichte uses ‘Bild’ (picture) in this connection. Cf. esp. Wissenschaftslehre of 1804, Nachgelassene Werke II, 141 and passim. Cf. also Wissenschaftslehren of 1798 and 1801. Cf. W. Janke, Fichte, Berlin 1970, 335 and passim.
- We refer the reader to the minutiae of Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric. For an exhaustive analysis, see E. Jüngel, “Metaphorische Wahrheit”, in: Evangelische Theologie, Sonderheft “Metaphor”, Munich 1974, 71–122, esp. 86–103. Metaphor, replacing a nominal meaning, is not normally used predicatively (“an office is a treadmill”) although the semantic tension inherent in such a predication may be what is desired. (P. Ricoeur discusses the semantic of metaphor, Ibid., 45–70, esp. 47.) For predication, comparison or simile is the common case (“an office is like a treadmill”.)
- 1984 passim.
- Ideas I, ch. 1.
- For quite a while now, unless Vico has the priority, the theoretical situation stated is the object of study. For the Greek language, B. Snell in: Die Entdeckung des Geistes (1946) has offered important analyses. Cf. also P. Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality (1962), distinguishing ordinary metaphor (‘epiphor’) from metaphor in the present sense (‘diaphor’, metaphor as mediating, disclosing rather than contrasting, p. 72); J. M. Edie, “Identity and Metaphor. A Phenomenological Theory of Polysemy”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 6, no. 1 (1975), 32–41; and E. Jüngel, op. cit., who considers metaphor especially in the religious domain. The notion of a ‘necessary metaphor’ occurs in Jüngel and in Edie.
- Cf. G. E. Yoos, “A Phenomenological Look at Metaphor”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1971, 78–88.
- For Husserl, meanings are ‘ideal meanings’ in so far as they feature an identity over against the contrasting cases of empty and fulfilled intention, or in so far as they are ‘per se’ (an sich; cf. First Log. Inv., § 32.) What we have in mind is ideal meaning in the sense of conceptual purity. It is open to doubt whether this notion is practicable except by way of approximation. Incidentally we should distinguish carefully between ‘intuitive’ meanings in the sense that they figure as the ‘as what’ of something intuitable (e.g., chair, table), permitting of pure meaningful reference to such an item, and ‘intuitive’ meanings in the sense in which they involve latent or manifest metaphor.
- We see the problematics of originalness. The revival of metaphoric sensibility incurs the reintroduction of intuitive content which does not necessarily enjoy priority over Heidegger's favourite original thought of Being, which latter is very abstract. One may argue that Being can be thought only metaphorically or poetically, that only in this way can we avoid metaphysical petrification in a terminology tailored to what is (Seiendes.) But Heidegger's idea is negative, anticonceptual. We are supposed to surmise the way the original philosophers presumably did not. Another matter are word-formations designed to avoid substantival forms, e.g., phrases like ‘um-zu’, ‘wozu’, ‘worumwillen’. How on earth could a metaphysical thinker like Aristotle hit on such non-substantive formulations which may still serve a non-metaphysical thinker like Heidegger?
- Cf. ABC of Reading (1934) and Guide to Kulchur (1952).
- ABC of Reading, 19. 21 f.
- Let us note another but comparable critique of Aristotle's method of definition in Wittgenstein. He suggests that in the given case there is no suitable genus for a number of species-terms, e.g., in the case of the word ‘Spiel’. Philosophical Investigations, Oxford 1953, Nrs. 66 ff.
- E. Fenollosa, “The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry”, Noh, or Accomplishment (1916).
- Philosophical Investigations. Nr. 58.
- Philosophical Investigations, p. 218e: “Meaning it (?) is not a process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the consequences of meaning”. Cf. Ibid., Nr. 358e: “But isn't our meaning it (?) that gives sense to the sentence?…. And ‘meaning it (?)’ is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private! It is the intangible something;, only comparable to consciousness itself. How could this seem ludicrous? It is, as it were, a dream of our language”.
- There is little in Wittgenstein on picture and metaphor. He seems to think that metaphor is an extended language game to be integrated into the ordinary use of language. “Here one might speak of a ‘primary’ and a ‘secondary’ sense of a word…. The secondary sense is not a ‘metaphorical’ sense. If I say 'For me the vowel e is ‘yellow’ I do not mean: ‘yellow’ in a metaphorical sense, for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea ‘yellow’”. Philosophical Investigations, p. 216e. The apparent denial of the problem of metaphor might even fit in with our view of metaphor stated above.
- A major analysis of Husserl's claim to transcendentality is available in H. Wagner, Philosophie und Reflexion, München 1959. For a statement of how Hegel meets the postulated requirement, K. Hartmann, “Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View”, Hegel. A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by A. MacIntyre, New York 1972, 101–124, and id., Die ontologische Option Berlin 1976, 1–30. Attempts to interpret transcendental philosophy in terms of word thought or language thought in authors like J. Simon, K.-O. Apel and W. Hogrebe.