References
- Page references which occur in the body of the text of this review refer to Phenomenology and the Theory of Science.
- Cf. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1969), Introduction.
- Aron Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Northwestern University Press (Evanston, 1966), pp. 350–358.
- The thesis that the natural sciences of the Galilean style and the mathematized universe to which they address themselves can be considered and studied merely as cultural facts amongst other such facts is fundamental to the thought of both Gurwitsch and Husserl. But it should be noted that this thesis is not accepted by all phenomenologists writing today. See Fred Kersten, “The Life-World Revisited”, Research in Phenomenology, Duquesne University Press, Vol. I (1971). Kersten comments that “….Husserl makes the assertion that, in effect, a science of the life-world is equally a science of sciences in their naïve positivity. (For this assertion to follow, certain premises must be accepted.)….The rehearsal of Husserl's thought which follows will suggest that these ‘premises’ are unwarranted and that Husserl's assertion about the life-world in his later writings is not justified”.