References
- Max Schcler, Nature and Forms of Sympathy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954, p. 40.
- Aesthetic intuition, intense personal suffering and pity are the main instances in which this intuitive awareness may take place. Cf. A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Dover Publications, New York, 1969, vol. I, p. 210; p. 230; pp. 375–9; p. 390.
- A. Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1965, p. 165. Cf. Cartwright's account in: W. Schirmacher (ed), Zeit der Ernte, Stuttgart, 1982, p. 63.
- A. Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality, p. 132.
- Max Scheler, Nature and Forms of Sympathy, pp. 252–253.
- Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1948, pp. 28–29.
- Nature and Forms of Sympathy, p. 10. Expressive phenomena take place not only at the level of our perception of other human beings, but may also play a role in the perception of the physical world. According to the various atomistic theories of perception, the given has no meaning in itself, each meaning being a kind of mental construction, either by way of association (Hume) or of categories a priori (Kant). But, as noted by Spinoza, in some cases, e.g., in optical illusions, we face two opposing claims. On the one hand, a claim of the senses tells us that the pencil in the water is broken and, on the other hand, a claim of our intellect, that it is not. The existence of two alternative, and in this example, opposing claims, can have sense only if the given is assumed to be meaningful in itself. Cf. Michael Strauss, Empfindung, Intention und Zeichen, München, 1984, pp. 107–109. Expressive phenomena in the field of the perception of causality have been studied by A. Michotte in his The Perception of Causality, London, 1963.
- Nature and Forms of Sympathy, pp. 15–17.
- Op. cit., p. 8.
- Op. cit., p. 53.
- Op. cit., p. 136.
- Max Scheler, Ressentiment, The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961, pp. 115–116.
- Op. cit., p. 118.
- Op. cit., pp. 124–125.
- Op. cit., pp. 95–96.
- In Nature and Forms of Sympathy Scheler brings as an example the life of Count Kropotkin, the famous Russian anarchist. In the psychological literature, Anna Freud has adopted a stand which is quite close to Scheler's. According to her, altruism can be seen as a projection of our instinctual impulses in favor of other people. Reporting on one of her patients, she observes that “instead of exerting herself to achieve any aims of her own, she expended all her energy in sympathizing with the experiences of people she cared for. She lived in the lives of other people, instead of having any experience of her own” (Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence, The Hogarth Press, London, 1961, p. 135). For a different view of the problem, cf. R. Coles, The Moral Life of Children, The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston and New York, 1986, ch. V (“Young Idealism”), pp. 157–199. Cole offers a “respectful emendation” to Anna Freud's analysis of young idealism by staling that “There is, at least in some of us, an intense idealism that doesn't yield its energy, later in life, to competing interests or obligations. Youthful idealism has become, for certain men and women, a much-valued moral habit” (op. cit., p. 197).
- Ressentiment, p. 121.
- Nature and Forms of Sympathy, p. 100.
- Op. cit., p. 5.
- Op. cit., p. 151.
- cf. Ludger Luetkehaus, “Pathodizee und Mitleidsethik”, in, Hans Ebeling and Ludger Luelkehaus (eds.), Schopenhauer und Marx: Philosophie des Elends-Elend der Philosophie, Verlag Anton Hain, Koenigstein/Ts., 1980, pp. 190–202.
- Nature and Forms of Sympathy, p. 55.
- William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act III, sc. I.
- Max Scheler, Ressentiment, p. 91.
- Cf. the account of the historical genesis of the sympathy ethics in V. G. Mc Gill, Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 2, 1941–1942, p. 279.