References
- Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 65 (ed. E-W von Herrmann), Frankfurt am Main, 1989. In the following B refers to this work.
- B. p.421.
- B. pp.287, 288.
- B. pp.174, 183, 258, 280. Heidegger uses the term “Ereignis” as well as “Ereignung”; occasionally he speaks of “Ereignung”, thus indicating that Ereignis and Ereignung, though intimately bound up with one another are not identically the same.
- B. pp.70, 189, 236, 247, 422–423; compare also pp.91–95.
- B. pp.7, 75–77, 92–93, 179–180, 182, 185, 235, 248, 250–251, 255–256, 258,428–429.
- B. p.286.
- B, pp.93, 95.
- Compare B, pp.254, 256.
- See e.g. B, pp.235, 249, 262, 488.
- B. pp.67, 251, 319–322, 471, 476. 479, 488–489.
- B. pp.301, 305.
- B. p.25.
- B. p.170.
- Compare B, pp.30, 44, 254, 318.
- See B, pp.254, 256, 330, 440, and the passages referred to under footnote no. 11.
- B. p.295.
- B. p.299.
- B. p.296. 297.
- B. p.254, 303, 308.
- B. p.296.
- B. p.295.
- B. p.30–31, 34–35, 170, 297, 301, 323, 343.
- B. p.341.
- B. p.304. This is not a rigorously literal translation. Heidegger's sentence is as follows “Die Einrückung in die Offenheit, das klingt zwar miβverständlich, als stünde diese bereit, wo doch die Offenheit erst und nur mit der Verrückung geschieht.”
- B. p.255.
- B. p.1 1, 251.
- B. p.16–17, 251, 452.
- B. p.250, 319–321.
- B. p.230.
- B. p.239.
- Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, 1950, p.81.
- B. p.56.
- B. p.447.
- B. p.304.
- Compare B, pp.254, 286–287.
- B. pp.230–231, 235, 239.
- Compare B, p.372.
- B. p.451.
- Compare B, pp.96, 262.
- B. pp.423, 426.
- B. pp.8, 56.
- B. pp.86.
- B. pp.422.
- B. pp.47.
- B. pp.47.
- B. pp.58, 171, 251.
- B. pp.78.
- Compare B, p.246.
- E.g. B, pp. 14, 21, 33–34, 169, 241, 248, 256.
- E.g. B, pp.76–77, 245.
- B. p.447.
- Compare B, p.252.
- B. p.78; see also pp.83–84.
- I call an ontology immanentistic if it implies that being is reducible to the being of beings. “Immanentistic” in this sense is not the opposite of “transcendental”. No doubt however, Heidegger also attempts to go beyond his earlier transcendental-horizontal perspective and towards one which is—seinsgeschichtlich. Assessing the philosophical significance of the Beiträge, F.-W. von Herrmann rightly emphasises this crucial shift in Heidegger's position. (I am referring to Professor von Herrmann's forthcoming paper “Die Frage nach dem Sein als hermeneutische Phänomenologie”, of which he kindly sent me a copy).
- B. pp. 74,92.
- In 1935 appeared Hartmann's Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, in 1938 Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. Heidegger repeatedly refers (in most cases not explicitly) to Hartmann's ontology as expounded in these works (e.g. B, pp. 72–74, 94, 205, 270, 273–275, 280, 281, 283, 484, 492); they constitute a kind of negative background to the Beiträge and serve as “abschreckendes Beispiel”, so to speak. Hartmann, on the other hand, criticised Heidegger's fundamental ontology in which, he thought, “all beings are understood, from the start as relative to man” (See esp. Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie I. Teil, I. Abschnitt, 2. Kapitel; and compare Heidegger's reply, B, pp. 489–490.)