References
- Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), p. 183.
- As late as 1937 Husserl writes in a letter to Martin Farber that Formal and Transcendental Logic, “…is by far my most mature work (except my Fifth Meditation in the Cartesian Meditations)”. See Kah Kyung Cho, “Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence During 1936–1937,” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Fall, 1990. Vol.1 Supplement, p. 39).
- So see, for example, Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allegemeine einfuhring in die reine Phänomenologie, Band III, ed.Walter Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), p. 97. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1972), p. 122.
- Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Parsier Vortrage, Band I, ed.S. Strasser (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950), p. 139. Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 108–109. Henceforth CM. Cairns takes a later typescript and the French translation into account when making his translation, one to which I have kept. Note that the term “Erlebnisse” is translated as “subjective processes”. It is important to stress however that “subjective” is obviously not to be equated with a sense of passivity, as within a “container” or empiricist tradition when it comes to the nature of consciousness.
- Husserl CM, p. 139 (p. 109).
- Ibid., p. 141 (p. 111).
- Ibid., (Ibid.).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid., p. 142 (p. 112).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid., p. 146 Cp. 117).
- Ibid., p. 147 (p. 118).
- Edmund Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft, Band XVII, ed.Paul Janssen (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. 242. Formal and Transcendental Logic, translated by Dorion Cairns (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969), p. 235. Henceforth FTL
- Husserl, Ibid., p. 240 (p. 233).
- Husserl, CM, p. 128 (p. 97).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid., pp. 128–129 (p. 98).
- Husserl, FTL p. 245 (p. 238).
- Husserl, CM, p. 175 (p. 148). My underlining of “harmoniously”.
- Ibid., pp. 156–157 (p. 128).
- Ibid., p. 166 (p. 139).
- Ibid., p. 157 (p. 129).
- For one sympathetic to the claim of Husserl not being a solipsist, see, for example, the classic text of Gaston Berger, The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy, translated by K. McLaughlin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 88–89. In a sympathetic vein, see also F. Elliston, “Husserl's Phenomenology of Empathy” in Elliston and McCormick, Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 215–238. For one critical of Husserl's ability to overcome solipsism, see Jean-Paul Sartre, L'être et le néant: essai de ontologie phénoménologique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1968), pp. 288–291. Henceforth EN. Also Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 233–235. Henceforth BN. I have kept to the English translation except where I felt that changes were necessary. BN is cited before EN in what follows for the sake of convenience.
- See reference 22. My underlining.
- Husserl, CM, p. 157 (pp. 128–129).
- SeeElliston, “Husserl's Phenomenology of Empathy”, p. 218.
- Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology. Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1950) p. 452. Also Richard Müller-Freienfels, The Evolution of Modern Psychology, translated by W. Wolfe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 310ff.
- Edward Bradford Titchener, A Text-Book of Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. 20. Henceforth TB.
- Ibid., p. 24.
- Ibid., p. 25.
- Edward Bradford Titchener, A Beginner's Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1915), pp. 15–16. Henceforth Bp. Synthesis is also mentioned as the counterpart to analysis in that “…psychology has to show how its elements go together, to discover the laws of their connection.” (Ibid., p. 16). In practice, however, the issue of synthesis played a very small role in the introspectionist endeavour considered overall. So see Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright Publishing Company, 1947), p. 85.
- Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, p. 71.
- Ibid., p. 72.
- Ibid.
- For a detailed description of the introspectionists’ treatment of the constancies of shape and brightness, see Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, pp. 73–76.
- I have dealt with these gestaltist criticisms in an article entitled, “Sartre and the Gestaltists: Demystifying (Part of) Being and Nothingness”, (Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol.11, No.3, October 1980).
- Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, pp. 94–95.
- Ibid., p. 97. This claim is moreover borne out by the earlier writings of the introspectionists themselves. So, for example, Titchener clearly advocates what from an ontological point of view could be thought of as a type of atomism when he writes that:
- All over the body and all through the body are dotted sense-organs, which take up physical and chemical impressions from their surroundings; these impressions are transmitted along nerve fibres to the brain; in the brain they are grouped, arranged, supplemented, arrested, modified in all sorts of ways; and finally…they issue along other nerve-fibres to the muscles and glands. (BP, p. 10).
- So see, for example, Titchener, TB, the chapter entitled “Association”, pp. 374–395.
- Ibid., p. 21.
- Ibid., p. 22.
- Ibid., p. 20.
- For an introspectionist account of the distinction between what is actually given and what common sense interprets this given to be, see Titchener, BP, pp. 26–27.
- Titchener, TB, p. 25.
- Ibid.
- Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970). The references to then-current psychologists, which are numerous, are obviously to constitutional issues concerning logic. Such concerns were at the time however often closely tied in with general psychological theory and clearly indicate Husserl's extensive and detailed knowledge of the field. So see, for example, references to: Herbart (pp. 215–218); Beneke (pp. 78–79); Hoffding (p. 308); Ehrenfels (p. 442, p. 658); James (p. 413, p. 420—a eulogy to James); Schumann (p. 410); Stumpf (pp. 439–442); G.E. Müller (p. 410, p. 420). Also numerous references to Lipps and to Wundt's Logik. In addition see, for example, p. 572ff for an analysis of the distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts, again showing a very detailed knowledge of then-current psychological material. And similarly with p. 416ff for a discussion of the relation of part-contents to the totality of parts.
- Edward Bradford Titchener, An Outline of Psychology (New York: Macmillan, 1908), p. 122. Henceforth Op.
- Strictly speaking, the self is a construct for the introspectionists, although a necessary one. So see Titchener, TB, p. 544ff.
- Titchener, OP, p. 123.
- Husserl, FTL, p. 244 (p. 237). My emphasis of “my”.
- I have shown that Sartre does in fact have a viable notion of interpersonal reciprocity and what can be termed the loved Other in the following articles: “Sartre, Hodological Space and the Existence of Others”, (Research in Phenomenology, Vol.XIV, 1984). “Childhood, Subjectivity and Hodological Space: A Reconstruction of Sartre's View of Existential Psychoanalysis”, (Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol.XXl, Nos. 1, 2 & 3, 1988–1989). “Sartre: Reciprocity & Solipsism”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol.25, No.2, May 1994.
- Sartre, BN, p. 254. (EN, p. 311).
- Ibid., p. 255. (Ibid., pp. 312–313).
- Ibid. (Ibid., p. 313).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid. (Ibid.).
- Ibid., p. 256 (Ibid.).
- Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, pp. 83–85.
- Husserl, CM, pp. 143–144. (Ibid., p. 114).
- Husserl, FTL p. 241 (p. 234).
- Ibid. (Ibid.). My Underlining.
- So see, for instance, Oswald Külpe, Outlines of Psychology, translated by E.B. Titchener (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1909), p. 31. Henceforth Op. Külpe, it should be noted, is well known in his role as the founder of the Wurzburg school, famous for its “imageless thought” experiments. And hence his having later tried to bridge the so-called content and act schools. At the lime of this work's original date of publications in 1893 under the title Grundriss der Psychologie, however, the author was still very much a follower of the prior school.
- Külpe, OP, pp. 46–47.
- Ibid., p. 47.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., p. 34.
- Ibid., pp. 37–44.
- Ibid., p. 53.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Titchener, BP, pp. 20–21.
- For the notion of an “exploding” noema see, for example, Maurita Harney, Intentionality, Sense and the Mind (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), p. 171.
- Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, p. 378.