References
- Martin Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes” in Holzwege (Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), 18–19. For the English translation see Albert Hofstadter trans., “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Poetry, Language, Thought (Harper and Row, 1971), 34. Further references to the essay appear in the body of the text, and are identified as UK, OW respectively.
- Meyer Shapiro argues that the shoes depicted in the painting belonged to van Gogh, “by that time a man of the town and the city”. “The Still Life as a Personal Object—A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh” in Marianne L. Simmel ed., The Reach of Mind: Essays in Memory of Kurt Goldstein 1878–1965 (New York: Springer Verlag, 1968), 205.
- Derrida argues that the question of the attribution of ownership cannot in principle be answered, indeed, that we cannot even be certain that we are here dealing with a pair of shoes. See Jacques Derrida, “Restitutions” in The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington, Ian McLeod (The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 255–382.
- The discussions of Heidegger's politics are legion. For some post-Farias accounts see, for instance, Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (Campus Verlag, 1988), particularly 131–248; Bernd Martin ed., Martin Heidegger und das ‘Dritte Reich’ (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989); Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy (University of California Press, 1992).
- One might object that this is not either the most obvious or the most immediate feature of a work of art, in fact, that apart from ready-mades or other “problematic” works, the most apparent feature is that it is an artwork, a feature a work generally obtains from its external characteristics. However, Heidegger might say in response that the designation of an object as a work of art presupposes the conception of art and artwork. Were he to argue in this way, this would hardly be satisfactory. After all, he also assumes that he can identify an artwork without the benefit of a clearly formulated conception of art. Consider his immediate designation of van Gogh's shoe painting as an artwork.
- He does return to the question of the nature of the thing at the end of the essay where he argues that the “thingly” nature of a thing lies in none of the common conceptions but must be found, rather, in its “belonging to the earth” (UK, 56; OW, 69).
- In the first draft essay Heidegger emphasises that at least as far as works of great art are concerned, the artist (and her productive/creative activity) is irrelevant. See Martin Heidegger, “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks” in Heidegger-Studies, 5 (1989): 6.
- Although this question has not been widely explored, it has been taken up by some. See, for instance, John A. Walker, “Art History versus Philosophy: The Enigma of the Old Shoes’,” Van Gogh Studies: Five Critical Essays (London: Jaw Publications, 61–71), particularly 67–70. Although Walker is soon sidetracked, his point seems to be that tools (such as shoes) might serve Heidegger's purpose equally well, a position with which I concur, given that, as I will show, the painting is irrelevant to the reflections Heidegger engages in.
- The following very sketchy account of Heidegger's concept of truth is largely based on “The Origin of the Work of Art” (UK 35–43 and passim; OW, 50–57 and passim). Other relevant texts are Being and Time, particularly Section 44, and “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in Wegmarken (Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), 73–97, John Sallis trans., “On the Essence of Truth” in David Farrell Krell, ed. Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (Harper San Francisco, 1977), 117–141.
- For an account of the attitude Heidegger held in 1933, the year he became rector of Freiburg university, to German life and culture and, with that, of his belief in the necessity of a new beginning, see his Rectoral Address “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität” (Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), pp. 9–19; Karsten Harries trans., “The Self-Assertion of the German University” Review of Metaphysics 38 (1985): 470–480) and the 1935 lecture course Einführung in die Metaphysik (Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). See also the works listed in note 4 above.
- We can describe this as Heidegger's version of a disinterested aesthetic attitude. Like aesthetic attitude theorists he holds that in order to treat the work as a work, the “spectator” must be dissociated or displaced from (disinterested in) the immersion in ordinary and familiar everyday concerns. Unlike aesthetic attitude theorists, however, the displacement is not, for Heidegger, to an aesthetic appreciation of certain properties of the work (beauty perhaps or significant form), but to the happening of truth that the work initiates at least potentially.
- “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks,” 6.
- Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Sections 61–64.
- This is particularly evident in view of an exhibit of German Art (“The Great German Art Exhibition”) mounted in Munich in 1937. That particular exhibit ran parallel with “The Exhibition of Degenerate Art.” While the latter was housed in dark and cramped rooms and featured largely modernist art, the former was housed in the new House of German Art and featured paintings approved by Hitler. Among these are images of peasant life, including a telling painting of a peasant woman. It is by Franz Eichhorst and appears on page 227 of Peter-Klaus Schuster ed., Nationalsozialismus und ‘Entartete Kunst’ (Prestel Verlag, 1987). Even if Heidegger was not familiar with this particular painting, he would have encountered similar images.
- Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik (Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 38; An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Mannheim trans., (Yale University Press, 1959), 35.
- In the Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger refers to the “inner truth and greatness” of the national socialist movement (208; Introduction to Metaphysics, 199), a reference that he refused to delete in the 1953 reprint. Heidegger justifies this by appealing to historical accuracy and by claiming that “a thinker who has learned the art of thinking” would not misinterpret the remark (that is, would not interpret it as an endorsement of national socialism in its reality). On this point see the epilogue of the 1983 edition (pp. 232–233).
- It is interesting to note that the second description employs many of the national socialist values—toil, earth, motherhood, and, above all, the acceptance of one's destiny.
- This might be wishful thinking. According to Tom Rockmore, Heidegger's political stance is intimately tied to his philosophy. See On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, particularly chapters 1, 2 and 4–6.
- The brief account of Fountain that follows takes its cue from Arthur Danto's account of ready-mades in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Harvard University Press, 1981).