References
- G. Agamben, “The Idea of Language“ in, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, tr. D. Heller-Roazen, California: Stanford University Press 1999, pp. 39–47; from now on referred to as IL.
- Cf. E. H. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of Language, New York, London, Sidney: John Wiley & Sons 1967, p. 331; from now on referred to as BFL.
- Cf. J. Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2003, p. 65; cf. also, G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition tr. P. Patton, London, New York: Continuum, 2004 pp. 45–46.
- Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition p. 96, “Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of our ‘self’ only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says ‘me’.”
- BFL, pp. 333–334; cf. p. 364f, “Words are not labels attached to objects by conditioning;…. The meaning-bearing elements of language do not, generally, stand for specific objects (proper names are a special case), and strictly speaking, not even for invariant classes of objects. Apparently they stand for a cognitive process, that is, the act of categorization or the formation of concepts…. However, since speakers use words freely to label their own conceptualization processes, the static dictionary meaning of words does not appear to restrict speakers in their cognitive activities….”
- Cf. A. Parr, “Differentiation/Differenciation” in, The Deleuze Dictionary, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, p. 76, “what are differentiated are intensities and heterogeneous qualities and this is what makes the virtual real but not actual…., differentiation,…, happens only in the virtual realm. Continually dividing and combining, differentiation can be linked to a zone of divergence and…it is fundamentally a creative movement, or flow, that conditions a whole in all its provisional consistency.”
- BFL, p. 335; cf. also, T. Moore and C. Carling, The Limitations of Language, London: Macmillan Press 1988, p. 38f.
- G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense tr. M. Lester and C. Stivale, London-New York: Continuum 2004, p. 28f; from now on referred to as LoS.
- Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 48, “If individuation does not take place either by form or by matter, neither qualitatively nor extensionally, this is not only because it differs in kind but because it is already presupposed by the forms, matters and extensive parts.”
- Cf. Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, tr. E. Curley, London: Penguin Books 1996, I, def. 1
- Cf. Deleuze, p. Ivi. “Three sorts of synthesis are distinguished: the connective synthesis (if…, then), which bears upon the construction of a single series; the conjunctive series (and), as a method of constructing convergent series; and the disjunctive series (or), which distributes the divergent series: conexa, conjuncta, disjuncta.”
- Cf. G. Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, tr. L. Heron, London-New York: Verso 1993, chap. IV, pp. 148–150.
- Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 66.
- Cf. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. B. Massumi, London-New York: Continuum 2004, pp. 281–282, “Plication. It is no longer a question of organs and function, and of a transcendent Plane that can preside over their organization only by means of analogical relations and types of divergent development. It is a question not of organization but of composition; not of development or differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness. It is a question of elements and particles, which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or jump on the same plane of pure immanence.”
- BFL, p. 336, “Naming is a process, not a catalogue of rigid conventions.”
- Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1972, p. 103
- Chomsky, Ibid. cit., p. 104; cf. also, Noam Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, Paris: Mouton, 1966, p. 12, “a generative grammar (that is, an explicit grammar that makes no appeal to the reader's ‘faculté de langage’ but rather attempts to incorporate the mechanisms of this faculty) is a system of rules that relate signals to semantic interpretations of these signals. It is descriptively adequate to the extent that this pairing corresponds to the competence of the idealized speaker-hearer.”
- Chomsky, Language and Mind, p. Ivi.
- Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, p. Ivi.
- Chomsky, Language and Mind, p. 111; cf. also, Chomsky, p. Ivi. “we abstract from conditions of use of language and consider formal structures and the formal operations that relate them. Among these formal structures are those of syntax, namely, deep and surface structures; and also the phonetic and semantic representations, which we take to be certain formal objects related to syntactic structures by certain well-defined operations. This process of abstraction is in no way illegitimate, but one must understand that it expresses a point of view, a hypothesis about the nature of mind, that is not a priori obvious.” Cf. also, Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, p. 11
- Cf. G. Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, Oxford, New York,: Oxford University Press 1998, pp. 177–178.
- Cf. BFL, p. 364–366, “The crucial question…is whether we are dealing with a universal and unique process that generates a unique type of pattern…. Chomsky, in the Appendix, also argues eloquently to this effect. In syntax we seem to be dealing always with the same formal type of rule and in the realm of semantics we have proposed that the type of relationship between word and object is quite invariant across all users’ words…. Common to all mankind are the general biological characteristics of the species…among which is a peculiar mode and capacity of conceptualizing or categorization. Languages tag some selective cognitive modes but they differ in the selection…. However, since speakers use words freely to label their own conceptualisation processes, the static dictionary meaning of words does not appear to restrict speaker in their cognitive activities.”
- Claire Colebrook, “Disjunctive Synthesis“ in, The Deleuze Dictionary, op. cit., p. 77; cf. C. V. Boundas, “Subjectivity” in, ibid. p. 267, and G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, tr. M. Joughin, New York: Zone Books 1992, p. 166f, “one should not imagine that a substance might undergo some limitation of its nature as a result of its own possibilities.”
- Cf. Steiner, ibid. p. 303, “Information can be conceived of as environment. The learning process and the ordered ‘stacking’ of memory must themselves constitute a dynamic, multidirectional phenomenon. The brain is never a passive tympanum. The act of internalization […] presumably triggers an immensely ramified field of associative recognitions, relocations, and serial impulses. Reasoning by analogy most probably has its counterpart in neuronal mechanisms through which a new unit of input is tagged and ‘inserted’ in its proper location. One must think of the cortex as an active space in which stimulus and response, continuity and change, inheritance and environment are totally reciprocal, totally definitional of each other.”