References
- Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag 2001 [1927]). Further references to this text shall be cited using the abbreviation SZ, followed by the page number of the German edition. Quotations shall follow the English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1962).
- Heidegger's concerns with Husserl's reductions are documented most famously in Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1979) (GA 20), 129–57.
- Letter to Alexander Pfänder of Jan 6, 1931, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931), ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997), 480.
- Ibid., 485. The quotation is from Edmund Husserl's lecture, “Phenomenology and Anthropology”, of June 1931.
- Such views are expressed, for example, in Husserl's letter to Roman Ingarden of Dec 26, 1927: “Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction”. Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel, vol. III, ed. Karl Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 236.
- Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1975) (GA 24), §5. Quotations follow the English translation by Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982).
- There are some exceptions to this rule. See, for instance, Timothy J. Stapleton's cogent defence of the thesis that Heidegger rejects transcendental reduction outright in Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning (Albany: State University of New York 1983), 89–112, 121–25.
- John D. Caputo, “The question of being and transcendental phenomenology“, in Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, vol. 2, ed. Christopher Macann (London and New York: Routledge 1992), 333–45, p. 334. The evidence cited includes positive remarks made about a “regress to the subject” and even a “regress to consciousness” in Die Grundprobleme (esp. 103 and 444), and in Heidegger's draft of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article (Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, op. cit., 108–9).
- Ibid., 336.
- Ibid., 339.
- Francis F. Seeburger, “Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction“, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36(2) (Dec 1975): 212–21, see p. 214f.
- Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1977) (Hua III/1), 53.
- Crowell, “Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article“, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50(3) (March 1990): 501–518, esp. 504f.; and also “Ontology and Transcendental Phenomenology Between Husserl and Heidegger,” in Husserl in Contemporary Context, ed. Burt Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997), 13–36, esp. 30–34. Cf. Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970), 263.
- Rudolf Bernet, “Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject“, in Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, eds. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press 1994), 245–267, p. 256.
- Ibid., 258.
- Ibid., 256.
- Ibid., 264.
- Ibid.; cf. SZ 188.
- Ibid., 256.
- Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le Phénomène (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1967). English translation: Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1973). See Ch 2, “The Reduction of Indication”.
- Jacques Taminiaux, “The Husserlian Heritage in Heidegger's Notion of the Self’, in Reading Heidegger From the Start, op. cit., 269–290, p. 279.
- Ibid., 284–87. See SZ 343; cf. §40 and §§56–58.
- Ibid., 285; cf. 280.
- Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, op. cit., 26, fn. 5.
- For instance, in Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), ed. Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1988) (GA 63), Heidegger makes it clear that apodictic certainty in matters of phenomenological description is an unrealisable dream. Phenomenological description of entities can never possess a “mathematical” level of proof for essential reasons: “The chance that hermeneutics will go wrong belongs in principle to its ownmost being. The kind of evidence found in its explications is fundamentally labile. To hold up before it such an extreme ideal of evidence as ‘intuition of essences’ would be a misunderstanding of what it can and should do” (15; Eng. trans., 12).
- See Bernet, “Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject”, op. cit., 265–67.
- Ibid., 263.
- See Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, ed. Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1987) (GA 56/57), 73–76, 89–110.
- See Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, op. cit., §11.
- Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications“, The Review of Metaphysics 47 (June 1994): 780.
- Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1983) (GA 29/30), 428.
- Daniel O. Dahlstrom, op. cit., 784.
- Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology, op. cit., 138. Cf. also Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme, op. cit., 100–102.
- Note that this understanding accords closely with the definition given to the term “reduction” in Die Grundprobleme, §5.
- Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme, p. 1. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in his “Nachwort” to the Gesamtausgabe edition of Sein und Zeit, reports that Heidegger burnt his first attempt at drafting the third Division of SZ (GA 2, 582).