Notes
- For a compelling thesis regarding the virtue of ambiguity, see I. Steinberg , Educational Myths and Realities ( Reading , Ma. : Addison-Wesley , 1968 ).
- Cf. “To the outsider it seems that we could have ‘decided’ to do something in a way that we could not have ‘decided’ to alter our heartbeat. But all our actions are the product of neural events and it would be remarkable indeed if these events were free of the deterministic laws that are the whole basis of empiric science and without which the flick of every light-switch would be an act of faith or fortune. … Voluntary actions follow nervous events in the cerebral cortex which trigger off the motor neurons. Consciousness of this triggering process we call the ‘will.’ All our actions derive from neural impulses and are essentially ‘impulsive.’ We cannot ‘will’ what our total experience makes it impossible for us to ‘want.’” D. Tribe , Nucleoethics ( London : MacGibbon & Kee . 1972 ). p. 67 . “Any list of values is a list of reinforcers—conditioned or otherwise. We are so constituted that under certain circumstances food, water, sexual contact, and so on, will make any behavior which produces them more likely to occur again. Other things may acquire this power. We do not need to say that an organism chooses to eat rather than to starve. If you answer that it is a very different thing when a man chooses to starve, I am only too happy to agree. If it were not so, we should have cleared up the question of choice long ago. An organism can be reinforced by—can be made to ‘choose’—almost any given state of affairs.” B. F. Skinner, “Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior,” in The Helping Relationship Sourcebook, ed. Avila, Combs, and Purkey (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971), p. 89.
- In contrast, Freire , for example, makes much of the notion of ontological vocation: “man's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human.” P. Freire , Pedagogy of the Oppressed ( New York : Seabury Press , 1974 ). p. 41 .
- It is a Sartrean view rather than the Sartrean view inasmuch as I drop any notion of the for-itself being caught up in a futile pursuit of in-itself. See J-P. Sartre , Being and Nothingness ( New York : Washington Square Press , 1966 ).
- Cf. “And whether we like it or not, survival is the ultimate criterion … the ultimate survival of mankind. Do not ask me why I want mankind to survive. I can tell you only in the sense in which the physiologist can tell you why I want to breathe … we are dealing with sets of conditions generating human behavior which will ultimately be measured by their contribution to the strength of the group. We look to the future, not to the past, for the test of ‘goodness’ or acceptability.” B. F. Skinner , “Issues. ” pp. 89 , 92 .
- This is not to say that given a Sartrean view of man any discussion of values is fruitless. One can usefully discuss the ramifications of specific value decisions, alternative value decisions, and supposed justifications of values. And preaching is not ruled out either.
- In the final analysis, the essential criterion of “action” is “I did it, and could have done otherwise” where “could have” speaks to physical and material possibility, not to value commitments “preventing” or “enabling” me. “Ontological freedom” entails “freedom to value” which entails “freedom to act” but does not entail “freedom to successfully act.” Put simply, one is free to try, but success is a question of power.
- Given a very general sense of “value,” amounting to “to value is to choose,” all statements are value statements inasmuch as they select out a topic and inasmuch as there is a choice of language. And the decision to pursue truth is clearly a value decision. But “true statement,” as used here, is one warranted by reality. On a Sartrean view, to look to reality to warrant “x is good” is pure nonsense—how could reality conceivably warrant a value judgment? Only on a destiny or behavioristic view does it start to make sense since “good” will ultimately refer to a specified state of affairs which either obtains or does not obtain, and the specification of “good” derives from a stated destiny or from the notion of strong group survival.
- J. Dewey , Experience and Education ( New York : Collier , 1966 ), p. 57 .
- Skinner , “Issues,” pp. 71 , 72, 75.
- C. Rogers , “The Interpersonal Relationship in the Facilitation of Learning,” Relationship Sourcebook , p. 232 .
- See S. Milgram , Obedience to Authority ( New York : Harper & Row , 1974 ).
- S. Milgram , “The Perils of Obedience,” Harpers. December 1973 , pp. 65 – 66 .
- Ibid. , pp. 75 – 77 .
- This tension is, at bottom, a reflection of the decisive distance between the in-itself and the for-itself. That distance ensures that truth and goodness can never be collapsed.
- This is not to say that on a Sartrean view discussion of when or when not to hold someone responsible is fruitless. The cry is pathetic in that, and only in that, it posits a correct answer.
- “Criminal” in the typical sense of being destructive of honest and kindly relations between people.
- Milgram , “Obedience,” p. 77 .