Objectual aboutness

References

• Baxter, D. 1988a. “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense.” Mind 97: 575–582.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baxter, D. 1988b. “Many-One Identity.” Philosophical Papers 17: 193–216.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Berto, F. 2018. “Aboutness in Imagination.” Philosophical Studies 175 (8): 1871–1886.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burnyeat, M. F. 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato. Indianapolis: Hackett.
   Google Scholar
• Cameron, R. 2009. “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties.” In The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, 265–275. Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Dorr, C. 2016. “To Be F is to Be G.” Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1): 39–134.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dorr, C., and Hawthorne, J.. 2013. “Naturalness.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8, edited by K. Bennett, and D. Zimmerman, 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Figdor, C. 2008. “Intrinsically/extrinsically.” Journal of Philosophy 105 (11): 691–718.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Figdor, C. 2014. “What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property?” In Companion to Intrinsic Properties, edited by R. M. Francescotti, 139–156. Berlin: De Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Fine, K. 2016. “Angellic Content.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2): 199–226.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, K. 2017a. “A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6): 625–674.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, K. 2017b. “A Theory of Truthmaker Content II: Subject-Matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6): 675–702.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fine, K. 2020. “Yablo on Subject-Matter.” Philosophical Studies 177 (1): 129–171.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodman, J. 2019. “Agglomerative Algebras.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4): 631–648.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodman, N. 1961. “About.” Mind 70: 1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hawke, P. 2018. “Theories of Aboutness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4): 697–723.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hoffmann-Kolss, V. 2019. “Defining Qualitative Properties.” Erkenntnis 84 (5): 995–1010.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hume, D. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon. First Edition by Selby-Bigge Published in 1888.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. 1971. “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.” Journal of Philosophy 68: 203–211.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. 1983. “Extrinsic Properties.” Philosophical Studies 44: 197–200.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. 1988a. “Relevant Implication.” Theoria 54 (3): 161–174.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. 1988b. “Statements Partly About Observation.” Philosophical Papers 17 (1): 1–31.
   Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. 2012. “Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.” Philosophy Compass 7 (8): 531–542.
   Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. 2016a. “An Analysis of Intrinsicality.” Noûs 50 (4): 704–739.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. 2016b. “The Varieties of Intrinsicality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 237–263.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. 2021. “Intrinsicality and the Classification of Uninstantiable Properties.” Philosophical Studies 178 (3): 731–753.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. MSa. “The Objectual Aboutness Theory of States of Affairs.”
   Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. MSb. “A Puzzle about Aboutness.”
   Google Scholar
• Marshall, D. MSc. “A Reduction of Objectual Aboutness.”
   Google Scholar
• Marshall, D., and Weatherson, B.. 2018. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, spring 2018 edition.
   Google Scholar
• Menzel, C. 2018. “Actualism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2018 edition.
   Google Scholar
• Parry, W. T. 1968. “The Logic of C.I. Lewis.” In The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, edited by P. A. Schlipp, 115–154. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
   Google Scholar
• Perry, J. 1989. “Possible Worlds and Subject Matter.” In The Problem with the Essential Indexical and Other Essays, 145–160. CSLI Publications.
   Google Scholar
• Picollo, L. 2020. “Alethic Reference.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3): 417–438.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plate, J. 2018. “Intrinsic Properties and Relations.” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8): 783–853.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Prior, A. 1971. “Platonism and Quantification.” In Objects of Thought, 31–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Putman, H. 1958. “Formalization of the Concept About.” Philosophy of Science 25 (2): 125–130.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Read, S. 1988. Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Examination of Inference. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Ryle, G. 1933. “‘About’.” Analysis 1 (1): 10–12.
   Google Scholar
• Sider, T. 1993. “Naturalness, Intrinsicality and Duplication.” PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts.
   Google Scholar
• Sider, T. 2007. “Parthood.” Philosophical Review 116: 51–91.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sider, T. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, T. 2003. “Everything.” Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1): 415–465.
   Google Scholar
• Williamson, T. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. 1961. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translation by D. F. Pears, and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. First Published in 1921.
   Google Scholar
• Yablo, S. 2014. Aboutness. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Yalcin, S. 2011. “Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality.” In Epistemic Modality, edited by A. Egan, and B. Weatherson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Yalcin, S. 2018. “Belief As Question-Sensitive.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1): 23–47.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar