Weak Street-level Enforcement of Tax Laws: The Role of Tax Collectors’ Persistent but Broken Public Service Expectations

References

• Abdel-Basset, N. A. (2009). Developing commitment towards change in Bureaucracies: The case-study of the Egyptian civil service sector (PhD). University of Stirling, Stirling.
   Google Scholar
• Adly, A. (2015, January 31). Triumph of the Bureaucracy: A decade of aborted social and political change in Egypt. Jadaliyya - جدلية. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/31735
   Google Scholar
• Ahmed, S. (1984). Public finance in Egypt: Its structure and trends (Vol. 1). Washington, DC: World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Alesina, A., & Fuchs-Schündeln, N. (2007). Goodbye Lenin (or not?): The effect of communism on people’s preferences. American Economic Review, 97(4), 1507–1528.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Assaad, R. (1997). The effects of public sector hiring and compensation policies on the Egyptian labor market. The World Bank Economic Review, 11(1), 85–118.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ayubi, N. (1980). Bureaucracy & politics in contemporary Egypt. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press.
   Google Scholar
• Beinin, J. (2009). Workers‘ protest in Egypt: Neo-liberalism and class struggle in 21st century. Social Movement Studies, 8(4), 449–454.
   Google Scholar
• Berman, S. (2001). Ideas, norms, and culture in political analysis. (Inglehart, R., Katzenstein, P., Laitin, D., and McNamara, K., Eds.). Comparative Politics, 33(2), 231–250.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Best, M. (1976, March). Political power and tax revenues in Central America. Journal of Development Economics, 3(1), 49–82.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bierschenk, T., & Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014). Ethnographies of public services in Africa: An emerging research paradigm. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), States at work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies (pp. 35–65). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
   Google Scholar
• Bierschenk, T. (2014). Sedimentation, fragmentation and normative double-binds in (West) African public services. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), States at work - dynamics of African Bureaucracies (pp. 221–245). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
   Google Scholar
• Bird, R. M. (1989). The administrative dimension of tax reform in developing countries. In M. Gillis (Ed.), Tax reform in developing countries (pp. 315–346). Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bishara, D. (2015). The politics of ignoring: Protest dynamics in late Mubarak Egypt. Perspectives on Politics, 13(4), 958–975.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cirolia, L. R., & Mizes, J. C. (2019). Property tax in African secondary cities: Insights from the cases of Kisumu (Kenya) and M’Bour (Senegal) (Working Paper 90). Brighton, UK: The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD).
   Google Scholar
• D’Arcy, M. (2011). Why do citizens assent to pay tax? Legitimacy, taxation and the African state (Working Paper No. 126). Accra, Ghana: Afrobarometer.
   Google Scholar
• Fairfield, T. (2015). Private wealth and public revenue. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Farag, I. (2001). Un emploi pour un diplôme - L’usure d’un accord tacite (1930-1990). Égypte/Monde arabe, 2001(4–5), 173–190.
   Google Scholar
• Fukuyama, F. (2004). The imperative of state-building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), 17–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goodfellow, T., & Owen, O. (2018). Taxation, property rights and the social contract in lagos (Working Paper No. 73). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Hameiri, S. (2007). Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism. Journal of International Relations and Development, 10(2), 122–149.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 725–740.
   Google Scholar
• Holland, A. C. (2016). Forbearance. American Political Science Review, 110(2), 232–246.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hood, C. (2000). Paradoxes of public-sector managerialism, old public management and public service bargains. International Public Management Journal, 3(1), 1–22.
   Google Scholar
• Hood, C., & Lodge, M. (2006). The politics of public service bargains: Reward, competency, loyalty - and blame. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Joshi, A., & Ayee, J. (2008). Associational taxation: A pathway into the informal sector? In D. Brautigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad, & M. Moore (Eds.), Taxation and state-building in developing countries - Capacity and consent(pp. 183–211). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Joshi, A., Prichard, W., & Heady, C. (2012). Taxing the informal economy: Challenges, possibilities and remaining questions (Working Paper No. 4). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M., & Read, B. L. (2015). Field research in political science: Practices and principles. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Keen, M. (2013). Taxation and development - Again. In C. Fuest & G. R. Zodrow (Eds.), Critical issues in taxation and development(pp. 13–44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lachapelle, J. (2012). Lessons from Egypt’s tax collectors. Middle East Report, 42(264), 38–41.
   Google Scholar
• Le, T. M., Moreno-Dodson, B., & Bayraktar, N. (2012). Tax capacity and tax effort: Extended cross-country analysis from 1994 to 2009 (Working Paper). Washington, DC: World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Lentz, C. (2014). “I take an oath to the state, not the government”: Career trajectories and professional ethics of Ghanaian public servants. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), States at work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies(pp. 175–204). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
   Google Scholar
• Levi, M. (1988). Of rule and revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: The dilemmas of the individual in public service. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
   Google Scholar
• Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes De Sociologie, 25(2), 185–213.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Matthews, F. (2012). Governance and state capacity. In D. Levi-Faur (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of governance(pp. 281–293). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Maynard‐Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2012). Social equities and inequities in practice: Street-level workers as agents and pragmatists. Public Administration Review, 72(s1), S16–S23.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Meagher, K. (2016). Taxing times: Taxation, divided societies and the informal economy in Northern Nigeria. Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 1–17.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Moore, M. (2014). Revenue reform and statebuilding in Anglophone Africa. World Development, 60, 99–112.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mukherjee, R. (2001). Total rewards for civil servants (Working Paper). Washington, DC: PREM Network.
   Google Scholar
• O’Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (1999). Selective policy implementation in rural China. Comparative Politics, 31(2), 167–186.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• OECD. (2011). Tax administration in OECD and selected non- OECD countries: Comparative information series (2010). Paris, France.
   Google Scholar
• Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2008). Researching the practical norms of real governance in Africa (Working Paper No. 5). London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014). The delivery state in Africa. Interface bureaucrats, professional cultures and the bureaucratic mode of governance. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), States at work - Dynamics of African Bureaucracies(pp. 399–430). Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.
   Google Scholar
• Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (1999). A moral economy of corruption? The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(1), 25–52.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Palmer, M., Leila, A., & El Sayed, Y. (1988). The Egyptian Bureaucracy. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pessino, C., & Fenochietto, R. (2010). Determining countries’ tax effort. Revista de Economía Pública, 195(4/2010), 65–87.
   Google Scholar
• Piracha, M., & Moore, M. (2016). Revenue-maximising or revenue-sacrificing government? Property tax in Pakistan. Journal of Development Studies, 52(12), 1776–1790.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Posner, E. A. (2000). Law and social norms: The case of tax compliance. Virginia Law Review, 86(8), 1781–1819.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Prichard, W. (2009). The politics of taxation and implications for accountability in Ghana 1981-2008 (Working Paper No. 330). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Prichard, W., Cobham, A., & Goodall, A. (2014). The ICTD government revenue dataset (Working Paper No. 19). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Prichard, W., & van den Boogaard, V. (2017). Norms, power, and the socially embedded realities of market taxation in Northern Ghana. African Studies Review, 60(1), 171–194.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Radian, A. (1980). Resource mobilization in poor countries: Implementing tax policies. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
   Google Scholar
• Said, M. (2015). Wages and inequality in the Egyptian labor market in an era of financial crisis and revolution. In R. Assaad & C. Krafft (Eds.), The Egyptian labor market in an era of revolution(pp. 52–69). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sen, A. K. (1977). Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6(4), 317–344.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Soliman, S. (2011). The Autumn of dictatorship: Fiscal crisis and political change in Egypt under Mubarak. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tanzi, V., & Zee, H. H. (2000). Tax policy for emerging markets: Developing countries. National Tax Journal, 53(2), 299–322.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tendler, J. (2002). Small firms, the informal sector, and the Devil’s deal. IDS Bulletin, 33(3), 1–15.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Alvarado Pachon, N., & Svensson, R. (2019). The quality of government standard dataset, version Jan19. Gothenburg, Sweden: University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Twijnstra, R., Hilhorst, D., & Titeca, K. (2014). Trade networks and the practical norms of taxation at a border crossing between South Sudan and Northern Uganda. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8(3), 382–399.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• von Soest, C. (2007). How does neopatrimonialism affect the African State’s revenues? The case of tax collection in Zambia. Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(4), 621–645.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• von Soest, C., Bechle, K., & Korte, N. (2011). How neopatrimonialism affects tax administration: A comparative study of three world regions. Third World Quarterly, 32(7), 1307–1329.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Waterbury, J. (1997). From social contracts to extraction contracts. In J. P. Entelis (Ed.), Islam, democracy, and the state in North Africa(pp. 141–176). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wenzel, M. (2005). Motivation or rationalisation? Causal relations between ethics, norms and tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26(4), 491–508.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Winter, S. (2000). Information asymmetry and political control of street-level bureaucrats: Danish agro-environmental regulation. Aarhus, Denmark: Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Univesrsitet.
   Google Scholar