- See, for example, Walburga von Raffler-Engel, “Development Kinesics: Cultural Differences” (Paper presented at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Meeting of the International Communication Association in Chicago in April, 1975), pp. 3 and 11.
- Henri Wald, “Structure, Structural, Structuralism,” Diogenes, LXVI (1969), 23.
- John Davis, “Is Philosophy a Sickness or a Therapy,” Antioch Review, XXIII (1963), 10.
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), #119; see also #127.
- Ibid., #122. Wittgenstein states: “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspecuity. A perspecuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’.”
- See Davis, p. 11. Philosophy as therapy seeks to clarify language misuse by accentuating the queer expressions. Therapy upon language amounts to three treatments: first, the quickening sense of the queer; second, the presentation of basic meanings via argument by paradigm cases; finally, the uncovering of misleading analogies. The philosopher-therapist offers no answers to the misinformed linguistic expressions (p. 18).
- Quoted from Tullio de Mauro, Ludwig Wittgenstein: His Place in the Development of Semantics (Dordrecht: D. Reidei, 1967), p. 43.
- See Edmund Erde. Philosophy and Psycholinguistics (The Hague: Mouton, 1973). Erde argues in defense of both of the enterprises of Chomsky and Wittgenstein. The former deals with the scientific model and linguistic data in an empirical way; the latter looks to the fundamental, foundational issues that philosophy is by nature to attend to. See esp. pp. 203ff.
- Wittgenstein, #90.
- In agreement with this position, though from a more formal linguistic perspective, is Walburga von Raffler-Engel, “Competence, A Term in Search of a Concept,” in Linguistique Contemporaine, ed. Yvan Lebrun (Brussels: Univ. of Brussels, 1969), pp. 280ff.
- De Mauro, p. 46.
- David Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 197.
- Quoted from Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, ed. K. T. Fann (New York: Delta Books, 1967), p. 108.
- Pears, pp. 106–107.
- This position, of course, has its own presuppositions and Weltanschauung. Ernest Gellner in Words and Things (London: Victor Gollancz, 1959) rightly notes that there is a metaphysic associated with this viewpoint. It is a naturalistic one: the world is what it is, oftentimes oblique and confusing, but it is nothing else.
- See Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” Aristotelian Society Supplement, IX (1929), 163.
- See C. van Peursen, Phenomenology and Analytical Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 173–174.
- Ibid., p. 175. The descriptive approach of phenomenology starts with positive, concrete data and plumbs to the depths of meaning. Linguistic philosophy, by contrast, starts with positive, concrete data and aims at breadth.
- See Philip Pettit, “On Phenomenology as a Methodology of Philosophy,” in Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology, ed. William Mays and S. C. Brown (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press, 1969), p. 262.
- Ibid.
- Cf. Maurice Cornforth, Marxism and the Linguistic Philosopher (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 139.
- See David Pole, The Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (London: Athlone Press, 1958), pp. 127–128.
- See Van Peursen, p. 154.
- See A. J. Ayer, Philosophy and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 18.
- See Van Peursen, p. 180. Truths of reason and truths of fact become perceptible in terms of the meaning of the logical rules. Perhaps a good reference here is in Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. 38, where he states: “There correspond to our laws of logic very general facts of daily experience…. They are to be compared with the facts that make measurement with a yard easy and useful.”
- Cf. J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology: A Historico- Critical Study, trans. Bend Jager (Pittsburg: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1967), p. 109.
- Paul Ricoeur, “Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language,” in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Edward Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 216.
- Ibid., p. 207; see also Benjamin Oliver, “Underlying Realities of Language,” Monist, LVII (1973), 408.
- See Oliver, p. 425. See also Thomas Olshewsky, “Deep Structure: Essential, Transcendental or Pragmatic,” Monist, LVII (1973), 438.
- Sidney Hook, “Empiricism, Rationalism, and Innate Ideas,” in Language and Philosophy: A Symposium, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1969), p. 165. Rationalism, to be sure, is a position which itself contains many varieties. Therefore, we must be careful not to reduce this type of perspective unfairly. Cf. Kenneth Stern, “Neorationalism and Empiricism,” in Language and Philosophy, p. 194.
- See Thomas Nagel, “Linguistics and Epistemology,” in Language and Philosophy, p. 172; see also in the same book Robert Schwartz, “On Knowing a Grammar,” p. 184.
- Arthur Danto, “Semantical Vehicles, Understanding, and Innate Ideas,” in Language and Philosophy, also points to the necessity of the relationship of ideas to the world (p. 129). On the same point see W. V. Quine, “Linguistics and Philosophy,” in Language and Philosophy, pp. 97–98.
- See Danto, p. 130. If language acquisition can be designated as innate in the ordinary sense of the term, then is it not also fair to describe the potential for sausage-making machines in the same way?
- Quine, p. 95.
- Jerrold J. Katz, Linguistic Philosophy: The Underlying Reality of Language and Its Philosophical Import (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), p. 178.
- Ibid., p, 15.
- Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #43.
- See Benjamin Oliver, “Depth Grammar as a Methodological Concept in Philosophy,” International Philosophical Quarterly, XII (1972), 130.
- Gilbert Harman, “Linguistic Competence and Empiricism,” in Language and Philosophy, p. 151.
- Two different ontological perceptions confront each other when Chomsky and his critics tangle over whether there is any validity in the notion of a linguistic competence. The misleading impression is that both sides of the debate appear to argue from the same theoretical and ontological base.
- Yorick Wilks, “One Small Head—Models and Theories in Linguistics,” Foundations of Language, XI (1974), 82.
- See Hayden White, “Foucault Decoded: Notes From the Underground,” History and Theory, XII (1973), 24.
- See Wilks, p. 81.
- See Oliver, “Depth Grammar,” pp. 121 ff.
- See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #644.
- On this point, see Van Peursen, pp. 171 if.
- Ibid., p. 153.
- See de Mauro, pp. 97 if.
WORD
Volume 27, 1971 - Issue 1-3: Child Language--1975